CHAPTER 3

Two Standpoints and the Problem of Moral Anthropology

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Kant's theory of freedom is famously described as a "compatibilism of compatibilism and incompatibilism" (Wood 1984, p. 74). On the one hand, Kant claims that human freedom is not a mere epiphenomenon of causally determined mental states. On the other hand, he seeks to reconcile this strong conception of freedom with thoroughgoing natural determinism of empirically observable actions of human agents. Equally famously, this theory of freedom has been given (at least) two different interpretations among Kantians. According to the "two-world" interpretation, human beings are free insofar as they exist in a noumenal world of things-in-themselves and determined insofar as they exist in a phenomenal world of mere appearances. According to the "two-standpoint" (or two-perspective) interpretation, humans are free insofar as they are thought of from a practical or deliberator's standpoint, and determined insofar as they are thought of from a scientific or observer's standpoint.[1] The two standpoints are not primarily distinguished by different beliefs, but by different tasks: from the theoretical standpoint one seeks to explain natural occurrences in terms of causal laws, while the practical standpoint is the standpoint from which human beings act in the world. But these different tasks have implications for belief. In particular, the practical standpoint requires thinking of agents as free, while the theoretical requires thinking of deeds as causally determined.

The two-standpoint interpretation has, in recent years, dominated discussions of Kant's theory of freedom, and it is at least implicit (and often explicit) in recent neo-Rawlsian versions of Kant's ethics. This two-standpoint interpretation has at least two important advantages

1 See Ameriks 1982 for an overview of the debate, and Aquila 1979, Prauss 1983, Watkins 2005, and Allison 1983 and 1990 for different approaches.

over two-world accounts. First, it allows one to make use of Kant's insights about freedom from a practical point of view without making substantive metaphysical assumptions. Especially for those primarily interested in Kant as a moral philosopher, this advantage is considerable. Second, it helps one avoid difficult problems about how different worlds can relate—especially since Kant sometimes suggests that the only legitimate use one can make of concepts of relation (causality, interaction, etc) is when these are applied to the phenomenal world (B149, A139-40/B178-9).

Whatever the merit of these advantages, the two-standpoint version of Kant's theory of freedom has recently come under fire. This paper examines three related objections to two-standpoint theories. First, two-standpoint theories seem to have a hard time making sense of the use of theoretical claims within practical deliberation, since such use seems to conflate two standpoints that are supposed to be distinct. Second, two-standpoint theories seem to lack a suitable answer to the question of whether human beings are *really* free. And finally, two-standpoint theories seem unable to make sense of Kant's deep commitment to what Eric Watkins has called the "grounding thesis," that "things in themselves, or the noumenal world, 'grounds' or 'underlies' appearance, or the sensible world" (Watkins 2005, p. 326). After articulating these objections, I show how two-standpoint approaches can adequately respond to them, where my solution to all three depends upon making sense of the grounding thesis in two-standpoint terms. In my conclusion, however, I suggest that this use of the grounding thesis opens two-standpoint theories to a new problem, the problem of moral anthropology. After briefly explaining how two-world theories might address this problem, I offer a conjectural beginning of a two-standpoint approach to moral anthropology.

The Theory-in-Deliberation Problem

On a two-standpoint interpretation of Kant's theory of freedom, a person can be regarded as free from one standpoint and as determined from another. For the purposes of this paper, I focus on the two-standpoint interpretations offered by Onora O'Neill and Christine Korsgaard. As they put it,

> We should…expect to find two accounts of action. The first, theoretical account would consider acts as natural events and would aim to explain their occurrence…. The second, practical account would consider acts as expressing certain determinations of the will, and moral action as expressing certain sorts of determination of the will. (O'Neill 1989, p. 67)

> The deliberating agent, employing reason practically, views the world as it were from a noumenal standpoint…. The theorizing spectator, on the other hand, views the world as phenomena, mechanistic and fully determined. The interests of morality demand a different conceptual organization of the world than those of theoretical explanation…. Both interests are rational and legitimate. (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 173)

Korsgaard and O'Neill concur that "The two standpoints are to be thought of not as ontologically distinct realms between which human agents must switch, but as distinct, indispensable, yet mutually irreducible frameworks of thought" (O'Neill 1989, p. 68; see Korsgaard 1996a, pp. 160, 167-76). Korsgaard sometimes seems to associate the practical standpoint entirely with the *deliberative* or first-person perspective, although all that is strictly required is that one takes a standpoint according to which a person must be considered an *agent*, and this can occur whether one *deliberates* or is *evaluated* in a practical way. The point is that people have different reasons to give an account of a human action. Depending on the interests that motivate one's account, one assumes either a practical standpoint according to which the agent is the ultimate free cause of the action or a theoretical standpoint within which one traces natural causes of the action.

Recently, Dana Nelkin has summarized this view in a way that draws attention to the way that it helps Kant develop his unique sort of compatibilism between freedom and determinism. Nelkin explains,

> According to the two-standpoints account, the propositions to which reason commits us are indeed contradictory. But we are not irrational in believing that we are free and undetermined, on the one hand, and believing that we are determined and unfree, on the other, because we can hold apparently contradictory beliefs from different standpoints (Nelkin 2000, p. 567).

Within traditional compatibilism, freedom is demoted to a mere form of internal causation, so the claims of freedom and determinism do not even conflict. But Nelkin rightly highlights that *Kant's* compabilism does not do this; for Kant, human freedom is freedom from determination by natural causes, and *this* freedom exists along with a thoroughgoing natural determination of human actions. On two-standpoint interpretations of Kant, this conflict is only apparent because the claims that freedom is real and that natural determination is thoroughgoing are made from different standpoints.

Nelkin offers several objections to this two-standpoint account. In general, she raises the "difficulty of producing a criterion that sorts beliefs appropriately into those held from the deliberative standpoint and those held from the theoretical" (Nelkin 2000, p. 570). More particularly, Nelkin raises an objection based on the use of theoretical be-

liefs within the practical standpoint, an objection I refer to as the theory-in-deliberation problem. Nelkin argues,

> When we are engaged in deliberation, we often rely on theoretical or scientific beliefs. For example, if I am deliberating about whether to sound a fire alarm, one of the things I rely on is my belief about what effects that action is likely to have. Does this mean, then, that my belief about the causal role of alarm sounding is a belief from the standpoint of the deliberator? It certainly seems so, for the belief seems quite "relevant" to my deliberative task. And if so, then it would appear that either I have two beliefs with similar contents that are distinguished by the points of view from which they are held, or I have a single belief that floats freely back and forth between standpoints. In either case, there seems to be nothing in principle that prevents a belief that is held from one standpoint to be held from another. (Nelkin 2000, pp. 570-1; cf. Watkins 2005, p. 322)

The problem with taking theoretical claims into account in deliberation is that it seems to obscure the distinction between standpoints. And if there is no clear distinction between standpoints, then there does not seem to be any reason to isolate the claim that one is unfree in a way that one isolates no other theoretical claims. The use of theory in deliberation seems to break down the distinction needed to insulate the practical belief in freedom from theoretical refutation.

Nelkin's objection arises from interpreting the practical standpoint of deliberation as fundamentally opposed to the postulation of causal necessity in the world. But the practical standpoint of deliberation assumes no such thing. O'Neill insists that "the actions that agents perform assume a causally ordered and knowable world that provides the arena for action" (O'Neill 1989, p. 68) and Korsgaard helpfully lays out the structure of this practical standpoint: "the deliberating agent, employing reason practically, views the world…as an expression of the wills of…rational agents" (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 173). The point is not that one sees the world as free of causal influence when one views it from a practical standpoint, but rather that one sees its causal relations as tracing back to one's own, undetermined choices. It is perfectly reasonable, even required, to take into account natural connections between one's actions and their *effects*, but it does not make sense, from the practical standpoint, to take into account natural connections between one's actions and their (sufficient) empirical *causes*.

Moreover, the *way* in which one takes into account natural connections is different, depending upon whether one is viewing the world from the practical or the theoretical standpoint. From the practical standpoint, the natural effects of pulling a fire alarm—panic, a rush of people to leave the building, etc.—are important *reasons* for or against action. Similar judgments about the effects of pulling a fire alarm could be made from a theoretical standpoint, but here they would operate not

as *reasons* for *action* but as *explanations* of *events*. From this theoretical standpoint, it might be relevant to ask not only about effects of pulling fire alarms, but about the causes that lead people to pull them. But in the context of practical deliberation, the effects of sounding the alarm are considered only as the *after*-effects of one's action, after-effects that are important in deliberation *because* they are after-effects *of one's action*. Thus when deliberating, one views the world "under the idea of freedom." One then *chooses* among options, all of which are largely constituted by objects the scientific properties of which may be relevant to one's choice. But the fact that scientific considerations are relevant to choice does not change the fact that one chooses.

First- and Second-Order Judgments and the Limits of Scientific Enquiry

The practical standpoint can accommodate judgments, the content of which is theoretical because, from a practical standpoint, one sees the world as a series of effects of one's choice, effects that begin in freedom but proceed in accordance with the order of nature. But Nelkin's theory-in-deliberation objection cannot be disposed of quite this easily. Given that scientific facts about the world can be reasons as well as explanations, Nelkin asks, "what is to prevent my taking th[e] theoretical belief [that I am unfree] into account in my deliberation just as I take into account other of my theoretical beliefs?" (Nelkin 2000, p. 571). If deliberation can take into account scientific facts about the world, why not take into account the fact that one is unfree?

As a preliminary response, we might turn to two related reasons that causes of choice should not be taken into account from a practical standpoint. First, as Korsgaard notes, causes of one's choices literally *cannot* function as reasons for choice. As she puts it, "imagine that you…know that your every move is programmed by an electronic device implanted in your brain.... In order to *do* anything, you must simply ignore the fact that you are programmed, and decide what to do—just as if you were free" (Korsgaard 1996a, pp. 162-3). Second, the practical standpoint is precisely the standpoint from which one holds oneself or others *responsible* for one's actions, and Kant insists that insofar as one is merely a secondary cause of one's action, one cannot be held responsible for that action (5:96). As soon as one introduces causal explanations of a particular human behavior, one has ceased to consider that behavior as a possible object of moral-practical evaluation, and one has thereby ceased to see that behavior from a practical

standpoint. Unlike beliefs about natural effects of one's actions, there is—to use Nelkin's phrase—something "in principle" that precludes certain theoretical beliefs from being held (or at least, being relevant) within the practical standpoint.

But these points might seem only to make the problem more acute. What these responses show is that one *needs* to exclude in deliberation the thought that one is unfree, but they do not, in themselves, show why one is *entitled* to exclude that thought. What distinguishes the thought that one is unfree from other theoretical claims, such that one can rightfully exclude that thought but not others in deliberation?

To answer this question, it is crucial first to be clear about the status of claims about one's freedom. Within the standpoint of practical deliberation, one takes into account reasons for actions that include purely practical claims—"I should not cause needless suffering" or "I should not deceive others"—and empirical claims taken as reasons—"Pulling this fire alarm will cause panic" or "Pulling this fire alarm will make people wrongly believe that there is a fire." I call these sorts of judgments, which include any that function as reasons or parts of reasons for action, "first-order" practical judgments. Similarly, first-order theoretical judgments include any descriptive and explanatory claims about the world. When one explains the rush of people emerging from a building by saying that the immediate cause is a fire alarm, or explains that the cause of the ringing of the fire alarm is a pair of children seeking to cause trouble, one makes first-order theoretical judgments. First-order theoretical judgments can even include the psychological laws that lead children to pull alarms or people to respond to them, or the biological laws that explain certain predispositions in human nature, or the physical laws that explain the working of the alarm. The content of at least some of these first-order theoretical judgments will be present in at least some first-order practical judgments; "the sound of a fire alarm causes panic" could be either a theoretical or a practical judgment, depending on the context.

In addressing Nelkin's concern about the theoretical belief that I am not free, it is crucial to note that beliefs about human freedom do not occur among first-order beliefs in *either* the theoretical *or* the practical standpoints. One deliberates *as if* one is free, but one's freedom is not itself a reason for action.[2] Likewise one conducts theoretical investiga-

2 At least, freedom is not itself a reason for action in normal circumstances. Sometimes one's freedom might be part of a reason for a specific action. For instance, I might reason that since I am free, and this scientist tells me that he knows exactly what I will do next, I will do something totally random to spite him. In a much more complicated way, one's freedom might give one a reason to respect the moral law, although even here,

tions *as if* the objects of such investigations can be explained in terms of natural causes, but ultimate explicability in terms of causes is not itself a first-order scientific claim.[3] But for Kant (and for Korsgaard), there are also second-order judgments, some theoretical, some practical. These are not judgments made *within* a deliberative or theoretical standpoint, but judgments that articulate the philosophical presuppositions of each standpoint. As Korsgaard explains with respect to belief in freedom, this is "not about a [first-order] theoretical assumption necessary to decision, but about a fundamental feature of the standpoint from which decisions are made" (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 163). In Kantian terms, we might say that second-order judgments express the conditions of the possibility of legitimately making first-order judgments.

Korsgaard follows Kant's terminology in referring to second-order practical judgments as "postulates" of practical reason.[4] Korsgaard explains, "a postulate of practical reason is an object of rational belief, but the reasons for the belief are practical and moral.... Although these beliefs are theoretical in form—the will is free, there is a God—their basis and their function are practical" (Korsgaard 1996a, 172). Since both deliberation and evaluation require ascribing responsibility to oneself or others, one must always act (or judge) as if one is free. And since one must act as if one is free, one can philosophically justify the way one acts only if one maintains that one is free.[5] The belief that the will is free is a second-order judgment that articulates a presupposition underlying first-order practical judgments.[6] Similarly, the belief that all

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one ought to obey this law because it is unconditionally binding, not because doing so confirms one's freedom.

3 At least, explicability in terms of natural causes is generally not given as a first-order scientific judgment. Insofar as universal explicability is presented as a scientific theory, it suffers from the problems of induction to which Hume famously drew attention in his *Treatise*, and which Kant further explained in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

4 We might, consistent with Kant's terminology from the first *Critique*, refer to second-order theoretical judgments as "principles of pure understanding" (A148/B187).

5 This claim is based on Kant's conception of (moral) responsibility. It is not the purpose of this paper to evaluate Kant's arguments for freedom, but only to raise a problem for a particular way of interpreting freedom.

6 Korsgaard explains that a person "needs this belief" in order to deliberate properly, which in context means, to obey the moral law (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 172). Of course, a person can deliberate as if she is free, and even act from respect for the moral law, without actually affirming the practical postulate that the will is free. Kant insists that even "the most common and unpracticed understanding" is capable of acting in accordance with the moral law (5:36). Such a person need not have a philosophical understanding of the relationship between freedom and moral responsibility. Rather, ordinary people need only sufficient confidence in their abilities to act as if they are free. It might be difficult to maintain a commitment to the moral law, or even to serious deliberation, if one *denies* the postulates (cf. 5:452, Wood 1992), but even then, such a commitment remains possible in principle. The belief in freedom is a second-order belief, and thus

objects of nature are causally determined articulates a presupposition of first-order theoretical judgments.[7] As Hume eloquently showed, one has no empirical evidence *for* the claim that the world is governed by causal laws, but, as Kant (less eloquently) showed, this claim is a conceptual precondition of giving a coherent account of the world as we experience it. For that reason, Kant insists, "The correctness of the principle of the thoroughgoing connection of all occurrences in the world of sense according to invariable natural laws is...confirmed as a principle of the transcendental analytic," that is, as a principle that provides the condition for the possibility of experience itself (A536/B564).[8] And the ideal of an *exhaustive* or *sufficient* causal explanation of the world is neither an empirical claim nor even a necessary condition of experience, but a necessary *ideal* of theoretical reason.[9]

This distinction between first- and second-order judgments helps show how the belief in freedom can differ from what Nelkin describes as cases where it is "rational to be irrational." Nelkin considers an explanation of the "practical" belief in freedom based on a "justification criterion," according to which one justifies certain beliefs on practical grounds and others on theoretical grounds. She mentions as examples the

> sort of 'practical' justification which applies to Blaise Pascal's belief in the existence of God (because he stands to gain eternal happiness if he believes and his belief turns out true), or William James's belief that he can jump over a wide ravine (because he will have a better chance of succeeding if he believes than if he does not). (Nelkin 2000, pp. 573-4)

Nelkin describes these as cases in which it is "rational to be irrational," but the status of the practical postulate that one is free is fundamentally

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not *necessary* in order to act as if one is free. All that is necessary for rational action is good first-order beliefs. Nonetheless, one can *philosophically* make sense of deliberation only by accepting that one is free.

7 As in the case of second-order practical judgments, it is possible to believe various theoretical explanations of the world without formulating the explicit belief that everything has a prior cause. But the only way to make philosophical sense of one's investigations and explanations is to believe that the objects of those investigations and explanations can be explained by natural laws.

8 Kant adds that this principle "will suffer no violation," so "the only question is whether, despite this…freedom might not also take place" (A536/B564). In his B Preface, Kant adds that the correctness of the principle of universal determinism in accordance with natural law is so strong that, were freedom incompatible with it, "freedom and with it morality…would have to give way to the mechanism of nature" (Bxxix). For Kant, then, there is an important and underappreciated *epistemic* priority of the theoretical standpoint. For a contrast with Korsgaard, see note 17. For discussion of how to reconcile this priority with the "primacy of the practical," see note 26.

9 See the "Ideal of Pure Reason." For discussion, see Grier, 2001.

different from the "practical" beliefs of Pascal or James. The beliefs of Pascal and James are adopted as parts of ordinary practical judgments. Pascal reasons that he should believe that God exists, in order to attain ends that he thinks are good. Likewise James reasons that he should believe in his abilities to jump the ravine in order to increase his chances of success. Both of these are reasons for actions. In each case, one decides to hold a belief because holding that belief is good for one in some sense. But the belief that one is free is not in itself good for one, and it is not adopted because it is advantageous. Rather, it is a belief that is necessary in order to make sense of the fact that one can be practically rational at all. It is the conceptual presupposition of a standpoint that one must—as a rational agent—adopt.[10]

And now we can return to Nelkin's question: "what is to prevent my taking th[e] theoretical belief [that I am unfree] into account in my deliberation just as I take into account other of my theoretical beliefs?" (Nelkin 2000, p. 571). In deliberation, one takes the content of certain first-order theoretical beliefs into account as (partial) reasons for action. In doing so, one assumes that there is some causal regularity in the world, but—in contrast to one's standpoint in theorizing about the world—one need not assume that this causal regularity is universal. And the second-order belief in universal and sufficient causation is not a belief for which one has any justification; it merely articulates the presupposition of *another* standpoint on the world. So there is no reason why one would need—or even be entitled—to take it into account from a practical standpoint.[11] Given that if one attempts to take its con-

10 The "necessity" of adopting this standpoint is first and foremost practical. That is, if one considers whether or not to adopt the practical standpoint, one finds oneself always already committed to adopting that standpoint. From the theoretical standpoint, one can note that human beings have various cognitive and volitional capacities by virtue of which they hold themselves responsible for their actions, and thus can ascribe a sort of biological necessity to humans' adoption of the practical standpoint. Kant does this when he explains, in the context of his empirical accounts of human beings, that we have both higher volitional capacities—a *Willkühr*—and a moral predisposition. For further discussion of Kant's empirical account of human beings, see Frierson 2006.

11 At times, Kant does suggest that universal determinism is a condition of the possibility of belief in *any* particular causal relations (e.g., A188/B234, A536/B564). If this is correct, then even the ordinary use of causal reasoning in practical contexts may commit one to universal determinism, which would reintroduce a direct contradiction within the practical standpoint. Two considerations mitigate the impact of this concern. First, while *universal* determinism *does* seem to be a necessary presupposition of the empirical investigation of nature, all that is necessary in order to employ empirical reasoning in practical deliberation is that one see the possible *effects* of one's actions as determined in accordance with causal laws, not that one sees the whole world (including one's actions) as so determined. Second, Kant's defense of the universality of determination in accordance with causal laws is a claim about "the sequence of appearances," "all *occurrences*," and in particular "all *alteration*" (A188/B234, A536/B564, emphasis added).

tent as a practical belief (either first- or second-order), one finds that it conflicts with the practical standpoint; there is every reason *not* to take it into account. The difference between the belief that "the sound of a fire alarm causes panic" and "Everything (including myself) is unfree" is that the first is a first-order (theoretical and potentially practical) judgment and the second is a second-order (theoretical) judgment. And this difference justifies taking the first, but not the second, into account in deliberation.

In the form in which she phrased it, Nelkin's question has been answered, but there is a similar problem that arises even at the level of first-order theoretical judgments. In particular, there are some first-order theoretical judgments that might seem to conflict with the freedom presupposed by the practical standpoint, such as the claims that "my bad upbringing led me to be malicious and weak-willed," and "given these circumstances, my malicious disposition inclines me to pull this fire alarm," and "my weak will causes me to act on my inclinations." Of course, Kant—and two-standpoint theorists—admit the possibility of this kind of causal explanation of human behavior:

> Let us take a...malicious lie.... We endeavor to discover the motives to which it has been due.... [W]e trace the empirical character of the action to its sources, finding these in defective education, bad company, in part also in the viciousness of a natural disposition insensitive to shame.... We proceed in this enquiry just as we should in ascertaining for a given natural effect the series of its determining causes (A554/B582).

As with the generic claim of universal determinism, Korsgaard's example of the implanted brain-control device shows why judgments about particular determinants of one's choice cannot be taken into account in practical reasoning. But as previously noted, this begs the question against Nelkin's insistence that there is a real conflict between claims made from theoretical and practical standpoints. If one is *justified* in using in deliberation the claim that one's action is determined by one's upbringing (as the parallel with theoretical claims about the fire alarm suggests), and if the denial of this claim is required by the deliberative standpoint, then there is a contradiction *within the practical standpoint*, which is just what the two-standpoint theory is supposed to prevent. And unlike the second-order affirmation of universal determinism, the claim that a particular choice is determined by particular prior causes is a first-order scientific judgment for which one can have substantial

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But from within the practical standpoint, one's choices are not themselves occurrences or alterations. One decides how the world should alter, but from within the practical standpoint, one's decision is not itself an "alteration," and thus even if everything *in the world* is subject to natural laws, the will of which that world is the expression (to use Korsgaard's phrase) is not.

empirical support. Thus we cannot dismiss these judgments as different in kind from judgments about the operation and likely consequences of the fire alarm. Both sets of judgments are first-order theoretical claims, and we take judgments about the fire alarm into account from a practical standpoint, but not judgments about ourselves.

So now the question is, does the claim that one's action is determined by one's upbringing preclude the sort of practical thinking that Korsgaard insists depends upon the idea of freedom? It would preclude this thinking *if* one's upbringing were taken as a *sufficient* cause of one's action. But *even from the theoretical standpoint*, no particular cause is fully sufficient to explain its effect, for two reasons. First, every cause itself has a prior cause (in time), so whenever a cause is posited as an explanation for the necessity of an effect, one can still ask what made that cause itself necessary. Second (and more importantly), every cause brings about its effect by virtue of an underlying law or causal power, and one can always ask why that causal law or power must be as it is.[12] O'Neill helpfully summarizes this limit of theoretical explanation:

> The important limitation is that all naturalistic explanations—even the most impressive explanations of some future neuroscience—are conditional explanations.... In a certain sense they are incomplete, for they can never explain that any natural law should take the form that it does. Even the most exhausting investigation cannot be exhaustive. Any explanations offered in terms of events and their effects is incomplete because it presupposes an account of the form of certain principles. Putting this in an old-fashioned way we might say that explanations under the heading of efficient causality presuppose explanations under the heading of formal causality. (O'Neill 1989, p. 68)

This theoretical limit on causal explanation provides room for practical deliberation. In practical deliberation, one can take into account "defective education, bad company, in part also . . . the viciousness of a natural disposition insensitive to shame" (A554/B582). One might reason, for instance, that telling the lie is not as bad for oneself as for another, since one has, after all, such a bad natural disposition, and people with dispositions like that tells lies; that's just what they do. But in the context of deliberation, these judgments are merely potential reasons for action. One must still *decide* whether to give one's natural disposition the weight that it typically has. One must decide whether these influences will have the causal power over oneself that they have been observed to have. And here, one *cannot* say, "well, it *has to* have that causal power over me," or rather, if one does say this, the "has to" will

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12 Here (and throughout this paper), I use the term "cause" in a broadly Humean sense that Eric Watkins has recently claimed is inappropriate in interpreting Kant (see Watkins 2005, p. 384). For my response to Watkins, see Frierson 2006, p. 7, n. 16.

be a purely practical one, a decision about what one values, and not a decision "forced by the facts." One's deliberation would find no room for freedom only if one had either an *exhaustive* theoretical explanation of a particular act or a theoretical basis for claiming that there *is* such an exhaustive explanation available, though one does not (yet) have it. But at the level of first-order judgments, one lacks exhaustive theoretical explanations,[13] and the second-order commitment to such explanations need not, and indeed should not, matter from a practical standpoint.

It is important to highlight that the insufficiency of causal explanations of behavior does *not* imply that freedom should play a role in theoretical explanation. Insofar as one adopts a theoretical standpoint, the insufficiency of any particular causal explanation is a reason to look for further causal explanations, not a reason to posit freedom. The second-order theoretical belief in universal causation commits one to that pursuit. But insofar as one adopts a practical standpoint, one need not be committed to the possibility of complete causal explanations of phenomena, and one needs to be—and, without contradiction, can be—committed to freedom.

The Grounding Thesis and the Reality of Freedom

Two-standpoint interpretations of freedom can accommodate ordinary theoretical judgments as reasons for action because from the practical standpoint one sees the world as the effect of the choices of rational agents. Causal explanations are wholly appropriate as long as they are explanations of a series of effects of or considerations for choice rather than an exhaustive series of causes of choice. Moreover, because the theoretical belief that one is not free is a second-order belief, it is a way of making sense of the theoretical standpoint, rather than an insight *from* that standpoint that might be relevant for practical deliberation. So there is no reason to think that one *should* take *that* belief into account

13 One might, of course, have a theoretical explanation of the causal power of such a natural disposition, perhaps in terms of genetics. But then one will lack a theoretical explanation of why genes must function the way they do. The point is that at some level, one's theoretical explanations will come to an end, and then one will find room for deliberation. Note too that one need not explicitly think of one's choices in the way described here. That is, in deciding whether or not to have a cup of coffee, one need not make reference to one's genes. The fact that freedom to choose whether to give in to the inclination for coffee is translatable in terms of freedom to choose whether to let oneself be influenced by genes is a way of validating ordinary deliberation's appeal to freedom, not a reason to shift to a new way of deliberating.

and, in fact, one *cannot* take it into account in practical deliberation since it conflicts with practical deliberation's own second-order commitment to freedom.

But given that the theoretical and practical standpoints require apparently conflicting second-order judgments about human freedom, all of this may seem to beg the important question: is one *really* free? As Eric Watkins puts it,

> Regardless of whether or not two standpoints can be held at the same time, can they both be true or must one of them be illusory?.... That is, granted that we conceive of ourselves as free and as determined (albeit from different standpoints at different times), which of these conceptions contains a true description of how we are? (Watkins 2005, p. 322)

This question seems to be the one that most troubles objectors to the two-standpoint version of Kant's theory of freedom. The point is that there must be an answer to this simple, yes-no question, and however much we want to say "yes" from one standpoint and "no" from another, eventually we are entitled to ask, "and which standpoint gets it *right*?"

Following Allison, Watkins suggests one possible answer to the question of whether one is "really" free. As he explains,

> At this point, the proponent of the [two-standpoint] interpretation could claim...that this last set of questions is illegitimate, perhaps suggesting that one would have to adopt either a God's-eye viewpoint or stand outside of all standpoints so as to determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of each one. (Watkins 2005, p. 322; cf. Korsgaard 1996a, p. 176)

To some extent, this response is correct, in that one cannot have *knowledge*—in Kant's technical sense—about what the world is like "in itself," so if what is meant by "are we *really* free?" is "what can we *know* about what the self is like *in itself*?" then the answer is surely that we cannot *know* anything.

But this response is insufficient, for three fundamental reasons.[14] First, it ignores the fact that Kant *does* posit one standpoint as more fundamental than the other; one describes "things-in-themselves," while the other describes mere "appearances." Second, this response

14 Eric Watkins raises another problem with this response, suggesting that "the accuracy of a standpoint is not determined by any putatively divine meta-standpoint, but rather simply by the metaphysical facts of the matter" (Watkins 2005, p. 322-3). Ultimately, this need not be a problem for the two-standpoint theorist, since such a theorist can simply deny that we even know what the question of freedom would *mean* as a question about "metaphysical facts." Freedom has a clear meaning in terms of empirical causes and a clear meaning in terms of practical responsibility. Watkins seems to assume that it has a clear meaning "metaphysically." But this depends on the legitimacy of a "metaphysical standpoint" from which one can ask the question. Short of the legitimacy of such a standpoint, we don't even know what kind of "accuracy" a standpoint is supposed to have.

fails to distinguish the two-standpoint reading from the "wretched subterfuge" of compatibilism, according to which "freedom" is merely a word for an "effect, the determining natural ground of which lies *within* the acting being," a freedom that is no different than the freedom of "a projectile...in free motion" or a "turnspit" (5:96-7). Finally, this response fails to take seriously the nature of the practical standpoint itself, which is not merely a standpoint according to which one is free, but a standpoint from which one sees *the world of appearance* as the *effect of one's freedom*. That is, the practical standpoint posits a relationship between itself and the theoretical standpoint, according to which the theoretical standpoint is secondary. In order to make sense of the practical standpoint, one must posit that this standpoint sees things as they really are, and that the theoretical standpoint sees things *merely* as they appear. (As we will see later, the theoretical standpoint does not similarly prioritize itself.) Agnosticism about whether or not one is really free is thus unsatisfying.

Christine Korsgaard has suggested another way to think about whether or not one is really free: "Both interests [of theoretical and practical reason] are rational and legitimate" (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 173). Rather than agnosticism, Korsgaard offers a kind of syncretism: we *really* are both free and not free. There is a danger here of thinking that, on this interpretation, one's freedom amounts merely to a posture of deliberation, not something *real*. Some of Korsgaard's language provokes this concern, as when she says, "the point is not that you must *believe* that you are free, but that you must choose *as if* you were free" (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 162).[15] This way of putting it can make it seem as though freedom is *merely* the way we must think of ourselves for practical purposes, not the way we *really* are. But Korsgaard, following Kant, refuses to allow this interpretation of freedom. In *The Sources of Normativity*, Korsgaard responds to the point about "reality" as follows: "You will say that this means that our freedom is not 'real' only if you have defined the 'real' as what can be identified by scientists looking at things third-personally and from outside" (Korsgaard 1996b, p. 96).[16] In

15 Nelkin raises the question of how this passage relates to Korsgaard's statement later that "the standpoint from which you adopt the *belief in freedom* is that of the deliberating agent" (Nelkin 2000, p. 567, n7, citing Korsgaard 2006a, p. 174, my emphasis). As I read these passages, the first describes the view of the world constitutive of the deliberative standpoint. The later passage is part of Korsgaard's discussion of the postulates of practical reason. Because one *must* act *as if* one is free, one is (practically) justified in ascribing freedom to oneself. On this reading, then, Korsgaard's account does not raise the question about whether one is "really" free, though her language can *seem* to raise this question.

16 In her explanation of this argument, Korsgaard shifts her focus from freedom as such to the "reasons" that one offers within the practical point of view. Here "reasons" are first-

fact, the belief that one is free and the belief that one is determined by natural causes are symmetric. Each is a necessary presupposition of one standpoint,[17] and the question of which belief is "real" seems not to arise for either standpoint. Both beliefs are necessary—and in this sense "accurate"– because both standpoints are necessary (see Korsgaard 1996b, p. 96). While agnosticism denies the legitimacy of the question about whether or not one is really free by refusing to answer it, Korsgaard denies its legitimacy by answering it in two ways. The point is that questions about what is "really" the case always assume some conception of reality. If reality is limited to scientifically knowable things, then we are really unfree. But if reality is the world of practical concern, then we are really free.

Unfortunately, at least as stated so far, Korsgaard's solution falls into the same three problems that threaten the agnostic solution. As in the case of that solution, she fails to take seriously Kant's apparent prioritizing of things-in-themselves, she risks embracing the "wretched subterfuge" (5: 96) of compatibilism that would make morality a "phantom" or "chimerical idea" (4:445; see too 4:456), and she fails to address the fact that the practical standpoint depends—at least for Kant—not merely upon the legitimacy of seeing oneself as free but upon the supremacy of the claim of freedom over claims about natural determination.

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order practical beliefs. Why pull the fire alarm? Because pulling the fire alarm will notify people of the fire and thus increase the likelihood that they will escape the building uninjured, and I should do what I can to help people avoid unnecessary injury. In her discussion in *The Sources of Normativity*, Korsgaard's point is that this is no less "real" an explanation for pulling the fire alarm than one based on states of my brain, or the evolutionary development of sympathetic instincts, or theories of social conditioning. An explanation in terms of first-order practical reasons is not *scientific*, of course. But there is no reason to deny that these reasons are any less *real* than the scientific causes that figure in scientific accounts. As Korsgaard puts it, "reasons exist because we need them" (Korsgaard,1996b, p. 96). In the same way that first-order reasons "exist because we need them," the freedom that is postulated as the condition of deliberation exists because we need it.

Nonetheless, it is important to recognize here two important differences between Korsgaard's argument and Kant's own view about the relationship between the theoretical and practical standpoints. One, on which I focus in the main text, is that Kant ascribes a priority to the practical that Korsgaard underrates. The other, discussed above in note 9, is that Kant ascribes a sort of epistemic priority to theoretical reason, in that Kant takes the task of empirically cognizing the world to have priority over the task of choosing and evaluating actions in the light of moral responsibilities (Bxxix). Were it not for the fact that the theoretical standpoint leaves space for another standpoint, Kant claims that one would have to reject freedom (and with it the legitimacy of the practical standpoint).

17 Here I draw heavily from Kant's account in the first *Critique*. As far as I know, Korsgaard has not explicitly discussed the status of the belief that one is causally determined; as far as I can tell, there is no reason that she could not agree with Kant.

Both agnosticism and Korsgaard's symmetrical affirmation fail to take seriously the *asymmetry* upon which Kant insists as a way of avoiding crude compatibilism. What is needed is a way of articulating the supremacy of the practical standpoint over the theoretical, and neither agnosticism nor Korsgaard's syncretism seems capable of articulating this supremacy. And that, once again, raises the question of whether we are *really* free, but in a way that is particularly urgent from the practical standpoint.

The failure of the agnostic and syncretist answers to the question of the reality of freedom highlights the importance of what Eric Watkins has recently called the "grounding thesis." Watkins draws attention to the priority of freedom in a way that makes clear how it can solve the problem of whether one is "really" free, but that also seems to raise problems for two-standpoint theories. Watkins explains the grounding thesis as follows:

> In various works, Kant repeatedly suggests that things in themselves, or the noumenal world, "grounds" or "underlies" appearances, or the sensible world.... Despite the epistemic limitations Kant places on what we can know about how *specific* features of things in themselves might ground appearances, Kant makes several *general* claims about grounding. For one, Kant makes clear that the grounding relationship is one-way and not reciprocal.... Things in themselves ground appearances, but appearances do not ground things in themselves..... For another…not only does the noumenal world of things in themselves cause the *existence* of appearances…it is also responsible for the *laws* that govern appearances. (Watkins 2005, pp. 326, 328)

It should be clear how this helps with the question of the reality of freedom. Insofar as freedom is located at the level of things-in-themselves, free choices provide the grounds for the very causal laws of nature that are observed by theoretical reason (at least insofar as those laws bear on one's actions). Thus one is really free, but this freedom grounds a world governed by causal laws. Positing that free choices ground the laws of nature, one avoids the "wretched subterfuge" of compatibilism and provides legitimacy to the priority implied in the practical standpoint.[18] And this account is consonant with Kant's claims about the priority of things-in-themselves over appearances, which posed problems for agnostic and syncretist views in the last section. Thus the grounding thesis provides a coherent way of answering the question of whether one is really free.

But is this thesis compatible with a two-standpoint account of freedom and determinism? Watkins thinks not. He introduces his account of the grounding thesis as a way to arbitrate the dispute between two-

18 For a detailed explanation of a similar point, see Watkins 2005, pp. 329-39.

world and two-standpoint understandings of Kant's transcendental idealism:

> Despite the uncertainty and ambiguity that Kant's use of these two different understandings [as two worlds or two standpoints] of Transcendental Idealism creates at a general level, we can still turn to a particular aspect of Transcendental Idealism that is fundamental to his understanding of freedom and determinism, namely the issue of "grounding." (Watkins 2005, p. 325)

This objection might seem obvious. The description of the grounding thesis proposed by Watkins is permeated with two-world talk: "the noumenal world grounds...the sensible world," etc. And Watkins is surely correct that "the ontological, two-worlds interpretation of Transcendental Idealism...has no difficulties with the grounding thesis" (Watkins 2005, p. 329).[19] Moreover, a two-worlds interpretation provides a (relatively) straightforward interpretation of the priority of freedom as a metaphysical priority, the priority of a ground to its effect. But why is it impossible to make sense of this thesis on a two-standpoint interpretation? Watkins argues,

> [T]he assertion that "things in themselves ground appearances" is a claim that cannot be made from either standpoint. Assertions about things in themselves can be made only from the practical or deliberative standpoint, while claims about appearances can be made only from the theoretical or scientific standpoint. (Watkins 2005, pp. 328-9)

Phrased in this way, Watkins's problem with a two-standpoint interpretation of the grounding thesis is based on the same misunderstanding as the theory-in-deliberation objection. Insofar as the practical standpoint involves deliberation about action *in the world*, it can and must make claims about appearances. Moreover, as we saw the last section, insofar as "the deliberating agent, employing reason practically, views the world...as an expression of the wills of...rational agents" (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 173), the practical standpoint *commits* the deliberating agent to the grounding thesis. One who reasons practically precisely sees actions in the world—appearances—as the effects of the choices of a free—that is, "in-itself"—agent that determines—or grounds—those actions. Whereas the two-world interpretation treats the language of "effects" here more-or-less literally, the two-standpoint interpretation ascribes a purely practical meaning to such language. Rather than being a *metaphysical* ground of effects in the world, one is a *practical*

19 At least, the difficulties the two-worlds theory has are familiar ones, such as how to make sense of a causal relationship between things-in-themselves and appearances when the only conception of causation that we can understand is a schematized concept that applies only to appearances. For Watkins's response to this problem, see Watkins 2005, pp. 324-9.

ground, which is simply to say that one is (morally) *responsible* for one's actions and their effects.

The real challenge to the two-standpoint interpretation comes not from an inability to articulate the grounding thesis—since this can be done straightforwardly within the practical standpoint—but from particular *features* of the grounding relationship. Watkins draws attention to two features of Kant's use of the grounding thesis that enable him to avoid the "wretched subterfuge" of crude compatibilism. Of these, the more important is that "the grounding relationship is one-way and not reciprocal.... Things in themselves ground appearances, but appearances do not ground things in themselves" (Watkins 2005, p. 328).[20] One might be concerned that while the practical standpoint can assert its priority from *within* that standpoint, the theoretical standpoint could as easily assert *its* priority from within its own standpoint. In other words, we might think that when reasoning practically, we must think of our choices as determining the way the world will appear when we study it scientifically, while when reasoning scientifically, we must think of empirical causes as determining the way people choose. And if both standpoints are, as Korsgaard insists, "rational and legitimate" (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 173), then we are left either without a real grounding thesis or with a perfectly symmetrical one. Either way, we seem stuck with crude compatibilism and without an answer to the question about whether freedom is "real."

Fortunately, the apparent symmetry between standpoints does not stand up to scrutiny. While the practical standpoint does posit priority over the theoretical by postulating that it is (at least partially) responsible for the world as it appears, the theoretical does *not* similarly posit priority over the practical. In that sense, Watkins is partly correct in claiming that for two-standpoint theorists, "Assertions about things in themselves can be made only from the practical or deliberative standpoint" (Watkins 2005, p. 328). When Kant "den[ies] knowledge in order to make room for faith" (Bxxx), he thereby ensures at least that the theoretical standpoint is not in a position to challenge the priority that the practical ascribes to itself.

But we can go further. In two important respects, the theoretical standpoint asserts its own *subordination* to the practical (or at least, to some non-empirical standpoint). First, while the theoretical standpoint

20 In fact, Watkins specifically ties the problems two-standpoint theories have with the grounding thesis to these *features* of it. The second feature, that "not only does the noumenal world of things in themselves cause the *existence* of appearances . . ., it is also responsible for the *laws* that govern appearances" can also be accommodated on a two-standpoint interpretation, and my discussion of causal laws in sections 2 and 3 suggests how this might be done.

cannot claim *knowledge* of "things-in-themselves," it posits things-in-themselves indirectly, as vaguely articulated ideals toward which scientific attempts at explanation aim. The incompleteness of science discussed earlier shows that within the theoretical standpoint itself, every particular explanation includes the recognition that something more needs to be said, that the explanation is incomplete. There is "a system of formal conditions that our understanding of the empirical world presupposes," and in the case of human beings, "we...not only see ourselves as parts of nature with a certain incompletely known empirical character; we...also see this empirical character as presupposing another, unknowable but *intelligible character*" (O'Neill 1989, p. 69). While theoretical reason cannot *posit* freedom to fill in those incomplete explanations, it implicitly recognizes its own always only partially formulated explanations as dependent upon something more fundamental, something that turns out to be the realm of freedom.[21] Second, even the theoretical standpoint is importantly practical in the sense that the theorizer sees herself as a free agent, capable of making judgments based on the best evidence, and not merely as a result of various causes. Thus the *practice* of science depends on freedom in a deeper way than the practice of morality depends on science: "The enterprise of naturalistic explanation itself depends on freedom" (O'Neill 1989, p. 69, cf. Korsgaard 1996a, p. 185, n18).[22]

For a two-standpoint theorist, there is no "absolute" standpoint from which to articulate the grounding thesis, but both theoretical and practical standpoints involve second-order claims about the relative priority of the standpoints. The "one-way and not reciprocal" aspect of the grounding thesis shows up in the fact that *both* the practical standpoint *and* the theoretical standpoint see the empirical descriptions given within the theoretical standpoint as *secondary*. *Both* standpoints, that is, affirm the "primacy of the practical." Now the *sense* of priority differs within each standpoint. The practical standpoint directly implies a second-order claim of the dependence of what can be observed on (among other things) the choices of human agents, where this "dependence" is understood in terms of ascriptions of responsibility. The theoretical

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21 As Kant puts it, "*causa noumenon* with respect to the theoretical use of reason is, though a possible, thinkable concept, nevertheless an empty one…. Now, however…the concept is given significance in the moral law and consequently in its practical reference" (5:56, cf. 8:136-8).

22 The second sense in which the theoretical standpoint depends upon the practical is one about which Kant is much more wary than O'Neill and Korsgaard. While Kant suggests that the spontaneity of the transcendental synthesis of a manifold makes me "conscious of myself not as I appear to myself" (B157), he avoids concluding from this that one must, from a purely epistemic standpoint, see oneself as *free*.

standpoint does not imply *this* claim, but it implies the priority of the practical both in that the theoretical standpoint can find its ultimate satisfaction only in a standpoint that allows for an unconditioned ground of the conditioned effects that are its immediate objects of study and in that the theoretical standpoint involves a sort of practice invoking standards of epistemic responsibility that imply some sort of freedom.[23] Because *both* standpoints posit the grounding thesis in ways that mutually support one another, a two-standpoint account can make sense of the dependence of "appearances" on "things-in-themselves."[24]

Given the priority of the practical within both practical and theoretical standpoints, one could say that one is "really" free because, from all of the perspectives one can take on the issue, whenever one considers freedom, one must consider it to have priority over natural causes. Korsgaard herself, immediately after claiming that "Both interests [of theoretical and practical reason] are rational and legitimate" goes on to say, "Or, if either is privileged, it is the practical" (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 173). And this way of articulating the grounding thesis is just what one should expect—and all that is needed—from a two-standpoint theorist. Freedom is real, not merely in the sense that it is required from a practical standpoint, but also in the sense that this practical standpoint has priority—in both a practical and a theoretical sense—over the theoretical.[25] The grounding thesis, and the reality of freedom, are both captured in Kant's insistence on "the primacy of...practical reason" (5:119-21).

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23 For discussion of the latter point, see Guevara 2000, pp. 64-8.

24 One might, of course, use a metaphysical account of two worlds, one of which grounds another, to make philosophical sense of the priority of the practical standpoint. The point of this paper is not to argue that the two- world account of freedom is incoherent or even wrong, only that it is not *necessary*. The priority of the practical can, for two-standpoint theorists, just be a basic fact about our standpoints, one that still lets us make sense of the grounding thesis.

25 This provides a way to reconcile Kant's different claims about the priority of the practical. On the one hand, Kant insists on the priority of practical reason (5:119ff.). On the other hand, Kant claims that if "speculative reason had proven that freedom cannot be thought…then the [moral] presupposition [of freedom]…would have to yield" to this speculative conclusion (Bxxix, cf. 4:456). On the two-standpoint account I have articulated, what Kant is saying is that *if* the theoretical standpoint were to claim priority for itself, we would have to accord it priority. But because the theoretical standpoint does not claim such priority, we can affirm the priority of the practical.

Theory-in-Deliberation Strikes Again: the problem of moral anthropology

This paper started with the problem of incorporating the content of scientific or theoretical claims into deliberation or, more generally, a practical standpoint on human actions. The key to solving that problem is seeing that the practical standpoint makes claims about the natural world, but only insofar as those claims are incorporated into reasons for action, either as consequences of action or as relevant contextual features. The practical standpoint is not a standpoint disconnected from the world of experience, but rather a standpoint that sees that world as the *effect* rather than the *cause* of choices. This characterization of the practical standpoint also allows for an answer to the question of the "reality" of freedom by providing a two-standpoint way of articulating what Eric Watkins has called the "grounding thesis." Thus two-standpoint theories can make sense of theory-in-deliberation, they can coherently claim that human beings are "really" free (while also, in a subsidiary sense, unfree), and they can make sense of the dependence of "appearances" on "things-in-themselves" in terms of the priority of practical reason.

Unfortunately, the asymmetry between standpoints that permits a two-standpoint account of dependency poses a new theory-in-deliberation problem in the context of certain *sorts* of theoretical claims that might play a role in certain sorts of deliberation. In particular, the grounding thesis claims that human freedom grounds the world as it appears, and that this grounding relationship is *not reciprocal*. This claim might seem problematic given that, scientifically speaking, there seem to be purely empirical causes of various human choices, but the necessary incompleteness of scientific explanation opens room within the deliberative standpoint for seeing "causal" preconditions as a *context* for choice rather than a *determinant* of choice. But a different problem arises when one seeks to make *use* of empirical claims about causes of human action from a *practical* standpoint. The sorts of theoretical claims that have the potential to raise a serious theory-in-deliberation problem are theoretical claims about causal influences on choices, where those theoretical claims are treated *as causal claims* and the choices are considered *as free choices*.

Unfortunately, there seem to be such theoretical claims.[26] For Kant, they arise explicitly in the context of what he calls "moral anthropology." As Kant explains in the *Metaphysics of Morals*,

> Moral anthropology...would deal...with the subjective conditions in human nature that hinder people or help them in fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics of morals. It would deal with the development, spreading, and strengthening of moral principles (in education in schools and in popular instruction). (6:217)

In cases such as moral education, one may seek to influence oneself or another through empirical causes, and influence oneself or another precisely insofar as one is a deliberative agent. In these cases, one reasons: "I will do action A in order to bring it about by a sequence of natural causes that person P does action B for reason R." Cases such as these seem to require viewing person P from both the practical and the theoretical-scientific standpoints at once and in the same respect. On the one hand, P must be viewed from the theoretical-scientific point of view, since one sees P's choice here as the result of a prior cause, action A. On the other hand, P must be viewed from the practical point of view, and hence as free, since one's goal is for P to act for a particular *reason*. The importance of "doing B for reason R" lies in the fact that one holds P *responsible* for acting in that particular way. If P were considered merely from a theoretical standpoint, one could seek to bring it about that P does B as a result of having a particular mental state, but one could not aim for P to do B for a particular *reason*.

The cases that raise conceptual problems for two-standpoint accounts of dependency must be distinguished from two similar but importantly different cases. One might treat another person as a mere object and seek to manipulate him through deceit, torture, or underhanded marketing. These forms of psychological manipulation are morally wrong, since they involve treating another as a mere thing, but they need not raise conceptual problems because one need not see the manipulated person as *both* manipulable *and* free.[27] One seeks to get another to do a particular action, but not for a particular *reason* (though perhaps as a result of particular psychological *causes*). The cases that raise difficulties for the grounding thesis should also be distinguished from ordinary cases of offering reasons to other agents. When I suggest a reason for you to do a particular action, I precisely see my action as

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26 Elsewhere Kant adds that moral education and churches (5:151ff., 6:474ff.), politeness (6:473, 7:151-3), a cultivated aesthetic appreciation for the beautiful and sublime (5:268-9, 299, and 354-6) and even belief in the practical postulates can affect one's deliberation in morally positive ways.

27 To see what is *wrong* with these cases of manipulation, of course, one must in some sense see the agent as both determined and free. This problem also poses difficulties for the grounding thesis, but I do not focus on those here.

providing a context for choice, not being a cause of choice. I can aim for you to do a particular action for a particular reason, but not see your action for that reason as the causally necessitated effect of my action.

Sometimes, however, one seeks not merely to cause another to perform an action, nor merely to offer possible reasons for another to act, but to causally effect in another the state of acting for a particular reason. In *After Virtue*, Alasdair MacIntyre gives an example of the sort of consideration that causes this problem. In his discussion of teaching a child to value the goods internal to the practice of chess, MacIntyre says,

> Consider the example of a highly intelligent seven-year-old child whom I wish to teach to play chess, although the child has no particular desire to learn the game. The child does, however, have a very strong desire for candy and little chance of obtaining it. I therefore tell the child that if the child will play chess with me...I will give the child 50 cents worth of candy; moreover I tell the child that I will always play in such a way that it will be difficult, but not impossible, for the child to win, and that, if the child wins, the child will receive an extra 50 cents worth of candy. Thus motivated the child plays to win . . .. [T]here will come a time when the child will find in those goods specific to chess...a new set of reasons, reasons now not just for winning on a particular occasion, but for trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess demands. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 188)

For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to get into the significance MacIntyre sees in this transformation. What is important here is that one seeks to change not only the sorts of decisions that the child makes, but even the sort of *reasons* that the child takes into account in deliberation. One would not start the process without believing that it is likely to give rise to the "new set of reasons" for which one aims, so it is not mere action at which one aims. And one seeks to get the child to play chess for the right reasons not by simply offering those reasons to the child, but by employing psychological tricks to eventually *cause* the child to see those reasons for herself.

From what standpoint is such a child considered? On the one hand, the child is clearly being viewed from the standpoint of theoretical-scientific reason, since one makes claims about how various empirical causes can influence the ultimate beliefs and actions of the child. On the other hand, one cares about the thoughts and actions of the child only insofar as one takes an evaluative, practical standpoint. One seeks to make the child better *as a deliberator*. One seeks to influence not merely the child's beliefs and desires, but the child's *reasons*, and one seeks to influence these reasons through natural-scientific causes. Moreover, one does not simply seek to change the mental states that *cause* the child to act in a particular way. One seeks to affect the sorts of *reasons* that the child takes into account in deliberation. Thus in this

case, one seems required to think of the child at the same time and in the same respect as both free, since only as a free deliberator do the choices of the child have the relevant weight, and as unfree, since one seeks causal influence on those choices.

This problem arises in an even more poignant way with respect to moral development, since in this case one's concern with bringing about a particular sort of choice in another is more clearly dependent upon holding that person responsible. So imagine that one seeks to influence the future deliberation of oneself or another. One seeks to promote a commitment to acting rightly for the sake of acting rightly. In such a case, one might pursue certain sorts of moral education, or practices of discipline, with the goal of making oneself or another more likely to make morally worthy choices. One might even promote social and political structures to positively affect the moral development of those living within such structures. The goal of one's action is moral development, but in order to think of someone as *morally* better, one must think of that person as free. At the same time, though, in order to think of one's action as causing that end, one must think of the person as unfree. For the maxim: "do action A in order to bring about the moral development of person P" to be reasonable, one must think of P as *both* free *and* unfree.[28]

Decisions that promote volitional development, and especially those that promote moral development, involve considering people as at once free and unfree. Two-standpoint theories cannot easily dismiss the contradiction in such decisions because both ways of considering people enter into the reasons for performing actions that promote volitional development. Thus in these cases, Nelkin's general worry about a contradiction arising within a single standpoint does seem apt.

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28 This kind of problem arises in non-moral cases, too, and even in cases in which one seeks to manipulate one's *own* behavior. For example, I might deeply enjoy going to the opera with my partner, and enjoy it for the sake of the opera and for my partner's company. Moreover, I might deeply desire to be the sort of person who goes to the opera for these reasons. But I often fail to consider going to the opera, or going to the opera seems like more trouble than it is worth when I consider it. But perhaps I know myself well enough to know that purchasing season tickets to the opera will make me more likely to decide to go. Having set dates ahead of time will effectively force me to consider going to the opera on the nights for which I have tickets. And having the tickets in hand will lead me to think that going is worth the trouble after all. One wouldn't want to waste the tickets, after all. Here it's important that the reason for going to the opera *not* be "to avoid wasting the tickets." Rather, the consideration that one would waste the tickets is merely a means for discounting the trouble involved in going to the opera, trouble that is usually exaggerated but in this case discounted. The reason for going to the opera is that I enjoy it, especially in the company of my partner. And I buy the season tickets because I want to be the sort of person who makes these sorts of choices. Again, I consider myself *qua deliberator* as susceptible to empirical causation.

Two Standpoints and Moral Anthropology

The problems with which this paper began were problems specifically for two-standpoint interpretations of Kant's transcendental idealism. The problem outlined in the last section is more general. Even with a two-world account of Kant's idealism, one will have to deal with a tension between the grounding thesis and the importance of having an influence upon the volitional (especially moral) development of oneself and others.

In *Freedom and Anthropology in Kant's Moral Philosophy*, I addressed a tension similar to that between the grounding thesis and moral anthropology in general,[29] but there I made liberal use of concepts and terminology drawn from a two-worlds interpretation of Kant's idealism. Put extremely briefly, my account there involved seeing that one's intelligible, noumenal character is expressed not merely in the individual, phenomenal actions of a moment, but in one's phenomenal life as a whole. The evidence from the empirical character of one's past suggests that one's intelligible choice in the noumenal world is not a pure choice of good, but includes a radically evil subordination of morality to non-moral inclinations, and the expression of this radical evil in the phenomenal world involves not merely evil choices but a deliberate propensity to evil. Insofar as one still has an obligation to *be* good (noumenally), this goodness can only mean a "revolution" against one's own radical evil, and the expression of this goodness (phenomenally) will be a life of constant struggle against one's own evil propensity. Moreover, because radical evil is (in part) social, this struggle must take place in the context of community; so one will not only struggle against one's own evil propensity but also seek to encourage others in their struggle against evil.[30] Thus promoting empirical states of affairs that strengthen the (empirical) wills of oneself and others against the propensity to evil is a way of expressing noumenal goodness-as-revolution.

However satisfying one finds this resolution to the tension between freedom and anthropology, it extensively uses two-world language, and one advantage of a two-world interpretation of Kant's idealism may be that it allows for a better articulation of a Kantian solution to the problem of moral anthropology than two-standpoint intrepretations. That

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29 I articulate my version of the grounding thesis in chapter one, and lay out my solution to the tension posed above primarily in chapter five.

30 Cashing out the social nature of radical evil is challenging. For two different approaches, cf. Anderson-Gold 2001 and Frierson 2003, chapter 6.

said, the rest of this paper will sketch a Kantian[31] solution to the problem in strictly two-standpoint terms. The key elements of this solution still lie in thinking of one's life *as a whole* as expressing free choice, in recognizing the challenges posed by radical evil, and in seeing one's struggle against evil as part of a social struggle.[32] The difference from the two-world way of dealing with the problem is that a two-standpoint interpretation is not entitled to the metaphysical speculations that underlie the articulation of these key elements in the last paragraph. But these elements can be developed through a richer conception of what the "practical standpoint" involves. Typically, this standpoint is described in terms of deliberation about (or evaluation of) a particular action or choice, but the importance of moral anthropology forces a revision of this typical description.

In this context, the implication of the first—life as a whole—element is that deliberation and evaluation should not be seen primarily as dealing with actions—what to do—but with character, who to be. In deliberations at any given time, one should see oneself as constructing a life, not merely as deciding on a particular action.[33] In a sense, of course, one can only *immediately* determine one's choices in the present. But Kant's moral theory temporally extends these choices in two important respects. First, genuine choices, for Kant, choices for which one can be held responsible, are choices of *maxims*, which are *policies* for action. As Korsgaard explains, these policies must been seen to be at least somewhat temporally extended in order to constitute choices *of an agent* (Korsgaard 1996b, pp. 231-2). What moral anthropology forces is an expansion of what is always already a temporally extended

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31 In part, the description "Kantian" is intended to highlight the role that radical evil plays in this account. One might develop a response to the problem of moral anthropology simply by shifting focus from individual acts to life as a whole. For Kant, however, the urgency of moral anthropology is due to the need to combat radical evil. Without radical evil, it is not clear that the sorts of self-cultivation that pose *prima facie* problems for the grounding thesis would have an important role to play in Kant's ethics.

32 For a similar emphasis on seeing one's moral life as a whole, see David Sussman's contribution to this volume.

33 O'Neill explains, "We must not only see ourselves as parts of nature with a certain incompletely known empirical character; we must also see this empirical character as presupposing another, unknowable but *intelligible character*. This is the central claim…of the most difficult of all Kant's thoughts about the atemporal character of human agency…" (O'Neill 1989, p. 69). The "atemporal" character of this agency is explained, in part, by the fact that the intelligible character for which we hold ourselves responsible is the presupposition of one's *whole* empirical character, that is, one's life as a whole. Similarly, when Korsgaard explains that "the deliberating agent…views the world…as an expression of the wills of God and other rational agents" (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 173), the point is that the temporally extended world as a whole—not merely the way the world turns out *now*—is an expression of one's free choice.

account of particular choices. Second, insofar as we choose *a life* rather than merely an action, we make individual choices about what to do in the light of how these choices will form us into a particular sort of person. Cultivation of talents is morally required only because one is a temporally extended person, who will have a will in the future that can make use of the talents that one cultivates. Cultivation of moral resolve, similarly, is morally required because one is a temporally extended person who can express that resolve in the future.

The implication of the second element—the importance of radical evil—is that the practical standpoint is not *simply* the standpoint of freedom, but a standpoint that one might, following Jeanine Grenberg, call the standpoint of *humility*.[34] As Grenberg explains it, humility is "that meta-attitude which constitutes the moral agent's proper perspective on herself as a dependent and corrupt but capable and dignified rational agent" (Grenberg 2005, p. 133). Acting from the standpoint of humility is different from merely acting from a practical standpoint, and even different from acting from the standpoint of pure practical reason. From the standpoint of a morally responsible and dependent but non-corrupt agent, action is a free response to the condition of moral obligation in the face of temptations caused by inclinations. But the standpoint of *humility* that takes into account radical evil recognizes that one's real enemy is not mere temptation, which can "be sought in the natural inclinations," but a freely chosen "*malice* (of the human heart) which secretly undermines [one's] disposition with soul-corrupting principles" (6:57). This humility in the face of one's own corruption does not compromise the demands of morality. As Kant insists, it "is of no use in moral dogmatics, for the precepts of the latter...include the very same duties...whether there is in us an innate propensity to transgression or not" (6:50). Nonetheless, humility requires more of one than simple duty:

> In moral discipline...the thesis means...this: We cannot start out in the ethical training of our connatural moral predisposition to the good with an innocence which is natural to us but must rather begin with a presupposition of a depravity of our power of choice in adopting maxims contrary to the original ethical predisposition and ...with unremitting counteraction against [this depravity]. (6:51)

The standpoint of practical humility is a standpoint from which one sees one's life as a life of struggle against one's own self-wrought tendency to subordinate the moral law to one's inclinations. And from this standpoint, one must not only do what is right in a particular moment, but act in ways that will promote an increasingly good life overall.

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34 In Frierson 2003, I refer to this as the "perspective of moral anthropology" (p. 132).

Finally, the third key element—that the struggle against evil is social—means that the humble, practical standpoint is not solely an individual one. Of course, the standpoint is individual in the sense that each individual must decide how to act. But when an individual deliberates, she should always see herself as part of a community. This requires seeking to live out one's struggle against corruption *in community with others*, and it involves seeing the ultimate consummation of that struggle in a new social condition. And that includes deliberately avoiding creating unnecessary temptations for others, exercising caution in relationships with others to avoid using their actions as a pretext for one's own corrupt desires, aiming to cultivate good choices in others, looking to others for support and encouragement in one's own efforts to improve, and conscientiously cultivating the sorts of community that can promote moral progress for all involved.

This two-standpoint solution to the problem of moral anthropology is only a sketch, and considerably more detail would need to be filled in. In the end, however, a two-standpoint interpretation of Kant's theory of freedom would meet the challenges of theory-in-deliberation, even in the case of moral anthropology, by developing a sufficiently rich account of the practical standpoint. The practical standpoint must attend to the importance of character, radical evil, and humans' social nature. It must also have "priority"; practical reasoning is not merely one sort of reasoning among many, but the most fundamental perspective on a world about which human beings think but also within which they live and act. Nothing in this paper precludes making sense of these two standpoints by appeal to two metaphysically distinct "worlds," but I have argued that two-standpoint theorists do not *need* such an appeal. What is required to make sense of freedom is not a new metaphysics, but rather a certain sort of practical orientation, a form of life that takes seriously both the priority and the complex nature of practical reason.[35]

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