The Double Problem of Liberal Education in Kant and Rousseau

This essay discusses what I will call the double problem of liberal education. Put most basically, the problems are how one can promote liberty as an end of education and how one can respect existent liberty in education. “Liberal” education focuses on liberty, or freedom, and this essay focuses particularly on the ways in which liberal education respects ideals of free agency. Free agency can be understood in two ways, both as the liberty-of-choice whereby one makes choices for oneself as a morally-loaded autonomy whereby one makes choices in accordance with (moral) reason or conscience. More importantly, “respecting” liberty can involve the cultivation of liberty as an end-goal, or an immediate deference to liberty as an existent end. Liberal education thus poses a double problem in two senses, both in terms of the kind of liberty to be respected and, more importantly, in terms of the dual problems of how to cultivate liberty as an end-goal and also how to respect existent liberty.\(^1\)

In the next section, I draw on Kant’s moral theory to articulate the two senses in which agency can be “free,” which I call “liberty-of-choice” and “liberty-as-autonomy,” and the two different ways of respecting freedom in those senses. From the distinction between different ways of respecting freedom, I articulate the double problem of liberal education, focusing at first on the double problem as it applies to liberty-of-choice. In section two, I briefly show that both Rousseau and Kant explicitly attend to this double problem. In sections three and four, I investigate one key area – the role of discipline in early childhood education – where they sharply disagree, and where, in particular, Kant explicitly rejects any role for respecting existent liberty-of-choice.\(^2\) After laying out the quite different approaches to discipline in Rousseau and Kant, I trace this difference to fundamental differences in how Kant and Rousseau conceive of the nature of that liberty-as-autonomy towards which education aims. Differing conceptions of that autonomy that is an essential part of the goal of education affect each’s conception of how liberty-of-choice should be understood, precluding respect for children’s existent liberty in the case of Kant and requiring it in the case of Rousseau.

\(^1\) In a sense, then, there are four problems of liberal education, since “the” double problem arises for each sense of liberty. For the purpose of this paper, though, I am primarily interested in the contrast between respect for liberty (of either kind) as an end-goal and respect for it as an existent end. Throughout, it is this sense in which I consider the problem to be “double.” It is worth noting, too, that rather than simply two independent problems of education, liberal education faces these as conjoined problems.

\(^2\) By focusing on discipline in early education, this paper emphasizes a particularly sharp contrast between the two thinkers. In later education, however, while their particular pedagogical proposals differ considerably, their attitudes towards the double problem of liberal education are more similar. Unfortunately, a fuller discussion of the pedagogical theories of Rousseau and Kant would make the present paper too extensive. For general discussion of Rousseau’s pedagogy, see (Dent 2005), (Bloom 1979), or (Gauthier 2006). For discussion of Kant’s, see (Herman 2007), (Louden, Kant's Human Being 2011), (Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings 2000), (Moran 2012), (Munzel 2012), (Munzel, Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The "Critical" Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment 1999), (Wood 1999) and the essays collected in (Roth and Surprenant 2012). I am currently working on a longer project tracing the role of respect for liberty in other areas of Rousseau’s and Kant’s pedagogy. See (Author, in preparation-a)
Within Kant’s moral theory there are two distinct notions of liberty (or freedom) that are relevant to education, often described in terms of “positive” and “negative” freedom but better termed liberty-as-autonomy and liberty-of-choice. 3 “Autonomy” is when one is “subject only to laws given by himself but still universal and … bound only to act in conformity with his own will, which, however … is a will giving universal law” (G 4:432, bold added). 4 This Kantian autonomy is not mere self-governance, but governing oneself in accordance with that universal law of reason that is the moral law. Thus, for Kant, liberty in this sense is just the same thing as morality: the “principle of autonomy is the sole principle of morals . . . [f]or . . . its principle must be a categorical imperative, while this commands neither more nor less than just this autonomy” (G 4:440). To be free, to have liberty, is just to be autonomous or morally good: “a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same” (G 4:447).

3 There are other senses as well, such as political liberty and the transcendental freedom that underlies human moral responsibility. Both of these have important implications for education, but they are beyond the scope of this paper.

4 Reference to Rousseau and Kant are given with abbreviations, as follows. All references to Kant’s works are to the pagination in the Academy Edition of Kant’s works, by volume and page number. (This pagination is included as marginal pagination in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, from which all translations of Kant are taken.) Throughout, italics reflect emphases that are original to the works cited, while bold is used for my own emphasis.

Rousseau’s Works:

For Kant, however, liberty-as-autonomy is only the fullest, “positive concept of freedom” (G 4:446, see too MS 6:226). The bare capacity for self-governance, that is, the capacity to act in accordance with maxims one gives to oneself, is equally important within Kant’s moral theory. Sometimes this capacity is associated with a “negative” concept of freedom (e.g. G 446, MS 226), but the sense more important for this paper is the notion of freedom implicated in Kant’s so-called “formula of humanity,” which requires that you “so act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (G 4:429). In his argument for this fundamental law of respect for others’ humanity, Kant draws on a thinner concept of liberty, explaining that the humanity worthy of respect is the “will” considered as “a capacity to determine itself to acting in conformity with the representation of certain laws” oriented towards bringing about various ends (G 4:427).

Within Kant’s moral philosophy, then, there are two distinct but related concepts of liberty. First, there is liberty-as-autonomy, the positive freedom that consists in self-governance in accordance with the moral law and that alone is “good without qualification” (G 4:393). Second, there is liberty-of-choice, a negative freedom from determination by anything external, that capacity by which one can “use nature” for “all sorts of ends” (KU 5:430), or, more generally, to set one’s own ends and act in accordance with the pursuit of them. Constitutive of our “humanity,” this liberty-of-choice must be respected “always at the same time as an end, and never merely as a means” (G 4:429). In thinking about “liberal education,” then, we need to be clear about which sort of liberty our education is supposed to respect. For example, education might cultivate morally good agents (liberty-as-autonomy) or agents with the capacity for setting and pursuing their own ends (liberty-of-choice).

Even once we clarify what sense (or senses) of liberty are at stake, however, there is a further distinction between two different applications of the concept liberal to education, that is, two different ways that education can relate to liberty. Making liberty one’s “end” can be understood in a typical sense of end as something to bring about, so that one aims towards the cultivation of liberty. This makes sense in education, where education is thought of in terms of its results. A “liberal” education would be one in which students emerge with liberty, either in that they finish their studies more capable of pursuing a variety of ends (liberty-as-choice) or in that they finish more morally good (liberty-as-autonomy).

But this notion of an end to be brought about is, for Kant, secondary to a more fundamental sense in which we must respect humanity as an end. Allen Wood has helpfully described liberty-of-choice (humanity) in Kant as an “existent end.” As he explains,

We are tempted to think that the concept of an end is nothing but the concept of a not yet existing object … whose existence we desire and pursue … But we also include among our ends existing things … that we merely … do not act against, such as our own self-

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5 A similar distinction arises within what we might call Kant’s practical epistemology. There is that “enlightenment” whereby one has the “ability to make use of one’s own understanding without direction from another” (WA 8:35), that “calling of each individual to think for himself” (WA 8:36). But this thinking for oneself, while it might involve “a few falls” (WA 8:35), is ultimately supposed to be oriented towards genuine understanding of the truth. We must share our thoughts and think in communities of free thinkers in order to “assur[e] ourselves the truth of our judgment,” “test … the correctness of our own judgments,” and avoid being “exposed to error” (A 7:128-9).
preservation and bodily well-being. They are constantly ends for us, setting limits on what we are willing to do in pursuit of our other ends. (Wood 1999:116)

When I refrain from making a false promise to you, I respect you as an existent end. You have liberty-of-choice, but deceiving you into performing an action on false pretenses undermines your existent capacity for setting your own ends (in your own ways), so I cannot deceive you in that way. Thus a liberal education would be one that avoids acting against the existent liberty of one’s pupils (and others involved).  

There is thus a double problem of respecting liberty: How can one cultivate liberty as an end to be brought about (problem 1) and also respect liberty as an already existent end (problem 2)?

2. Rousseau and Kant on the double problem of liberal education.

Rousseau is attuned to both Kantian senses of liberty – as both choice as such and a morally-loaded autonomy – and acutely aware of the double problem of liberal education. For Rousseau, the goal of education is a kind of liberty-as-autonomy: a man “who knows how to conquer his affections; for then he follows his reason and his conscience; he does his duty; he keeps himself in order, and nothing can make him deviate from it,” one who has given up the “apparent . . . [and] precarious freedom of a slave to whom nothing has been commanded” and

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6 There is a simple terms for such violations of existent liberty in the name of consequent liberty (or other consequent goods): paternalism: “[W]hat makes paternalistic action objectionable – indeed, what makes is paternalism – is that such action consists in the imposition of a benefit, rather than the offer of one” (Schapiro 1999, 583). But one might think, as Tamar Schapiro has recently argued, that however inappropriate paternalism is in general, it is entirely appropriate in the context of children. To be paternalistic, after all, is to treat someone like a child. But there is nothing wrong with treating children like children.

7 As noted in footnote 1, this problem can arise for each sense of “liberty,” and in the next section, I show how Rousseau and Kant both (seem to) recognize it for both senses.

8 For the purpose of outlining Rousseau’s philosophy of education, I focus on his Emile, or On Education. Despite this seeming the obvious source for Rousseau’s views here, there are some complications worth noting. First, this is not the only work in which Rousseau discusses education (including parts of Julie, The Social Contract, The Government of Poland, and correspondence such as his Letter to Tronchin of Nov. 27, 1758). That said, Emile is clearly Rousseau’s most developed and most important contribution to education. Second, and more importantly, Rousseau himself claims that the work, despite its title, is not really a “real treatise on education” but a “philosophical work on the principle that … man is naturally good” (Letter to Philibert Cramer, 13 Oct. 1764, cited in (Dent 2005, 81)). Without denying that the work is also such a philosophical work, it is still the clearest exposition of Rousseau’s educational views. Finally, some have argued that the work is ironic, intended precisely to show “the impossibility of education” (Scuderi 2012, 26). While I cannot respond to that reading to Rousseau, I’ll simply note my disagreement with it. As idealized as this education it, I take it to be a serious albeit fictional description of what a realistic ideal would be (as Rousseau explicitly states at E I, 50-51). Finally, I ignore Rousseau’s claims in book V of Emile that girls should be educated differently than boys. An exploration of the ways in which girls’ education respects and cultivates liberty would reward further study, but it’s not the task of the present paper.
who is “really free,” having “become [his] own master” (E V, 444-5, cf. E IV, 325). Such a person, for Rousseau, will enjoy liberty-of-choice carefully regulated by his own self-governance in accordance with conscience: “Good instruction ought … to put us in a condition to choose well.” The education in *Emile* cultivates in its namesake just this sort of liberty, and the book as a whole is, in large part, a detailed investigation of the first problem of liberal education: what must one do to cultivate such an autonomous person?

But Rousseau is also attentive to the second problem of liberal education, how to respect the existing liberty of the child. Thus his educational theory is not merely oriented towards best achieving liberty as a goal. He rails against “that barbarous education which sacrifices the present to an uncertain future, which burdens a child with chains of every sort and begins by making him miserable to prepare him from afar for I know not what pretended happiness” (E I, 79, cf. V, 410-11, 443). Rousseau emphasizes the importance of this in a particularly morose way, through pointing out that “Of the children born, half, at the most, reach adolescence; and it is probable that your pupil will not reach the age of manhood” (E 79). But this concern with infant mortality, though real, is not Rousseau’s real justification for valuing existent goods in the child. Rousseau makes this clear when he objects,

One thinks only of preserving one's child … [but o]ne ought to teach him to preserve himself as a man … You may very well take precautions against his dying. He will nevertheless have to die. And though his death were not the product of your efforts, still these efforts would be ill conceived. It is less a question of keeping him from dying than of making him live. To live is not to breathe; it is to act; it is to make use of our organs, our senses, our faculties, of all the parts of ourselves which give us the sentiment of our existence. (E I, 42)

Even if it were reasonable to aim for future happiness, Rousseau asks, “how can one without indignation see poor unfortunates submitted to an unbearable yoke and condemned to continual labor like galley slaves, without any assurance that so many efforts will ever be useful to them?” (E I, 79). Instead, what we ought to do is to “be humane,” and that not in the paternalistic sense, but in the Kantian sense of respecting the humanity of children:

Love childhood; promote its games, its pleasures, its amiable instinct … As soon as they can sense the pleasure of being, arrange it so that they can enjoy it, arrange it so that at whatever hour God summons them, they do not die without having tasted life. (E 79, see too E38n)

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9 At least at this level, my reading of Rousseau is consonant with F. Neuhouser’s recent readings (see Neuhouser, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Origins of Autonomy 2011), (Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love 2008). Autonomy, in both Kant and Rousseau, requires making up one’s own mind but in relation to others (Neuhouser 2011, 489-92). However, as I’ll suggest later in note 17, I think that Neuhouser reads too much of the Social Contract back into Emile and thereby overplays the role of others’ judgment in Emile’s autonomy.

10 Throughout, I will use the masculine pronoun as a “generic” pronoun in the context of Rousseau’s philosophy of education. This will make transitions from quotations to my analysis smoother, but it also reflects the (deeply regrettable) fact that the Rousseauian respect for liberty in education on which I focus is a respect for liberty only in the education of boys. Rousseau has a very different account of the education of girls, and while there are ways in which Rousseau sees this education as genuinely liberal – in both cultivating and respecting the liberty appropriate to sex that is “passive and weak” (E V, 358) – my discussion of Rousseau here will be limited to his accounts of education for boys.

Rousseau does not have the same theory of “humanity” that Kant develops in the *Groundwork*, and he conflates (intentionally) the notions of life, agency, pleasure, being or existence, and happiness. But his general point is that one must respect the *existent* good of the child even while promoting his future good. And one ought never enslave the child for the sake of anything, even his own “good.” Rousseau’s education will be one that, at *every stage of life*, “accord[s] children more true freedom and less dominion” (E I, 68), one in which “Emile … in childhood did everything voluntarily and with pleasure” (V, 432).

For Kant, as for Rousseau, the cultivation of liberty – in both senses above – is the primary task of education. “The child must be reared [to be] free” (25:725). This rearing must “develop him both *pragmatically*, so that in the future he can look after himself and make his way in life, and *morally*” (MM 6:281). With respect to liberty-as-autonomy in particular, “the human being must . . . be *educated* to the good” (7:325) and “The acquisition of good character in the human being occurs through education” (LA 25:1172, see too 25:727).

Kant’s philosophy of education also seems to show respect for the existent liberty of children. Education is the development of pre-existing “germs” or “predispositions” within human beings (9:443, 445). And learning happens best when it happens through one’s own free activity:

> The best way of cultivating the powers of the mind is to do everything that one wants to accomplish by oneself; for example, … One understands a map best when one has to draw it oneself … one learns most thoroughly and retains best that which one learns as it were from oneself. (P 9:477)

At its ideal, Kantian education is an “auto-education” (P 9:477). And when it comes to *moral* education in particular, Kant makes this prescription that children learn from themselves a requirement rather than a mere ideal:

> In the formation of reason … one can bring forth a good deal from their own reason … [A]s soon as duty is concerned, … the reasons in question must be made known to them. However, … one must see to it that one does not carry rational knowledge into them but rather extracts it from them. (P 9:477)

Ideally in all education, but necessarily in moral education, “with the child one must first begin with the law that it has in itself” (P 9:944).

The next two sections focus on respect for existent liberty-of-choice, particularly as this plays out in young children. As we will see, Kant’s apparent support for auto-education does not apply to young children and does not primarily focus on liberty-of-choice. As it turns out, and in sharp contrast to Rousseau, Kant shows no respect for existent liberty-of-choice in children, and thus respect for liberty in young children (who are incapable of autonomy) only as an end to be brought about.12 In section five, we return to consider the role that liberty-as-autonomy plays in

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12 Superficially, Kant and Rousseau are the most similar – in terms of specific pedagogical practices – in their descriptions of early education. But philosophically, this period marks their sharpest divergence in pedagogical theory. They actually agree more with respect to other aspects of their educational theories,
shaping the conceptions of the role of discipline in early education. There I show that the
differences between Rousseau and Kant are due not merely to a different conception of
children’s capacities for choice, but to fundamental differences in the way each sees the liberty-
as-autonomy that is both the end of education and the highest virtue for human beings.

3. Command and Obedience in Rousseau’s Pedagogy

For Rousseau, a central implication of the emphasis on respect for existent liberty is the
diagnosis of the fundamental problem in our relationships with children, starting the moment
they are born, as a relationship of command and obedience.

Either we do what pleases him, or we exact from him what pleases us. Either we submit to
his whims, or we submit him to ours. No middle ground; he must give orders or receive
them. Thus his first ideas are those of domination and servitude. Before knowing how to
speak, he commands; before being able to act, he obeys. (E I, 48)

Commanded obedience is introduced into relationships with children (as into any human
relationship) either through the adult enslaving the child, demanding that he obey the adult’s
will, or through the child enslaving the adult (through the adult’s over-ready submission to the
child’s demands). Generally, in fact, this slavery happens in both ways, with adults submitting
to the whims of children and also requiring that children obey them. The result, for Rousseau, is
that children grow up with a sense that slavery and domination are natural facts of the social
world, that the only way one can interact with others is through forcing them to conform to one’s
own will or through conforming to theirs, or, again most commonly, through submitting to them
as a means towards eventually dominating them.

Against this tendency, Rousseau insists upon an educational program completely free
from commands on either side. The tutor must “Command him nothing, whatever in the world it
might be, absolutely nothing” (E II, 1). This command is absolute, such that Rousseau-the-

particularly for older children, despite the fact that for those children, Kant endorses very specific
pedagogical practices – notably the use of moral examplars and two different kinds of moral catechism –
that diverge considerably from Rousseau. Even in later education, however, where Kant does recognize
the need to both respect and cultivate liberty, this respect is limited to respect for existent liberty-as-
autonomy, and his overall approach even to respecting that liberty is much more consequentialist than
Rousseau’s. A full discussion of these aspects of their pedagogical theories would, however, go far
beyond the scope of the present paper.

13 Admittedly, Rousseau also does allow the use of force against children, though only when strictly
necessary:

Let the bridle that restrains him be force and not authority. Do not forbid him to do that from which
he should abstain; prevent him from doing it without explanations, without reasonings. What you
grant him, grant at his first word, without solicitations, without prayers — above all, without
conditions. Grant with pleasure; refuse only with repugnance. But let all your refusals be irrevocable;
let no importunity shake you; let “no,” once pronounced, be a wall of bronze against which the child
will have to exhaust his strength at most five or six times in order to abandon any further attempts to
overturn it.” (E II, 91)
tutor not only does not command Emile to perform or refrain from any actions but even abstains from telling him to believe anything about the world:  

Do not give your pupil any kind of verbal lessons; he ought to receive them only from experience. Inflict no kind of punishment on him, for he does not know what it is to be at fault. Never make him beg pardon, for he could not know how to offend you. Devoid of all morality in his actions, he can do nothing which is morally bad and which merits either punishment or reprimand. (E II, 2)

Most generally, “it is important for a child to do nothing because he is seen or heard — nothing, in a word, in relation to others; he must respond only to what nature asks of him, and then he will do nothing but good” (E II, 2-3). The child “ought to do only what he wants” (E II, 120). The problem, of course, is not merely that adults seek to command and enslave children, but also that they excessively submit to the whims of those children. Rousseau points out that “there is quite a difference between obeying children and not thwarting them” (E I, 66), insisting that while not thwarting children by forcing their obedience, one ought also not submit to their every whim (e.g. E II, 87, 121). One reason for not enslaving oneself to a child is simple self-respect on the part of the adult, but the reason for refraining from submission that Rousseau emphasizes in Emile is that such submission ends up being a new form of thwarting children. Since children are in the process of constructing their sense of the world, a child who is constantly obeyed naturally thinks of himself as being capable of exercising power over the world through others’ wills, and he then cannot help but see the refusal of aid as a personal affront, an imposition of the will of another against his exercise of his own natural powers. The child who has only to want in order to get believes himself to be the owner of the universe; he regards all men as his slaves. When one is finally forced to refuse him something, he, believing that at his command everything is possible, takes this refusal for an act of rebellion. (E II, 87)

The child is right in feeling affronted, since one’s refusal takes away what the child has come to see – through one’s own actions – as a power of its own. In the end, as Rousseau claims to have “said a hundred times,” children should be “[n]either obeyed nor commanded” (E II, 121).

For Rousseau, there are two quite different kinds of justification for this maxim of slavery-free education, one related to the effects of slavery, and the other to its intrinsic cruelty and injustice. The effects of enslaving the child are devastating for his moral cultivation. From A thorough investigation of the difference between the exertion of force over the bodily movements of a child and the assertion of authority over the will of the child is beyond the scope of this essay. Put briefly, however, most of the force that is used is passive or indirect, a matter of not providing something the child wants or of constructing the environment so that it resists the child. Even then force is used directly, which will be rare, it never requires any deference of the will of the child to the will of the adult. The adult is, for the child in these cases, akin to a force of nature.

Thus Rousseau emphatically rejects the paternalism Tamar Schapiro seems to think inevitable in our relationships with children, where however much we might seek to persuade them of a course of action, eventually we require that they give in to our commands (see especially (Schapiro, Childhood and Personhood 2003, 577)).

I have cut Rousseau’s qualification of this claim: “but he ought to want only what you want him to do.” See note 14 for discussion of Rousseauan manipulation in education.

There is a related argument that could be made for the more epistemic versions of liberty, that is, for the
being enslaved, the child develops resentment and hatred towards his masters, and his desires are only exacerbated:

The perpetual constraint in which you keep your pupils exacerbates their vivacity. The more they are held in check under your eyes, the more they are turbulent the moment they get away. They have to compensate themselves when they can for the harsh constraint in which you keep them. (E II, 92)

Even worse, the child can develop “the crawling and servile submission of a slave” (E II, 161, cf. 2D II, 177, SC I.2.8, p. 43), within which children grow accustomed to servility as a means for advancing their own wills. By contrast, “In leaving him the master of his will, you will not be fomenting his caprices” (E II, 120).

But the reasons not to enslave children or let one be enslaved to them are not merely oriented toward the future avoidance of caprice and cultivation of autonomy. Rousseau repeatedly emphasizes the present benefits and intrinsic justness of a slavery-free relationship with the child: “I act for his good in the present moment by leaving him free” (E II, 87). In explaining why, for instance, he will allow Emile to be like the “little rascals playing in the snow, blue and numb with cold, hardly able to move their fingers,” who, importantly, are free to “go [inside] to get warm,” Rousseau does appeal to future benefits from this activity: “I act for his good in the future by arming him against the ills he must bear.” But his primary justification is focused on the present, on the fact that “If [the children] were forced to [warm themselves], they would feel the rigors of constraint a hundred times more than they feel those of the cold” (E II, 87). Rousseau not only sees the primary good of the child as a liberty-of-choice, but sees this as a good that the child, even from birth, is capable of enjoying, and that the tutor must therefore, even from birth, respect for its own sake. For Rousseau, liberal education is not only an education that aims for liberty, but one that always respects it. His ideal is that education that at once “is in no way detrimental to freedom and engenders no vices” (E II, 85).

Before closing this section, I must discuss two apparent exceptions to Rousseau’s prohibition on command and obedience, both of which are, to different degrees, exceptions that prove the rule. The first exception to the prohibition on domination is that Rousseau does issue a command to Emile, one and only time. This commanding takes place when Emile is already an adult, has fallen in love with Sophie, and is ready to marry her. Rousseau commands him, saying “Emile, you must leave Sophie [for a while]” (E V, 447, 448, 449). Three features of this exception to Rousseau’s general principles help highlight his general rule. First, this obedience comes only at the very end of a process of education that has left Emile “not … accustomed to desire one thing and to will another” (E V 448). Emile has first learned his own will, his own strength, his own liberty, before being asked to submit to another. Second, precisely because he already knows himself and his power, he is free even in obedience. His submission to Rousseau derives only from his own strength of will combined with his own attachments and commitments. It is his own “reason, friendship, gratitude, countless affections,” and even his “self-love” and “habit” that bind Emile to Rousseau (E IV, 316). Finally, this exception shows Rousseau’s recognition of an important feature of (Kantian) liberty-as-autonomy. It is precisely through this strength of will over desire that Emile’s education towards autonomy is completed, since it is precisely here that notion that the child needs to learn everything from experience rather than from lessons. On the one hand, this is the most effective way to gain knowledge; on the other, it is the only way to respect the child’s already-existent cognitive capacities.
Emile comes to recognize and exercise genuine self-control. But even though this is a submission to another, precisely because it comes at the end of a long process of knowing himself and because it is elicited voluntarily, it can be an exercise of control by another that is at once and already a self-control. Rousseau emphasizes that “the child will treat as a caprice every will opposed to his own when he does not appreciate the reason for it” and that “a child does not appreciate the reason for anything which clashes with his whims” (E II, 91n). Thus any control of a child will be an infringement upon liberty. But Emile has grown up, and he can understand a reason that transcends not only his whims but even his deep passion, so his submission – if we even want to call it that – is not servile but liberal.

The second apparent exception to Rousseau’s prohibition on domination is his pervasive, disturbing, and oft-noted use of manipulation in Emile’s education. Rousseau’s solution to the double problem of education involves an environment that seems slavery-free from the perspective of the pupil. But Rousseau exerts incredible levels of control behind the scenes, ensuring that Emile does what he needs to do by virtue of the “natural” necessities of his surroundings rather than the commands of Rousseau. This requires cultivating the kind of observant and affectionate relationship with Emile whereby Rousseau can anticipate how to best steer him into various behaviors and can inspire compliance without command or explicit control. Ultimately, Rousseau says, Emile should “do only what he wants; but … want only what you want him to do” (E II, 120). And that can seem like the worst form of slavery, where one is completely controlled by another without even knowing that this control is occurring.

The problem is made worse by Rousseau’s frequent use of “ruse” (E IV, 316). Throughout Emile’s whole education, Rousseau pretends to be motivated by his (Rousseau’s) own pleasure, when in fact he constantly moved by pedagogical goals: e.g., “I work with him, not for his pleasure, but for mine; at least he believes it to be so” (E II, 98, bold added). And Rousseau gets Emile to engage in activities by partly concealing foreseen and even intended effects of those activities. Thus to teach Emile lessons about private property and contract, Rousseau “encourages” Emile’s desire to plant beans, all the while knowing that the beans will be ripped up by the gardener, whose melon seeds he and Emile – he knowingly, Emile unknowingly – have uprooted (see E II, 98-100). Part of teaching Emile geography is getting him to see the usefulness of such knowledge, something Rousseau does by “suggest[ing] to him a walk before lunch” wherein they “get lost,” and Rousseau uses Emile’s desperation and hunger to nudge him towards finding the way home by means of his knowledge of geography and astronomy. And in a particularly important – because “repeated in countless ways” – episode, Rousseau, apparently passively, lets Emile embarrass himself in public by trying to outsmart a “magician.” But the apparently passive Rousseau actually cultivates the skills by which Emile thinks he can outsmart the magician, and knowingly lets Emile fall into the magician’s embarrassing trap (see E II, 173-5). In all of these cases, Rousseau knows that Emile is heading down a path that will lead him to suffering (but also learning), and he even encourages Emile down this path, but conceals from Emile his real reasons for doing so, feigning ignorance and genuine interest in the immediate activities of the moment.

There is something amiss about this manipulation on the part of Rousseau, but these methods are consistent with genuine respect for the liberty of the child in at least one very important sense. What is essential for Rousseauian respect for the active life and free choice of the child is that he allows his pupil to make his own decisions. Coercive force and authoritative command undermine this liberty-of-choice, but Rousseau’s manipulations do not. Emile makes his own choices. Of course, one might object that, as in many cases of deceptions, Emile does
not really make the choices he thinks he is making. One fails to respect the existent liberty-of-choice of another not only when one forcibly takes their money but also when one falsely promises to repay them money. In the latter case, they think they are consenting to lend money, when in fact they are giving money, and one might say something similar about Emile, that he thinks he is going on a walk, but he is really learning the importance of geography. But most of Rousseau’s manipulations are not akin to false promising, but rather to the case where one asks to borrow money, fully intending to repay them, while remaining silent about what one plans to spend the money on. That sort of behavior is perfectly respectful, even if, were they to know what one were going to spend the money on (perhaps to outbid them for an item at auction that they want), they would not lend it. They willingly choose to lend money now in exchange for repayment (perhaps with interest) later; later regret does not that they did not know what they were choosing.

In the case of his interactions with Emile, Rousseau’s “deception” and manipulation are of generally of this sneaky but permissible sort. When he suggests planting beans, it is to an Emile who does not yet know the value of private property and who therefore would not even be able to understand the future threat that the gardener poses to his bean-planting. Were Rousseau to say to Emile before planting the seeds, “We don’t yet know whether we have a right to use this land, so perhaps we should solicit that before planting beans,” Emile would simply not understand what he is saying. Emile deliberately plants the beans, and he cannot make sense of his action in any other terms until after he has had the experience of his property being destroyed. When Rousseau suggests taking a walk before lunch (to teach the value of geography), Emile “does not ask for better. Children are always ready to take a run” (E II, 180). And in the case of the magician, Rousseau simply lets Emile try to outwit the magician. Throughout, Rousseau insists that teachers must not actually lie to their pupils.

Let your responses always be solemn, short, and firm, without ever appearing to hesitate. I do not need to add that they ought to be true. One cannot teach children the danger of lying to men without being aware of the greater danger, on the part of men, of lying to children. A single proved lie told by the master to the child would ruin forever the whole fruit of the education. (E IV, 216)

Even in manipulations effected for the sake of cultivating future liberty, Rousseau is (generally) careful not to cross the line into genuine deception or that sort of manipulation that prevents his pupil from making his own choices for reasons that he perceives to be good ones and that are realized in the situations Rousseau provides.

Of course, there are limits to the extent to which this kind of manipulation can be genuinely respectful. One who deliberately holds back crucial information that would be relevant to another’s decision-making is sometimes failing to respect their humanity. If I borrow money fully but over-optimistically intending to repay but not informing my creditor about other crushing debts that will have priority over my debt to her, I likely thwart her will. And society is full of situations where economic conditions, social pressures, or various other influences can compromise another’s ability to choose for themselves, even when one does not explicitly assert one’s authority. Some cases with Emile might fit into this category of manipulation that fails to respect liberty. For example, Rousseau clearly fails to follow even his own strict prohibition on lying when it comes to claims about himself, such as when he asserts, “I don’t know” (E III, 206)

Arguably, Rousseau’s description of the initial social contract in the second Discourse describes just such a case (see 2D II, 171-2), and a deliberate invocation of such a contract by parties well aware of its effects would certainly be an unjust infringement on liberty, even if “willingly” entered into.
or in his constant feigning of intrinsic motivation, which requires at least dissembling if not direct lying. But these missteps do not undermine his general and principled commitment to respect for his pupil’s choice, a commitment he maintains even when, for the sake of his pupil’s safety and to cultivate his future liberty, he constructs situations so that Emile’s choices will be “only what [Rousseau] want[s] him to do.”

4. Discipline in Kant’s Pedagogy

Despite Kant’s claim that “If [children] are soundly reared, then they are reared in the way that Rousseau wants to have it,” (25:726), he does not agree with Rousseau when it comes to command and obedience, or what Kant calls “discipline”: “man is an animal, who requires discipline, without which he grows up to be not unlike a wild animal, and this is where Rousseau makes a mistake” (25:447, quoted in Moran 2012:141). Kant so sharply contrasts with Rousseau’s absolute prohibition on issuing commands to the child that Kant sees the main point of early education in teaching the child to obey commands. Kant puts this in terms of “discipline,” which “must … begin early” (25:753) and “changes animal nature into human nature” (P, 9: 441). But this discipline is

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18 I have put a particularly positive spin on Rousseau’s use of manipulation here in order to draw the contrast with Kant, but there is one aspect of Rousseau’s whole regime of manipulation that is both essential to his pedagogy and fundamentally opposed to most conceptions of respect for liberty. In particular, Rousseau’s manipulation must be essentially secret because Emile must believe himself to be his own master, or his autonomy will be undermined by a constant attention to others’ opinions of him. Emile’s blindness to Rousseau’s manipulation secures for Rousseau a more solid control over Emile’s will, which is instrumentally valuable later. And more fundamentally, this blindness allows Rousseau to accomplish all his particular goals for Emile – teaching him the value of private property or basic principles of geography and astronomy – without undermining the most important aspect of Emile’s character, his sense of dependence upon himself alone in all his choices. Were Emile made aware of Rousseau’s constant manipulation, even if he still undertook the lessons, he would undertake them as a pupil, rather than as the independent person Rousseau wants him to think himself to be. In that sense, Rousseau’s use of manipulation helps solve the double problem of liberal education only if kept secret, because Rousseau can let Emile make all his own choices (respecting his existent liberty) while promoting Rousseau’s own pedagogical goals (hence developing his future liberty). But the importance of secrecy about the nature of manipulation shows the limits of Rousseau’s solution. Rousseau respects existent liberty in appearances, but fails to accord that full respect that is called for by Kant’s formula of humanity, a respect wherein

All actions relating to the rights of others are wrong if their maxim is incompatible with publicity … For a maxim that I cannot divulge without thereby defeating my own purpose, one that absolutely must be kept secret if it is to succeed … is not right. (EF 8:381-2)

This feature of Rousseau’s use of manipulation is thus a real problem, albeit less of a problem for considering the double problem of liberal education than Kant’s overt dismissal of children’s existent liberty. For a discussion of children’s liberty that incorporates many of Rousseau’s other emphases but avoids Rousseauan problems for manipulation, see my (Author, in preparation-b).

19 This discipline is related to what Kant calls “ethical ascetics” in his Metaphysics of Morals. Kant says little there about what role education per se has in ethical ascetics, even emphasizing “the training (discipline) that a human being practices on himself” (6:485, bold added), but his description of the “Ethical gymnastics, which consists only in combatting natural impulses sufficiently to be able to master them when a situation comes up in which they threaten morality” (6:485) is precisely what discipline in education aims to accomplish, and it is this regular combat against natural impulse that, Kant claims, not
fundamentally a matter of getting children to obey: “all freedom notwithstanding, [the child] must learn to obey, and to subjugate itself passively to the order, for example, the observances and customs of the school and household” (25:725). In terms of pedagogy, Kant takes this quite far, saying “I shall accustom my pupil to tolerate a constraint of his freedom” (P 9:453) and even insisting that

Through discipline the human being is submitted to the laws of humanity and is first made to feel their constraint. But this must happen early. Thus, for example, children are sent to school initially not already with the intention that they should learn something there, but rather that they may grow accustomed to sitting still and observing punctually what they are told, so that in the future they may not put into practice actually and instantly each notion that strikes them. (9:442)

As this recommendation makes clear, the discipline that children learn is not merely submission to moral laws laid down by reason, nor even, as one recent commentator has put it, that “children will learn that they have the capacity to restrict their use of their freedom when this is necessary to accommodate others’ freedoms” (Moran 2012: 150, see too 160). Rather, children learn submission to whatever the “observances and customs” of the school happen to be. The point here is not learning to obey good laws, but just learning to obey laws as such.20 Kant even emphasizes the extreme passivity and blind obedience of the student undergoing discipline. Whereas in later moral education,21 “[o]ne must see to it that the pupil acts from his own maxims[, so education] is passive for the apprentice, [who] must be obedient to the direction of someone else” (P 9:475). Discipline is a kind of “compulsion” (A709/B737-38) calling for a “passive obedience” that becomes “obsequiousness”22 towards one’s teachers (P 9:452 and

only helps us do without pleasure but also, and more specifically, “makes one valiant and cheerful in the consciousness of one’s restored freedom” (MS 6:485).

20 Kant even says that when it comes to moral laws in particular, one must be much more careful about how one solicits obedience than with these merely arbitrary laws. Thus, for instance, punishments are appropriate for merely customary laws, and can help establish the discipline that is a precondition of moral formation, but punishments and rewards should not be used for properly moral laws, since they will confuse the child about the status of those laws (which is that they are to be obeyed for their own sakes and not for any punishment or reward). See P:475, 483-4.

21 For the purpose of this paper, where my focus is on early childhood education, I pass over these later stages of moral education, within which Kant is more respectful of existent liberty. Even in those cases, he primarily respects only the emerging liberty-as-autonomy – particularly the capacity for moral judgment – rather than the liberty-of-choice of pupils, and Kant maintains the parental right over children “akin to a right to a thing” even at these later ages. Moreover, there is little indication that the regime of discipline actually ends when children reach the age of reason (approximately 8 or 10 on Kant’s account, see KpV 5:155 and TP 8:286). Even once the child has a functioning higher faculties, Kant insists that parents retain “the right … to manage and develop the child, so long as he has not yet mastered the use of his … understanding” (MS 6:281, bold added).

22 The notion of Unterwürfigkeit is translated in the Cambridge edition as “obsequiousness” only in Kant’s Pedagogy; elsewhere it is translated as “submission” (e.g. Anth 7:268), submissiveness (R 6:177) or – particularly when used to describe our obedience to the moral law – “subjection” (G 4:439, KpV 5:82). The connection between its use here and in other passages (particularly in G and KpV) is crucial for Kant’s overall point about the pedagogical role of obsequiousness before one’s teachers as preparation for subjection to the moral law.
Insofar as existent liberty shows up at all in Kant’s discussions of discipline, it is a danger to be suppressed rather than an expression of dignity to be respected.

Now by nature the human being has such a powerful propensity towards freedom that when he has grown accustomed to it for a while, he will sacrifice everything for it. And it is precisely for this reason that discipline must, as already said, be applied very early; for if this does not happen, it is difficult to change the human being later on. He then follows every whim … If he is allowed to have his own way and is in no way opposed in his youth, then he will retain a certain savagery throughout his life. (9:442, see too 9:449).

Here Kant recognizes the childhood desire for freedom, but insists that precisely this desire must be crushed; the child must learn, from early on, to submit, to subordinate his own choices to those of others.

Moreover, there is no limitation of discipline to rules that children can understand for themselves. Whereas an older child investigating moral examples or learning the moral catechism(s) “must at all times comprehend the ground of the action and its derivation from the moral law” (P 9:475), children under discipline “do not need to exercise reason …[,] must not reason about everything …[,] and] do not need to know the reasons for everything which is meant to make them well-educated” (P 9:477). Elsewhere, Kant explains – in sharp contrast to Rousseau’s exhortation that one must “let the child do nothing on anybody’s word” (E III, 178) but rather teach him to always ask “What is that good for?” (E III, 179) – that “School is compulsory culture … Even if the child does not see immediately how this compulsion is useful, nevertheless in the future it will become aware of its great usefulness” (P 9:471). This comment is striking not only because of Kant’s insistence that children need not understand what they are required to do, but also because, in this case, what Kant insists will be useful is not primarily the culture that the child acquires, but specifically the compulsion whereby he is forced to do what he does not choose. Kant reemphasizes this point with a specific rejection of Rousseau’s exhortation to follow the natural impulses of the child:

One talks a lot about having to present things to children in such a way that they might do it from inclination. In some cases this is certainly good, but there is also a great deal which one must prescribe to them as duty … Even if the child is unable to understand the duty, it is nevertheless better this way. And that something is its duty as a child, it may well understand, but it will be harder for it to understand the that something is its duty as a human being (P 9:482)

Children, even if they cannot understand the actual value of various rules, can readily understand...

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23 Kant tries to mitigate the forcefulness of his exhortations to discipline by insisting that “Education must be compulsory, but this does not mean that it must be slavish” (P 9:472, see too 9:464). But this qualification is not sufficient to make discipline genuinely respectful of existent liberty.

24 Again, this is quite unlike that later moral education that will take place through moral examples and the moral catechism.

25 Kant goes on to say that “as soon as duty is concerned, the reason in question must be made known to them” (P 9:477). Again (see previous note), the point is that one can learn obedience through discipline in non-moral contexts, which prepares for obedience to moral laws that one understands for oneself.
their “duty as a child,” which is to obey their teachers and other authorities, and this obsequiousness is and should be a perfectly suitable ground for them to act. Partly because the reasons for compliance will not be understood by the child, Kant emphasizes that obedience can and will be secured through punishment until the necessary obsequiousness is internalized: “Every transgression of a command by a child is a lack of obedience, and this brings on punishment. Even in the case of a careless transgression of the command, punishment is not superfluous” (P 9:482). Kant is, of course, well aware that there is a kind of obedience that derives from genuine respect for an authority and an understanding that his rules are good:

To the character of the child, especially of a pupil, there belongs above all things obedience. This is twofold: first, obedience to the absolute will of a leader, but also second, obedience to the will of a leader who is recognized to be reasonable and good. Obedience can be derived from constraint, and then it is absolute; or it can be derived from confidence. (P 9:481)

But while Kant admits that “voluntary obedience is very important,” he emphasizes that “the former [non-voluntary obedience to an absolute will] is also extremely necessary” (P 9:481-2). Overall, the regime of discipline is one within which the child is passively and submissively obedient to rules given by others the purpose of which the child does not understand, for disobedience to which he will be punished.

Kant’s justification of imposing discipline is based on its role in solving the first problem of liberal education, that is, in terms of its consequences for the moral development of the child: “Discipline or training changes animal nature into human nature” (P 9:441). More particularly, “discipline … consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires” (KU 5:432). The general point is that to be truly human is to transcend one’s sensible desires and to be “free enough to tighten or loosen them … as the ends of reason require” (KU 5:432, see too P 9:442, 449). The “freedom” towards which “by nature the human being has such a powerful propensity” (P 9:442, see too Anth 7:268) is not initially that liberty-as-autonomy which is the highest aim of education but rather the crudest sort of liberty-of-choice, whereby one “follows every whim” (9:442) and is in a state of “Savagery,” or “independence from laws” (P 9:442, VA, Friedländer, 25:723-4). Because our natural love of liberty-of-choice precedes the development of our reason (moral and even pragmatic), there is a danger that children will develop habits of liberty that will make being governed – even by their own reason – impossible later. Discipline, by curbing the inclinations and forcing children to submit their momentary choices to a higher law, prepares them for a future when they will be able to control their inclinations in the light of those higher laws, both moral and prudential, that they legislate for themselves.

For Kant, curbing the free exercise of choice in the service of inclination is an urgent task. Because of the strength of humans’ natural propensity towards freedom, if he has grown accustomed to [unfettered liberty-of-choice] for a while, he will sacrifice everything for it. And it is precisely for this reason that discipline must, as already said, be applied very early; for if this does not happen, it is difficult to change the human being later on. He then follows every whim. (P 9:442)

The importance of early discipline is emphasized repeatedly in Kant’s lectures on pedagogy:

The human being must be accustomed early to subject himself to the precepts of reason. If

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26 Quotation continues: “, by which we are made, attached as we are to certain things of nature, incapable of choosing for ourselves, while we turn into fetters the drives that nature has given us merely for guidance in order not to neglect or even injure the determination of animality in us, while yet we are free enough to tighten or loosen them … as the ends of reason require.”

27 As we will see in section 4.5, it also prepares them for submitting to political laws with which they disagree, but that’s of secondary importance.
he is allowed to have his own way and is in no way opposed in his youth, then he will retain a certain savagery throughout his life. (P 9:442)
Omission of discipline is a greater evil that omission of culture, for the latter can be made up for later in life; but savagery cannot be taken away, and negligence in discipline can never be made good. (P 9:444)

One can make up for neglect of cultural education, and even for other failures of moral education (such as the failure to inculcate the moral catechism or expose children to casuistical instruction). But failures of discipline establish savagery as the basic character of a person, and after the practice of lawless freedom has become a habit, there is little that can be done. One is doomed, like the “savage not yet habituated to submission,” to “the state of continuous warfare, by which he intends to keep others as far away … as possible and to live scattered in the wilderness” (Anth 7:268).

Given its importance to solving the first problem of liberal education, Kant might be forgiven for subordinating the problem of how to respect existent liberty in one’s pupils. But Kant also has other reasons for refusing to consider the existent liberty of children under a regime of discipline, and it is crucial that he have such reasons. Given Kant’s moral theory, within which the humanity of every person must be treated as an (existent) end and not a mere means, he cannot justify a coercively enforced regime of control over children merely on the grounds of its beneficial effects, even effects that are beneficial to the one coerced. So although Kant primarily emphasizes these positive effects, he also offers intrinsic reasons that imposing discipline on children is morally acceptable.

In particular, children are unlike adults in that they simply do not have existent liberty of the kind worthy of respect. For Kant, it is not mere desire that constitutes our “humanity,” but the ability to reflectively choose on the basis of maxims. Even when, for instance, one respects the non-moral choices of others to pursue the objects of their animal impulses, one respects these choices as the choices of beings who can reflect on and affirm those impulses in the context of an overall conception of their own good. But children are not, for Kant, capable of any such choice. They lack reflection: “at the beginning physical constraint must take the place of reflection, which is lacking in children” (P 9:483). Further, even insofar as they might have rudimentary reflection, the lack a capacity to form a coherent and sustained life-plan:

[T]he human being … has no instinct and must work out a plan of conduct for himself. However, since the human being is not immediately in a position to do this, because he is in a raw state when he comes into the world, others must do it for him. (9:441)

Tamar Schapiro, in developing a Kantian account of child, has put the point particularly well: Paternalism is prima facie wrong because it involves bypassing the will of another person … But if the being whose will is bypassed does not really “have” a will yet, if she is still internally dependent upon alien forces to determine what she does and says, then the objection to paternalism loses its force. (Schapiro 1999:730-31, see too Schapiro 1999:729 and 2003: 583)

In the case of young children, for Kant, there really is no second problem of liberal education. Because children, at least when very young, lack wills, there is nothing there to respect. So the only task is to discern the best ways to prepare the young primates (for they are still animals) to become autonomous human beings. And discipline is the first and most important step in this
process, the step whereby they become capable of governing themselves in accordance with rules rather than impulse.

5. Discipline, Pedagogy, and the Nature of Autonomy

Kant’s moral theory defends a notion of respect for the humanity of others that provides resources to articulate the double problem of liberal education, how to cultivate liberty as a goal while also respecting existent liberty. But with respect to childhood education, it is Rousseau – and not Kant – who puts forth a solution to that double problem. Kant’s emphasis on discipline denies the present of existent liberty in children, focusing entirely on cultivating habits of self-control that will serve the interests of future agency. The different between Kant and Rousseau is not merely, however, a difference in their attitudes towards respecting the liberty-of-choice of children. Instead, the different attitudes towards discipline in early childhood reflect more fundamental differences between these two thinkers regarding that other liberty—liberty-as-autonomy—towards which, according to both, education aims. In this paper, I focus on two central differences between Kant and Rousseau regarding the nature of autonomy, differences that help explain these thinkers’ disparate attitudes towards discipline.

The first fundamental reason for the difference between Kant and Rousseau on moral education relates to the psychological origin of autonomy for each. For Kant, moral autonomy is grounded in practical reason, which is an independent “faculty” or “power” rooted in a basic natural predisposition intrinsic to the human species but emergent only upon maturity. Even the much more complicated “predisposition to personality” (see R 6:27-8), which includes not only practical reason but the affective and volitional components of moral life, emerges independently of the other predispositions as a basic (set of) power(s) of its own. For Rousseau, by contrast, virtue and thereby autonomy is a power derived from the modification of other more basic features of our psychology, including our reason but also—and more prominently—our pity, amour propre, and self-love. As a result, the characteristics essential to morality are present in

28 For one thing, even where Kant does endorse educating in ways that are respectful of the existent liberty of (older) children, his pedagogy differs from Rousseau’s both in the kind of liberty that is respected and in the justification for that respect. In particular, Kant’s respect is only for liberty-as-autonomy, rather than for the liberty of choice of his students. And Kant’s justifications for respectful pedagogical practices are almost exclusively instrumental rather than intrinsic, treating them as the most effective means for cultivating future autonomy, rather than as morally required in their own right. Thus the strong insistence that “bring forth a good deal from their own reason” (P 9:477, cf. too e.g. KpV 5:154-61, MS 6:477-84) is an appeal to students’ autonomous reason rather than a respect for their choice, and the aforementioned endorsement of auto-education is based on the consequences for learning of letting children learn for themselves: “one learns most thoroughly and retains best that which one learns as it were from oneself. (P 9:47).

29 For the sake of length, I have limited myself to these two explanations of the different attitudes towards discipline in Kant and Rousseau. There are several others, as well. Rousseau and Kant differ, for instance, on the role of Nature, the value (or lack thereof) of historical progress, and the proper relationship of the citizen and state. In all of these cases, differences in their broader philosophical commitments contribute to their attitudes towards discipline. Because a full discussion of these other aspects of their philosophies would make this paper unwieldy, I have focused on what is most important to the role of discipline in pedagogy: their differing conceptions of moral autonomy.

30 For further discussion of this point in connection with Kant’s empirical psychology more generally, see Author 2014.
childhood in different ways for each. For Kant, practical reason exists in young children only as a merely potential “germ” waiting to unfold; thus there is literally nothing existent to respect in children. For Rousseau, by contrast, children already have existent forms of various elements of morality (particularly self-love) that can be respected even in infancy.

To begin with Kant, Kant’s empirical psychology\(^{31}\) is based on a conception of the human mind as organized into distinct and irreducible mental powers that are grounded on biological “natural predispositions.” For Kant, psychologists must “derive[e] diverse powers, which we know only through observations, as much as possible from basic powers” (28:564), but Kant emphasizes that psychology must not overly reduce powers to a too few basic ones: “there must be several [basic powers] because we cannot reduce everything to one” (29:773-822).\(^{32}\) These powers are “basic” in that they cannot be further explained in terms of other cognitive elements. Autonomy is based on the ability to act on the basis of the moral law, but this ability is a distinct “basic power” (KpV 5:47) in Kant’s psychology. Moreover, this power of moral motivation is not active in the earliest years of one’s life; it is “lacking in [very young] children” (P 9:483). Because moral motivation is a distinct basic power that is either functionally present or not, there is nothing in children corresponding to the moral capacity that will eventually be worthy of respect. And as a distinct power, it is strongest, as Kant explains, when purest (see KpV 5:156-7), so encouraging any other active abilities of young children will only interfere with the future strength of morality. Children whose moral predisposition has not yet emerged are capable only of animal liberty,\(^{33}\) and animal liberty is a liberty that must be – and legitimately can be – suppressed for the sake of its future subordination to the moral personality that will emerge on its own. But once the predisposition to personality develops, all moral education – such as in the use of examples and the catechisms – must appeal to the child’s innate moral sense, and only that moral sense. Any appeal to other elements of the child’s motivational psychology will only weaken the force of this distinct basic power (see e.g., G 4:412, KpV 5:156-7, TP 8:286, MS 6:483).\(^{34}\)

Rousseau, by contrast, sees the capacity for virtue emerging from other basic human predispositions. These particularly include motivational drives of self-love (e.g. E IV 213, 235), amour propre (E IV, 252), and pity (E IV, 232-3, 253), and cognitive capacities such as reason and the imagination,\(^{35}\) but the capacity for virtue even draws on such mundane characteristics as physical strength and dexterity. There is no separate moral predisposition: “the first voices of conscience arise out of the first movements of the heart, and … are hence only an ordered development of our primitive affections” (E IV, 235). A person’s virtue (insofar as a person has virtue) is intertwined with all of that person’s motivational and cognitive characteristics; a virtuous person must have well-developed self-love, pity, amour propre, imagination, and reason, and virtue just is the way that these elements of a unified character express themselves. Thus to

\(^{31}\) For much more detail on Kant’s empirical psychology, see (Author 2005) and (Author forthcoming).
\(^{32}\) This is part of Kant’s objection to the Leibnizian-Wolffian psychology of his day that saw all human mental states as various forms of cognition.
\(^{33}\) Strictly speaking, this need not be true. There is a power of acting on maxims that is prior to our capacity to act on specifically moral maxims. In his discussions of young (pre-moral) children, however, Kant typically treats them as having merely the desires – and liberty – of animals.
\(^{34}\) I have discussed these other elements of Kant’s philosophy of moral education in Author 2014.
\(^{35}\) For an excellent discussion of the cognitive (including sensory) components of virtue, see (Hanley 2012)
respect “humanity insofar as it is capable of morality” is to respect this whole package. Since various of these elements are present even from birth, there is something there worthy of respect. 36 And since they together make up the child’s future autonomy, respecting them in the child is a way of directly fostering the strength of the autonomous, moral will.

Related to this difference in the psychological seat of that conscience by which one autonomously governs oneself, Kant and Rousseau differ markedly when it comes to thinking about the primary threat to autonomy. For Kant, the primary threat is inclination, or better, a tendency to give license to inclination. For Rousseau, the primary threat is foolish amour propre, particularly in the form of an inability to judge and decide for oneself as opposed to slavishly following opinion. Put another way, for Kant, the main challenge for governing oneself is becoming governable, while for Rousseau, the main challenge is asserting one’s self as the governor.

Given that, for Kant, morality is rooted in a distinct natural predisposition, there is a sharp distinction between morally-practical reason and other cognitive and volitional predispositions in human beings, and a corresponding insistence that the morally appropriate relationship between these predispositions is one of subordination.

The law … imposes itself on him irresistibly, because of his moral predisposition; and if no other incentive were at work in him, he would also incorporate it into his supreme maxim as sufficient determination of his power of choice … He is, however, also dependent upon the incentives of his sensuous nature because of his equally innocent natural predisposition, and he incorporates them too into his maxim … Hence the difference, whether the human being is good or evil, must not lie in the difference between the incentives that he incorporates into his maxim … but in their subordination…: which of the two he makes the condition of the other. It follows that the human being (even the best) is evil only because he reverses the moral order of his incentives in incorporating them into his maxims. (6:36, see too 6:32)

Human beings act in the light of various different volitional predispositions, but whatever other predispositions are operative in a given case, our predisposition to personality ensures that the “moral law” is something “of which we become immediately conscious … as soon as we draw up maxims of the will for ourselves” (KpV 5:29). The key to genuine – that is, morally good – liberty-as-autonomy is to learn to subordinate our innocent natural predispositions to our moral one.

We might see this threat to autonomy as the inclinations themselves, and Kant sometimes discusses inclinations in ways that suggest they are direct threats to autonomy: “the inclinations

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36 Recently, Kantians have (rightly) argued for a conception of Kantian moral agency that is more integrated that the language of subordination and suppression might suggest. Barbara Herman (see (Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment 1993) and (Herman, Moral Literacy 2007, especially chapter 1)) has been at the forefront of this more integrated conception of Kantian agency. Even Herman, however, to be true to Kant, must see the structure of agency as involving the structuring of one’s whole character by a morally-practical reason that exists as an independent faculty, one not constituted by developed faculties of self-love, pity, etc.
themselves … are so far from having an absolute worth … that it must instead by the wish of every rational being to be altogether free of them” (4:428) and “the inclinations … are always burdensome to a rational being, and though he cannot lay them aside, they wrest from him the wish to be rid of them” (KpV 5:118). But elsewhere, Kant specifically emphasizes that all these inclinations are, like morality itself, tied to various “predisposition[s] to the good” (R 6:26).

And he specifically rejects the view (which he arguably held earlier) that inclination per se is a moral problem: “Considered in themselves, natural inclinations are good, i.e., not reprehensible, and to want to root them out would not only be futile but harmful and blameworthy as well” (R 6:58). Evil comes not directly from inclination, but from the act of will that subordinates morality to inclination.

Particularly in this more subtle formulation, the primary threat to liberty-of-autonomy is a certain attitude towards the inclinations, a love of liberty-as-license wherein one acts on all one’s particular impulses. In Kant’s moral philosophy, he refers to this attitude as “self-conceit,” whereby one makes “claims to esteem for oneself that precede accord with the moral law” (KpV 5:73), but the attitude is equally recognizable in that love of liberty-as-license wherein people, including children, act without (moral) self-restraint. The root of all evil, we might say, is the tendency to give license to inclination. A fundamental task of moral education, then, will be the curbing of this liberty-of-license. Even if inclinations themselves are not vicious, the tendency to give them free sway in one’s life is the root cause of evil. As Kant puts it in a lecture on ethics: “what, now, is the subjective condition for the performance of duties to oneself? The rule is this: seek to maintain command over yourself … Man must have discipline” (LE 27:360, cf. MS 6:407-8).

This account of the primary source of moral failing helps us see why Kant is so adamant, in his pedagogy, on the cultivation of obedience, of limiting the freedom of inclination (see P 9: 442). In young children, the predisposition to personality has not yet emerged as a motivational force, so its strength cannot be cultivated. But the non-moral predispositions (to animality and, increasingly, to humanity) have emerged, and children can already learn to subordinate inclination, even if only to the reason of another. But since subordination is really the hard part of morals – after all, one’s moral reasoning is a natural predisposition that will come with age – this is precisely the most important thing to learn (see MS, 6:484-5). Thus one must discipline one’s inclinations from an early age – even prior to the emergence of the moral predisposition – so that they will be prepared to be “obsequious” or “submissive” to the moral law when it enters the scene.

In sharp contrast to this Kantian picture, Rousseau could not even make sense of the notion of disciplining all one’s inclinations, since morality itself is merely an internal modification and integration of these inclinations. When Emile learns to “conquer his affections” and “follows his reason and his conscience” (E V 444), the conscience that he

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The difficulty of controlling one’s inclinations in the light of principles is also tied to the importance of developing character as part of moral cultivation. For discussion of the role of character in moral formation, see (Munzel 1999), (Munzel 2012), Author 2006, Author 2013.
follows is precisely “an ordered development of … primitive affections” (E IV, 235). For Rousseau, neither inclination/affection nor a tendency to give in to affection as such can be a threat to autonomy, since autonomy will involve precisely the assertion of some sets of affection over others. But there is a different but equally serious threat to autonomy for Rousseau, one that arises from what Rousseau calls amour propre, or better, a specifically foolish amor propre.

38 For an account of this contrast between Rousseau and Kant that largely shares my view that Rousseau sees morality as inseparable from self-love while Kant sees it as a distinct power, but that takes a very strongly pro-Kant reading of that difference between the two thinkers (and a somewhat overly simplified view of Rousseauan self-love), see (Munzel, Kant's Conception of Pedagogy: Toward Education for Freedom 2012).

39 I prefer the term “foolish” (e.g. “rich fools” at E 244) to Neuhouser’s (and now Kolodny’s) “inflamed.” While some ways in which amour propre can be foolish involve its becoming particularly intense, one can have a foolish amour propre that is weak and passive or cold and calculating, for neither of which cases does the active and intense language of “inflamed” strike the right chord in my ear. (Also, for Rousseau, the notion of “inflaming” passions is not generally a bad one – see e.g. E 316, 323, though cf. E 247 – while a “fool” is always to be despised (or pitied, or both.).

40 The role of foolish amour propre in generating excessive passions that threaten virtue is shared by Kant, but even in this area of agreement with Rousseau, Kant’s emphasis reflects a quite different conception of the way that the passions of social life undermine autonomy. Kant points out how passions inflamed by competitive social life threaten moral virtue in his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason:

If he searches for the causes and the circumstances that draw him into this danger [of moral evil] and keep him there, he can easily convince himself that they do not come his way from his own raw nature, so far as he exists in isolation, but rather from the human beings to whom he stands in relation or association. It is not the instigation of nature that arouses what should properly be called the passions, which weak such great devastation in his originally good predisposition. His needs are but limited, and his state of mind in providing for them moderate and tranquil. He is poor (or considers himself so) only to the extent that he is anxious that other human beings will consider him poor and will despise him for it. Envy, addiction to power, avarice, and the malignant inclinations associated with these, assail his nature, which on its own is undemanding, as soon as he is among human beings. Nor is it necessary to assume that these [other human beings] are sunk into evil and are examples that lead him astray: it suffices that they are there, that they surround him, and that they are human beings, and they will mutually corrupt each other’s moral predisposition and make one another evil. (R 6:93-4)

This passage almost seems like it could have been lifted straight from Emile; it certainly shows Kant’s enduring sensitivity to Rousseau’s insight about the dangers of that amour propre wherein one evaluates oneself in the light of anxiety about how others see one and this anxiety gives rise to the passions that corrupt moral life.

But Kant and Rousseau differ fundamentally about the sort of threat that socialization (and amour propre) are. In particular, as noted above, Rousseau sees two main ways in which foolish amour propre threatens virtue. For one thing, foolish amour propre gives rise to foolish and exaggerated passions that are hard to set aside for the sake of virtue. Even Rousseau’s one proper passion – his love for Sophie – nearly undoes him. But one with foolish and inflamed amour propre has “unbridled desires” and “devouring passions” that are in principle insatiable and contrary to duty: “He covets everything … is envious of everyone … [and] want[s] to dominate everywhere” (E IV 229). For Rousseau, this danger of amour propre is extremely serious, but it is not the most serious threat to autonomy. That most serious threat comes not from desires that are hard to resist, but from an incapacity for self-control. One improperly defended against the corruption of amour propre never learns to judge for himself. Such a fool, even were desires weak enough to be controlled by duty, has no “conscience and reason” of his own
Amour propre is a “modification” of self-love that Rousseau distinguishes from self-love in general in that while self-love is focused solely upon procuring the good for oneself – initially only self-preservation but eventually anything one takes to be good – amour propre is a “relative sentiment” that “makes comparisons” (2D, fn XV, 218; E IV, 213, 235). At least in theory, self-love can be self-sufficient, where one seeks to have what is good without relation to others. But amour propre is intrinsically related to others in two important respects. First, amour propre seeks, as its object, a certain standing relative to others. It is when Emile begins “to compare himself with” others that “love of self turns into amour propre” (E IV, 235). [*Second, amour propre includes a desire for recognition of one’s comparative status by others.*]({#}) Thus merely

“written in the depth of his heart by conscience and reason” (E V, 473). The best that he can do is subordinate his desires to “positive law,” whether legal or merely societal. The best that he could attain would be to become the “denature[d] man,” the “citizen of Rome” from whom society has “take[n] his absolute existence … in order to give him a relative one and transport the I into the common unity, with the result that [he] believes himself no longer one but a part of the unity and no longer feels except within the whole” (E I, 40). Whatever we are to say of such a person – and for Rousseau, he is better off than most of us – he is not the product of a liberal education.

For Kant, by contrast, the most serious threat of the passions is to self-control. The most serious threat is precisely the cultivation of desires and passions that are unsatisfiable without vice and generally insatiable even in principle. The passions cannot undermine the existence of a conscience of one’s own, since such a conscience is part of one’s innate natural predisposition. They merely represent “attacks” or “assaults of the evil principle” against which one “must … remain forever armed for battle” (R 6:93). And, strikingly, precisely because the primary threat is to the control over passion rather than to any diffusion of personal identification with the moral law, Kant’s suggestion for combatting the socially-induced threats is more and more intensely intimate social life, “an enduring and ever expanding society, solely designed for the preservation of morality by counterracting evil with united forces” (R 6:94). Such a society involves mutual exhortation to virtue and that “plain rational faith which can be convincingly communicated to everyone” (R 6:103), a “church” or “ethical community” (R 6:102) that works together to promote virtue in all.

Rousseau might be able to allow for such a church or ethical community for various reasons, but he could not see it as addressing the primary threat to liberty-as-autonomy arising from social life. In such a community, one who lacked the independent judgment of Emile would perhaps, like the citizen of Rome, come to live a well-ordered life, but he could never come to have genuine self-control, since the constant moral exhortations from others would be foolishly absorbed rather than wisely measured against his own – never developed – touchstone of conscience. And Kant could not see Rousseau’s solution to threat of social life – particularly the careful management of amour propre through the avoidance of slavery – as a serious solution to the problem he diagnoses. For Kant, Rousseau’s solution merely exacerbates the problem by strengthening non-moral predispositions through lack of discipline and misguided moral direction. What is needed to combat social incentives to vice is social structures fostering virtue.

[41] Rousseau generally focuses on those forms of amour propre that lead to vice and error, and in those contexts emphasizes that one seeks superiority to others, and Frederick Neuhouser has recently made a strong case that at least some sorts of superiority are desires in amour propre (see e.g. E 213, 235; Neuhouser 2008:151). But its most general structure is simply, as Niko Kolodny and others have put it, to have “a certain value in comparison with others” (Kolodny 2010, 169), see too e.g. (Cohen 1997).

[42] See E I, 39–40, IV, 213–14, but contrast e.g. E V, 338 and RJJ 175. At present, there is a sharp divide in the literature between those (particularly (Neuhouser 2008, passim, esp. p. 33) who see the striving for recognition by others as central to amour propre and those (Cooper 1999, 137–50) who deny that amour propre necessarily seeks recognition from others at all. I follow (Kolodny 2010, 169) in adopting
“preferring ourselves to others” would be insufficient; one “also demands others to prefer us to themselves” (E IV, 214). As Niko Kolodny has explained, “generic amour propre” is “A desire to have, and to be evaluated by others as having, a certain value in comparison with others” (Kolodny 2010:169, cf. Neuhouser 2008: 13, 29-45).

Amour propre can become foolish in many different ways, and it threatens autonomy in many ways. 43 For example, our natural desire for a certain standing with others can become the desire for a superiority over others that is unsatisfiable in general. And amour propre, whether exaggerated in this way or not, can giving rise to foolish and unnatural desires based on a desire to impress others (see e.g. E IV, 212). Rousseau notes, for instance, that “amour propre produces more libertines than love does” (E IV, 331, see too e.g. E IV, 244). But the primary way in which amour propre becomes foolish and thereby undermines autonomy is by fostering an undue deference to opinion, which, for Rousseau, is “the grave of virtue” (E V, 365). It is primarily insofar as amour propre leads us to “depend very much on opinion” that it generates excessive desires and “hateful and irascible passions” (E IV, 214). But more fundamentally, excessive deference to opinion undermines autonomy by preventing one from judging for oneself in practical matters.

Rousseau emphasizes, throughout Emile, the importance of preserving Emile’s ability to judge and choose for himself. The negative education that “leav[es] natural habit to his body” does so in order to “Prepare from afar the reign of his freedom … by putting him in the condition always to be master of himself and in all things to do his will, as soon as he has one” (E 63). As Emile cultivates his powers of mind and body during early adolescence, Rousseau resists any forms of instruction that would allow Emile to learn from others, so that “Forced to learn by himself, he uses his reason and not another’s; for to give nothing to opinion, one must give nothing to authority, and most of our errors come to us far less from ourselves than from others … What is more useful to him, he takes more seriously; never deviating from this way of evaluating, he grants nothing to opinion.” (E III, 207). Later, Rousseau’s primary goal as Emile enters the moral order is that “enclosed in a social whirlpool, he not let himself get carried away by either the passions or the opinions of men, that he see with his eyes, that he feel with his heart, that no authority govern him beyond that of his own reason.” (E IV, 255). In summarizing his aspirations for what Emile will become, he emphasizes that while Emile “knows where he ought to find the happiness of his life and how he can contribute to the happiness of others …, he will hardly seek advantages which are not clear in themselves and which need to be established by another’s judgment” (E IV, 339). Given his emergent amour propre, he desires esteem from others, but “He will not … say … ‘I rejoice because they approve of me,’ but rather … ‘I rejoice because they approve of what I have done that [I can see] is good … So long as they judge so

43 Even while “amour propre is a … dangerous instrument,” however, it is still “useful” in education (E IV, 244). Rousseau’s view is not, as some claim, a matter of protecting self-love from being “distorted by amour propre” (e.g. Munzel 2012, 97). For Rousseau, the pity which, when universalized, is conscience, is just a particular modification of amour propre: “Let us extend amour-propre to other beings. We shall transform it into a virtue” (E IV, 252). A full discussion of the ways amour propre functions positively for the cultivation of virtue is beyond the scope of this paper. For different ways of making sense of Rousseau on this point, see, e.g., Cohen 1997, Kolodny 2012, and Neuhouser 2008.
soundly, it will be a fine thing to obtain their esteem” (E IV, 339). In sum, “Emile…values nothing according to the price set by opinion” (E IV, 338). Even at the close of Emile’s education, Rousseau emphasizes that Emile will find the laws by which to govern himself in his own heart:

the eternal laws of nature and order do exist. For the wise man, they take the place of positive law. They are written in the depth of his heart by conscience and reason. It is to these that he ought to enslave himself in order to be free … Freedom is found in no form of government; it is in the heart of the free man. He takes it with him everywhere. (E V, 473; see too E V, 382)

For Rousseau, human beings are constantly vulnerable to the danger of giving up their own point of view for the sake of the opinions of others. In early childhood and infancy, one’s weakness, reliance on others, and frequent enslavement by them exacerbate this danger. And the danger becomes even more acute as amour propre awakens us to directly care for others’ opinions. One can preserve autonomy and avoid succumbing to the foolish amour propre that merely absorbs the opinions of others only through taking one’s own conscience and reason as one’s ultimate touchstone. 44

44 In laying out in this paragraph my textual case that a, and arguably the, primary focus of Emile is the cultivation of a capacity to judge for oneself, I take issue, at least in emphasis, with Frederick Neuhouser’s recent reading of Rousseau’s practical philosophy. Neuhouser has recently argued that autonomy depends upon relinquishing one’s “moral sovereignty” to the judgments of the general will (Neuhouser 2011, 489-90), such that autonomy is achievable only insofar as the individual moral reasoner views herself as but one participant, possessing limited authority equal to that of all others, in what is an essentially collective quest to determine what is right and to legislate the principles that specify our obligations (Neuhouser 2011, 492)

[For human beings, successfully determining one’s actions in accordance with reason cannot be separated from winning esteem from others. Knowing oneself as obeying reason and being recognized as rational by one’s associates are coincident phenomena. (Neuhouser 2008, 255)]

Neuhouser recognizes, of course, the many passages from Emile that “make … the ideal of self-sufficiency … loom so large over Emile’s education” but claims that “the rational self-sufficiency alluded to in these passages is presented as a goal of Émile’s education in books III and IV” so that “self-sufficiency may be the supreme pedagogical objective at one stage in Emile’s life but not the only, or even the highest, ideal that the man of reason will embody at the end of his education” (Neuhouser 2008, 256-7).

But the insistence on self-sufficiency in reasoning comes not only in books III and IV, but also in book V (e.g. E V, 382, 473), and there is nothing in Emile that suggests a higher form of education within which Emile comes to form his judgment with ultimate deference to the opinions of others. As Niko Kolodny has rightly pointed out, “Dependence upon Opinion” remains the consistent threat to autonomy throughout the later stages of Émile’s education (Kolodny 2010). Neuhouser’s fundamental mistake is in taking “the Social Contract’s description of how the citizen … is constituted … [as] a picture of what Rousseau thinks is involves subjectively in submitting oneself to … the demands of reason” (Neuhouser 2008, 191). Thus Neuhouser reads Rousseau’s description of autonomy in Social Contract I.8.1, p. 53) as implying that one is an autonomous person only as a citizen in a well-ordered state, while I take Emile and the Social Contract to provide two different but mutually compatible (and best when combined) routes to autonomy, one pedagogical and the other political.
Thus while for Kant, the hard part of self-governance is getting one’s inclinations to submit to being governed, for Rousseau, the hard part is asserting the self in governance. And this difference helps explain the different attitudes towards discipline in early education. If the most significant threat to liberty-as-autonomy is conformity to the opinions of others, then education must protect against this threat. And for Rousseau, one of the most important ways to protect against this threat is to avoid forcing the child to conform to one’s own opinion of what is best. Rousseau, like Kant, sees subjection as something to which one can become habituated. But for Rousseau, it is precisely such habitual subjection that is most to be prevented. Thus rather than subjecting the child to one’s own opinions and seeking to redirect that obedience onto

In the end, the difference may fundamentally be one of emphasis. Neuhouser concedes that “Emile, takes the capacity for independent, self-determined judgment as its primary concern; it is no exaggeration to say that the central question of Emile is how it is possible to educate human beings so as to make them capable of thinking or judging for themselves” (Neuhouser 2011, 491). He goes on to say,

What autonomy requires, then, on Rousseau’s account is individuals who are capable of independent moral judgment but who at the same time recognize that their own considered judgments about which laws are best for them are fallible and that, as long as those judgments remain the judgments of only a few, they lack the authority to constitute law and to impose obligations on others. In other words, autonomy requires of individuals both the capacity to judge for oneself and the disposition to adopt an attitude of suspicion towards one’s own moral judgments when they diverge from others’. This attitude towards one’s own judgments can also be described as an attitude one takes towards others: achieving autonomy involves adopting an attitude of respect towards the judgments of others, a respect that consists in granting a certain, though by no means absolute, authority to the judgments of others, including those that diverge from one’s own. (Neuhouser 2011, 491, cf. Neuhouser 2008, 256-62)

In my view, this is basically correct, but it misplaces the emphasis, at least for a philosophy of education. Within political philosophy, where co-governance is required and autonomy is the autonomy of a citizen, it is crucial to defer to the opinions of others about the general will. But for the individual moral autonomy of ordinary life, what is much more important is to resist such deference, listening instead to the “eternal laws of nature and order … written in the depth of [the wise man’s] heart by conscience and reason [and] found in no form of government” (E V, 473). Kolodny rightly, I think, balances the deference to others with independence of judgment in a better balanced way:

In repudiating Dependence on Opinion, Rousseau need not be taken to repudiate all reliance on others’ judgments, which seems not only unreasonable but also at odds with much of Rousseau’s thought. Consider, for example, the citizen’s epistemic deference to the majority (SC 124/OC 3.441). Epistemic deference can differ from Dependence on Opinion, first, in attaching to judgments about subject matters other than one’s self-worth and, second, in being based on some independent evidence of the reliability of the judgments deferred to (such as that the majority has the characteristics of the general will). (Kolodny 2010, 185n25)

Ultimately, whichever emphasis one takes in terms of the rational ideal for the well-educated man, what is most important is yet another concession of Neuhouser’s, which is that, for Rousseau and quite unlike for Kant, “the … capacities [for deference to others] come much more naturally to humans [that those of independence] and so pose less of a challenge for education than instilling in them the virtues of self-sufficiency” (Neuhouser 2007, 260).

This difference also helps explain their quite different views about polite society. While Rousseau sees the cultures of manners and politeness as mere shams that cultivate all the worst vices of society, Kant sees polite necessary as a helpful and even necessary exercise in cultivating self-restraint, one that can prepare a person for genuine virtue (see MS 6:473; for discussion see Author 2005).
the child’s own reason, Rousseau insists that children must be protected from subjection to others so that they will be able to *have* a reason of their own at all.

### 6. Conclusion

Rousseau and Kant share the view that education should be liberal in that it should aim for the cultivation of liberty, particularly liberty-as-autonomy but also a broader liberty-of-choice, in one’s pupils. But they differ markedly with respect to the extent to which *existent* liberty should be *respected* in one’s pupils. While Rousseau endorses the goal of developing an education that is doubly liberal – both respecting existent liberty and cultivating future liberty – Kant ends up dismissing the necessity for respect of existent liberty-of-choice in young children. One result is a radical divergence when it comes to the role of discipline in the education of children. In part, this divergence is explicable in terms of the different conceptions each thinker has about the kinds of liberty-of-choice that ought to be respected and the kinds that children are capable of. But these differences also closely relate to fundamental differences in the conception of liberty-as-autonomy that is at once the highest end of education and a central concept in each thinker’s moral theory. In this paper, I have traced two dimensions of each philosopher’s conception of autonomy that help explain their divergence with respect to the treatment of young children. Rousseau integrates conscience into human beings’ whole set of affective and cognitive capacities, while Kant sees conscience as rooted in a pure practical reason that is a distinct and irreducible basic predisposition in humans’ bio-psychological make-up. And while Rousseau sees amour propre with its all-too-common tendency to encourage excessive deference to opinion as the primary threat to *autonomy*, Kant sees the inclinations with our all-too-common tendency to accord them license as the primary threat to *autonomy*.