Genealogies of Morals

Lecture Notes for 9/10/01

(Mandeville)

I. Recap from Moses, Paul, Aquinas. (Skip in lecture, post to web.)

Moses: In Moses we saw the importance that genealogy can play in the justification of a set of moral beliefs. According to Moses's account, the Ten Commandments (and the rest of the Law) were given by God to the Israelites after God rescued them from Pharoah with many miracles. All the elements of this genealogy feed into the justification of the Commandments, since the power of God and God's concern for the Israelites, as well as God's potential for blessing and cursing them, were all shown in the story that led to the establishment of the Commandments among the Israelites. The importance of this genealogy can be seen in Moses's commands that the Israelites teach the stories to their children when the children ask about the Law.

Paul: Paul's concern with reaching out the Gentiles led him to downplay the importance of Moses's genealogy for the justification of morality. For Paul, the fact that morality is the law of God might have some influence on its justification, but this law is found "written on the hearts" of all people. We look to our conscience for morality, and even if there is some sense in which the ultimate origin of conscience is God, it doesn't seem to matter to Paul how human beings came to have a conscience. The point is just that we have one. In that sense, genealogy is unimportant from the standpoint of justifying moral law.

Aquinas: In Aquinas's conception of the natural law, Paul's doctrines are spelled out in more detail. The law written on the hearts of all is the natural law, which both proceeds from God -- since it is a part of God's eternal law -- and proceeds from people themselves -- since human beings are "provident" for themselves. Again, as in the case of Paul, Aquinas is not too concerned with how God implants this natural law in human beings. It comes from reason, to be sure, but Aquinas's account of natural law does not seem to commit him to any particular account of how humans came to have the particular moral reason that they have. God must somehow be responsible, but our moral reason (or as Aquinas will say, our "practical rationality") could be brought about in us through evolution, or social conventions, or psychological manipulation . . . or so it would seem.
Aquinas does have an account of divine law, which does seem to depend on a particular sort of genealogy for its legitimacy, but this is not the only sort of law there is.

II. The Enlightenment.
Several factors came together in the 16th and 17th centuries and led to some major changes in Europe, European philosophy, and European genealogies of morals. To list just a few:
A. Scientific Revolution - challenged the understanding of the natural world that was central for Aquinas. Also opened a new standard by which knowledge could be measured. Science seemed to provide models of right thinking, which raised the issue of what the right sort of moral reasoning would be.

B. Reformation - challenged the authority of the Church. Collapsed any sort of consensus on how to interpret Scripture, so that revelation became a less reliable source of morality. Aquinas thought -- as we saw and questioned last week -- that divine law is more certain than natural law. But the problems of interpretation posed by the Reformation led to a collapse in the certainty of particular moral precepts derived from revelation. This led many to turn to the natural law as a potentially more stable source for morality than revelation.

C. Political Splits - political divisions between kingdoms, and the rise of powerful aristocrats and bourgeois, led to a desire to formulate political principles both for international law and to legitimate or suppress rebellion. Because many of these divisions were based on religious controversy, natural law -- rather than divine law -- seemed a fruitful source of these principles.

D. Discovery - the discovery of the New World, not to mention greater contact with the peoples of Africa, Asia, and the South Pacific, led people to reflect on the universality of morality. Deeper encounters with "savages" led to reflection on the real differences between such peoples and the "civilized" folk of Europe. The diversity of moral customs around the world led to moral skepticism, which was promptly argued against, while the similarity between peoples led to renewed confidence in some sort of natural law. All in all, the people of Enlightenment Europe - from whom most of us are descended, at least in mindset even if not literally - were infatuated by the notion of savages and the emergence of civilized man, and this fascination will find its way into many of the genealogies of the period. In particular, people like Hobbes and Locke, who we will not read, as well as Rousseau, who we will read, talk about a "state of nature" as opposed to the civilized state in which we find ourselves.

• Natural law stuff is crucial for reasons B-D, and A gives new models for how one might go about thinking about natural law.
• A leads to interest in genealogy because there seems to be something very scientific about genealogical approaches to thinking about ethics. If we can figure out where something comes from - whether that something is a star or a moral code - it should help us understand what that thing is. Thus the origin of morality might, or so was the hope, give us a better understanding of the nature of morality and, if we are lucky, even a justification for it.
  Of course, a scientific exploration of morality will not make use of the sorts of religious premises that a story like Moses's takes for granted, so we get a whole set of secular enlightenment accounts of the origin of morality.

Does genealogy seem like a particularly scientific way to study morality? Why?

As we saw in Moses, we can approach the issue of morality from several angles, and all of these are important in the Enlightenment.
(1) What is the content of morality? Generally, people during this period still accepted the basic moral principles of Christianity, though there were a few exceptions. The real issue here was where these moral principles were to be found. In particular, people questioned what the "heart" is upon which the law was written. As we saw last week, Paul is not very clear on this point. Aquinas seemed to make things easier when he identified this heart with practical reason. In the Enlightenment, there were really three major options: Reason (Clarke, Spinoza, Kant), the "Passions" (Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, in some ways Hobbes) or Laws and Customs (Montaigne, in some ways Hobbes).
(2) Where does morality come from? (Genealogy.)
(3) What is the status of morality? Is it justified, etc...?

III. Mandeville, Rousseau, Hume, Smith, and Kant.
All very important enlightenment figures. Mandeville and Smith were very influential on development of economics. Hume wrote a major history of England. Rousseau helped shape the ideology of French Revolution. Kant is often considered the last great Enlightenment thinker, or even the first post-Enlightenment thinker. All three wrote genealogies of morals, accounts of where the moral convictions we have come from. All three wrote "secular" genealogies that do not necessarily depend on God, though - as we will see in the case of Mandeville - this does not mean that God is totally left out or excluded from genealogy. In the case of Hume and Smith (as we will see), these genealogies contribute to a justification of morality. In the cases of Mandeville, Rousseau, and Kant, the relationship is more complicated.
Both Mandeville and Rousseau were taken to be undermining morality, and both responded that they had no such intention. Unlike Moses, whose genealogy - if true - seemed to support morality, Mandeville's and Rousseau's genealogies might be taken to undermine it. In our discussions of these thinkers, we will explore closely the issue of whether and to what extent these genealogies undermine morality. In particular, we will think about the sorts of justifications that these genealogies undermine.

IV. Mandeville.

A. His life. (Most of this is taken from the Introduction to the Liberty Fund edition of Mandeville.)

Baptized 20 November, 1670 (so born shortly before), in Rotterdam (Holland), of noble blood. Intended to study medicine but ended up philosophy (it's never too late!). He still ended up practicing medicine, focused on "hypochondriack and hysterick diseases." When to London, learned the language, and decided to stay. He was married to an englishwoman, and little else is known for sure about his life. But there are a lot of rumours.
One contemporary (J.W. Newman) said, "His own life was far from being correct . . . an indulger in gross sensuality."

Ben Franklin said: "Dr. Lyons carried me to the Horns, a pale alehouse in -- Lane, Cheapside, and introduced me to Dr. Mandeville, author of the "Fable of the Bees," who had a club there, of which he was the soul, being the most facetious, entertaining companion."

He died at the age of 63, possibly of influenza.

B. His writings, the Fable.

1. Story of the Fable.
As Mandeville himself notes, the Fable was initially published alone, as a short cheap tract. These were very common in London at the time, and were often means for gaining popularity, influencing public opinion in general, or influencing public policy. As Mandeville responded to criticisms, this short tract grew into a massive two-volume treatise!

2. The Fable and its moral. Its consequence for morality?

Fable. Bees are a great society, but lots of corruption and vice. The gods make people all just, and gradually the whole society falls apart, till no one has anything but bare necessities and they are so weak they are easily chased out of their hive, which they don't mind because they can just move to a little tree stump, not so nice as the hive.
The point is that the vices led to the industry that helped the hive thrive (see 25).

A couple other points about the fable
(1) note the importance of deception and appearances. Everyone is vicious and knows they are, but hides it (see 26, 21, 23)
(2) note the importance of politics (24-25).

Moral. Someone else, what's the moral?
Here it is crucial to note that Mandeville consistently insists, in his moral, that the point of the fable is to show that two things are inconsistent. We cannot be both great and honest, cannot have both the benefits of pride and no pride, and that vice is beneficial found where the people would be great. He does not actually say that we should be vicious, or that we should put up with some lack of virtue, only that the costs of virtue will be significant for society as a whole.
This point is central to Mandeville's response against those who took him to task for the Fable. (See 6-7, 12-13 . . . but note the caveat there as well!)

C. Writings, the "Origin of Moral Virtue."
1. The genealogy itself: Moral virtues are the political offspring that which Flattery begot upon Pride.

Note that there are really two stages:
(I) Some group of Lawgivers and wise men (p. 42) get the whole thing started.
Why? 42@29, they need some cheap reward to get people to act the way they want.
Thanks to human pride, people will act for flattery, which is cheap (42,54-55)
Note too (42) that justification is not enough to get actual obedience. The genealogy accounts for why we actually do take morality seriously, and Mandeville just assumes (rightly?) that merely knowing something is right will not be enough.

How? (43) Instruct them in honor and shame, teach them to lift themselves above brutes, divide species. Note how psychological all this is. Mandeville uses his experience of psychology (remember, he dealt with mental illness) to construct techniques for getting people to adopt a moral system. (See the brilliant comparison of morality with etiquette on 53-54.)

What? What should the Lawgivers teach people? See 47 top. To make people easy to control. See too 47-48.

(2) Once people start praising each other for virtue, the system is self-perpetuating, even once the original rulers are gone.
The virtuous will praise virtue. Why? (See p. 45)
The vicious will praise virtue. Why? (See p. 45, 47-48)

2. The implications for morality?

3. Another important caveat . . . this is all only for natural morality. Mandeville brackets the issue of divine revelation. (See 40, 50) Do you think he is genuine? Do you think he might suppose a different genealogy for some peoples? Does it matter? If his genealogy is enough, which seems more likely as a story for how England came to have morality, Moses or Mandeville? Also, not that Mandeville argues that God can be the direct origin of morality only for Jews or Christians. Is this what a good Christian should say?

Also, note last paragraph (p. 57). Mandeville claims that this genealogy actually shows the greatness of God as origin of morality . . . God is so Wise because he uses man's weakness to promote morality!! Is this plausible? Could Aquinas and Paul agree?

D. The reception and Mandeville's response.
1. How did you all respond?
Reception.
He was taken to be attacking morality by many. Many also focused on his apparent claim that everyone always acts for bad -- especially selfish (though this seems illegit to me) -- motives, his extreme cynicisms -- clear in the references to the difference between appearances and reality.
Why might this be the reception?

2. How would you think Mandeville should respond?
His response. (P. 4, 6, 8-9, 12-13, 57)

V. Issues for discussion:
1. How plausible is the genealogy? Do you think Mandeville intends it to be taken literally? If so, how literally? If not, why would he write it?
(In this context, point out that even if it is not literally true -- see caveat on 46 -- that there were some primary lawgivers who tricked everyone else, the genealogy could still provide a good account of why human beings continue to perpetuate morality. That is, we might still think that the reason that we have morality today is that pride and flattery continually beget that pride in us, even if the political structures that initiated this flattery have been incorporated into the ordinary lives of ordinary folk, so that we no longer need people to get the flattery going.)

2. What are the implications of the genealogy, if it is true? What kinds of justifications for morality does it undermine?
In this context, you might think of some of the following justifications:
1. God gave the law to us so we should obey it.
2. We will go to hell if we do wrong.
3. We will be better off on the whole if we do what it right.
4. [clarke] it is part of the nature of things that we should act certain ways (e.g. debtors should repay debts.)
5. Society as a whole will be better off if we are virtuous.
More??

3. Is believing this genealogy consistent with believing that God wrote the moral law on our hearts, or on our reason? (See 57.)

VI. Appendix: Mandeville vs. Locke vs. Hobbes on the State of Nature and Civilized Condition.

Mandeville: SN: No moral concepts, people motivated solely by passions, life is not too bad, not too good.

....................Civilized Condition: Notions of Virtue and Vice, people motivated solely by passions (but pride leads them to act virtuously), life is full of prosperity, misery, the appearance of virtue, and lots of vice under the surface.

Hobbes: SN: no moral concepts, people motivated just by passions, life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."

...............Civilized Condition: notions of right and wrong, people motivated by passions (but fear of punishment leads them to act in accordance with laws), life is generally pretty good.

Locke: SN: The state of nature is already moral, with property rights, etc. The civilized condition just takes care of problems related to enforcement and deciding disputes.