Chapter Eleven: Normativity

In the last three chapters, we have looked at several approaches to thinking about human beings that foundered on problems related to normativity. As a result of work in the biology and psychology, we now understand, better than ever before, how the human mind – as an empirical object in the world – works. Through the study of human history and, more generally, of human diversity, it is increasingly clear that the biological and psychological characteristics of human beings admit of extremely wide variations in very basic categories in terms of which human beings think about and govern action within the world. And philosophical developments over the past 100 years, especially the important influence of existentialism and deconstruction, has challenged traditional philosophical dualisms and at the same time driven home the difficulty, and perhaps even impossibility, of fully determining the “nature” of human beings.

Even with all of these developments, however, normative issues have not gone away. Insofar as human sciences (whether biology or history or anthropology) purport to provide anything like knowledge of human beings, they appeal to some sort of epistemic standards. Moreover, as forms of life, the practice of these sciences involves appeal to some sort of volitional standard. Even those not directly involved in these scientific and philosophical development need – at least now that you have read this far in this book! – to decide what to make of them. And in any case, as reflective thinkers, feelers, and actors, we find ourselves – again, especially if you’ve read this far – needing to decide what to think, feel, and do in our lives. As the existentialists rightly show, even the refusal to see oneself as needing to make such decisions is an exercise of freedom, albeit in bad faith.

Unfortunately, none of these developments provide, in themselves, the tools for deciding how we ought to think, feel, and act in the light of them. Even if evolutionary biology shows how and why humans evolved to care about one another, this does not in itself help us determine whether such caring is a trait to be fostered or resisted. And even if historical analyses show how modern physics developed through the overturning of a Newtonian paradigm, how modern conceptions of penal justice developed, or even how human beings as subjects emerged; historical analysis alone cannot tell us whether to believe the claims of modern physics, embrace current conceptions or penal justice, affirm modern subjectivity, or reject one (or all) of these developments. Comparison of different ways of thinking and acting across lines of gender, race, or culture, likewise, can reveal the contingency of these ways of thinking, but it cannot tell us whether this contingency should be embraced as a delightful pluralism, rejected as tribal ethnocentrism, or treated in some wholly different way. And even existentialism itself, with its emphasis on freedom, so emphasizes freedom and authenticity, and calls into such great suspicion any purportedly universal normative standards, that it fails (and intentionally so) to provide real guidance for making the important decisions the omnipresence of which it so aptly reveals.

As we saw in chapter two, Kant’s transcendental anthropology provides a normative framework for answering questions about what to think, feel, and do. Kant’s purely formal normativity leaves room for individual thoughts and choices to be influenced by historically-evolving cultures and biological capacities/tendencies while still being incorporated into normative frameworks that are at once authentically one’s
own and genuinely universal for all human beings. But Kant has hardly been the last word in thinking about how human beings ought to think, feel, and choose. In chapter seven, we saw the wealth of alternatives that emerged in the years immediately after Kant. The past century has seen an equally rich range of normative theorizing informed by increasingly rich conceptions of human beings. In fact, as natural and human sciences have become more rigorous and informative, they have split from “philosophy” to form disciplines of their own, leaving to philosophers the normative issues that the sciences have been incapable of addressing themselves. As a result, contemporary philosophy – insofar as it is not merely an existential reverie or a handmaiden to the sciences – has focused on human beings from a normative perspective.

To summarize all of contemporary philosophy in a single, short chapter is, of course, an impossible task. This chapter does not even aim at discussing all of the contemporary normative theories in circulation, nor even all of the major theories. Instead, I focus on just five recent and important approaches to normativity. With the exception of the first, these approaches all aim, in one way or another, to take seriously the problems posed by naturalism, existentialism, and human diversity. In that sense, they arguably all speak, in a more direct way than Kant, to our contemporary human situation. The first approach – intuitionism – is really a whole cluster of approaches that dominated much 20th century philosophy. The next two approaches – Rorty’s pragmatism and MacIntyre’s emphasis on narrative and tradition – are two of the more provocative recent approaches to normativity in both epistemology and ethics, and both seriously take on the task of responding to naturalist, historicist, and existentialist developments in our conceptions of human beings. The last two approaches – Habermas’s communicative ethics and Korsgaard’s neoKantianism – are arguably the most influential recent appropriations of Kant in contemporary moral philosophy. Both incorporate substantial elements of naturalism and historicism into their philosophical approaches, and Korsgaard also incorporates some central existentialist insights. But they remain recognizably and self-consciously Kantian, and in that way they provide excellent, even if controversial, examples of how Kant might be updated for the 21st century.

I. Phenomenology and intuitionism, then and now.

We start our grand tour of contemporary philosophy with two early 20th century thinkers whose general approaches, though not always explicitly invoked, still dominate much contemporary philosophical theorizing: Edmund Husserl (xxx-xxx) and G.E.Moore (xxx-xxx). Both thinkers, in different ways, advocated the use of “intuitions” to discern philosophical truth, and both have left extensive legacies on contemporary philosophy. One result is that much contemporary philosophical work is intuition-driven.

Husserl’s phenomenology represented an early attempt to reinvigorate philosophy in the face of a rising “psychologism” by focusing philosophical research on the search for “essences.” Husserl sees “the question of philosophy’s relation to the natural and humanistic [i.e. historical] sciences” as the defining problem for philosophy, and he aims to establish philosophy “as a rigorous science” without falling into the scientific naturalism described in chapter nine (Husserl/Lauer 1965: 72). Against the dominant neoKantianism in early 20th century German that preached a return to Kant, Husserl proposes that philosophers go “back to the things themselves,” but the “things” to which Husserl aim to return are not individual objects but essences: “Pure
phenomenology as science . . . can only be essence investigation.”17 While natural and human sciences might study relations between particular things in the world, they can never make the necessary and universal claims about things that constitute claims about something’s essence. While Kant focuses on the merely formal structure of our experience, Husserl insists on a “material” a priori that goes far beyond Kant’s own transcendental philosophy: “nature with all its thing-like contents certainly also has its a priori,18 such that, for instance, we can know a priori that “colors” cannot literally be heard as such; such a claim is based on an insight into the fact that it is essential to what it is for something to be a “color” that it is an aspect of specifically visual experience.

For Husserl, one gets access to essences by means of what he calls “eidetic seeing” or “essential intuition,”19 and such intuitions, properly understood, provide a “foundation free of doubt” (1965: 76) for future philosophical progress.20

No conceivable theory can make us err with respect to the principle of all principles: that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originally (so to speak, in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there.21 While this “intuition” is infallible as a foundation, its reliability depends upon limiting one’s use of it only to what is immediately present in one’s intuition. With respect to this process of limiting, Husserl insists that one focus on the “phenomena” as they are presented to consciousness, and this requires “a general reversal of that ‘natural attitude’ in which everyday life as a whole as well as the positive sciences operate. In [this natural attitude] the world is for us the self-evidently existing universe of realities which are continuously before us in unquestioned givenness” (SW 27b). Husserl describes this “reversal” of the natural attitude as an “epoche,” a “bracketing” of one’s ordinary assumptions about the world in order to focus specifically on what is immediately present in intuition. By bracketing assumptions about individual objects, one can effect an “all-embracing transition from the factual to the essential form, the eidos.”

If the phenomenological actual fact as such becomes irrelevant; if, rather, it serves only as an example and as the foundation for a free but intuitive variation of the factual mind and communities of minds into the a priori possible (thinkable) ones; and if now the theoretical eye directs itself to the necessarily enduring invariant in the variation; then there will arise with this systematic way of proceeding a realm of its own, of the “a priori”. There emerges therewith the eidetically necessary typical form, the eidos; this eidos must manifest itself throughout all potential forms of mental being in particular cases. (SW 25b)22

Rather than asking about how and when people actually become aware of colors (a sort of factual investigation of color), one can take the experience of a particular color as an occasion for a “free but intuitive variation”23 wherein one imaginatively runs through an indefinite number of variations on “color,” intuiting what is essential to color as such.24

At this level of generality, Husserl’s phenomenology can be applied to anything: tones, colors, material objects, and so on. But the primary focus of Husserlian phenomenology is consciousness itself, that is, to discern the essence of consciousness in its various forms (perception, recollection, valuing, etc.).

We follow our universal principle that every individual event has its essence, which can be seized upon in eidetic purity and, in this purity, must belong to a field of possible eidetic research . . . We therefore effect, as examples, any single mental process whatever of consciousness . . . [and] we seize upon and fix, in an adequate ideation, the pure essences that interest us . . . Let us limit our theme still more narrowly. Its title runs: consciousness or, more distinctly, any mental process.
whatever of consciousness in an extraordinarily broad sense . . . [E]very mental process . . . which can be reached by our reflective regard has an essence of its own which can be seized upon intuitively. (Ideas §34, pp. 67-9 <G60-1>
From this basic methodology and focus, Husserl went on to develop an elaborate phenomenology of consciousness. His most important eidetic insight was the recognition that consciousness is essentially “intentional,” in that it “intends,” or is directed towards, particular objects. That is to say, consciousness in all its forms is always a consciousness of (perception of, valuing of, willing of, etc). From this, Husserl develops an elaborate account of what he calls “noesis” and “noema,” referring (respectively) to the “intensive mental process” by which an object is intended in a particular way (e.g., one perceiving of a cup of coffee) and the objects as objects of consciousness (the coffee as perceived). (Again, because the natural attitude is bracketed, even “imaginary” objects are noema, in the sense that one’s imagining of a unicorn has an object just as much as one’s perception of a cup of coffee.)

Both Husserl’s general methodology and his specific claims have been both appropriated and critiqued by an ongoing phenomenological tradition in phenomenology, one that aims to discern essential structures of consciousness through an examination of them from-within that brackets, if not the natural attitude as such, at least the scientific-naturalistic assumptions that can interfere with paying close attention to consciousness as such.

Moore operated within a very different philosophical climate xxx. Moore’s most famous philosophical position is his attempted “Proof of the Existence of the External World.” Moore claims to give a “perfectly rigorous” proof of the external world by showing that two things (specifically two hands) exist in the external world:

How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another.’

Moore raises the obvious objection, that he does not really “know” that his hands exist, and responds:

I knew that there was one hand in the place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my first utterance of ‘here’ and that there was another in the different place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my second utterance of ‘here’. How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case! You might as well suggest that I do not know that I am now standing up and talking — that perhaps after all I’m not, and that it’s not quite certain that I am!

For Moore, the reason that the proof seems inadequate is that there is no “proof” of his premises, “Here is one hand” and “Here is the another.” But, Moore argues, it is not necessary to prove these premises, as long as one knows them, and “I can know things, which I cannot prove; and among things which I certainly did know, even if (as I think) I could not prove them, were the premises of my two proofs.” Strictly speaking, Moore does not describe these know-but-not-proved premises as “intuitions,” and he is here better understood as a commonsense philosopher than an “intuitionist” strictly speaking. But this proof captures the spirit of building one’s philosophy on the basis of claims that are obviously true, and in that sense, contributes to a broader sort of intuitionism in recent philosophical approaches to normativity.
Moore’s more worked-out philosophical intuition comes in his ethics. Within ethics, Moore argues against any attempt to define the good or any identification of the good as equivalent to some other property (such as being conducive to happiness or being capable of being universalized). Moore accuses all such attempts of engaging in what he calls the “naturalistic fallacy,” since in its most common form, it involves the identification of “the good” with some natural property such as pleasure. Moore argues that for any such definition, it remains an “open question” whether “pleasure (or whatever it may be [that one identifies with the good]) [is] after all good?” And one “can easily satisfy himself that [in asking this question] he is not merely wondering whether pleasure is pleasant.”

In the case of Kant, one might say that it seems coherent to ask, “Is acting only on universalizable maxims good?” As anyone who has taught Kant’s ethics knows, this question is notoriously unlike the question, “are universalizable maxims universalizable?”, and countless people have answered the former question with a resounding “No” when considering such tricky cases as the Nazi at the door. For Moore, this implies that “‘good’ denotes a simple and indefinable quality” much like basic perceptual qualities (such as “yellow”).

Because goodness is a simple and indefinable quality, Moore turns to “intuition” to discover which states of affairs have “intrinsic value” or “goodness.”

For Moore, then, the question “What ought I do?” ultimately reduces to two questions, “What kind of things ought to exist for their own sakes?” and “what things are related as causes to that which is good in itself?” The first is answered via intuitions that certain states of affairs have the simple and indefinable property of goodness; the second via ordinary, scientific causal reasoning (based, among other things, on our commonsense knowledge of objects in the external world).

Neither Husserlian phenomenology nor Moorean intuitionism are particularly popular approaches today. Both Moore and Husserl suffered philosophical attacks from former students – Heidegger in the case of Husserl, Wittgenstein in the case of Moore – attacks that affect the ways in which phenomenology and intuitionism have been appropriated today. In both cases, these attacks targeted (among other things) the way in which Moore and Husserl sought unrevisable conclusions based on isolating particular intuitions. Relatedly, both Heidegger and Wittgenstein rejected the broadly foundationalist philosophical program shared by Husserl and Moore, in which indubitably self-evident intuitions provided a foundation for a scientifically rigorous philosophical system. Most contemporary philosophers have followed Heidegger and Wittgenstein in giving up any attempt to derive an indubitable philosophical system on the basis of intuitions gleaned from isolating particular phenomena.

Despite the explicit rejection of Husserlian phenomenology and Moorean intuitionism, however, some important general features of these thinkers’ approach is widely shared within epistemology, moral philosophy, and even metaphysics. This general phenomenological appeal to what can be made evident through careful attention to one’s engagement with the world is evident, for example, in the existentialist
phenomenologies of Heidegger, Sartre, and Levinas when these thinkers aim to develop philosophical accounts of human being by giving rich descriptions of the encounter with handy objects, the feeling of angst, or the encounter with the Other. But the importance of intuition is particularly prominent in contemporary normative theorizing in epistemology and moral theory, especially among philosophers who aim to avoid or supplement scientific naturalism and who have neither concern for historicism nor sympathy with existentialism.37 38 39

One place where the appeal to intuition has been particularly prominent is within the field of “analytic epistemology,” a philosophical school focused on “a priori theorizing about the nature, conditions, and extent of human knowledge, rationality, and justification.”40 For example, Roderick Chisholm, one of the foremost practitioners of this style of epistemology, argues that “xxx” and “xxx.” And the single most discussed problem within 20th century analytic epistemology is based on our “intuitions” about what should count as “knowledge.” Within analytic epistemology, a dominant account of knowledge had posited that knowledge can be identified with “justified, true belief.” But in xxx, xxx Gettier proposed the following case: xxx. The problem here is that this knowledge is both justified and true but does not seem to be knowledge. But the sense that this is not a case of real knowledge is based entirely on the intuitions of the epistemologists studying it. If someone thinks that Gettier’s case just is knowledge, then there seems little reason to challenge the conception of knowledge as justified true belief, and thus little sense in much contemporary epistemology, which aims to respond to Gettier-style counter-examples to various definitions of knowledge.

The general style of argument for analytic epistemologists is, as in the case of Husserl and Moore, intuition-driven. Just as Husserl sought to discern “essences” by means of imaginative variation, contemporary analytic epistemologists continually form and refine accounts of belief, knowledge, justification, and so on based on intuitions formed about countless examples and counter-examples. The goal is to get to universal and necessary (a priori) claims about the nature of knowledge, belief, and so on; and thus (in ways that are increasingly suspect41) to get an answer to the question of what one ought to believe.

Similarly, within contemporary moral philosophy, a great deal of moral work is done by moral intuitions.42 “Moral intuitionism” of the Moorean sort, Xxx, is largely rejected by contemporary moral philosophers, who, if they are not Kantians, prefer various kinds of “utilitarianism” (the view that one ought to maximize pleasure and minimize pain for the greatest number) or virtue ethics (the view that xxx). But within all three of these major approaches to ethics (Kantianism, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics), moral intuitions often play major roles. Peter Singer, for instance, simply starts his defense of xxx. And xxx.

In both epistemology (what can we know?) and moral philosophy (what ought we do?), intuitions have largely shifted away from playing a foundational role in a philosophical system and towards playing the role of considerations that need to be accommodated by one’s philosophical claims. One way that this new
role for intuitions has been explained is through the methodology of reflective equilibrium, or, more generally, coherence. We introduce the language of coherentism here.

Recently, intuitionism in philosophy has been heavily criticized from at least two perspectives. First, naturalists, historicists, and those who emphasize human diversity point out that intuitions are largely rooted in our sociocultural backgrounds. As ways of figuring out the nature of “truth” as such or of discerning what we “ought” to believe in some absolute sense, it does not seem reasonable to favor our own (contingent) intuitions over those of people with other backgrounds. Even for more coherentist approaches, there is a standard “garbage-in-garbage-out” objection; if one’s initial set of intuitions is misguided or historico-culturally contingent, one will reach what is only a misguided or historically local equilibrium, one that gives little grounds for believing that one has discovered normativity in any supra-historical sense.

As has put it, Such critics argue that what intuitionist epistemologists and moral philosophers are really doing is offering a highly local “anthropology” that merely specifies the carefully taught (and selected for) prejudices of a small tribe of wealthy, mostly-white, mostly-male philosophers in English-speaking universities in the 20th and early 21st centuries. See stich quotes, including dramatic one about how to respondxxx.

“Pending a detailed response to this problem, we think that the best reaction to the High-SES, Western philosophy professor who tries to draw normative conclusions from the facts about “our” intuitions is to ask: What do you mean “we”?“ (Stich et al 2001: 36**)

Second, intuitionism has been criticized from those (whom we might see as broadly existentialist) who simply ask why one should take the fact that something seems true to mean that it is true, those, that is, who recognize that in general one is capable of standing back from one’s intuitions and asking about them, “But is this really true?” korngaret

Kant’s philosophical approach can, I think, help with both sets of concerns. With respect to the first, three points should be made, both related to similar points made in defense of Kant in chapters nine and ten. First, naturalist and historicist critics of intuitionism simply mistake the important difference between the transcendental and empirical perspectives. When one xxx. (use Sosa herexxx). Second, while there may be considerable historical and cultural divergence with respect to certain forms of human life, there is considerably less divergence with respect to others, such as the experience of an objective world and the normative constraint of personal choice in terms of some sort of moral norms. Third, as we noted in chapters nine and ten, the very naturalist and historicist claims that seem to call our intuitions into question are based, at least to some degree, on those very intuitions. Without some reason to view as reliable the scientific methodology behind comparative studies of human intuitions, there is no reason to consider any results of such studies as calling into question one’s intuitions. To some degree at least, one must take one’s own perspective, one’s own sense of what counts as justification or knowledge, for granted even to take
historicist or naturalist objections seriously. Depending upon the results of such studies, one may have to give up confidence in the legitimacy of some of one’s intuitions, but one cannot give up confidence in all of them without giving up confidence in the studies themselves.

With respect to more existentialist concerns, Kant might rightly point out that our “standing back” from our intuitions is always a normative standing back, that is, it is a way of asking oneself whether one should really remain committed to what one finds oneself committed to. And normatively standing back depends upon some standards for normative evaluation, so that one cannot even stand back from one’s intuitions without having or at least seeking some basis for evaluating them. This does not mean, of course, that one can only evaluate intuitions based upon other intuitions one already has, nor that one must adopt a method of reflective equilibrium. In that sense, intuitionism may turn out to be the wrong way to go about developing a normative theory. But it does imply that some sort of normativity is necessary in order even to stand back from the intuitions one finds oneself to have, and in the absence of any other candidates, this will require that one evaluate some intuitions on the basis of others.

As these responses might suggest, however, Kant’s philosophy also differs in important ways from contemporary appeals to intuition. Not all are equal, aims for very thin sense of intuition, also for unconditionality (which alleviates second issue), xxx. Transcendental argument is neither foundationalist nor reflective equilibrium. Result is a tighter, less fuzzy, but still non-foundationalist approach to epistemology and moral philosophy.

II. Pragmatism and “Cheerful Ethnocentrism”

Intuitionism in various forms continues to be a dominant way in which ordinary people as well as philosophers decide what to think and do and what theories of knowledge and action to adopt. Although several contemporary trends (naturalism, historicism, and existentialism) call into question the legitimacy of using intuitions in the way that we do, they continue to be defended, and Kant’s own philosophy provides resources for defending intuitions, at least to some degree. Nonetheless, the historical and cultural variability of intuitions and the seeming impossibility of any truly universal, foundationalist philosophical system has led to alternative approaches to normativity. One such approach simply accepts the fact that one’s intuitions are simply one possible set of intuitions among others but to embrace it nonetheless for all that. One of the most important and interesting contemporary approaches along these lines is a form of neo-pragmatism espoused in its most influential form by Richard Rorty.

We can understand Rorty’s fundamental claim in terms of the Kuhnian, historicist account of science in chapter nine. Rorty generalizes Kuhn’s claim that “normal science” is characterized by adhering to rules and norms intrinsic to a particular paradigm and Kuhn’s rejection of fixed and determinate standards for evaluating the revolutionary science involved in fundamentally changing paradigms. For Rorty, every “language game” is governed by norms for the use of words within that game, and in that sense, every ordinary use of language is akin to the practice of “normal science.” Rather than a specifically “epistemic” normativity that would ask “What should I believe?”, Rorty focuses on a more linguistic normativity that asks, “What should I say?” (which will
include such things as saying to oneself, “I believe such and such”). And the answer to that question, Rorty claims, is typically local. Language-games include their own norms for use, and one should say only what is consistent with the internal norms of one’s game. For Rorty, the primary sense of normativity is \textit{internal} to a particular language-game (or paradigm, or structure of thought). Xxxx need quotes and one or two examples xxx.

Within the religious language-game of 17\textsuperscript{th} century British (or 20\textsuperscript{th} century Bible-Belt) Protestantism, it makes perfect sense to say, with Milton, “He [God] the golden-tressed sun, makes his daily course to run.”\textsuperscript{47} Within the ordinary language of daily life and weather channels, it makes sense to say, “Tomorrow, the sun will set at 7:13 PM.” And in the language-game of introductory astronomy, it makes sense to say “The earth lies at a distance of xxx million kilometers from the sun, orbiting the sun at a speed of xxx kilometers per second, and spinning on its axis at xxx kilometers per second.”

One can, of course, ask whether one ought to adopt a particular language game. If one chooses to use a particular term – say, “spinster,” “heretic,” “homophobe,” “phlogiston,” “quark,” or “essence” – then the use of such terms is governed by norms intrinsic to the language games of which they are a part. But one might still ask whether or not one should use these terms at all. Aside from historians of science, no one uses the term “phlogiston” anymore. Very few people use the term “spinster.” And “heretic” (along with Milton’s “golden-tressed sun” running “his” daily course) is gradually loosing traction in Western societies, while “homophobe” (along with the sun-orbiting Earth) is gaining ground. In order to make sense of, and justify, these shifts from one vocabulary to another, one might think that we need some norms that transcend particular language-games, norms for choosing which vocabulary is best all things considered, which best maps onto the world as it really is.

Rorty resists this move to a master set of norms: “Philosophy, as a discipline, makes itself ridiculous when it steps forward at such junctures and says that it will find neutral ground on which to adjudicate the issue” (CIS 51). Instead, he argues that one’s choice of vocabulary, too, is ultimately local, though in a different sense. We should, he suggests, “treat alternate vocabularies . . . like alternative tools” (CIS 11). In such a context,

\begin{quote}
We will not be inclined to ask questions like ‘what is the place of consciousness in a world of molecules?’ . . . ‘what is the place of value in a world of fact?’ . . . ‘What is the relation between the solid table of common sense and the unsolid table of microphysics?’ . . . ‘Merely philosophical’ questions, like [the] question about the relation between the two tables, are attempts to stir up a fictitious theoretical quarrel between vocabularies which have proved capable of peaceful coexistence. (CIS 10-11)
\end{quote}

Choice of vocabularies (or language-games, or paradigms) is local in the immediate sense that one chooses one’s vocabulary \textit{for a purpose}. For heightening one’s sense of religious devotion to God, Milton’s description of the sun is useful. For determining when to go to the beach to enjoy the sunset, one should turn to the weather channel. And for determining when (and at what speed) to launch a satellite, one should use the scientific description. This emphasis on the utility of vocabularies, and thus for the basic structures in terms of which we think about our world and our lives, is what makes Rorty’s philosophy a sort of “pragmatism.” What we say and think should be “practical;” it should help us get things done.
But this implies that norms are “local” in another sense as well, since Rorty rejects the idea of a practical or moral master vocabulary just as much as he rejects the notion of an epistemic master vocabulary. If we could determine a priori what “should be done,” then we might be able to determine what to say and think based on some categorical imperative of action. If we could know that religious devotion is more important than satellites, we would know we should prefer Milton to astrophysics. Or if we could know that religious devotion is dangerous superstition, we could justifiably sent Milton to the scrap-heap (or, perhaps better, put him to use in new ways). But for Rorty, one determines what to do based on norms intrinsic to particular language-games, and, more generally, intrinsic to the particular forms of life that provide the social context of those language-games.

I do not think there are any plain moral facts out there in the world, nor any truths independent of language, nor any neutral ground on which to stand and argue that either torture or kindness are preferable to the other. (CIS 173)

Just as one cannot stand above every different paradigm in physics and ask which is best “all things considered,” so one cannot stand above every different conception of human life and as what one ought to be doing “all things considered.”

One might think, of course, that one of the things we should be doing with at least some of our vocabularies is “getting the world right.” In the last chapter, I pointed out that even if Heidegger is right (which he certainly is) that we are not always engaging with the world as reflective objective knowers, there is still room (as Kant insists) for thinking that knowing the objective world is at least one worthwhile epistemic project (and perhaps even a particularly important one). Rorty vehemently rejects this suggestion. xxx

Normativity, for Rorty, ends up being “local” both in the sense that particular norms are always intrinsic to particular language-games and in the deeper sense that the norms governing one’s choice of language-game are tied to locally-relevant conceptions of what tools are needed to live a good life. The result is what Rorty calls a “cheerful ethnocentrism,” according to which xxx.

What counts as being a decent human being is relative to historical circumstance, a matter of transient consensus about what attitudes are normal and what practices are just or unjust. (CIS 189).

One might think that the recognition of one’s values as being historically contingent would undermine one’s commitment to them, but Rorty rejects this suggestion: “belief can still regulate action, can still be thought worth dying for, among people quite aware that this belief is caused by nothing deeper than contingent historical circumstance” (CIS 189). Rorty’s pragmatism aims to cure us of precisely this insistence upon indubitable and final justification for one’s beliefs. Once we stop using language of objectivity and “absolute” truth, we need not take the contingency of our beliefs as undermining them. One’s commitment to any particular value will depend upon one’s particular projects, the value of which will, in turn, depend upon other values. As Rorty puts it, “We have to start from where we are” (CIS 198). Thus ethnocentrism need not be a “relativist” undermining of all commitment to our beliefs and values, but can be a “cheerful” acceptance of them.

Even or perhaps especially when cheerful, however, ethnocentrism can seem like a vice, something we should avoid in our most basic approach to normativity, and this for
two main reasons. First, cheerful ethnocentrism seems to suggest a stale conservatism of beliefs and values. If norms are intrinsic to language-games and related forms of life, it might seem as though these norms are never subject to really whole-hearted revision. If one could justify this stasis on the basis of truth, on the basis that one has finally figured out what the world is really like and what a good human life really consists in, then this stasis might not be so bad. But Rorty’s cheerful ethnocentrism can offer no such assurance. So ethnocentrism seems stagnant without a consolation prize – not very cheerful. Second, “ethnocentrism” is associated with, at a minimum, ignorance about and intolerance towards other “ethnic” groups. At worst, without some non-local norms and thereby without a basis for reasoned agreement with others about what to believe and how to act, ethnocentrism in our pluralist and interconnected world seems to open the way to the worst sorts of imperialism and oppression.

One of the great merits of Rorty’s work is that he takes on both concerns head-on and emphasizes the importance of both a creativity that outstrips the norms of one’s language-games (Rorty calls this “irony”) and a tolerance that seeks to understand and appreciate the perspectives of others and to provide everyone the freedom to pursue their own conceptions of the good free from the interference of others (Rorty calls this “liberalism”). Rorty’s emphasis on “irony” manifests itself particularly poignantly in his rejection of philosophical intuitionism. One might expect a cheerful ethnocentrist to simply embrace the prevailing intuitions of his “ethnos,” but Rorty does no such thing:

> On the view that I am suggesting, the claim that an “adequate” philosophical doctrine must make room for our intuitions is a reactionary slogan, one which begs the question at hand . . . What is described as such a consciousness is simply a disposition to use the language of our ancestors . . . Unless we suffer from what Derrida calls “Heideggerian nostalgia,” we shall not think of our intuitions as more than platitudes, more than the habitual use of a certain repertoire of terms, more than old tools which as yet have no replacements. (CIS 22)

Even while admitting that one must take one’s intuitions, for now, as “tools that have no replacements,” Rorty rejects both the Heideggerian nostalgia that looks back for originary insights and the Moorean conservatism that just takes present intuitions as eternal truths. Instead, he opts for a sort of Nietzschean optimism that hopes for new intuitions in a better and brighter future that we can creatively make for ourselves. For Rorty, this new future is, in part, social, in that new terms and visions can catch hold and become the intuitions that will be shared by our descendents. But Rorty is also passionately committed to a personal ideal of irony, one best represented by our best poets, those (like Derrida, who Rorty reads as a philosophical poet) who seek to transcend the norms, terms, and tools (linguistic and otherwise) of the society in which they live, to affirm themselves in their uniqueness. The ironist in this sense, we might say, is the existentialist par excellence, the one who not only recognizes her freedom from any norms but who actualizes precisely this freedom through creatively reinterpreting and thereby rising above the currently dominant “intuitions” to think and act in new and unforeseen ways. Rather than a stale conservatism, cheerful ethnocentrism – when enriched by irony – leads to radical and playful revisions of dominant norms and intuitions in the service of personal authenticity.

Irony on its own, however, does little to alleviate the ethical concern that associates ethnocentrism with intolerance and imperialism. A willingness to violate,
transcend, and reinterpret the values of one’s culture need not imply any greater tolerance for the values of others and can often lead to the opposite. Rorty is well aware of “how our attempts at [authenticity], our private obsessions with the achievement of a certain sort of perfection, may make us oblivious to the pain and humiliation we are causing” (CIS 141). Unlike Kant, Rorty does not think that there is anything that connects “our duties to self and duties to others” (CIS 141), no a priori principle that shows that the way to really be creative is to allow others the space to be creative in turn, no argument from the conditions of possibility of irony to the necessity of respect for others. But, Rorty insists, one’s commitment to respecting others need be none the less for the lack of an a priori principle. Rorty is a liberal ironist, and this liberalism brings with it two important commitments that mitigate irony’s free-for-all creativity. First, “liberals are the people who think that cruelty is the worst thing we do” (CIS xv). Because Rorty is a liberal, he is sensitive to – and aims to be increasingly sensitive to – acts and attitudes that are cruel towards others. And Rorty goes further than merely supplementing ironic ethnocentrism with liberalism. He insists that ironic creativity rather than transcendental justification is what liberals really need. For one committed to being less cruel – and Rorty sees himself and his audience as being so committed – what is needed is not an assurance that we are right to avoid cruelty, but greater sensitivity to the variety of ways in which it is possible to be cruel. And this will very likely involve revisions of our perspective on things. When Foucault shows how supposedly “humane” prison conditions are actually forms of manipulation and control that are de-humanize both inmates and society as a whole, when Nabokov shows the cruelty of pursuing personal fulfillment against social norms, when Levinas shows how systems of “justice” can impose categories on others and thereby de-face them, all of these creative redescriptions draw attention to forms of cruelty that can be obscured by our “intuitions.” And in that sense, Rorty suggests, an ironic overcoming of philosophical commitments to “objectivity” and the “justification” of moral norms can actually contribute to being better liberals.

Rorty’s liberalism includes a further element that alleviates concerns with oppressive and complacent ethnocentrism. While rejecting “objectivity” and Kantian “universalism,” Rorty insists upon an ironically liberal ideal that he calls “solidarity.” Solidarity includes “the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers” (CIS xvi), and in that sense is an important part of avoiding cruelty. But solidarity also gives a new meaning to “objectivity” as a goal for inquiry. For pragmatists, the desire for objectivity is not the desire to escape the limitations of one’s community, but simply the desire for as much intersubjective agreement as possible, to extend the reference of “us” as far as we can. Rather than trying to conform beliefs to the “real world,” liberal ironists aim for an epistemic (and social, and political) community that includes more and more diverse groups of people. And for Rorty, the negative connotations of “ethnocentrism” are avoided precisely by this desire to justify one’s beliefs and actions to as wide an audience as possible while avoiding cruel attempts to destroy or undermine the diversity of that audience:

What takes the curse off [our] ethnocentrism is . . . that it is the ethnocentrism of a “we” (“we liberals”) which is dedicated to enlarging itself, to creating and ever
larger and more variegated *ethnos*. It is the “we” of a people who have been brought up to distrust ethnocentrism. (CIS 198)\textsuperscript{55}

Xxx concluding sentence. xxx\textsuperscript{56,57}

There is something appealing about Rorty’s cheerful ethnocentrism.\textsuperscript{58} Rorty is correct that, from-within, we have no choice but to take ourselves as we are. Even insofar as we seek to incorporate other perspectives, I can take them seriously only by, in some way, making them my own. And any concerns that might seem to raise problems for my own presuppositions can raise those problems only by appealing to something that is (or becomes) yet another presupposition of mine. Even our concern with ethnocentrism, our sense that diversity might somehow undermine our presuppositions, and our desire for a more neutral standpoint, even these concerns are *our* concerns and arise from *our* perspective. We always wear our own shoes. Ethnocentrism, in other words, is right as far as it goes. And it *might* be as far as we can go. If so, then I share with Rorty the conviction that we need to be pragmatists with as much liberalism, as much compassion, as much tolerance as we can be, but no more than we can afford. But Rorty’s positive arguments for local norms are much stronger than his negative arguments against any possibility of developing norms that are at least *less* local, and perhaps even universal. Thus there is still hope for a conception of normativity that is more robust, less ethnocentric, and more “objective,” than Rorty’s own.

Moreover, it seems that we – at least many of us, at least some of the time – *need* something more than what Rorty provides. At least at the level of generality at which I’ve presented it so far, Rorty’s liberal irony does not provide much guidance for a person who is genuinely *concerned* about what to believe and how to act. Even if I am already engaged in language games with their own internal norms, I can wonder about whether I *should* be thinking and acting in the light of these norms.\textsuperscript{59} And even if I have already accepted that “cruelty is the worst thing one can do” and already endorse a personal ethic of creativity and self-improvement, I not only face potential conflicts between these ideals but can also raise questions about the legitimacy of these ideals. To a considerable extent, Rorty’s way of dealing with this existential possibility is to focus on particulars, to look at specific and local reasons for preferring one ideal over another. To some extent, his solution is simply to “get over it,” that is, to stop reflecting too much; the ability to ask “but should I really care so much about cruelty” is an ability born of language games of justification in terms of an external world, absolute norms, and, ultimately, from language-games in which human beings subordinate themselves to a God who stands above and apart. There is no need, claims Rorty, to ask questions about whether what I ultimately care most about is *worth* caring most about; and he proposes revisions to our philosophical and even our everyday language that will make such questions increasingly difficult to ask.

For Kant, however, human beings from-within are always able, at least in principle, to ask such questions, and “enlightenment” or “autonomy” precisely consists in refusing to let these questions be silenced, refusing to let oneself simply absorb the categories, norms, and values of others. \textsuperscript{Xxx} Even if (as Foucault and Rorty suggest) this ideal of autonomy is an “Enlightenment” ideal in this historically-local sense, that is, even if it is only an ideal that has emerged recently, it is still an ideal that “we” –
including Rorty himself – share. Now Rorty wants to show that autonomy, at least in every sense worth caring about, does not depend upon any standards xxx; but xxx.

Moreover, the world today is increasingly pluralist in increasingly deep ways. Rorty is quite right that one of the greatest merits of “our” liberal societies is precisely our desire to be inclusive, to be fair to xxx. But he underestimates the extent to which this ideal, even if it is only “our” ideal, commits us at least to attempt non-ethnocentric ways of arbitrating between diverse ways of thinking and forms of life. And he often mistakenly portrays this need for arbitration as one that is fundamentally political. There is a political problem of how to respect those whose values differ fundamentally from one’s own, a problem dealt with, in large part, through keeping individuals and communities as free from political interference as possible (that is, by minimizing the extent to which we need to agree with one another in order to live well together). But there is also a more personal problem, one that arises for modern liberal individuals from-within, a problem of how to decide what I personally should believe or do in the light of my own contact with different communities who hold incompatible visions of what the world is like and how to live within it. In the modern world, one can no longer simply assume the vocabulary of one’s birth. Before one can be a cheerful ethnocentrist, one needs to decide which ethos (or better, ethoi) to make one’s own.

III. Local Normativity, Narrative Unity, and Tradition(s)

Given that most of us recognize, in the world in which we live, multiple incompatible possible sets of norms for governing how to think and act, we require some way of arbitrating between these. A brute intuitionist approach posits that there are some norms that emerge, on reflection, as obviously or intuitively right, and one can evaluate other, more local norms in the light of these. The approach of reflective equilibrium suggests that one xxx. Cheerful ethnocentrism xxx. But all of these approaches risk underplaying not only the diversity of norms in our world, but the extent to which, for many people, this diversity has become (or constantly threatens to become) internalized. In the final two sections, we will look at a pair of broadly Kantian approaches that seek to construct a universalist order that can have priority over the particular xxx. Before turning to those universalist, Kantian approaches, however, this chapter looks at a richer and more well-worked out pluralist and non-universalist approach to normativity. 60

The central idea behind this approach is that the primary structure of human deliberation about what to think and believe is not logical and foundationalist, nor even strictly coherentist, but narrative in structure. 61 Other philosophers have increasingly turned to narrative, and the notion of “narrative unity,” as a framework for thinking about what the choice of norms looks like “from-within.” One of the most important such philosophers, on whom I focus in this section, is Alasdair MacIntyre. 62 In many important respects, MacIntyre’s account reflects an appropriation of Rorty’s central claims about the local character of normativity. But MacIntyre helps reveal an underlying (and even “universal”) normativity in the notion of “narrative unity,” a unity that that unifies appeals to local norms. Moreover, MacIntyre situates individual narratives in the context of communal narratives – traditions – and develops an account of “the rationality of traditions” that, without providing a “master vocabulary” or “view from nowhere,” still provides a general structure within which one can make justify preferring one tradition (and hence one language-game) over another. And finally, MacIntyre proposes certain
general *virtues* than will be necessary for any successful narrative unity of life or rational progress of a tradition. In these ways, MacIntyre provides more general normative claims that the *mere* cheerful ethnocentrism of Rorty, but without requiring any absolute and strictly universal normative principles that rise above all contingent and particular human communities.

MacIntyre starts with an insistence upon the narrative structure of individual choices. He insists that “Narrative history . . . [is] the basic and essential genre for the characterization of human actions” (AV 208), so one can make an action, statement, belief, or choice “intelligible by finding its place in a narrative” (AV 210). Narrative structure is not merely the structure of making sense of others’ actions from-without, but is also and primarily essential for the intelligibility of thought and choice “to agents themselves” (AV 208).

[A]ction itself has a basically historical character. It is because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we understand our own lives in terms of the narratives that live out that the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others. (AV 212)

For MacIntyre, then, one decides on which language-games to play, which purposes to pursue, what kind of beliefs to hold or actions to take, in terms of an overall narrative of one’s life. Thus, for MacIntyre, “To ask, “what is the good for me?” is to ask how best I might live out that unity [“of a narrative embodied in a single life”] and bring it completion. To ask, “What is the good for man?” is to ask what all answers to the former question must have in common.” (MacIntyre 1984: 218-9)

One important advantage of this approach is that it better captures the day-to-day experience of the normative character of choice (and even thought) than either intuitionism or Rorty’s cheerful ethnocentrism. As existentialists recognized, decisions about how to live one’s life involving incorporating one’s past into a projected future; that is, they have a narrative structure. One looks back on one’s life, seeing the roles and responsibilities that one has taken on, and thinks about how one’s present and future actions can “complete” one’s life so far. This largely explains the sense of being “trapped” in a “dead-end” career, or relationship, or habit. It can become difficult to envision a coherent story that goes from what one has been and where one finds oneself towards any complete life that one would find worth living. Without narrative progress, one’s life is at a “dead-end.”

This account of the narrative structure of life helps bring out two features that, for MacIntyre, are essential to making sense of normativity in narrative terms. First, a “crucial characteristic of all lived narratives” is “a certain teleological character” (AV 215).

[T]he unity of an individual life . . . is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. To ask, “what is the good for me?” is to ask how best I might live out that unity and bring it completion. (AV 218-9)

While our lives may take unexpected turns, and while we might not, at any given point, be able to articulate the goal(s) towards which our life is oriented, the narrative unity of a life depends on at least a goal-oriented, or teleological, character.

Second, and more importantly, the narrative of one’s own life is interconnected with the community (or communities) in which one lives. Not only does one depend upon
that community for support in living one’s life, but “we approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity” (Macintyre 1984: 220).

I can only answer the question, “What am I to do?” if I can answer the priori question, “Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?” We enter human society, that is, with one or more imputed characters – roles into which we have been drafted – and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be construed. (AV 216)

Neither the child of immigrant parents who have worked in order to send her to college nor the fourth generation child of a long line of Marines who has been groomed for a career in the military can construct a personal narrative according to which she just falls into plumbing as a career. If she chooses to be a plumber, it will be a form of rejecting or radically reinterpreting the role into which her parents’ goals and sacrifices have thrust her. And all of us find ourselves, first as children (and siblings), then as students, friends, spouses, workers of particular kinds, and so on, in a host of social roles. These social roles are defined in terms of the community in which one lives, and while one can appropriate, revise, or reject these social roles, one cannot construct one’s personal narrative independent of them. In that sense, “We are never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors of our own narratives” (AV 213). Importantly, this dependence on social roles is not merely (nor primarily) a matter of describing the actions of others. From-within our own perspectives of deliberation, as we decide how to construct the narrative unity of our lives, we always see ourselves as characters with roles that we must live up to (or reject, or revise). “What ought I do?” very quickly becomes, even from-within, the question “How should balance my responsibilities (as spouse and parent) to my family with my responsibilities (as teacher) to my students?”

Individuals make choices about what to do in the light of stories and construct those stories in the light of the roles that the find themselves occupying in a community. But communities are no more fixed than individuals. One’s community too has a story, and thus “the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity . . . I find myself part of a history and that is generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the bearers of a tradition” (AV 221). And just as one sees choices about what to do with one’s life teleologically, that is, as choices about how to bring to completion the life that one has lived thus far, one sees these choices also as choices about how to be part of the progress of one’s community towards goods that can make sense in terms of the narrative of that community:

All reasoning takes place within the context of some traditional mode of thought, transcending through criticism and invention the limitations of what had hitherto been reasoned in that tradition . . . A living tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute the tradition. (AV 222)

So far, of course, this sounds remarkably like Rortian ethnocentrism, albeit with a narrative twist. And MacIntyre, like Rorty, vehemently rejects “some neutral tradition-independent standard of a rationally justifiable kind to which we may appeal” in “decid[ing] between rival and mutually exclusive claims” (MacIntyre 1988:329). “[T]here is no such neutral ground . . . [T]here is instead only the practical-rationality-of-this-or-that-tradition and the justice-of-this-or-that-tradition” (346).
But MacIntyre differs from Rorty in two fundamental respects. One, shared by many cheerful ethnocentrists who rejects Rorty’s extreme pragmatism, is that MacIntyre sees an important role for “truth” within tradition-guided enquiry. Where Rorty sees “The idea of Truth as something to be pursued for its own sake” as “the central theme” of a particular tradition (beginning with Plato and, he hopes, ending with him), MacIntyre sees the pursuit of Truth as intrinsic to any tradition, at least insofar as it is a tradition of enquiry.

The concept of warranted acceptability always has application only at some particular time and place in respect of standards then prevailing at some particular stage in the development of a tradition of enquiry. . . . The concept of truth, however, is timeless. To claim that some thesis is true is not only to claim for all possible times and places that it cannot be shown to fail to correspond to reality . . . but also that the mind which expresses its thought in that thesis is in fact adequate to its object. (1988: 364)

And for MacIntyre, “implicit in the rationality of [tradition-constituted] enquiry there is indeed a conception of final truth” (360). Thus “every tradition, whether it recognizes the fact or not, confronts the possibility that at some future time it will fall into a state of epistemological crisis,” such that “that particular tradition’s claims to truth can . . . no longer be sustained” (364).

And this leads to a second difference from Rorty; although MacIntyre rejects any “neutral standard” from which to evaluate traditions, he develops a theory of the rationality of traditions that allows for at least a sort of supra-traditional evaluative framework that can “answer” relativism in a way that Rorty is uninterested in doing:

The grounds for an answer to relativism and perspectivism are to be found, not in any theory of rationality as yet explicitly articulated and advanced within one or more of the traditions with which we have been concerned, but rather with a theory embodied in and presupposed by their practices of enquiry, yet never fully spelled out, although adumbrations of it, or of parts of it, are certainly to be found in various writers . . . The rationality of a tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive enquiry is in key and essential part a matter of the kind of progress which it makes. (MacIntyre 1988: 354)

The kind of justification that they [first principles within a tradition] receive is at once dialectical and historical. They are justified insofar as in the history of this tradition they have, by surviving the process of dialectical questioning, vindicated themselves as superior to their historical predecessors. (360)

Protagonists of each tradition . . . ask whether the alternative and rival tradition may not be able to provide resources to characterize and to explain the failing and defects of their own tradition more adequately than they, using the resources of that tradition, have been able to do. (1988: 167)

“[T]raditions possess measures to evaluate their own progress or lack of it, even if such measures necessarily are framed in terms of and presuppose the truth of those central theses to which the tradition gives allegiance” (167)
“requires a rare gift of empathy as well as of intellectual insight” (167)

Re: Aquinas:
What justifies his representation of the order of things over against its Averroist, Neoplatonist, and Augustinian rivals is its ability to identify, to explain, and to transcend their limitations and defects, while preserving from them everythin that survives dialectical questioning in a way which those rivals are unable from their philospohical resources to provide any counterpart. (172, see too 175-6)

Finally, MacIntyre complements his emphases on narrative and on traditions with an emphasis on the virtues. Among other things, virtues are “sustain . . . the form of an individual life in which that individual may seek out his or her good as the good of his or her whole life” and “sustain and strengthen traditions” (MacIntyre 1984: 223): “Lack of justice, lack of truthfulness, lack of courage, lack of the relevant intellectual virtues – these corrupt [both lives and] traditions” (MacIntyre 1984: 223). This set of virtues transcends individual narratives and traditions while still being a part of such narratives and traditions. Traditions, or personal narratives, that fail to ascribe proper value to justice or truthfulness or courage will not – and, one might even say, should not – be sustained. Starting from a deeply historicist and narrative conception of normativity, MacIntyre nonetheless finds the basis for non-historical and non-narrative norms, the virtues that make possible any “history” with normative import, any narrative that can provide one’s life with unity.

For Kant, MacIntyre’s emphasis on narrative unity and even finding one’s place in the tradition can be entirely welcome. Especially in the context of his account of radical evil, Kant points out the importance of seeing one’s life as a whole along the lines of a narrative of progress, and Kant can certainly accommodate the need for one’s thoughts and actions to be consistent with while still pushing forward those of the traditions in which one finds oneself. Nonetheless, for Kant, there are several problems with MacIntyre’s account. With respect to the importance of narrative unity, MacIntyre’s approach is too vague. Where MacIntyre simply posits narrative unity as an ideal, Kant suggests specific means by which one can bring one’s life into a coherent unity through the cultivation of a character that acts consistently in accordance with principles and through the unification of these principles of action into a moral whole. Moreover, MacIntyre’s conception of narrative is insufficiently autonomous, since it allows for a primarily passive relationship to substantive values that one adopts from one’s tradition and in terms of which one defines the meaning of one’s life.

With respect to the role of tradition, not only is the dependence upon tradition overly heteronomous, but while MacIntyre’s conception of tradition is a valuable descriptive account of why people hold the values – and even the “rationality” – that they do, it is insufficient from-within, when one is trying to decide whether and to what extent one should endorse the values and “rational” norms of one’s traditions. Here MacIntyre’s insistence upon “truth” as a telos of traditions of enquiry and his supra-traditional evaluative framework are a substantial improvement on Rorty’s cheerful ethnocentrism. But MacIntyre’s account of this framework is too amorphous and arbitrary to sustain the from-within needs of those 21st century thinkers and actors who find ourselves only
loosely tied even to our own liberal traditions. MacIntyre’s proposal is too amorphous in that it recommends merely “the process of dialectical questioning” as the framework for choosing traditions, offering, within that framework, detailed historical case studies but little in the way of general principles that can guide the pressing choices between traditions that we face today. And the proposal is too arbitrary in that the Hegelian historical lineage of MacIntyre’s account of the rationality of traditions is all-too-obvious, opening the question of why one should take this quasi-Hegelian conception of rationality as the definitive supra-traditional one.

Where MacIntyre’s overall approach to normativity is strongest is also where it is most Kantian. Although MacIntyre specifically contrasts his defense of “virtues” to “the knowledge of a set of . . . maxims which may provide our practical inferences with major premises” (MacIntyre 1984: 223), his defense of virtues is remarkably Kantian. Virtues are universally required because they provide the necessary conditions for the possibility of successfully unifying both one’s life and the rational development of any tradition of enquiry. xxx

Contemporary neo-Kantians, while seeking to incorporate much of the insights of the normative approaches discussed in this chapter and responding to (and incorporating) naturalism, historicism, and existentialism, xxx.

In the rest of this chapter, I thus focus on two of the most important contemporary neo-Kantian approaches to normativity. The first, that of Jurgen Habermas, is primarily oriented towards the political realm but also includes stuff re: epistemology etc. The second, that of Christine Korsgaard, is primarily moral (in the non-political sense). Both of these thinkers operate primarily in the realm of volition rather than cognition or feeling. In part, this emphasis here reflects the current state of philosophical Kantianism, which is more prominent in moral philosophy than in epistemology or philosophy of emotion. But in part, it simply reflects my own predilections xxxx.

IV. Habermas and Communicative Rationality

Jurgen Habermas is one of the 20th century’s leading defenders of a broadly Kantian approach to normativity, especially in a moral and political context. In many respects, Habermas can be seen as offering a sort of Kantian version of the “rationality of traditions” developed by MacIntyre. Like MacIntyre and Rorty, Habermas recognizes that there is a sort of thick rationality embedded in particular cultural traditions, and he admits that many of our decisions about how best to live our lives take place in the context of the roles and norms that we inherit from our culture. But, like MacIntyre and against Rorty, Habermas also insists that particular traditions, at least insofar as these are traditions of enquiry, embody a commitment to “truth” that appeals to something supratraditional and functions as a regulative ideal xxx. Moreover, like MacIntyre, Habermas insists that the pursuit of truth in the context of conflicting traditions involves a sort of “dialectical and historical” process in which principles and norms are “vindicated . . . as superior to their historical predecessors” (MacIntyre 1988: 360). But unlike MacIntyre (and Rorty), Habermas argues that this dialectical process involves certain universal and necessary norms of interaction that can be articulated and defended. Habermas aims, in other words, to reconstruct Kantian moral philosophy as a “theory of communicative action” that “xxx.”76
The argument, in its most basic form, is this: xxx.

The result is a position that is like Kant’s in being xxx, xxx, xxx, and xxx. But Habermas differs from Kant in several respects. (1) (2) (3) (4) naturalist and historicist. (5) adds “ethics” to Kant’s dichotomy of practical life xxx.

From the standpoint of the developments in our understanding of the human being over the last two centuries, Habermas’s communicative ethics has some important advantages. Naturalism, perhaps a better way of making sense of Kant, xxx. Historicism and development xxx, existentialism-> more realistic sense of ethics; more social-political emphasis less individualist xxx.

Of course, Habermas’s differences from Kant bring with them some important disadvantages as well. Xxx naturalism compromises the sharp dichotomy that Kant set up and that seems so powerful. Xxx anti-subjectivism makes Habermas’s theory helpful from the standpoint of setting up institutions for discourse but less helpful for the from-within perspective of individuals seeking to discern what to think and do in non-ideal conditions, introduction of “ethics” adds some of the vagueness, indeterminacy, and potential heteronomy of MacIntyre’s account of narrative unity (but here it’s important to remember that “ethics” is really a supplement to hedonism, which in Kant is already vague, indeterminate, and heteronomous, not to morality).

V. Korsgaard and The Sources of Normativity

By far the most influential contemporary Kantian moral theorist today is Christine Korsgaard. Korsgaard was a student of John Rawls, whose Theory of Justice xxx. Where Rawls focused his attention on developing a broadly Kantian political theory, however, Korsgaard has focused more squarely on the issue of (moral) normativity itself. Consistent with Kant’s own project, Korsgaard emphasizes the standpoint of the individual moral agent deliberating about her responsibilities, and she contrasts this from-within perspective with the natural scientific perspective on xxx. For Korsgaard, the problem of normative (that leads us to ask about the sources of normativity) arises “xxx”.

Korsgaard’s answer draws heavily from xxxx.

Consistent with Sartre etc xxx identities that we find ourselves in but must still freedom affirm (or endorse). Particular identities, getting at something that Kant largely missed, which is the sense of obligation that can come from our particular projects. Also helps answer the existentialist issue re: eg. Sartre’s student and the front. Provides room for rich use of narrative (cf. NDPR books) as part of constructign and staying true to our identities, allows for identities rooted in tradition etc. and even for some level of cheerful ethnocentrism. Allows for historically and culturally contingent identities to have real normative weight, but also insists that we must endorse any such identities and can rise above them.

No fixed standard for evaluating these identities (// historicists, Rorty, etc.)

Nonetheless, there is something universal. → argument for humanity, Kant’s CI.
Draws heavily on linguistic turn, Wittgenstein, Levinas! (though not explicitly) to note that we are always already engaged with others. Unlike Kant, she doesn’t think CI tells us the domain. → room for levinas.

Result is a rich Kantian account that combines a thorough acceptance of naturalism as a perspective on human beings but also a from-within perspective that provides for real normativity. Affirms Kant’s emphasis on morality,79 but enriches the rest of his account of human practical life so that it’s not just about seeking “happiness” but about meeting “obligations” of lots of identities that we can endorse as part of a coherent whole life while recognizing their contingency, diversity, cheerfully ethnocentric (or even cheerfully idiosyncratic) status, etc. Gives room for Rorty’s sort of personal interest in creativity (though without making it an important ideal for everyone) while giving authority over that interest to moral ones (arranging obligations in at least something like a hierarchy).

Korsgaard’s views are, of course, not without their detractors amongst defenders of the “true Kant.” She’s more naturalist than Kant, in seeing more of a symmetry between nature and freedom. She’s less metaphysical, so has no truck for any metaphysical correlate of the two standpoints. Lately (and even in SN), she’s got a more teleological bent. As noted, she doesn’t think Kant works without Wittgenstein, so she ends up with a more linguistic and social Kant. She thinks you can get moral obligation out of reflection as such, where Kant seems to take it as more of a brute given (cf. especially religion footnote xxx)

Xxxxx
Frankfurt, xxx

natural and human sciences have become more rigorous and informative, they have split off from “philosophy.” What has been left to philosophers is largely the normative issues that the sciences have been incapable – for reasons laid out in chapter nine – of addressing.

VI. Conclusion: Humans as Normative Animals
“At least since Plato, philosophical analysis has relied on thought experiments as a way to test hypotheses about the nature and conditions of human knowledge, and other rational desiderata, such as justice, happiness, and the rest. Any such practice gives prime importance to intuitions concerning not only hypothetical cases but also principles in their own right. The objective is to make coherent sense of the contents that we intuit, by adopting general accounts that will best comport with those intuitions and explain their truth.” (Sosa 2009, draft pp. 5-6)

“How do we discover that a belief can be both true and justified without being knowledge, when we had once been so sure of the opposite? It is here that the appeal to intuition seems in place. We feel confident that if someone deduces a true conclusion from a justifiedly believed false premise, his justified true belief in that conclusion will not thereby constitute knowledge. So we can see, in a way that seems intuitively obvious, something previously overlooked: namely, a way in which someone could arrive at a justified true belief that would not thereby constitute knowledge.” Sosa 2009, p. 6)

“According to this alternative, the individual philosopher has intuitive access to data such as the Gettier examples, and can take these data into account in assessing criteria of rightness. Once he shares his thoughts with others, the philosopher may encounter apparent disagreement. And this in a way will also constitute relevant data. If it is real disagreement, not just apparent disagreement in misleading linguistic garb, then some explanation will be desirable. If the thinker’s own side of the disagreement is to prevail rationally, then, it will be helpful to have some
theory of error, of how the other side has fallen into error. This is one reason why it is better to attain agreement with others who share one’s philosophical questions. The reason need not be just xenophobic conservatism. Nor need one think that the very fact of the agreement among us is a fundamental source of the justification for the coincident beliefs. On the contrary, the main reason for engaging in dialectic may be to learn from others in an exchange of reasons. Preferably, such discussion will yield agreement, which will save us the trouble of elaborating a theory of error. The explanation of agreement as joint, rational discerning of a truth is confirmatory of our own belief, which then needs no special defense through a theory of error.” Sosa 2009, pp. 8-9

“just about all of the vast literature that arose in response to Gettier’s classic paper uses intuitions about specific cases to test proposed analyses of the concept of knowledge.16” (Stich 2001: 8**) FN 16: Gettier, E. (1963). For a review of literature during the first two decades after Gettier’s paper appeared, see Shope, (1983). For more recent work in this tradition, see Plantinga (1993a) and (1993b) as well as the follow-up collection of papers in Kvanvig (1996).

For example, much contemporary epistemology xxx

- Willingness to start with basic prejudices about the nature of knowledge (if it’s not true, it can’t be knowledge; if it’s not justified, it can’t be knowledge)
- Counter-examples as imaginative variation, intuition by isolation
- But, post-Witt/Heid, particular intuitions are often allowed to be revised in the light of how they hang together as a whole
- post-Witt/Heid and deeply contrary to Husserl and even Moore, “progress” in epistemology is not foundationalist…building from a solid foundation to more and more insight, but coherentist, trying to piece together a more and more coherent reflective equilibrium

To give an example of the tone of contemporary analytic epistemology, it is useful to look at one of the major arguments in epistemology in the 20th century. One of the central questions of epistemology is the nature of “knowledge,” and by 19xxx, the prevailing wisdom among analytic epistemologists was that “knowledge” is “justified true belief.” But in a short paper in 19xxx, xxx Gettier raised the following counter-example to this prevailing wisdom:

Xxxx quote xxx.

The response has been a host of attempts to reformulate the nature of knowledge, either by adding further qualifications (so that knowledge = justified, true, ____ belief) or by
cashing out the nature of “justification” such that Gettier’s case does not count as genuinely justified.

The details of these analyses constitute much of the ever-growing field of analytic epistemology and would require several books of their own to discuss. But in the context of this book, it is worth noting that these debates are primarily normative rather than descriptive or psychological. Their normative status and its limits emerge particularly clearly in the context of a recent criticism of analytic epistemology. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Within moral philosophy, intuitionism in its Moorean form is defended by some, but xxx.

- Rawlsian reflective equilibrium (and, via Larmore, Rawls back to Moore again!)
- Utilitarianism (note in this context the striking similarity between Moore and Mill (both in Mill’s argument for util (desireable is that I desire it) and in his rankings (experts…though here he does include some non-imaginative element).
- Same use of imaginative counter-examples, which reinforces Moore’s naturalistic fallacy argument. xxx

“According to Epistemic Romanticism, knowledge of the correct epistemic norms (or information that can lead to knowledge of the correct norms) is implanted within us in some way, and with the proper process of self–exploration we can discover them.’ (STich et al 2001: 4**

“an epistemic intuition is simply a spontaneous judgment about the epistemic properties of some specific case – a judgment for which the person making the judgment may be able to offer no plausible justification.” (STich 2001: 5)

Note how Kant is like and unlike this epistemic romanticism. Like romanticism, he takes it that correct epistemic norms are “in us.” Unlike romanticism/platonism, though, he does not take this to be an insight into such norms in some realist sense; “true” or “real” norms are not “implanted within us in some way”; rather, the norms that are in us are explanted into the world, into the space of epistemic justification, such that these norms determine what counts as justification.81

“Our data indicate that when epistemologists advert to “our” intuitions when attempting to characterize epistemic concepts or draw normative conclusions, they are engaged in a culturally local endeavor – what we might think of as ethno-epistemology. Indeed, in our studies, some of the most influential thought experiments of 20th century epistemology elicited different intuitions in different cultures. In light of this, Intuition Driven Romanticism seems a rather bizarre way to determine the correct epistemic norms. For it is difficult to see why a process that relies heavily on epistemic intuitions that are local to one’s own cultural and socioeconomic group would lead to genuinely normative conclusions.” (STich et al 2001: 36**)

asdfxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxproblemsgxxxxxxxxx
Their normative status and its limits emerge particularly clearly in the context of a recent criticism of analytic epistemology. See too stich et al 2001 and related articles Bishop and Trout have argued, in defense of their broadly naturalist approach to epistemology, that what modern analytic epistemology amounts to is not a normative study of what we ought to believe but merely.

Bishop and Trout’s criticism fails to recognize the important distinction between normative analyses that take place “from-within” the context of epistemic justification and descriptive analyses of justification-behavior. If analytic epistemologists were seeking empirical descriptions of human justification-behavior, then Bishop and Trout are certainly correct that they would be going about this project in the wrong way, since they would be picking out the behavior of only a small set of agents. But this is not the project of analytic epistemology. They are not trying to find out what people think knowledge is, but what knowledge really is. And that is a normative question, akin both to Husserl’s search for essences (here the essence of knowledge) and Kant’s question “What should I believe?” (since “knowledge” picks out belief that meets at least some desiderata for belief). And no amount of survey data can help one answer this question. What contemporary analytic philosophy offers is one methodological approach to getting at normativity (one that is, in many respects, similar to Husserlian phenomenology). But Bishop and Trout also give reasons to think that Kant’s approach to epistemology has some distinct advantages over contemporary analytic epistemology (and, for that matter, phenomenology). Kant does not seek a reflective equilibrium between the whole set of out intuitions about knowledge and his theory of knowledge. Instead, Kant’s transcendental seeks the conditions of possibility of any empirical cognition at all. This approach commits Kant only to identifying some very basic formal features of empirical cognitions and. The result is that Kant’s approach is less susceptible to the sort of arguments from diversity than contemporary analytic epistemology. Even if people might differ about Gettier cases, or about other intuitions appealed to by contemporary epistemologists, they are likely to agree that empirical cognition is cognition of external objects that undergo changes over time. At the same time, Kant’s epistemology is not foundationalist in any traditional sense. The possibility of empirical cognition is neither indubitable nor rationally self-evident. One could retreat into a radical empirical idealism according to there are only strings of disjointed perceptions, according to which any semblance of order in the world is a mere sham. Kant’s transcendental method thus avoids the problems that plague both foundationalism and mere intuitionism.

End with two criticisms: (1) Naturalist critique of these approaches to normativity: Bishop and Trout’s critique of this as mere (empirical) anthropology of the intuitions of a certain (odd) population set.

Discuss moral intuitionism here too, including reflective equilibrium and LArmore’s latest book.
Existentialist critique . . . note that Heidegger et. al were responding to Husserl’s attempt to get at essences by putting existence 1st. A similar point can be made about contemporary analytic philosophy (cf. Gutting’s liberalism book re: three types of philosophy, and the paradox of doing conceptual analysis when others are doing conceptual genealogy/revision.)

Note how both realism and utilitarianism in moral theory end up being intuitionist. xxx

Reflective equilibrium as a more complicated (less foundationalist) sort of intuitionism: “the most familiar examples of Intuition Driven Romanticism are various versions of the reflective equilibrium strategy in which (to paraphrase Goodman slightly) “a [normative] rule is amended if it yields an inference we are [intuitively] unwilling to accept [and] an inference is rejected if it violates a [normative] rule we are [intuitively] unwilling to amend.” In a much discussed paper called “Can Human Irrationality Be Experimentally Demonstrated,” L. J. Cohen proposes a variation on Goodman’s strategy as a way of determining what counts as rational or normatively appropriate reasoning.

Vs. intuitionism: “the Normativity Problem: What reason is there to think that the output of one or another of these Intuition Driven Romantic strategies has real (as opposed to putative) normative force? Why should we care about the normative pronouncements produced by these strategies? Why should we try to do what these outputs claim we ought to do in matters epistemic? Why, in short, should we take any of this stuff seriously? We don’t think that there is any good solution to the Normativity Problem for Intuition Driven Romanticism or indeed for any other version of Romanticism in epistemology. And because there is no solution to the Normativity Problem, we think that the entire tradition of Epistemic Romanticism has been a very bad idea.” (Stich 2001: 8-9, cf. too Stich 1990)

“There might be a group of people who reason and form beliefs in ways that are significantly different from the way we do. Moreover, these people might also have epistemic intuitions that are significantly different from ours. More specifically, they might have epistemic intuitions which, when plugged into your favorite Intuition Driven Romantic black box yield the conclusion that their strategies of reasoning and belief formation lead to epistemic states that are rational (or justified, or of the sort that yield genuine knowledge – pick your favorite normative epistemic notion here). If this is right, then it looks like the IDR strategy for answering normative epistemic questions might sanction any of a wide variety of regulative and valutational norms. And that sounds like bad news for an advocate of the IDR strategy, since the strategy doesn’t tell us what we really want to know. It doesn’t tell us how we should go about the business of forming and revising our beliefs. One might, of course, insist that the normative principles that should be followed are the ones that are generated when we put our intuitions into the IDR black box. But it is less than obvious (to put it mildly) how this move could be defended. Why should we privilege our intuitions rather than the intuitions of some other group? “ (Stich 2001: 9)

Note how Kant has a two-fold response to this: (1) social nature of knowledge, vs. logical egoism. (2) idealism...when push comes to shove, we can admit that others might have
radically different epistemic norms, in which case they literally live in a different epistemic world.

Most generally, note that while Kant does start with epistemic “intuitions” of a sort, these are sufficiently vague to at least prima facie avoid the problems with diversity that recent intuitionist programs in epistemology face. Within epistemology, for instance, Kant does not start with specific intuitions about justification but only with the affirmation that at least some concrete empirical judgments can be true. By then looking for the conditions of possibility of true judgments, he can arrive at a set of epistemic standards xxx. Similarly in morals, Kant’s approach does not depend upon the accuracy of any particular moral intuitions – in fact, he challenges the quite common intuition that one should deceive the murderer at the door – but only on the fact that at least some moral judgments are justified, that is, on the fact that we have at least some moral obligations. Now admittedly, as we saw in chapter 11 (historicism), Kant’s arguments end up assuming conceptions of empirical judgment and moral responsibility that might not be universal, and thus Kant’s approach might depend upon more specific and controversial epistemic or moral intuitions that it seems, but Kant’s overall approach – starting with xxx and reasoning via conditions of possibility – at least avoids the brute appeals to intuition that plague contemporary epistemology and Moorean moral realism.

1 VI. Aesthetics, Emotion, and the Normativity of Feeling
Put in a footnote that you keep. Briefly talk about aesthetics, the shift from beauty to art (and back?), the issue of universalism and the extent to which we’ve lost this. Kant still read as a classic and very influential, but, especially in popular mind, largely left behind.

But re: normativity of emotion, Kant is underappreciated. Emotional normativity is a hot topic these days. Xxx.

2 Deal with the McDowell-Brandom approach? Figure this out!!!

3 The developments in the natural sciences are powerful tools for thinking about human beings; they can and should be used to improve the thoughts, intentions, and actions of human beings, and ultimately to improve human lives. But these sciences alone cannot define what such “improvement” involves. In order to study human beings scientifically, one must have standards for what counts as a legitimate scientific theory, and these standards cannot be given from science itself. And in order to use scientific accounts of human beings to improve human lives, one must have a theory of what counts as a good (or a better) human life. And, again, science cannot provide such a theory. Historicist and existentialist approaches to thinking about human beings highlight the problem of normativity but fail to provide anything like a solution to that problem. Seeing that our
basic presuppositions are contingent, that we might have (or have had) different ones, opens up a whole new realm for human thought and deliberation. One response to this is a sort of nihilistic despair, xxx. Another, more xxx response, is Nietzsche’s xxx. But xxx.

One of the striking features of the approaches to human beings laid out in the past two chapters – naturalism, historicism, and existentialism – is that they all include some attempt to deal with the fact that human beings find themselves with ideas about proper ways of thinking, acting, and even feeling that are distinct from the ways that they actually think, act, and feel. That is, human beings are constrained by norms. But none of the approaches to human beings laid out in the last chapter does an adequate job of enabling human beings to deal with this normative feature of human life. Xxx.

This chapter tracks a variety of recent attempts to come to terms with the necessity of normativity. Human beings are, as Sartre aptly put it, fated to be free. We are not merely the objects of possible scientific investigation, objects of possible “experience,” in Kant’s terms. We are also the subjects of such investigation, the thinkers and not merely the objects thought about. More importantly, we are actors in the world. Even if human actions can be seen from one perspective as the results of biological, psychological, or social-cultural forces (or some combination), we humans also inhabit our choices from the inside, and from that perspective we must simply decide what is best to do. The necessity of normativity comes from the necessity to act for reasons. Xxxx.

In chapter thirteen, we will return to Kant’s own approach.xxx

Or, of course, existentialist or deconstructive.

I also include, in my penultimate section, a discussion of the normativity of emotion, a hot topic today and one about which Kant has more to say that many might expect. Xx/.

Xxx Somewhere too discuss Sellars (space of reasons, etc), first and third person (and now second person) perspectives,

Perhaps restructure in terms of normativity of cognition, desire, and feeling (perhaps with a separate – intro section on phenomenology and intuitionism in general).

Habermas is broader, including specific attention to epistemology and focusing considerable attention on political rather than strictly ethical xxx.

From Stanford Encyclopedia:

2. Philosophical Method

Chisholm wrote and taught in a distinctive style that inspired his readers and students. His characteristic methodology was to begin his discussion of a philosophical issue by identifying a few key questions and citing pre-analytic data that an adequate theory should accommodate. In many cases his work began in the Aristotelian fashion with a set of “aporia” or puzzles. He sought to develop a theory that would be adequate to the puzzles. He formulated his theories by first introducing a small number of primitive or unanalyzed terms and then constructing an often elaborate system of definitions and principles all built on these primitives. The final principles and definitions provided solutions to the puzzles with which he began and accommodated the data he had cited.
The clarity and elegance of the systems were remarkable, though in some cases critics worried that the primitive concepts were for one reason or another suspect. Chisholm encouraged readers and students to criticize his systems by proposing counterexamples and objections. They were eager to do so, and Chisholm took great joy in revising and improving upon his views in the light of their comments.

Chisholm was well known for his penchant for formulating definitions and subsequently revising them in the light of counterexamples. The authors of the *Philosophical Lexicon* (see Other Internet Resources) took note of this and accordingly introduced a new technical term of their own:

**chisholm**, v. To make repeated small alterations in a definition or example. “He started with definition (d.8) and kept chisholming away at it until he ended up with (d.8′′′′′′′′).”

Philosophy for the past hundred years has largely been divided between two approaches roughly identified as an Anglo-American-Australian “analytic” philosophy and a “Continental” philosophy presently dominant in France. The former emphasizes

11 Husserl is widely seen as the father (or grandfather) of contemporary “Continental” philosophy, an approach dominant in France and Germany that, today, largely emphasizes the sort of existentialist philosophizing of figures like Derrida and Levinas. Moore, along with Frege and Russell, is one of the fathers (or grandfathers) of what is generally called contemporary “analytic” philosophy, dominant in the English-speaking world.

12 In some cases, intuitions play a foundational role, as the fundamental an irrevocable starting points for developing philosophical theories. In other cases, intuitions

13 My brief discussion of Husserl focuses on the period of his *Ideas*. xxx

14 “We shall keep our regard fixed upon the sphere of consciousness and study what we find immanently within it.” (Ideas § 33, G p. <59>)


Cf. Essence of “any tone” “any material thing” (*Ideas* § 2, p. 8 <9>), but preeminently interested in the essence of consciousness itself: “We shall keep our regard fixed upon the sphere of consciousness and study what we find immanently within it . . . We shall subject it to a systematic . . . *eidetic* analysis” (*Ideas* § 33, G p. <59>)

18 Logical Investigations, trans Findlay, ed. Dummett, p. 43.

19 See *Ideas* § 3 8-9 <G: 10-11> and Husserl 1965:110.

Experiencing, of intuition of something individual can become transmuted in *eidetic seeing* (ideation) – a possibility which is itself to be understood not as empirical, but as eidetic . . . This seeing is presentive of the essence and, perhaps, presentive of it originary, can be an adequate one such as we can easily obtain in, for example, a seeing o the essence tone . . . The essence (Eidos) is a new sort of object. Just as the datum of individual or experiencing intuition is an individual object, so the datum of eidetic intuition is a pure essence. Not a merely external analogy but a radical community is present here. *Seeing an essence is also precisely intuition*. (*Ideas* § 3 8-9 <G: 10-11>

20 Though see *Ideas* §87, pp. 212 <180>, where Husserl admits the possibility of “errors” in phenomenology, but then proposes “weeding out errors by measuring them against intuition.”

21 (*Ideas*, §24, p. 44 <G: 43>.

22 “the universal task . . . to investigate systematically the elementary intentionalities . . . and from this advance towards a descriptive knowledge of the totality of mental processes, toward a comprehensive type of a life of the psyche. Clearly, the consistent carrying out of this task will produce knowledge which will
have validity far beyond the psychologist's own particular psychic experience.” (Encyclopedia article, in Shorter Works, p. 23b).

“the situation is quite different [from empirical investigation of psychic “facts”] in an a priori science. In it, every self-enclosed field of possible experience permits eo ipso the all-embracing transition from the factual to the essential form, the \textit{eidos}. So here, too. If the phenomenological actual fact as such becomes irrelevant; if, rather, it serves only as an example and as the foundation for a free but intuitive variation of the factual mind and communities of minds into the a priori possible (thinkable) ones; and if now the theoretical eye directs itself to the necessarily enduring invariant in the variation; then there will arise with this systematic way of proceeding a realm of its own, of the “a priori”. There emerges therewith the eidetically necessary typical form, the \textit{eidos}; this \textit{eidos} must manifest itself throughout all potential forms of mental being in particular cases. (SW 25b)

“a general reversal of that ‘natural attitude’ in which everyday life as a whole as well as the positive sciences operate. In [this natural attitude] the world is for us the self-evidently existing universe of realities which are continuously before us in unquestioned givenness” (SW 27b).

23 SW 25b, see too \textit{Ideas} §70, pp. 157f. <129f>.

24 \textbf{Include in text? In footnote?} Thanks to the bracketing of the natural attitude, one considers these possibilities not in terms of possible realization in the objective world but in terms of the essence of color as such. Even if, scientifically speaking, color is impossible without “energy,” one can eidetically distinguish between colors and various interpretations of energy (as possible work, possible heat, etc) by imaginatively considering a possible experience of color independent of any energy-effects.

25 “the universal task . . .: to investigate systematically the elementary intentionalities . . . and from this advance towards a descriptive knowledge of the totality of mental processes, toward a comprehensive type of a life of the psyche. Clearly, the consistent carrying out of this task will produce knowledge which will have validity far beyond the psychologist’s own particular psychic experience.” (Encyclopedia article, in Shorter Works, p. 23b).

See too \textit{Ideas} § 36ff.

26 For discussion of noesis and noema, see \textit{Ideas} §§ 85ff. (through the end of volume 1), pp. 205ff. <174ff). See too xxx secondary source.xxx

27 I have focused here only on the most general claims of the early Husserl. Xxx extended these in later years, lifeworld, phenomenological approach to history, etc. xxx

28 Existentialism itself, as we saw in chapter eleven, appropriated Husserl’s general methodological approach to develop detailed accounts of

29 (‘Proof of an External World’ 166).

It seems to me that, so far from its being true, as Kant declares to be his opinion, that there is only one possible proof of the existence of things outside of us, namely the one which he has given, I can now give a large number of different proofs, each of which is a perfectly rigorous proof; and that at many other times I have been in a position to give many others. I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘I-here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And if, by doing this, I have proved \textit{ipso facto} the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply examples.
But did I prove just now that two human hands were then in existence? I do want to insist that I did; that the proof which I gave was a perfectly rigorous one;

30 (‘Proof of an External World’ 166)
31 Proof of an External World’ In Moore phil papers 148
32 He is, here, very far from Husserlian intuitionism, in the sense that Moore is precisely taking the natural attitude for granted and using common sense to make substantive existential claims, not mere claims about essences (and certainly not claims limited to a phenomenology of consciousness!).
33 McDowell as neo-Moore? xxx
35 Moore PE preface and §88.
36 although something like Moorean intuitionism has recently gained a bit of a following in very recent years, See Audi, xxx, xxx, xxx.
37 Such theorizing was dominant in the English speaking world until quite recently, especially within epistemology.xxx

XXX
Tie to intuitionism, first Moore’s xxx.
Note too the tie to Frege xxx. Frege drew explicitly from Kant’s anti-psychologism about logic and mathematics. Xxx
Shift into the use of intuitions in contemporary epistemology.
   Post-linguistic term, a lot of contemporary epistemology focuses on analyses of what’s required by/implied in certain terms/concepts. (E.g. xxx ) This includes, preemminently, certain sorts of normative analyses (e.g. what counts as “warrant” for warranted true belief, what norms govern “assertion” (Williamson 2000), externalism vs. internalism debates about belief, intention, warrant, etc.)

39 Indeed, as Goldman notes, an illuminating taxonomy of epistemological theories can be generated by classifying them on the basis of the sort of criterion of rightness they endorse. So how are we to go about deciding
8 Goodman (1965), p. 66.
10 See, for example, Elgin, C. (1996), Chapter IV, and Stein (1996), Chs. 5 & 7.
12 Goldman (1986), p. 64.
15 In an insightful commentary on this paper, presented at the Conference in Honor of Alvin Goldman, Joel Pust notes that in his recent work Goldman (1992, 1999, Goldman and Pust 1998) has offered a rather different account of how epistemic intuitions are to be used:
Very roughly, Goldman's more recent view treats the targets of philosophical analysis as concepts in the psychological sense of "concept," concrete mental representations causally implicated in the production of philosophical intuitions. On this new view, intuitions serve primarily as reliable evidence concerning the intuitors internal psychological mechanisms. Especially interesting in the context of [the Weinberg, Nichols and Stich paper] is the fact that Goldman explicitly disavows the common assumption of "great uniformity in epistemic subjects" judgments about cases, noting that this assumption may result from the fact that philosophers come from a "fairly homogeneous subculture." (Goldman 1992, 160).

This new psychologistic account makes it easier to explain why intuitions are reliable evidence of some sort. However, this reliability is gained by deflating the evidential pretensions of intuitions so that they are no longer treated as relevant to the non-linguistic or non-psychological question which is the central concern of the Normative Project: "What makes a belief epistemically justified?" While Goldman’s approach solves a problem about the reliability of intuitions by telling us that the fact that people have certain intuitions is a reliable indicator of their psychological constitution, it does not resolve the problem which motivated Stich's argument since that problem was whether we are justified in treating the content of our epistemic intuitions as a reliable guide to the nature of justified belief. So, while Goldman's use of intuitions in his new project seems to me largely immune to [the criticisms in the paper by Weinberg, 7

Sosa (in Stich and his Critics) 2009: 103. Strictly speaking, this is only one of the dominant approaches within contemporary analytic epistemology, the other being a "more naturalist epistemology that studies contingent ways in which we humans can and do satisfy conditions revealed by reflection as necessary for human knowledge of one or another variety" (Sosa 2009: 103). Since I have discussed naturalist epistemology briefly in chapter 9, I focus my discussion here on more classical analytic epistemology.

See e.g. Sosa 2009: xxx-xxx, where he admits that "knowledge" might not even the be the highest purely epistemic value. xxx


E.g. from Karen Jones in Contemporary Philosophy, p. 73.

This, at least, is how Kant sees his own strategy. As we saw in chapter ten, even Kant’s apparently thin conceptions of “objectivity” and “obligation” may involve xxx. At the end of this chapter, we’ll look at some attempts to xx.

Asdfxxx Careful, though:

On the view that I am suggesting, the claim that an ‘adequate’ philosophical doctrine must make room for our intuitions is a reactionary slogan, one which begs the question at hand . . . What is described as such a consciousness is simply a disposition to use the language of our ancestors . . . Unless we suffer from what Derrida calls “Heideggerian nostalgia,” we shall not think of our intuitions as more than platitudes, more than the habitual use of a certain repertoire of terms, more than old tools which as yet have no replacements. (CIS 22).

Rorty’s pragmatism grows in part out of a “linguistic turn” in 20th century philosophy, wherein xxx.

Reference xxx.
Rorty considers the question, “If freedom has no morally privileged status, if it is just one value among many, then what can be said for liberalism?” and answers We cannot assume that liberals ought to be able to rise above the contingencies of history and see the kind of individual freedom which the modern liberal state offers its citizens as just one more value. Nor can we assume that the rational thing to do is to place such freedom alongside other candidates (e.g., the sense of national purpose which the Nazis briefly offered the Germans, or the sense of conformity to the will of God which inspired the Wars of Religion) and then use “reason” to scrutinize these various candidates and discover which, if any, are “morally privileged.” Only the assumption that there is some such standpoint to which we might rise gives sense to the question, “If one’s convictions are only relatively valid, why stand for them unflinchingly?” (CIS 50, see too 85)

“In the ideal liberal society . . . the nonintellectuals . . . would not need a justification for her sense of human solidarity, for she was not raised to play the language game in which one asks and gets justifications for that sort of belief.” (CIS 87)

“openmindedness should not be fostered because . . . Truth is great and will prevail, nor because . . . truth will always win in a free and open encounter. It should be fostered for its own sake. A liberal society is one which is content to call “true” whatever the upshot of such encounters turns out to be. (CIS 52)

In my view, an ideally liberal polity would . . . not assume that a form of cultural life is no stronger than its philosophical foundations. It would regard the justification of liberal society simply as a matter of historical comparison with other attempts at social organization – those of the past and those envisaged by utopians. (CIS 53)

This way of putting things suggests a sharper distinction between ethnocentrism and irony than Rorty in fact endorses. Once one properly recognizes the contingency of the ethnos to which one is committed, Rorty suggests, this very recognition helps cultivate a lack of seriousness conducive to the sort of playful revision of values involved in living ironically (see CIS 73).

Nothing can serve as a criterion of a final vocabulary save another such vocabulary; there is no answer to a redescription save a re-re-redescription. Since there is nothing beyond vocabularies which serves as a criterion of choice between them, criticism is a matter of looking on this picture and on that, not of comparing both pictures with the original. (CIS 80)

Nietzsche’s use of language of domination and control in connection with creative redescription, not to mention Heidegger’s direct involvement with Nazi politics, b

XX

Gaugin xxx

Against those, like Kant, who aim to provide transcendental justification for the wrongness of cruelty, Rorty insists that “belief can still regulate action, can still be thought worth dying for, among people quite aware that this belief is caused by nothing deeper than contingent historical circumstance” (CIS 189). That cruelty is the worst thing one can do is, for a liberal ironist, just such a belief; and while Rorty-the-ironist rejects any calls for universal justifications of the wrongness of cruelty, Rorty-the-liberal would rather die than be cruel.
Of course, “There is no neutral, non-circular way to defend the liberal’s claim that cruelty is the worst thing we do” (CIS 196).

Rorty in Rajchman 1984: 5.

Include in a footnote his radical claims about the dialogue with the religious student/parents. xxx

Rorty’s liberal irony, with its resistance to stasis and insistence upon respect for others through seeking solidarity and avoiding cruelty, xxx.

Rorty’s liberal irony, with its resistance to stasis and insistence upon respect for others through seeking solidarity and avoiding cruelty, xxx.

For alternative cheerful ethnocentrisms, see figures as diverse as Simon Blackburn (Ruling Passions, especially chapter xxx); Mark Timmons Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism (see e.g. p. 218).

Rorty’s pragmatism is the most prominent form of cheerful ethnocentrism, but many contemporary philosophers embrace one or another aspect of Rorty’s ethnocentrism while rejecting various aspects of his pragmatism. Pragmatism combines an acceptance of the limitations of the from-within standpoint, in that this is always a standpoint of an “I” or at best a “we” xxx. Pragmatism adds to this cheerful ethnocentrism a particular claim about the sort of standards that “we” should use for evaluating our beliefs and choices; in particular, that beliefs are merely tools for accomplishing certain purposes. One could adopt cheerful ethnocentrism without adopting this particular pragmatist conception of what makes beliefs “justified,” and thereby cheerfully conduct one’s epistemological or phenomenological investigations without worrying about (or at least, without worrying too much about) potential cultural myopia. Xxx.

It’s important to note that not all who like Rorty’s cheerful ethnocentrism also like his pragmatism. Note Rorty and his Critics ..how many are trying to show that there is still a coherent sense of objectivity even within a broadly rortian approach xxx.

Include Blackburn . . . just take where you are and justify yourself via bootstraps not skyhooks, but in no particular way.

Rorty as naturalist, historicist, and existentialist: “this . . . attitude . . . naturalizes mind and language by making all questions about the relation of either to the rest of the universe causal questions, as opposed to questions about adequacy of representations” (CIS 15).

“At the very least, it’s cheerful, and we could all use a bit more cheer. ☺.”

Rorty writes approvingly of Freud, who “does not ask us to choose” between the “merely moral man” and the “poet,” noting that, Freud “does not think we have a faculty which can make such choices” (CIS 35). But from-within, we often must make such choices. Xxx.

In some respects, one can see this approach as another variation of cheerful ethnocentrism, one that develops a specific account of the normative structure of decision-making about how to live one’s life.

Rorty himself adopts this view in describing how one chooses vocabularies for one’s personal xxx.

“There are two principle ways in which human beings try, by placing their lives in a larger context, to give sense to those lives. The first [which Rorty here endorses] is by telling the story of their contribution to a
community. This community may be the actual historical one in which they live, or another one, distant in
time or place, or a quite imaginary one . . .” (“Solidarity or Objectivity,” in Rajchman 1984: 3).
Rorty contrasts this approach with a second way, in which one seeks “to describe themselves as standing in
immediate relation to a nonhuman reality,” a contrast that (as we will see) MacIntyre rejects.

62 MacIntyre’s appeal to the importance of narrative and tradition is part of a more comprehensive critique
of the “Enlightenment Project,” which includes Kant xxx. The details of that critique are xxx, but I will not
discuss it here.
63 Well, he starts with a criticism of the enlightenment project, and then an account of the importance of
“practices,” but xxx.
64 “We cannot . . . characterize behavior independently of intentions, and we cannot
characterize intentions independently of the settings which make those intentions
intelligible both to agents themselves and to others” (AV 206, see rest of passage, too.)

65 “Human actions in general [are] enacted narratives” (AV 211)
66 Interesting MacIntyre/Aquinas parallels to HAbermas and Korsgaard:
“the natural law is discovered not only as one of the primary objects of practical enquiry but as the
presupposition of any effective practical enquiry” (MacIntyre 1988: 180)
“confrontation with the natural law is inescapable for anyone who persists in the enquiry as to what his or
her good is – and anyone who does not so persist will of course thereby have put him or herself in the
67 such as Sartre xxx (who, non-coincidentally, was a novelist as much as a philosopher)
Note how sad it is that MacIntyre so misreads Sartre (ignorinng factiticy) that he misses their mutual
affinity.

Also Heidegger re: being-towards-death xxx
68 To ask, “What is the good for man?” is to ask what all answers to the former question must have in
common.” (AV 219)
69 There is a tension here between the fact that I “find myself” the bearer of a tradition and the fact that I
“might not recognize” this. The best way to put this, I think, it that, from-within, I always find myself to
have a relationship to a community that has a story, and thus I find myself the bearer of a tradition, but I
may not see this connection with my evolving community as being the bearer of a tradition. In our
(post)modern, naive-existentialist, and deeply anti-traditional culture, we might specifically not see
ourselves this way, but that’s only because we see ourselves in the light of a society that rejects language of
traditions, etc. xxx
70 See recent NDPR books re: narrative and agency…look very good here (but depend on
CK). xxx
MacIntyre, Taylor, others? (This might make for a good transition to anderson and
benhabib…) (Link this up with historicism claims as well, neohegelian response to
foucault.)

71 When two large-scale intellectual traditions confront one another, a central feature of the problem of
deciding between their claims is characteristically that ther eis no neutral way of characterizing eitehr the
subject matter about which they give rival accounts or the standards by which their claims are to be
evaluated. Each standpoint has its own account fortruth and knowledge, its own mode of characterizing the
relevant suvject matter. And the attempt to discover a neutral, indepednent set of standards or mode of
charaderizing data which is both such as must be acceptable to all rational persons and is sufficient to
determin the truth on the matters about which the two traditions are at variance has generally, andperhpae
universally, proved to be a search for a chimera. How then can genuine controversy proceed? (MacIntyre
1988: 166, see too 328-9)
There is always the possibility of one tradition of action and enquiry encountering another in such a way that neither can, for some considerable stretch of time at least, exhibit to the justified satisfaction of its own adherents, let alone to that of the adherents of its rival, its rational superiority” (emphasis added, MacIntyre 1988: 328)

72 For MacIntyre’s specific critiques of intuitionisms and appeals to self-evidence of various kinds, see AV xxx and MacIntyre 1988: 360-1.

73 Rorty in Rajchman 1984: 3.

74 To some extent, Rorty might accept MacIntyre’s notion of truth, in that Rorty, too, has room for a conception of truth as “xxx quote re: truth as possibility of revisionxxx.” But MacIntyre, with many of Rorty’s critics, sees the xxx.

What then sustains and strengthens traditions? . . . The answer in key part is: the exercise . . . of the relevant virtues. The virtues find their point and purpose not only in sustaining those relationships necessary if the variety of good internal to practices are to be achieved and not only in sustaining the form of an individual life in which that individual may seek out his or her good as the good of his or her whole life, but also in sustaining those traditions which provide both practices and individual lives with their necessary historical context. Lack of justice, lack of truthfulness, lack of courage, lack of the relevant intellectual virtues – these corrupt traditions.

(MacIntyre 1984: 223)

76 Benhabib(? YES!), Anderson as social versions of this . . . justification involves social agreement, but figuring out normativity is a matter of diplomacy and real conversation, not philosophy. There’s no “transcendental” approach to be taken here but just an approach of figuring out what we can all come to agree with.

77 Korsgaard’s position has shifted somewhat between her classic The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: 1996) and her more recent Locke Lectures (published as XXX (Oxford: xxx). Here I focus on her earlier account xxx.

78 Many of Korsgaard’s views are shared by other neoKantians. Among the other top neoKantians, in (roughly) order of overlap with Korsgaard, one must include Onora O’Neill, Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Allen Wood. See too xxx routledge volume on Kant’s morals xxx

79 Oddly, CK suggests that morality doesn’t necessarily trump. XXX And also oddly, she has an account of pain that makes it (and animals) more important than it is for Kant. XXX. Teleological stuff too xxx.

80 Nor need that be a matter of linguistic intuition. There is no semantic ascent in the preceding paragraph. We do of course need to presuppose that we have a common understanding of the words I have written, if we are to take ourselves to be communicating properly by means of them. But this is nothing peculiar to philosophy. It is the normal background presupposition of linguistic communication generally. The question is not just whether “knowledge” applies to the protagonist in a certain example. The question is whether the protagonist who satisfied the conditions specified in the example would know. To see that
this is the interesting question in epistemology we need only retreat to our own reflection, leaving behind any kind of dialogue, whether in journal, conference, seminar, or hallway, and just entertain the question reflectively in foro interno.

The question we then consider is whether someone who believed a true conclusion, but only because he had derived it from a justified false belief, would know in believing that true conclusion. We can of course consider also whether in our idiolect of the moment it would be correct to apply our word ‘knows’ to such a justified believer of a truth. But this is a different question, though one now with an equivalent answer.

That the questions are different may be seen by comparing this. If we consider a hypothetical case of a triangle on a plane surface, and we consider whether that triangle is a square we know the answer to that question and we know it because it is intuitively obvious. Of course, one can also consider the question whether the word ‘square’ in one’s idiolect of the moment would apply to that figure. And this is clearly a different question, even if it must receive an equivalent answer. (p. 6, note parallel to Abe Lincoln parallel in Brandom’s article in Rorty)

81 Thus Kant fits all three of Stich’s criteria for “intuition driven romanticism,” but he is not in fact an epistemic romantic.

Stich’s criteria:
(i) The strategy must take epistemic intuitions as data or input. (It can also exploit various other sorts of data.)
(ii) It must produce, as output, explicitly or implicitly normative claims or principles about matters epistemic. Explicitly normative claims include regulative claims about how we ought to go about the business of belief formation, claims about the relative merits of various strategies for belief formation, and evaluative claims about the merits of various epistemic situations. Implicitly normative claims include claims to the effect that one or another process of belief formation leads to justified beliefs or to real knowledge or that a doxastic structure of a certain kind amounts to real knowledge.
(iii) The output of the strategy must depend, in part, on the epistemic intuitions it takes as input. If provided with significantly different intuitions, the strategy must yield significantly different output. 7

82 As Bishop and Trout note, there may be reasons to believe things that are not knowledge and reasons not to believe what would be genuine knowledge. Bishop and Trout argue this in the context of a broadly utilitarian conception of good belief, which seems to me deeply misguided. Locke and Nietzsche are more
appealing xxx. And Kant, of course, works out a very specific account of practical belief, wherein certain
beliefs are rationally required even though not knowledge. Still xxx.

83 Give some e.g.’s . . . in text?

84 Of course, as we saw in chapter 10-a, even Kant’s rather modest assumptions about the nature of
empirical cognition are susceptible to criticisms as being historically and culturally local. xxx

85 FromSTich 2001: 35**

The last objection we’ll consider was proposed (though not, we suspect, endorsed) by Philip
Kitcher. What IDR strategies need, this objection maintains, is neither first-off intuitions nor
even minimally reflective intuitions, but rather the sorts of intuitions that people develop after
a lengthy period of reflection and discussion – the sort of reflection and discussion that
philosophy traditionally encourages. Kitcher suggested that they be called Austinian
intuitions.

Your experiments, the objection insists, do nothing to show that Austinian intuitions would
exhibit the sort of cultural diversity you’ve found in first-off intuitions, or, indeed, that they
would show any significant diversity at all. When sensible people reflect and reason together,
there is every reason to suppose that they will ultimately reach a meeting of the minds.

Reply:
We certainly concede that we have not shown that Austinian intuitions would not ultimately
converge. However, to echo the theme of our previous reply, in the absence of any evidence
we don’t think there is any reason to suppose that the sorts of marked cultural differences in
sensitivity to epistemic vectors that our experiments have demonstrated would simply
disappear after reflection and discussion.