Week I: Prefaces and Introduction |
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General Secondary Reading (optional): Allison pp. 1-96; Heidegger pp. 1-29, Strawson pp. 13-46. | |
Question 1) What does the word "experience"
mean for Kant? What do you think it ought to mean ? Consider in particular
the references to the word on A vii, A ix, A xii, B xvii, B xxvi, A 1, B
1, A 8, B 11-12, and A9=B13. You will see in the secondary literature that
these represent at least two quite different uses of the word. Which do
you think ought to be given priority? Which do you think Kant actually gives
priority?
Secondary literature: Strawson 1966: 72-4; Heidegger 1967: 4-14; (optional: Heidegger 1997-B: 8-26); Wolff, 98, 159, Bennett 33-4, van Cleve 73-6, Ameriks 2003: 5-16. |
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Question 2) What does the analytic/synthetic distinction
amount to? Can it be successfully drawn? If so, how? Are the two criteria
Kant offers for it really one and the same? Secondary literature: Ayer, "The A Priori" in Ayer 1952: 71-87; LW Beck, "Kant's Theory of Definition," "Can Kant's Synthetic Judgments Be Made Analytic?" (in Gram 1967: 215-46); Bennett, 4-12; Garver, "Analyticity and Grammar," (in Beck 1969: 245-73); Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (online in JSTOR, Philosophical Review 60: 20-43); Grice/Strawson, "In Defense of a Dogma" (JSTOR, Philosophical Review, 65: 141-58); van Cleve 15-33, Allison 2004: 89-96; (Optional: Heidegger 1997-B: 27-39) |
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Question 3) Are geometric truths a priori and synthetic? Secondary literature: cf. readings from (2), as well as Hintikka, "On Kant's Notion of Anschauung," in Penelhum. |