Secondary literature: Smith, 473-7, 534-7, 541-61; Weldon, 127-37; Wilkerson, 154-9; Walsh, 241-9; Bennett, 270--80; Walker, 136-43; Pippin, 201-15; Allison 423-48; (optional: Grier 263-302).

Question 2) Allison writes that, insofar as the lawfulness of nature is merely a regulative idea, "it remains possible that nature does not exhibit any empirically accessible lawlike regularities." (Allison 1990: 34). Does Kant really leave this possibility open - is there no Kantian argument to defend specific scientific laws?

[Optional: Assess with reference to the Appendix to the Dialectic and the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment.]

Secondary literature: Walker, 122-9, 140-7; Broad, 301-16; Buchdahl, "The Kantian Dynamic of Reason" (in Beck 1969) and "The Conception of Lawlikeness in Kant's Philosophy of Science," (in Beck 1974); Watkins ???; Allison ???; Grier 288-94;

Question 3) After Darwin, how convincing are Kant's claims for the uses of teleology?

Secondary literature: Critique of Judgment, introduction; McFarland, 25-42 [optional: 69-97]; Walker, 165-77; Körner, 196-214; find one further source on your own.