Week VI: Schematism, Axioms, Anticipations (pp. 267-95)
General Secondary Reading (optional): Allison pp. 202-28; Heidegger pp. 62-88.
Question 1) Is the schematism "unnecessary," as Prichard puts it (cf. Allison p. 202), or "the central core of the whole voluminous work," as Heidegger (p 63) puts it, or something in between, as Allison suggests? What role does the schematism actually play in the work as a whole?

Secondary literature: Allison 202-28, Guyer 157-81, Heidegger 62-80, Longuenesse 243-7 (cf. too readings under question 2).
Question 2) Can the categories be separated from their schemata? (Could God think with categories but not schemata? Can we think of God without schemata?) What, if anything, does the schemata add to what we have already learned from the Deductions?

Secondary literature: Allison 202-28; (optional: Guyer 157-81); Longuenesse 246-7; Smith 334-42; Paton (volume II) 17-44, 60-78; Heidegger 14-26, 62-80 .

Question 3) Can the possession of concepts be distinguished from the ability to apply them?

Secondary literature: G.J. Warnock, "Concepts and Schematism," in Analysis 1949, pp. 77-82 (copy on reserve); Guyer 157-9, 163-5; Bennett, 84-8, 95-9, 141-52; Walker, 87-94; Aquila 1989: 74-81 (including footnote 38); Allison, 202-27; Pippin, 104-50

Question 4) In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger calls the Schematism "the central core of the whole voluminous work" (63). Why? Do you agree? Why is it so important for Heidegger's interpretation of Kant (regardless, now, of whether it is that important for Kant himself)?

Secondary literature: Smith, 334-42; Paton (volume II), 17-24, 68-70; Heidegger, 62-80, 89-109, 112-142

Question 5) Does the Schematism add to Kant's account of the imagination? How does it relate to his discussions of models, schemata, and symbols in the Critique of Judgment?

Secondary literature: Smith, 334-42; Paton (volumeII), 17-44, 60-78; Wolff, 206-14; Bennett, 141-52; Walsh, 65-77; CJ, §§16-7, 35, 59; Warnock, 28-34; Guyer 1997: 86-92, 374-6

Question 6) Can the schemata be understood as referential rules?

Secondary literature: Smith, 334-42; Paton (II), 17-44, 60-5; Wolff, 206-14; Körner, 70-5; Bennett, 141-52; Butts, "Kant's Schemata as Semantical Rules," in Beck 290-300.