Analogies of Experience


	Week VII: Analogies of Experience (pp. 295-321)

	General Secondary Reading (optional): Allison pp. 229-74; Strawson pp.118-152.

	Question 1) Is Kant's proof of substance successful? Does it adequately respond to Hume's/Berkeley's skepticism re: substance? Secondary literature: Read at least three of the following: van Cleve 105-18, 120-1; Walsh 129-35; Allison 229-46; Bennett 181-200. [Suggested but not required: follow at least one footnote to find a further source.]

	Question 2) Does Kant prove that every event has a cause? Secondary literature: Smith 363-71, Bennett 219-29, Strawson 133-46, Wolff 260-83, Beck 1978: 130-45, van Cleve 122-33, Allison 229-36, 246-60.

	Question 3) Does the argument of the Second Analogy answer Hume? Secondary literature: Lovejoy, "On Kant's Reply to Hume" (in Gram, 284-308); Melnick, 130-5; Smith, 364-71; Wolff, 224-48, 260-83; Bennett, 153-63; Allison, 229-36, 246-60; van Cleve 30-2.

	Question 4) Is Kant's Second Analogy compatible with modern physics? Secondary literature: Wolff, 224-48; Körner, 80-7; Körner, "On the Kantian Foundation of Science and Mathematics" (in Penelhum); Strawson, 118-21; Beck, "The Second Analogy and the Principle of Indeterminacy," (in Penelhum); Wilkerson, 76-94; Walker, 98-105

	Question 5) Does Kant's Second Analogy prove that events are causal, or that they follow causal laws? (In Beck's terms, does Kant show that every event follows some cause, or that the same kind of event follows the same kind of cause? Secondary literature: Beck 1978:111-29; Friedman in Guyer 1992: 161-97; Allison 1996: 80-91. (The readings in questions 2 and 3 are also relevant, and this would also be a good week to "follow a footnote," but these are the only required readings.)

	Question 6) Does Kant's account of time in the Analogies conflict with his account in the Transcendental Aesthetic? Secondary literature: Smith, 134-8, 356-61; Cleugh, 84-104 (handout on reserve); Wolff, 224-48, 260-83; Melnick, 22-30, 85-94

	Question 7) In What is a Thing?, Heidegger says that the Critique "reaches its deepest basis" (182) in the second section of the System of Principles. Explain. Is he contradicting his claim about the centrality of the Schematism in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics? Why is the System of Principles so important to What is a Thing? [You should answer this question only if you have answered at least one other Heidegger question.] Secondary literature: Heidegger 1967: 119-32, 181-244; Sherover, "Heidegger and the Copernican Revolution" in the Monist 51: 559-573 (1967), also in Beck 1969: 130-53.

Week VII: Analogies of Experience (pp. 295-321)