Transcendental Illusion and Paralogisms

Week IX: Transcendental Illusion and Paralogisms

General Secondary Reading (optional): Strawson pp. 155-75; Allison pp. 307-56.

Question 1) What are the nature and causes of transcendental illusion? What role does Kant's doctrine of illusion play in his philosophy as a whole?

Secondary literature: Allison xvii-xviii, 307-32; Smith 441-454; Ameriks in Guyer 1992: 249-72; Grier 101-39; Bennett 1974, p. 262-7.

Question 2) Does Kant believe in the immateriality of the soul? Does he have good grounds for this belief (or for not holding any belief)?
Secondary literature: Ameriks 2000: 27-83, 303-21; McGinn (in Mind 98 (1989): 349-66); Allison (in Monist 72 (1989) 190-208; find this one in the stacks!); Allison 341-46.

Question 3) Does Kant adequately show what is wrong with the argument (paralogism) for the substantiality of the soul? Can an argument for the soul's substantiality survive Kant's critique? Can an argument against substantiality survive?

Secondary literature: Allison 333-41; van Cleve 172-5, 179-80; Ameriks (read chapter on substantiality), Grier 139-63; Kitcher 181-95, Smith 455-8; Strawson 162-74.

Question 4) Are Kant's paralogisms (especially the first) consistent with the claims he makes in his transcendental deduction? (If you focus on a paralogism other than the first, you may need to adjust secondary literature accordingly.)

Secondary literature: Allison 333-41; van Cleve 172-5, 179-80; Ameriks (choose which section of Ameriks to read based on which paralogism you focus on), Grier 139-63; Kitcher 181-95, Smith 455-8; Strawson 162-74.

Question 5) In the context of the third paralogism, how does Kant's account of personal identity differ from Hume's? Does Kant have a consistent and coherent account of personal identity? (In this context, consider the relationship between this account and the transcendental unity of apperception from the transcendental analytic.)

[Related but optional questions: How rationalist is Kant's account of personal identity? Does Kant think personal identity is something of which we can be a priori certain?]

Secondary literature: Grier 169-71; Allison 333-41, 343-6; van Cleve 180-end; Ameriks 128-76

Question 6: How can our empirical selves relate to our noumenal ones? Can we know anything about our noumenal selves? Discuss with reference both to the Paralogisms and to chapter III of the Groundwork.

Secondary literature: Walsh, 183-9; Weldon, 146-63; Wolff, 142-5, 191-200; Strawson, 247-9; Allison, 50-73, 346-56.

Question 7: You may choose any of the paralogisms and offer an analysis and assessment of the Paralogism itself, its overall role in Kant's project, and whether it is consistent with Kant's philosophy as a whole. For this purpose, you should use at least three secondary sources. I particularly recommend Kitcher, Brook, Allison, and Grier.