Immanuel Kant’s

 

Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen

(Remarks on the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime)

 

At present, this translation is being made free of charge on the web.  It is based on Marie Rischmueller’s German edition of Kant’s Bemerkungen in den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1991).  Throughout, I have included both references to page numbers in both Rischmueller {marked with an R} and in the Academy Edition of Kant’s works [marked with square brackets].  The Academy Edition version is volume 20 of the Academy Edition of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften (Vol 20, Ed. Gerhard Lehmann, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co: 1942), available on the web at www.ikp.uni-bonn.de.  Kant’s text Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime is available (in German) in volume 2 of the Academy Edition and at www.ikp.uni-bonn.de.  The text has been translated into English as Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (trans. John T. Goldthwait, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1960) and in a forthcoming translation by Paul Guyer that will be part of the Anthropology, History, Pedagogy volume in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.  Notations such as “{1, on the reverse of the cover, opposite 2:205}” give Rischmueller’s notation (1), followed by an explanation of where in the original Observations the relevant Remark occurs (on the back side of the cover), followed by the Academy edition page number of that original page.

 

Throughout, struck out text (like this) is text that Kant struck out (based on Rischmueller’s notation.  Words that appear in <wedge brackets> are words that Kant inserted into his previously written remarks.

 

Throughout, there are three sorts of notes.  Notes marked with asterisks (* or **) are Kant’s own footnotes.  Notes in Arabic numerals (1, 2, 3 . . .) give either the original term being translated here or note variations between Rischmueller’s text and the Academy editions.  Roman numerals (i, ii, iii, . . .) give explanatory information.  These notes are still quite rough; I hope to refine them soon.

 

I strongly welcome any comments or criticism of this translation.  The current translation is a working draft, but I plan to submit it for publication in the near future.  Please send comments to frierspr@whitman.edu or Patrick Frierson, Philosophy Department, Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA 99362. 

 

 

{1, on the reverse of the cover, opposite 2:205}

 

{R 7} [3] The man’s art of appearing inconsiderate and the woman’s of appearing prudent.

 

A person can employ two kinds of beneficial emotions on others, respect and love, the former by way of the sublime, the latter by way of the beautiful.  A woman reconciles both. Never does a   This composite feeling is the greatest that can ever affect the human heart.  Yet, it [the heart] can only be strong enough for two faint feelings.  Should one of the two be strong, then the other must be weak.  One now wonders which of the two one wants to weaken.  Principles are of the greatest sublimity.  For example, self-esteem demands sacrifice.  E.g. a man can be ugly but a witty woman cannot.

 

The Coquette exceeds the feminine, the rough Pedant the masculine; a prude is too masculine and a petit maitre[i] too feminine

 

It is ridiculous that a man, through understanding and a large income, wants to make a young woman fall in love with him

 

The diversity of women as that of faces.  Characters

 

 Parallels between feeling and capacity[1]

 

A more tender (dull) a finer (coarser) taste[2]

 

<Sympathy with the natural misfortune of others is not necessary, but it certainly is for the injustices suffered by others.>

 

[4] The feeling with which I am dealing is so constituted that I do not need to be taught to ratiocinate in order to sense it

 

{R 8} The finer feeling is that for which the idealistic does <not chimerically contain the noble reason> of agreeableness[3]

 

Voltaire knew and I hope <why women are embarrassed among one another>[ii]

 

dolce piccante  the pleasant acidity[iii]

 

Bold <The third gulp Alexander took from the chalice was sublime though rash>[iv]

 

The splendor of the rainbow of the setting sun

 

Cato’s death.[v]  Sacrifice <Our current constitution makes it so that women can also live without men, which ruins everything>[vi]

 

strange and peculiar  

 

 the powerful person is kind.  Jonathan Wild.[vii]

 

The brave youngster.  Temple at Ephesos.[viii]

 

[5] Women are strong[4] because they are weak <their courage>

 

Menfolk will be casual toward vapeurs and hysterical coincidences[ix]

 

Hat under the arm[x]

 

Love and respect

 

<Taking revenge oneself[5] is sublime.  Certain vices are sublime.  Assassination is cowardly and low.  Most do not even have the courage for great vices.>

 

Sexual love[6] always presupposes lustful love,[7] either in feeling or memory.

This lustful love is also either crude or refined

{R9}Tender love has a great mixture of respect, etc.

A woman does not reveal herself easily; for this reason she does not drink.  Because she is weak, she is clever

 

In marriage unity not union

 

Tender love is also different from marital love

 

{2, Title Page, Front Side, Upper Margin}

 

- - {Latin} What you desire is in you

do not seek yourself outside of you     Persius[xi]

 

On moral rebirth

What supplies a true or imagined need is useful                    mihi bonum[8]

 

{Under “Observations”}

 

 

The desires that are necessary for a person through his nature [6] are natural desires.[9]  The person who has no other appetites and none to a higher degree than through natural necessity is called the person of nature and his satisfaction ability[10] to be satisfied by less is the sufficiency of nature

 

The first part of science is zetetic, the other dogmatic[xii]

 

The number of cognitions[11] and other perfections required for the satisfaction of nature is simplicity of nature.  The person in {R10} which one encounters as much simplicity as the sufficiency of nature is the person of nature.

 

Whosoever has learned to desire more than what is necessary through nature is luxurious.

 

The needs of the person of nature are pressing needs[12]

 

A reason why the representation[13] of death does not have the effect that it could is because as active creatures by nature, we should hardly think about it at all

 

{3, reverse side}

 

Gaiety is wanton, irritating, and disruptive; but the soul at peace[14] is benevolent and kind.

 

Wit[15] belongs to unnecessary things; a man who takes this to be essential in a woman acts just like one who spends his fortune by buying parrots and monkeys

 

One of the reasons why debauchery among the female sex while in an unmarried state is reprehensible is because of the fact that [7] when men in this state are debauched they are not thereby preparing themselves for infidelity in marriage, for their [men’s] concupiscence has certainly increased but their capacity[16] has decreased.  On the other hand, with a woman the desire is unrestrained if the concupiscence increases.   So nothing holds one back from presuming that loose women will become unfaithful, but the same is not the case for similar men.

 

Every purpose[17] of science is either eruditiv (memory) or Speculation (reason).[18]  Both must result in making a person more reasonable (cleverer, wiser) and thus more sufficient in a world that is generally suitable to human nature.

 

{R11}A tender woman-love[19] has the characteristic of developing other moral characteristics, but the lustful ones suppress them.

 

<Moral taste is such that one regards science that does not improve as unimportant>

 

The sensitive soul at peace is the greatest perfection in speech, in poetry, [and in] society, but it cannot always be so.  Rather, it is the final goal – even so in marriages.  Young people surely have much feeling but little taste; the enthusiastic or zealous style ruins taste.  Perverted taste through novels and gallant flirtations.  The healthy, pampered, [and] spoiled taste.

 

A knowledgeable but not clever man [is] not cunning

a clever but not wise man.  Higher manners

 

[8] The woman has a fine taste in the choice of that which can affect the feelings[20] of a man and the man has a dull [taste].  Therefore, it pleases him most when he thinks least about pleasing.  On the other hand, the woman has a dull healthy taste for whoever is concerned with her own feelings

 

{4, sheet inserted after the title page, front side}

 

Bearded women beardless men.  Valiant domestic.

 

The honor of a man consists in the valuation of his self, of women in the judgment of others.  A man marries according to his judgment, a woman not against the judgment of the parents.  A woman opposes injustice with tears, a man with anger.[21]

 

Richardson went so far sometimes puts one of Seneca’s judgments in a woman’s mouth and makes it “as my brother says.”  Were she married it would be called “as my husband tells me.”[xiii]

 

Men become sweet toward women if the women become masculine.  Insult to women in the habit of flattering them.  {R12} Softness roots out more virtue than wantonness, the dignity of a housewife.[22]

 

The vanity of women makes it so that they are only happy in the glimmer beyond the home

 

The bravery of a woman consists of the patient bearing of evil[23] for the sake of honor or love.  That of a man in the eagerness to defiantly drive it [evil] away.

 

[9] Omphale forced Hercules to spin[xiv]

 

Because so many foolish needs make us soft, the pure unaffected moral drive cannot give us enough powers.  Therefore, it must come to something fantastic.

 

Whence the stoic says: my friend is sick; what does it matter to me  There is no man who does not feel the heavy yoke of opinion, and no one does away with it.[24]

 

The chimera of friendship in our condition and the fantastical friendship in the ancient condition.  Aristotle[xv]

 

Cervantes would have done better if instead of making the fantastical and novelistic[25] passion ridiculous he had made something better of it.  Novels[26] make noble women fantastical and common ones absurd.[xvi] 

 

noble men also fantastic, common ones lazy[27]

 

Rousseau’s book serves to improve the Ancients[xvii]

 

In accordance with the simplicity of nature, a woman cannot do much good without the providing of a man.  In conditions of inequality and wealth, she can [do so] immediately

 

Moral luxury.[28]  In sentiments that are without effect

 

Inner grief about the inability to help, or about the sacrifice when one helps,  even when one’s own cowardice makes us {R13}believe that others suffer much although they can fairly endure it, brings about pity.  Incidentally this is a great [10] antidote against selfishness.  These drives are altogether very cold in natural persons.

 

The natural elevations are degradations in one’s state, for example to raise oneself to the position of craftsman

 

Relative evaluation is quite unnecessary, but in the state of inequality and injustice, it is good to set oneself against the pompous high-ups with a certain pride or at the least indifference so as to disapprove of unimportant things

 

With a certain breadth one must [breaks off]

 

{5, back side, opposite page 1 in Ob, at Ri 13}

 

Although being tall does not make a man great, physical greatness does indeed conform to moral judgments

 

It is easier to educate a nobleman than an [ordinary] person.  He would be a despiser of the common rabble.  For he must call them the industrious and the oppressed so that one believes he has been created to support him.  The scholars in China let the nails on their left hand grow[xviii]

 

In all states there is no one more useless than a scholar as long as it is in natural simplicity; and no one more necessary than the same in a state of oppression by means of suspicion or force

 

Thoughtfulnesses belong to small and pretty dispositions

A woman’s affects are just as large as a man’s, but they are superior, especially when it comes to respectability, the man is rash.  The Chinese and Indians have affects that are just as great [11] as Europeans but they are calmer.  A woman is vengeful

 

The rising sun is just as splendid as the setting sun, but the {R14} sight of the former strikes the beautiful, the latter the tragic and sublime  What a woman does in marriage comes much more from natural bliss than what the man does, at least in our civilized condition

 

Because so many unnatural desires find themselves in a civilized relationship, the occasion for virtue also sometimes originates, and science originates because so much luxury is found in enjoyment and knowledge.  In a natural condition one can be good without virtue and reasonable without science

 

It is now difficult to have insight into whether a person would have it better in simple conditions 1. because he has lost his feeling for simple gratification.  2. because he commonly believes that the corruption that exists in a civilized state also exists in conditions of simplicity.

 

{6, page 1 of Ob, upper margin, at 2:207}

 

[12] Bliss without taste is based on innocence and modesty of inclination.  With taste it [is based on] the sensitive soul at peace; for this reason it is possible for one to be happy without society.  Amusements, not needs.  Rest after work is pleasant   One must never chase after gratification.

 

{Lower margin}

 

One must distinguish between he is in accordance with the taste of others, though he has taste in the consideration of judgments of others.  Women know very well how to evaluate in accordance with the taste of others, and for this reason easily know other minds and have good taste to satisfy them.  But they have a bad taste for others, which is good.  For this reason they also all marry the richest

 

{7, page 2 of Ob, marginal notes at lines 15-18, at 2:208}

 

{R15}Tenderness and fondness of sensation. 

 

Taste chooses in trifles

 

{8, sheet inserter after Ob 2, at 2:207}

 

Logical egoism [is] <skillfulness in taking a stance.>

 

Common duties do not need as their motive the hope of another life, but greater sacrifice and self-denial surely have an inner beauty.  But our feeling of pleasure for them can never be so strong in itself that it outweighs the annoyance of inconvenience unless the representation of a future state in which the persistence of such moral beauty and the bliss is thereby increased, so that one will find himself more capable of acting, thus it [the representation of a future life] comes in handy.

 

All pleasures and pains are either physical or ideal.  As for the latter [breaks off]

 

[13] A woman is offended <by[29] crudeness> or oppressed by injustice where no justification but only threat can help.  She uses her touching weapons of melancholic tears, reluctance, and complaints, but she endures the evil anyhow before she ever returns the injustice.  See here the courage of woman.  The man gets angry that one might be so bold so as to offend him; he returns force with force threatens, frightens, and lets the insulter feel the consequences of his injustice.  See here the courage of man.  It is not necessary that the man be indignant about the evil of delusion; he can despise it in a masculine way.  Yet he will be as truly infuriated about this evil as about true insults if it befalls a woman.

 

{R16}A woman never uses scolding reproaches as the external weapon of her anger against a woman, but rather against a man, except by means of the threats against another man

 

When men women squabble or fight the men laugh about it, but not the other way around

 

Duels primarily have their basis in nature for the sake of women.

 

[14] In the present condition, a man can use no other means against injustice than a woman can, that is, authority is arranged not in accordance with the order of nature, but rather with the civil society constitution

 

Rousseau.  He proceeds synthetically and starts from the natural person, I proceed analytically and start from the civilized person

 

The country life delights everyone, especially the shepherd’s life.  Indeed, [the country life] absorbs the civilized person’s boredom.

 

{9, back side, opposite Ob 3, at 2:208}

 

The human heart[30] may be constituted as it likes, so the question is simply whether the state of nature or of ethical civilization develops more actual sin and skill in it [the heart].  It can subdue moral evil so much that merely a lack of great purity appears in action but never a noticeable degree of positive vice (whoever is not so saintly is for that reason not vicious).  On the other hand, this can develop so far that it becomes detestable.  The simple person has little temptation to become vicious.  [15] Luxury alone accounts for great provocations, and the culture of moral feelings and understanding will never hold itself back if the taste for luxury is already great

 

Piety is the <means of> complementi of moral goodness[31] to holiness.  Therefore, the {R17}question is not in the relation of one person to another.  We cannot naturally be saintly and we lost this through original sin, although we certainly can be morally good.

 

Is it not enough for us that we a person never lies, whether or not he has a secret inclination which, were it put in the right situation, would develop into lying?

 

We surely ask whether a man undertakes his actions of honesty, of fidelity, etc. out of consideration for a divine obligation, if he does them, although these actions are condemnable before God insofar as they do not arise through this [consideration]

 

In order to prove that the person of nature is corrupt one appeals to the civilized condition.  One ought to appeal to the natural.

 

Actions of justice are those which, when neglected by another will, naturally move us to hate.  Actions of love, when neglected, will be reason no reason for love of others toward us.

 

 {10, Page Ob 3, on the margin, next to lines 13 and 14, at 2:207}

 

Utility; counterfeit money[32]

 

{Lower margin}

 

Because the basic talents basic characteristics of women are used up in the research of the man [16] and his inclinations and because they [women] also easily create illusion,[33] they are made to rule and also to govern everything in nations that have taste

 

{11, sheet inserted after Ob 4, front side, at 2:208}

 

There is a perfect world (the moral) in accordance with the order of nature, and we ask ourselves about this one to the same extent that we do about the supernatural.

 

{R18}The virtuous one sees the rank of others with indifference, although when it relates to himself, with consideration

 

One can either confine his luxurious impulses or, by maintaining them, discover remedies against their diseases.  To the latter belong science, and respect for life for the sake of the imminence of death, and solace for the future

 

Boredom is a kind of longing for an ideal gratification

 

The Holy Scripture more effectively brings about improvement if supernatural powers accompany it.  The good, moral upbringing [has more effect] if everything should happen purely in accordance with the order of nature

 

[17] I admit that through the latter we cannot bring forth saintliness, which is justified, but we can bring about a moral goodness coram foro humano,[34] and this is even promotable through the former.

 

Just as little as one can say that nature has implanted in us an immediate inclination for acquiring (the stingy greediness), so little can one say it has given us an immediate drive to honor.  Both develop and both are useful in general state of luxury.  But here they let themselves be excluded: so that just as nature brings about healing through hard work, it also provides remedies in its injuries

 

The difference of position[35] makes it so that, as rarely as one puts himself in the place of a subservient horse in order to introduce himself to his wretched feed, just as rarely does one put himself in the place of wretchedness in order to understand it.

 

{12, back side, opposite Ob 5, at 2:208}

 

The provisions[36] for the blissful life can be twofold:

1.      That one reveals how, after all the already acquired inclinations of honor and of luxury, one can maintain his purpose[37] and at the same time prevent the {R19}grief that can originate[38]  in ideas like that of a future life, the nothingness of this life, etc.

2.      Or that one attempts to bring the inclinations themselves to moderation[39]

The Stoics: their mistake [is that] that through virtue, they search for a mere counterweight to the pain of luxury.  Antisthenes’s school tried to eradicate luxury itself.[xix]

 

The Stoic teaches of anger out of respect for others.

 

The current moralists presuppose much as evil[40] and want to teach to overcome it and many temptations for evils[41] and write motives for overcoming them.  The Rousseauian method teaches to regard the former as not evil and the latter, then, as no temptation.

 

[18] There is no one more moderate in enjoyment than a miser.  The miserly greediness comes from an eager desire for all kinds of pleasure to which there is no actual, but only a chimerical, inclination in the miser because from hearsay he regards it as a great good even if he himself is already moderate.  This is bold miserliness.  Cowardly miserliness.

 

The threat of eternal punishment cannot be the immediate foundation of morally good actions, although [it is] certainly a strong counterweight against impulses to evil ones, so that the immediate sensation of morality is not outweighed.

 

There is no immediate inclination to <morally> evil actions, but certainly an immediate [inclination] to good ones

 

{13, page 5 of Ob, upper margin, 2:208}

 

This idealistic feeling sees life in dead nature or imagines seeing it.  Trees drink from the neighboring brook.  The zephyr whispers of loved ones.  Clouds cry on a melancholic day.  Cliffs threaten like giants.  Solitude is inhabited by dreamy shadows and the deathly silence of graves.

 

{R20}Fantastical                    This is whence the pictures and the picturesque spirit come.[42]

 

{right margin, next to lines 12-13}

 

Idealistic therefore beautiful

 

{Lower margin}

 

[19] Philosophical eyes are microscopic.  Their view is exact but small and is therefore and their intention is truth.  The sensible[43] view is bold and provides enthusiastic excess that is stirring, although it will only be encountered in the imagination.

 

 

Beautiful and sublime are not the same.  The former swells the heart and makes the attention fixed and tense, thereby exhausting it.  The latter lets the heart melt in a kind of softish sensation and, as it leaves the nerves behind here, the feeling becomes a gentler emotion which, if it goes too far, transforms into feebleness, boredom, and disgust

 

{14, page 6 of Ob, marginal notes at line 2}

 

bold

 

{marginal notes at lines 24-27, 2:209}

 

The majority of men are primarily effeminate[44] or common and thus still worse in company than women

 

{lower margin}

 

Whence does it come that without women our societies are somewhat without taste, because neither with the Greeks nor with the {R21}Romans was it so.  At that time one spoke of virtue and fatherland.  Now this is an empty matter[45] in whose place false devotion at best can tread.  Among loud men pleasantries have no life and also become uncivilized.  We are softish[46] and effeminate and have to be among women.[47][xx]

 

{15, sheet inserted at Ob 6, front side, at 2:209}

 

The good-natured and the well-mannered[48] person are quite different.  The first may not have drives that have been turned tame, for they are natural and good.  The representation of higher natures.  If he thinks about it perhaps he will say he is in another life.  One must be good and expect the rest.  The second is [either] 1. only civilized [or] 2. well-mannered.  In the former case he has many fantastical friends whose any idea that cannot be intuitive he must oppose in order to maintain himself well.  The second one is a civilized man who will extend his ethical life over the simplicity of nature until it extends to the object for which he only wishes and believes.

 

This natural ethical life must also be the touchstone of all religion.  For if it is uncertain whether people in other religions can become blessed[49] and whether they cannot help the torments of this world become bliss in the next, still it is certain that I should not follow them.  This would not be the case if the natural feeling were not sufficient for exercising all duties of this life.

 

[20] As the Portuguese Celebes discovered, the inhabitants understood the correctness of their religion, but sent to Malacca for Don Pedro as often as to Achin for the queen.  [They] got double the priests and [breaks off][xxi]

 

Everyone who is a coward lies, but not vice versa.  Therefore, what makes one weak brings about lying.  The foolish lust for honor and shame the most.

 

Shame and modesty are different.  The former is a betrayal of a secret through the natural flow of blood.  The latter is a {R22}means of concealing a secret for the sake of vanity, in other words for a sexual excitement

 

It is far more dangerous to be with free and greedy people than with the subjects of a monarch in war.  The utility they have from vanity.

 

[21] I will say ‘of everything’ where there are seldom exceptions.  For in accordance with the rule of prudence, that which occurs so seldom that one thereupon regards it as a stroke of luck [can be said to] never happen, and according to that [is said to] be generally in accordance with the rule of prudence where any cases that one can seek of the contrary accord with no rule.  I speak of taste, I take then my own judgment according to the rule of so that it is generally true in accordance with the rule of taste (aesthetic) whether or not it is also exactly logical in accordance with the rule of measured reason (logical) [or is] only valid on its own

 

{16, back side opposite Ob 7, 2:209}

 

[22] A heart expanded through sensibility prepares itself for longing and will finally be worn out[50] from the sensations of all the things of life; for this reason it sighs for something that is outside its circle, and as true as its devotion is to itself, just as fantastical is it with respect to most people because they are themselves chimerical, and [it] comes about that they offer their love [and] their sincerity only with respect to God and are cold with respect to the former [love] while misplaced with respect to the other [sincerity].  For one can be more easily deceived concerning the former than the latter

 

Because one can make for himself a concept of higher moral characteristics, sacrifice for the common good, everlasting devotion, fulfillment of marital intentions without sensual pleasure, immediate inclination to science without honor, one imagines all these to be suitable for the state of humanity and finds the situation that one sees to be corrupted.  But they are the same desires, fantastical and developing from precisely the [same] sources as general corruption.  Even these shortcomings become no more blameworthy when regarded with respect to humanity when the remaining corruption is raised up

 

{R23}Whole nations can deliver the example of a human being generally.[51]  One never finds great virtues where they are not also combined with great excess, like with the English.[52]  Canadian savages.  What is the cause [?]   The French are more proper and all the sublimity of virtue is also missing.

 

The station[53] of humankind in the order of created being

 

{17, page 8 of Ob, marginal notes at line 7, 2:210}

 

Beautiful, cute

 

{18, sheet inserted after Ob 8, front side, 2:210}

 

[23] All devotion that is natural has a use only when it is the result of a good morality.  Under the same [category] is also taken natural devotion that is related to a book.  For this reason the spiritual teachers correctly say that it [devotion] does no good except where it has been affected by the spirit of God, whereupon here it is intuition, otherwise it is closely enjoined to self-deception.

 

The reason why married people are so cold-minded is this: because both members have so many external, chimerical bonds of decorum, of grace, and if one or the other part depends strongly on an opinion, he becomes indifferent toward the opinion of the other.  From this arises contempt, finally hate.  For this reason, in relation to novelistic[54] love, it is only the characteristic of a hero.  Coquette.

 

Those who would make a doctrine of virtue into a doctrine of piety would make a whole from a part, for piety is only one kind of virtue.

 

It often seems to us that the human race would have almost no value if it contained no great artist and scholar.  Therefore, [24] the country people [and] the farmers appear to be nothing in themselves and to be something only as some kind of support for the former.  The injustice of this judgment {R24}already shows that it is false.  That is to say, one feels that if he has extended his inclinations, he may do what he wants, [that] life would be nothing, and that the extension of these inclinations is therefore injurious.

 

There is thus a great difference [between] overcoming one’s inclinations and eradicating them, that is to say, making it so that one loses them, this is again different from restraining inclinations, namely, making sure no one gets them.  The former is necessary for older people and the latter for younger ones.

 

There is a great difference between a good human being and being a good rational being.  As the latter is perfect, it has no bounds but finitude, the former has many limits.

 

{19, back side, opposite Ob 9, at 2:210}

 

To prevent children from lying is a great art.   For since they are far too wanton and far too weak to tolerate denials or punishments, they have a very strong incitement to lie, as old people never do.  Especially since they can provide nothing for themselves like grownups can, but instead everything depends on the way in which they represent things according to the inclinations that they notice in others.  Thus, one must only punish them for things that they cannot deny and not grant them things on spurious grounds.

 

If one would approve of develop morality, then one must not introduce motives that do not lead to morally good actions, e.g., punishment, reward.  For this reason one must also portray lying as repulsive, as it is in fact, and never subordinate it to any other rule of morality, for example, duty toward others.

 

(One has no duties towards oneself, but one has absolute [25] duties, that is, in and for itself an action is good.  It is also nonsensical that in our morality we should depend on ourselves)

 

In medicine, one says that the doctor is the servant of nature: it works just the same in morality.  Merely hold off external evil, [and] nature already will take the right course

 

{R25}If the doctor said that nature in itself is ruined, by what means does he want to improve it [?] Likewise with the moralist

 

A person takes no more share in the luck or misfortune of others than what makes him feel contented.  If it happens that he is contented with very little, then it will produce kind people.[55]  Otherwise it is for nothing.

 

Universal love of humankind has something high and noble in itself, but among human beings it is chimerical.  When one acts upon[56] this universal love of humankind, one becomes accustomed to deceive oneself with longing and idle wishes.  As long as one is so very dependent on such things, one cannot participate in the happiness of others.

 

{20, page 9 of Ob, marginal notes at lines 16-19, 2:211}

 

Because dubious things[57] are small, one is called [breaks off][58]

 

{21, sheet inserted after Ob 10, front side, 2:211}

 

[26] The simple man has a feeling of what is right early on, but very late, or never at all, does he have a concept of it. That feeling must be developed long before the concept.  If one teaches him early on to develop according to rules he will never feel [it]

 

It is difficult, after the inclinations have developed, to represent good and evil in other circumstances.  Because I will waste away from boredom without a perpetual pleasure, I also represent to myself that it is the same with the Swiss man, who grazes his cows in the mountains.   I And <this> [Swiss man] cannot understand how a man who has had enough could want even more.   One can hardly conceive how, in such a lowly state, this lowliness does fill one with pain.  On the other hand, when the rest of {R26}the people are also stuck with the evil of delusion, some cannot understand how they could have gotten this delusion.  The noble man imagines the evil contempt of stolen splendor that could have crushed a commoner, and the latter [the commoner] does not understand how he [the noble man] could become used to [27] counting certain delights among his needs.

 

The ruler who endowed the nobility wanted to issue something that certain people could serve instead of all other excess[59].  Yet they have a tidbit of nobility.  Let the rest of the mob have the money.

 

Can anything be more perverse than to tell tales to the children who have barely stepped into this world, just as with the others?]

 

Indeed, one tires of others.  One does not listen long to precocious talk.  A person who does not neglect himself at all becomes troublesome.  Too much attentiveness to oneself looks fastidious.[60]

 

{22, back side, opposite Ob 11, at 2:211}

 

Just as fruit, when it is ripe enough, breaks away from the tree and approaches the earth to let its own seeds take root, so the mature person also breaks away from his parents, plants himself, and becomes the roots of a new generation[61]


[28] A man must depend on no one else so that the wife depends entirely on him.

 

It must be asked how far inner moral grounds can bring a person.  Perhaps it they will carry him far enough so that he is secured in a position of freedom without great temptations, but if other injustices or the coercion of illusion forces him, then this inner morality[62] does not have enough power.  He must have religion and be {R27} encouraged by means of the reward of a future life and human nature is not capable of an immediate moral purity.  But if supernatural wisdom produces purity in him, future rewards will no longer have the quality of motives

 

The difference between a false and a healthy morality is that the former seeks only for antidotes for evil,[63] while the latter is concerned that the cause of this evil not exist at all

 

Appearance, if it announces sublimity, is ‘the gleam’; if it announces beauty, it is ‘the pretty’ or, also, if it is contrived, the ‘ornamentation of finery’

 

Among all types of finery there is also the moral.  Sublimity of condition consists of the fact that he deals with much worth; here, the beautiful is called ‘the suitable’

 

The reason why those of the nobility commonly pay so poorly

 

{23, page 11 of Ob, upper margin, at 2:211}

 

It is a great shame for a genius when criticism comes before art.  When in a nation it [criticism] blinds them before a standard is set and they have revealed their own talents.

 

{lower margin}

 

[29] Sublime attitude that overlooks trivialities and notices the good among deficiencies.

 

Tobacco

 

{24, sheet inserted after Ob 12, front side, at Ri 27, 2:212}

 

It is unnatural that a person spends most of his life teaching one child how it should someday live.  A tutor like Jean Jacques is therefore artificial.  In simple conditions a child would be afforded very little service; as soon as he has a bit of strength {R28}he would carry out small, useful adult activities, as by a farmer or craftsman, and will gradually learn the rest. 

 

It is therefore fitting that a person spend his life teaching so many others how to live that the sacrifice of his own is by contrast not to be considered.  Hence schools are necessary.  But for them to be possible, one must raise[64] Emile.  One would wish that Rousseau had shown how schools could arise from it.[xxii]

 

Preachers in the country could begin to do this with their own children and their neighbors

 

Taste is not attached to our needs.  A man must already be civilized if he wants to choose a wife in accordance with taste.

 

[30] Do not be very refined, because then only small traits will be noticed; substantial traits will only be apparent to simple and coarse eyes.

 

To have taste is a discomfort to the understanding.  I must read Rousseau so long that the beauty of [his] expression no longer disturbs me, and then can I examine him with reason for the first time

 

That great people only glimmer in the distance; that a ruler loses it in front of his valet comes from the fact that no man is great

 

Something that is again a great impediment to the doctrine of eternal bliss, and that allows one to suppose that it [the doctrine] is not appropriate for our situation, is that those who believe it become thereby no less zealous about the bliss of this life, which must happen if our vocation to act for a great cause is to break [forth]

 

{25, back side, opposite Ob 13, at 2:212}

 

If I want to put myself into a great, though not complete independence [31] from people, then I must be able to be poor without {R29}feeling it, and slightly obliged without respecting it.  But if I were a rich man I would, especially in my gratification, bring about freedom from things and people.  I would not overburden myself with things like guests, horses, or subjects from whose loss I must be secured.  I would have no jewels because I can lose them, etc.  I would neither my clothes arrange myself according to the delusion of another so that he doesn’t actually harm me, for example, reduce my acquaintance but not so that he makes me comfortable.

 

How freedom in actual understanding (the moral and not the metaphysical) is the topmost principium of all virtue and also of all bliss

 

It is necessary to comprehend how late the art of daintiness and civilized disposition came about and how they are never in their own area of the world (e.g. where there are no house pets) so that one distinguishes between what is foreign and accidental to nature and what is natural to it.  If one considers the bliss of the savage it is not in order to turn back to the forest, but instead in order to see what one has lost, by making gains elsewhere.  Thereby one does not paste enjoyment and the employment of sociable luxury together with unfortunate and unnatural inclinations, and [one] remains a civilized person of nature.  That consideration serves as the standard.  For nature never created a person into a citizen, and his inclinations and his endeavors are aimed merely at the simple condition of life.

 

It appears that the primary vocation of the majority of other creatures is that they live and that their kind lives

 

If I assume this of human beings, then I must not condemn the lowliest savage

 

{26, page 14 of Ob, marginal notes at lines 4-8, at, 2:213}

 

Greek profile: a thick body, great tallness, wide shoulders

 

{27, sheet inserted after Ob 17, front side, at 2:213}

 

{R30}[32] How, out of luxury[65], simple[66] religion and also the force of religion (at the very least every new transformation) becomes necessary

 

Pure, natural religion in no way suits a state,[67] and skepticism still less.

 

Anger is a good natured feeling of weak people.  An inclination to suppress it brings about unforgiving hate.  Women, men of the cloth.  One does not always hate those at which one is angry.  The good-naturedness[68] of people who get angry.  Feigned modesty conceals anger and makes false friends

 

For such a weak creature as a human being, the partly necessary, partly voluntary ignorance of future things is quite suitable

 

I can never convince another except by means of his own thoughts.  I must therefore presuppose that the other has a good and correct understanding, otherwise it is futile to hope that he could  [33] be won over by my reasons.  Likewise I cannot even move someone morally except through his own sentiments; consequently, I must presuppose that the other has a certain goodness of the heart, or else he will never feel abhorrence at my portrayal of vice nor feels motives in himself from my praises of virtue.  Because if his evil was complete and he was truly evil,it would instead be impossible that some morally correct sentiment would be in him or for him to be able to suspect that his sentiment was in harmony with that of the entire human race, so I must in that sense grant partial goodness[69] to him and must depict the slippery resemblance of innocence and crime as deceptive

 

Greek profile.  A thick body, great tallness, wide shoulders

 

{28, back side, opposite Ob 15, 2:213}

 

{R31}[70]The chief reason to create is because it is good.  A consequence of this is that because God, with his power and great knowledge, finds himself to be good, he also finds good everything that is possible to actualize.  [34] Secondly, he has a liking for everything that is good, but mostly whatever aims at the greatest good.  The first is good as a result, the second as a reason

 

Because revenge assumes that people who hate each other stay close, failing which, if one can withdraw himself when he wants, the reason to take revenge falls away, thus it [revenge] cannot exist in nature because it [nature] does not assume that people will be confined near one another.  But anger is a very necessary characteristic and suitable to a man, that is to say, if it is not a passion (which is different from an affect), [it] is certainly found in nature

 

One cannot imagine of convenience what he has not required, just as the Carib detested salt, because he was not used to it.[xxiii]

 

Agesilaus and the Persian satrap both despised each other; the former said, “I know the Persian sensual pleasure, but you know nothing of mine.”   He was wrong[xxiv]

 

The goods of softish luxury[71] and of delusion; the latter accrue from the comparative manner of evaluation in science, in honor, etc.

 

Christianity says that one should not attach his heart to temporal things.  Under this it is also understood that early on one should prevent himself from acquiring any such dependence.  Lastly, to nurture inclinations and then expect supernatural assistance to govern them, that is to tempt God.

 

{29, page 16 of Ob, marginal notes at lines 8-12, at 2:214}

 

{32}The adventurous taste parodies.

 

Grotesqueries parody Hudibras[xxv]

 

Comically sublime.

 

{30, sheet inserted after Ob 16, front side, at 2:213}

 

Stages[:] freedom, equality, honor.  (Delusion).  Foresight, henceforth he loses his entire life.

 

[35] Two touchstones for the difference from the natural [and] from the unnatural: 1. Whether it is suitable to what one cannot change 2. Whether it can be common to all people or to a few with the oppression of the rest

 

A certain great monarch of the North civilized, as it is called, his nation; If God wanted, he would have brought morals to it, but then everything he did was political welfare and moral ruin[xxvi]

 

I can make no one better than the remaining good that is in him, I can make no one more prudent than the prudence remaining in him

 

Vicious people can be considered with affability because vice comes to them externally through our ruined constitution

 

From the feeling of equality comes the idea of justice, [which is] as harm much constrained as coerced.  The former is duty toward others, the latter is the sensed duty of others towards me.

 

[36] So that this has a standard gauge in understanding, we are able to put ourselves in the place of another in our thought and, so that it does not lack motives, {R33}we are moved through sympathy by the misfortune and distress of others, just as by our own.

 

This duty will be recognized as something whose lack in another will let me consider him my enemy and make me hate him.  Nothing stirs something up more than injustice, all other evils that we endure are nothing in comparison.  Duty concerns only necessary self-preservation in so far as it is preservation of the kind, everything remaining is favor and goodwill.[72]  Still, I will also hate anyone who sees me struggling in a pit and cold-heartedly passes by.

 

Kindnesses find themselves only through inequality.  For I understand in kindness a readiness to create good, especially in those cases where the general, natural sympathy would not be a sufficient reason for it.  Now it is simple and natural even to sacrifice as much convenience as I provide for another because one person is worth as much as another.  So if I should be ready and willing for it, I must judge myself more harshly with respect to discomforts than another, I must consider it a great evil from which I spare another and a small one that I suffer myself.  A man would despise another if he showed such kindnesses toward him.

 

The first inequality is of a man and child and of a man and of a woman.  To a certain extent, he considers it a duty, since he is strong, and they are weak, not to sacrifice anything to them.[73]

 

{Linked by characters to Ob 6, line 2, at 2:213}

 

Apparent nobleness is <appearance> decency.[74]  The apparent splendor [is] the luster.  The apparently beautiful [is] the ornamented.  [37] The beautiful is either charming or pretty

 

{31, back side, opposite Ob 1, 2:214}

 

Every unjust valuation that does not belong to the purpose of nature also disturbs the beautiful harmony of nature.   Because the {R34}arts and sciences are held to be so important, anyone who does not have them is made disdainful and [this] brings us to injustices that we would not bear if we were to consider them as more than resembling us.

 

If something is not ultimately suitable to the length of a lifetime, or not to its epochs, or not to a large part of human beings, finally, to the extent that it is subjected to chance and is only possible with difficulty, it does not belong to the blissfulness and perfection of the human race.  [38] How many centuries have passed by before actual sciences existed and how many nations exist in the world that will never have them.

 

One must not say that nature calls us to the sciences because they have given us skills. For what concerns pleasure can be merely contrived.[75]  Because the insidiousness of the sciences has been proven, there is much more to judge: we have a capacity for understanding that goes further than our vocation in this life, thus there will be another life.  If we try to disentangle this here, we will poorly satisfy our position.  A grub that would feel that it ought to become a butterfly.

 

Scholars believe that everything is for their sake.  Noble people, too.   If one has traveled to barren France, then one can find comfort again in the Academy of sciences[xxvii] or in the society of good fashion, just like one happily gets away from all the beggars in the church-city, in Rome one can delight himself until intoxicated by the splendor of the churches and antiquity.

 

[39] From the previous reasons, one should judge that those who want to know too much prematurely here will thereby be castigated by weakness as punishment.  Just as a prematurely clever child either dies or fades and becomes dumb at a young age.

 

A human may tinker as much as he wants, but he cannot force nature to follow other laws.  He himself must either work or {R35}others [work] for him, and this work will rob others of so much bliss that he will increase his own beyond the average

 

If one person wants to enjoy without working, then others will [have to] want to work without enjoying

 

{32, sheet inserted after Ob 20, front side, at 2:215}

 

One could promote one’s welfare either by letting one’s desires expand, and striving to satisfy them; one could promote righteousness if one allowed the inclinations of illusion and luxury to grow and would endeavor to oppose them with moral impulses. But to both problems there is yet another solution, that is, not allowing the inclinations to arise.  Lastly, one could also promote good conduct by putting aside all immediate moral goodness and merely laying the ground for the commands of a punitive lord who issues rewards.

 

The evil[76] proper to science for humans is primarily this, that the largest part of them who want to adorn themselves with it acquire not any improvement of the understanding but instead only a depravity of it, not to mention that it [science] serves the majority only as a tool of vanity.  The use for which the sciences have is either luxury, e.g. mathematics, or the hindrance of evil[s] that it itself wrought, or also, as an indirect result, a certain modesty.

 

[40] The concepts of civil justice and what is natural and the feeling of duty that comes from it are almost directly opposed.  If I solicit from a rich person who got his fortune by extorting his peasants, and I give this to the poor, then I carry out a very noble action in the civil understanding, whereas I only do a common duty in the natural [understanding].

 

[41] With general luxury, one complains about the divine rule and about the rule of the king.  One does not consider that, as {R36}concerns the latter, the very same desire for honor and immoderacy that controls the commoner and have no other form on the throne than as they have 2. that such commoners cannot be ruled otherwise.  The subject wants the master to overcome his inclinations of vanity in order to promote the good of his lands and [he wants] to think that demands of him do not occur in consideration of lowly things even with the law.  Where people themselves are in the first place wise, righteous, and moderate, these virtues will soon rise to the throne and also make the prince good.  See here the weak princes who show kindness and courage in such times, could they practice something completely different as with great injustice towards others, because this puts the courage in nothing other than the distribution of robbery that one stole from another.  The freedom that a prince accords to think and write like I am doing now is worth just as much as many privileges of a greater luxury, because through that freedom everything of this evil can still be improved.

 

{33, back side, opposite Ob 21, at 2:216}

 

The greatest concern of the human being is to know how to properly fulfill his station[77] in creation and rightly understand what one must do in order to be a human being.  But if he becomes acquainted with gratifications or learns ethical characteristics that are above or beneath him that may flatter him but for which he is not organized so and which opposes the style of arrangement that is by nature suitable to him, [or] when he learns ethical qualities[78] that gleam, then he will himself disturb the beautiful order of nature and only prepare the ruin of it, because he will have avoided his post he knows that he cannot be content with that which is noble; for, since he is not content with that for which he is destined, since he steps out of the sphere of humanity, he is nothing and the hole that he has made spreads his own corruption to the neighboring members[79]

 

[42] Among the harms wrought[80] by the flood of books in which our part of the world is annually drowned, is one that has not the slightest bit of real usefulness and that is seen swimming here and back again over the wide abysses of booklearning {R37}ocean of booklearning[81] and must share the fate of decrepitude with the residual chaff.  The inclination to read much in order to say that one has read.  The habit of not lingering long on a book, and [breaks off]

 

Luxury brings people together to the city   Rousseau wants to bring them to the country

 

Evil quite replaces the self-wrought intemperance[82] of a person.  The desire for freedom and the exclusive force of a ruler[83] is a great misfortune, but it becomes just as much an orderly system – in fact, there is actually more order, though less [43] bliss – as in free states.  Feebleness of morals, idleness, and vanity create sciences.  These give the whole a new ornament to ward off much evil, and if they are increased to a certain degree, the evil of self-wrought intemperance pretty well compensates itself.

 

One of the greatest harms of science is that it takes away so much time that the youth get neglected in virtue

 

Second, that they so habituate the mind to the sweetness of speculation that good actions stop.[84]

 

{34, page 21 of Ob, upper margin, at 2:216}

 

Moral beauty, simplicity, sublimity.  Justice; righteousness is simple.  The passion of the sublime is enthusiasm.  Beloved, virtuous.  Friendship.  Beautiful ideal.

 

{35, sheet inserted after Ob 22, front side, at 2:217}

 

The first impression that a <reasonable[85]> reader <who does not read out of vanity or for entertainment> gets from the writings of Mr. J. J. Rousseau {R38}is that he has encountered an great uncommon astuteness of spirit, a noble impetus of genius and sensitive soul combined to such a high degree certainly hardly at any time as has perhaps never been possessed by a writer of any era or people.  The next judgment that initially grows concerns the   The impression that follows is alienation[86] from strange and absurd opinions that are in such opposition to what is generally acceptable[87] that one easily forms the suspicion that the author, by virtue of his extraordinary talents, would want to show, < prove>, and provoke admiration and the force of an enchanting wit the [44] magical power of his eloquence and make himself the queer man make himself the eccentric so that he among who stands out among all his rivals in wit by way of engaging novelty.  The third thought to which one only arrives with difficulty because it only seldom occurs [breaks off]

 

One must teach youth to honor the common understanding as much for moral as for logical reasons.

 

I myself am a researcher by inclination.  I feel the entire thirst for knowledge and an eager restlessness to proceed further in it, but also satisfaction in each forward step.  There was a time when I believed that this alone could constitute the honor of humankind and I despised the rabble, who knows nothing.  Rousseau brought me around.  I This blinding prejudice[88] vanished.  I learned to honor human beings and I would think myself less useful than the common worker if I did not believe that this consideration could give worth to all others in establishing the rights of humankind.

 

 [45] It is quite ridiculous to say that you should love other people, rather one must say you have good reason to love the ones near you.  This even goes for your enemy.

 

Virtue is strong, thus whatever weakens and makes one soft for pleasures or dependent upon delusion is opposed to virtue.[89]  Whatever makes life contemptible or even hateful to us does not lie in nature.  Whatever makes vice easy and virtue difficult does not lie in nature

 

{R39}Universal vanity makes it so that one says they know living only of those who never understand living (outside themselves)

 

It is not at all conducive to bliss to extend the inclinations to luxury, for there are many uncommonly many cases where circumstances are unfavorable [and] contrary to a desired situation, and they become a source of displeasure, grief, and worry, of which the simple person knows nothing

 

It also does not help here to preach noble endurance.

 

{36, back side, opposite Ob 23, at 2:217}

 

If <there is> any science necessary to the human being that a person truly requires, then it is the one that teaches a person to properly fulfill the place[90] which was allotted to him in creation and from which he can learn how one must be in order to be human.[91]  Suppose he got to know deceitful deceptive enticements above and beneath himself that brought him unnoticed from his <proper> place, then this instruction would lead him back again to the state of a human being and, [46] even if he also might still find himself to be small or inadequate, in such a way he will be correctly at his allotted post[92] because he is neither more nor less than is exactly what he should be.

 

The mistake of saying one knows none this is universal among us [and thus] absolutely universal is easily avoided by intelligent [people].  But consequent judgments are apparent: nature has given us the opportunity for gratification, why do we not want to attend to it; we have the capacity for sciences, it is a call of nature to seek it; we feel in us a ethical voice that speaks to us [and] that is noble and righteous; this is a duty to act in such a way

 

Everything passes by us in a river and the changeable taste and the different forms of people make the entire game {R40}uncertain and deceptive.  Where do I find definite points of nature that a person cannot displace and that could give him signs as to which  bank he must head for

 

[47] That all size is only relative and there is no absolute size can be seen here.  I measure the sky by the diameter of the earth, the earth’s diameter by miles, the miles by feet, these by relation to my body

 

{37, page 23 of Ob, marginal notes at lines 11-12, at 2:217}

 

Friendship, young people

 

{in the margin, next to lines 16-18}

 

Respect for his own equality

 

{38, sheet inserted after Ob 24, front side, at  2: 217}

 

The question is which characteristics which condition suits human beings as inhabitants who are running around on a planet 200 sun-diameters from the sun

Just as little as I can step onto the planet Jupiter from here, so little can I demand to have characteristics that are that planet’s own.  The one who is so wise regarding another place of creation is a fool regarding the one he inhabits

 

I certainly do not have the ambition to want to be a seraphim, my pride is only this, that I am a human being

 

 The one phrase it is difficult to sort out: that does not lie <or lies> [48] in nature, that is, nature has given no drive for it, instead they are artificial; no such affliction is innate[93], instead they are accidentally[94] grown; the other [phrase] is easier, that does not conform with nature, that is, that which opposes whatever actually is in nature.  {R41}Often Rousseau proceeds according to the former and because human nature has now acquired such a devastated form, natural foundations[95] become dubious and unrecognizable

 

The moderate commoner can form no concept [of] what else the courtier can lack, who can live on his goods just as he pleases, meanwhile the latter grieves to death

 

Many people have theology and no religion except perhaps to someday apologize for awful viciousness when they become threatened by the terrors of hell

 

On the worth of this life in itself or immediately and on the worth of this life only as a means to another life.

 

The life of the purely pleasurable without contemplation and morals appears to have no worth

 

[49] <A sign of crude taste nowadays is that one requires so much pretty make-up but in fact the finest taste is of simplicity.>

 

With people and animals, a certain average size has the most strength.[96]

 

<In a civilized state,  one becomes clever very late in the game, one could certainly say along with the Theophrast, it is a shame then that one ceases to live just when he hopes for success.>[xxviii]

 

Moral taste with respect to sexual inclination, since in that everyone wants to appear to be quite refined[97] or even pure.  Truth is not the highest perfection of social life; the beautiful illusion drives it here just as it does much more in painting.  On taste in marriage.

 

{39, back side, opposite Ob 25, at 2:218}

 

{R42}Certainty in ethical judgments by means of comparison with the ethical feeling is just as great as with logical sentiment, and through the analysis of a human being I will make [the claim] that lying is repulsive just as certain as [the claim] that a thinking body is incoherent.  Deception with respect to ethical judgment occurs just like that of logical [judgment], but the latter is still more frequent

 

In the metaphysical foundations of aesthetics the [50] differentiated nonmoral[98] feeling is to be taken note of, with the first principles of ethical world-wisdom,[99] the differentiated moral feeling of people toward the difference of gender, of age, of upbringing and governance of races and climates is to be taken note of[xxix]

 

On the religion of a woman – on bold facial expression.  A certain timidity, suspicion, etc. suits her well. Her loquacity, usefulness

 

Why difference in position is shown mostly among women.

 

The woman is closer to nature

a man who knows how to live – – what a woman he will marry

 

On Rousseau’s attempt to move through love [to] the best talents[xxx]

 

Women educate their men themselves; they can attribute it to themselves if the men turn out badly.

 

Anyone who is foolishly accommodating becomes a disgruntled husband

 

On empty longing through a feeling of the sublime that is disproportionate and poorly suited to humans.  Novels. 

 

Rousseau took his sweetheart to the village[100][xxxi]

 

{R 43}[51] A marriage of an overly-refined <exquisite> man to a coquette.

 

One imagines two marriages of which one has, so to say, a good sound, and the other is domestic

 

Moral taste is inclined to imitation; moral principles rise above this.  Where there are courts and great distinctions between people, everything amounts to taste, in republics it is otherwise.  Therefore the taste in society is more refined in the former and more crude in the latter.  One can be very virtuous and have little taste.  If the social life should grow, taste must be expanded because the agreeableness of society must be easy, while principles must be difficult.  This taste is easiest among women.  Moral taste does not easily reconcile itself with the illusion of principles.  [52] Swiss, Dutch, English, French free cities.  Suicide in Switzerland.

 

Taste for pure virtue is somewhat crude; if it [taste] is refined, then it must be able to try mixing it [virtue] with folly

 

{40, sheet inserted after Ob 26, front side, at 2: 218}

 

What a person calls the finer part of life is a wonderful weaving of trifling amusements <distractions, boring amusements>, [and] still more troubles –    vanity and a whole swarm of silly distractions.  The loss of the same is commonly regarded as death or even much worse than death (a person who knows how to live) one who has lost the taste for it has died to gratification 

 

Refined crude feeling.  Refined self-acting ideal, sometimes chimerical.  One has reasons for not refining his feeling too much, first so as not to open the gates of pain, secondly in order to be closer to what is most useful

 

Sufficiency and simplicity demand a crude feeling and make [one] happy

 

{R44}The beautiful is loved, the noble respected

 

 The ugly hated [is met] with disgust, the ignoble despised[101]

 

The courage of a woman to follow a man in misfortune and her tenderness.  With a more tender, a more valiant man, the man feels himself in his woman and shares no pain with her

 

[53] Small people are courageous and arrogant, large [people are] composed

 

The natural person  is moderate not because of future health (for he does not foresee [this]), but because of present well-being

 

A reason that women are haughty toward each other is that they are more similar to each other because the basis of nobility is in the men.  The reason that they are embarrassed near one another and are competitive is that they the happiness of men though the latter from favor and from does not come so much from kindness as from service, so that they make themselves happy, while the latter are made happy by others.  On this is based their inherent inclination to please

 

The reason why the excesses of lust are sensed so sharply is because they concern the basis of propagation, that is, the preservation of the species; and because this is the only thing women are good for, it constitutes their highest perfection, whereas the preservation of their selves depends on the man

 

The capacity to create usefulness with fertility is limited for a woman and broad for a man.

 

{41, back side, opposite Ob 27, at 2:218}

 

Luxury causes one to draw a great distinction between one woman and another

 

Desires do not satisfy one through love, but through marriage; they are at the same time the purest

 

{R45}[54] The distinguishing feature of social life is to not always prefer another.  To always prefer another is weak.  The idea of equality regulates everything

 

In society and in fashion,[102] simplicity and equality make it easy and pleasant

 

Conquer delusion and be a man so that your wife esteems you highest among all people, do not yourself be a servant to the opinions of others.

 

When your wife honors you, she does not see a slave of others’ opinions.  Be domestic; [let] taste and not expense, comfort and not superabundance, prevail in your society; more a choice of guests than of food

 

– It would be better for women if they actually worked.

 

[55] A good[103] of delusion consists in this, that only opinion is sought after, but the thing itself is either regarded with indifference or even hated.  The first delusion is that of honor.  The second of spirit.  The latter only loves the opinion that he can have many goods of life through his money without ever really seriously wanting it

 

Anyone who is not convinced of what is obviously certain is a blockhead.  Anyone who is not impelled by what is obviously a duty is a scoundrel.

 

– A dull head and corrupt heart.

 

That the drive to honor comes from the desire for equality is seen here.  Would a savage call upon another in order to show his advantage?  If he can relinquish his [advantage], then he will enjoy his freedom.  Only when he must be together with him, will he try to outdo him, therefore the desire for honor is indirect

 

The desire for honor is just as indirect as the miser’s desire for money.  Both originate in the same way

 

{42, in Ob 27, lower margin, at 2:219}

 

{R46}The Arcadian shepherd’s life and our chivalrous life of the court are both in bad taste and unnatural though alluring.[xxxii]  For true gratification cannot take place when it is done out of occupation.  The recreations of an employed person that are seldom or short and without preparation are alone lasting and of genuine taste.  Because she does not now have anything to do but to muse about entertainments, a woman becomes annoying and gets a bad taste for men who do not always know to quiet this frustrated inclination

 

{43, sheet inserted after Ob 28, front side, at 2:219}

 

[56] Others’ love of honor is so highly valued because it indicates so much renunciation of other advantages

 

The question is whether, [in order] to motivate my affects or those of others, I should take my footing[104] outside of the world or in it.  I answer in the state of nature, that is, I find it [my footing] in freedom

 

Women have feminine virtues.

 

Of sympathy one must only note that it never governs, but must always be subordinated to the capacity and reasonable demands to do good 

He who cannot do without much or is lazy has an idle sympathy.

 

[57] The natural person without religion is preferred to the civilized [person] with a purely natural religion.  For the latter must have his morality to a high degree if he should administer a counterweight to his corruption.

 

Meanwhile, a civilized person without any religion is much more dangerous

 

In natural conditions, no correct concept of {R47}God can originate and a false [one] that one constructs is detrimental.  Consequently, the theory of natural religion can only be true where science is, therefore it cannot bind all people

 

Natural theology, natural religion; a supernatural theology can nevertheless be combined with a natural religion.  Nevertheless, those who believe Christian religion theology only have natural religion in so far as the morality is natural.  The Christian religion is supernatural with respect to doctrine and also the powers it exercises.  How little cause ordinary Christians have to linger over the natural.

 

Knowledge of God is either speculative, and this is uncertain and subject to dangerous errors, or moral through beliefs and this thinks no other characteristics in God other than those that aim at morality.  This faith is either natural or supernatural

 

{44, reverse side, opposite Ob 29, at 2:219}

 

Providence is primarily to be praised for this reason, that it fits so well with people in their present situation, namely, that the direction [of providence] does not conform to their foolish wishes, that they suffer for their folly and [that] nothing wants to harmonize with the person who has stepped out of the order of nature.  [58] If we consider the needs of animals and plants, this conforms to providence.  It would be quite perverse if the divine governance were to change the order of things, just as man has changed himself, in accordance with the delusion of humanity.  It is just as natural that, as far as one has deviated, everything must seem to be perverse with respect to his degenerate[105] inclinations.

 

Out of this delusion springs a kind of theology as a phantasm of luxury (for this is every time fraught with feeble and superstitious) and a certain sly cleverness to interweave through subjugation the highest things into his business and schemes

 

{R48}Diagoras.[xxxiii]

 

Newton was the first to see order and regularity united with great simplicity, where before him disorder and terribly matched multiplicity were found, whereas since then, comets move along geometric trajectories.[xxxiv]

 

Rousseau was the first to discover, among the multiplicity of forms human beings have taken on, humankind’s deeply concealed nature and the hidden law, in accordance with which providence [59] through its observation is justified. Formerly, the objections of Alfonso and Manes were still valid. After Newton and Rousseau, God is justified, and henceforth Pope’s theorem is true[xxxv]

 

{45, Ob Page 30, marginal notes at lines 12-25, at 2:220}

 

pleasant melancholy

true virtue cries

 

{46, sheet inserted after Ob 32, front side, at 2:221}

 

[60] The savage is a part of human nature

A luxurious person roams further out of its [human nature’s] borders and the morally affected person goes above it [human nature].

 

On friendship generally

On beauty and nobility of company and on banquets; simplicity, magnificence.

 

If something keeps a youth, who has become a man, from becoming a father, if something gets in the way of enjoying life, if it is short and demands preparation for future things in order to lose the present, if[106] something makes us think that we hate life or that it is unworthy or too short, then it does not lie in nature

 

{R49}Masculine strength does not manifest itself in that one forces oneself to endure the injustices of others when he can drive them back, but rather in bearing the heavy yoke of necessity even while putting up with deprivations as a sacrifice for freedom or for whatever else I love.  Endurance of insolence is a monkish virtue

 

[61] The sanguine[107] endures insults because he fears the great extent of revenging them

 

The foolishness of conceit consists in [the fact] that the same one who values another as so important that he believes their opinion to give him such great worth nevertheless despises them so much that he considers them to be almost nothing compared to himself

 

parallel to miserliness

 

{47, reverse side, opposite Ob 33, at Ri 49, 2:221}

 

The art of illusion fits well with the character of the beautiful.  For the beautiful does not consist in the useful, but in mere opinion.  Moreover, since the thing itself makes loathsome that which is beautiful when it doesn’t appear to be new, [and] since the simplicity of nature is all the same, the art of giving a pleasant illusion to things is very beautiful.  The female sex possesses this art to a high degree, which also creates our entire happiness.  Through this the deceived husband is happy, the lover or partner sees angelic[108] virtues [62] and much to conquer and believes [himself] to have triumphed over a strong enemy.  Dissimulation[109] is a perfection of women but a vice for men.

 

Uprightness[110] complies with the noble  

It pleases the woman even if she is ill-bred but good-hearted

 

The choleric person is honored in his presence and criticized in his absence, he has few no friends.  The melancholic, little and good

The sanguine, much and careless. 

 

{R50}The choleric person looks as if [he is] filled with secrets

 

If one keeps in mind that man and woman constitute a moral whole, then one must not attach the same characteristics to them, but instead [attach] those characteristics to one that the other is missing

 

<They do not have as much feeling for the beautiful as man, but more vanity>[111]

 

A woman endeavors to acquire much more love than men.  The latter content themselves with pleasing one person, the former everyone.  If this inclination is to be understood as evil,[112] then a person of universal fidelity[113] arises

 

{48, Page 33 of Ob, lower margin, at 2:222}

 

All shocking delights are feverish and deadly languor and numb feeling follow the ecstasies of joy.  The heart gets used up and the sensation gets coarse

 

{49, sheet inserted after Ob 34, front side, at  2:222}

 

<The melancholic person is just and embittered about injustice.>

 

[63] Anger is a good-natured passion in the simplicity of nature, but in the silly vanity of society it makes a fool.

 

The melancholic person who is choleric is frightful. Extinguished blue eyes filled the sickly face of Brutus.[xxxvi]  (On humor, mood, [and] hypochondria.  A woman and a softish visionary have moods) The melancholic person who is sanguine is cowardly [and] depressed, afraid of people, [and] jealous (the sanguine is galant).  The melancholic person loves more strongly} and becomes less loved by women because women are fickle.  The choleric is a trickster of state,[114] secretive, and important in bagatelles, the sanguine makes fun of {R51}important things.  The melancholic-sanguine is a hermit or penitent in religion; the melancholic choleric [breaks off]

 

[64] The sanguine choleric is valiant like a choleric, vain like a sanguine drive to fame without and yet gracefully loves change and is therefore brave.  For this reason [he] gives consideration to his pranks, loves the coquette and it mixes[115] his wife merely from the point of view of how they please others.  The melancholic person is domestic, the choleric is a courtier.  The sanguine person thrusts himself into every jovial conversation.  In misfortune the melancholic choleric is rash and desperate, the sanguine is in tears and disheartened, the choleric is ashamed of becoming obliged, the choleric sanguine distracts himself through amusements and is pleased because he seems to be happy.  In clothing, the melancholic sanguine is clean but something is always missing, the choleric sanguine is in good quality, by neglect,[116] the phlegmatic is dirty, the melancholic choleric is pure and simple

 

{50, reverse side, opposite Ob 35, at 2:222}

 

Before one inquires into the virtue of a woman, one must first ask whether she needs it.  In the state of simplicity there is no virtue.  With men, to protect strong inclinations and honesty; with women, loyal fidelity and flattery. 

 

In states of luxury the man must have virtue, the woman honor.

 

One can hardly put the movement of refined moral feelings or decoration (moral yeomanry.  Alongside the pomade tin, the greaseball)[117] in the place of domestic occupation, [65] and she who weaves a gown for her husband always puts to shame the gallant dame, who in place of this reads a tragedy.

 

Longings.

 

In discussion the melancholic person is still and serious.  The sanguine person {R52} talks a lot when one jests and changes the subject.  The choleric tries to set the tone and is affected himself.  The choleric person laughs, forced by propriety.  The sanguine [laughs, forced] by habit and friendliness.  The melancholic person laughs when everything has ceased.

 

When both sexes degenerate, the degeneration of the man is worse[118]

 

He who suffers nothing other than excessively furious expressions has a numb feeling, he who suffers nothing but very beautiful people, only screaming colors, only great heroic virtues has a numb feeling.  He who notices the impulse that soft handwriting and noble simplicity hides in morals has a subtle feeling.  The feeling becomes more tender in middle age, but also gets gradually weaker.  The subtle feeling is not as strong as the coarse one

 

{51,  Page Ob 36, in the margin, next to line 18f., at 2:223}

 

Valiant

 

{52,  sheet inserted after Ob 36, front side, at 2:222}

 

Good consequences are surely signs of morality, but not always those the only ones, because they cannot always become known with certainty.  How many lies could have good consequences.

 

The ground for the divine legislative power[119] does not lie in kindness.  For the motive would then be gratitude (subjective moral ground, type of feeling) and consequently not strictly duty.  The degree of legislative power [120] presupposes inequality and causes one person to lose a degree of freedom to another. [66] This can happen only if he himself sacrifices his will to another.  If he does this with respect to all his actions, then he makes himself into a slave.  A will that is subjected to that of another is imperfect because a person and contradictory, for a person has spontaneity;[121] if he is subjected to the will of a person {R53}(if he himself can still choose) then he is repulsive and despicable; if he is subjected to the will of God alone, then he is close to nature.  One must not perform actions out of obedience toward a person that one could do out of inner motives, and to do everything out of obedience, where inner motivating grounds would have done everything, produces slaves.

 

The body is mine because it is a part of my self[122] and is moved by my power of choice.  The entire animated or unanimated world that does not have its own power of choice is mine in so far as I master it and can move it in accordance with my power of choice.  The sun is not mine.  The same goes for another person, therefore no property is a Prioprietat or an exclusive property.  But in so far as I want to claim something as exclusively my own, I will presuppose that the will of the other is at least not opposed to mine, nor [is] the action of the other opposed to mine.  [67] Therefore, I will carry out the actions that indicate what is mine,[123] chop the tree down, timber it, etc. The other person tells me that it is his because, through the actions of his power of choice, it is as though it belongs to his self.

 

{53, reverse side, opposite Ob 37, at 2:223}

 

A will that should be good must not invalidate itself[124] if it is taken universally and reciprocally; similarly, the other will not take as his[125] that on which I have worked, for otherwise he would thereby posit that his will moved my body

 

By the fact that a person calls many a thing his own, he thereby tacitly promises in similar circumstances through his will not to [breaks off]

 

The obedience of the children toward the parents is not based 1. on gratitude 2. on the fact that they cannot sustain themselves, because that would be based on use, but rather because they do not have their own complete will and [because] it is good to be directed by the will of others.  Because they are so much a thing of the parents, for they live only through their will, it is morally good to be governed by them [the parents].  If they could support educate[126] themselves, obedience would cease.

 

{R54}[68] We belong as it were to divine causes and exist through him [God] and his will.  Many things can be suitable to God’s will that would not be good from inner motives, e.g., to slay one’s son.  The goodness of obedience is based on this.  My will in accordance with its vocation is constantly subject to the will of God, thus it is consistent with itself best when it agrees with the divine; and it is impossible that, in accordance with the divine will, [one’s will] be evil.

 

The wife seeks gratification and expects [her] necessities from others, the man seeks needs and expects gratification from women.  When both seek necessities they are in agreement but poor [and] when both seek gratification they are foolish

 

A man finds more gratification in making a woman comfortable than a woman does, yet the latter wants to appear to impart before enjoying; for, to be sure, the former is opposed to her primary vocation of having the need to conceive

 

{54, Page 38 of Ob, lower margin, at 2:224}[127]

 

{55, sheet inserted after Ob 38, front side, at 2:223}

 

I do not know what solace those who regard their imagined needs as right and natural could find in a providence whose fulfillment is promised to them.  I, who I know suffer no evil[128] but that which I cause and that it only depends on me to be happy through the kindness of divine order, will never murmur against it

 

{R55}<Why must one speak French in order to be polite.  Dames Messieurs.  Chapeaux Cornetten. *>[xxxvii]

 

Now if a woman marries a twenty year-old man, she takes for herself a fop.  The reason for this is, among others, that he has not yet become acquainted with the deceptive art of women to appear better and more pleasant than they are.  For this reason, he will make a bad husband, because he will always believe that he could have chosen better or also because he actually fell in love[129] and chose poorly.  On the other hand, [69] if with more age he gets to know the sex and sees the empty illusion, then he turns back to simplicity, where according to nature he already could have been from the start.  For this reason, the path to a good marriage goes through wantonness, an observation that is very unpleasant especially because it is true.

 

The time of maturity of a lord and of a farmer is never different.  A woman has never come of age without a man.

 

Men fall much further in love than women,** which also comes from nature.  However, if the latter grows in the art of illusion [70], an illusion that ceases in marriage, then from this a kind of deceived reluctance in the marriage emerges, which finds less agreeableness than it had expected.  It is not good to make a future husband fall too much in love; one must save something for the future

 

To do without art, that is, to not let inclinations germinate in oneself, is the means of bliss; therefore, one can either seek honor, that is to say, earn the praiseworthy opinion of others, or strive to do without it [honor] completely and be indifferent toward it.

 

That the choleric person is angry comes from his love of honor because he {R56}always believes himself to be insulted; the reasonable person desires nothing but equality and has little occasion to be angry.

 

In lands where the women are not beautiful they are treated tyrannically, as among savages, because the weak person must influence inclination or else be oppressed

 

[71] The main ground for lasting beauty is illusion.  Make-up.  A kind of falsehood[130] that is lovelier than truth.  Correggio goes off of nature[xxxviii]

 

Women like to love bold men and these modest, decent[131] men.  Judgment of a woman by Bayle.[xxxix]  Hercules endeared himself more to Omphale through his 72 girls than through his spinning.[xl]

 

As far as gender[132] is concerned, women have more of a firm taste, men more of a fine one.  They love good behaviors and court manners more in order to display their own vanity.

 

If the savage had taste, eating-houses would please the best

 

If the inclinations of women and men grow similarly, then they must come in disproportion, namely, that the latter have less capacity according to the proportion of their inclinations

 

{57, sheet inserted after Ob 40, front side, at 2:224}

 

In everything that belongs to beautiful and sublime feeling, we do best if we let ourselves be led by the model of antiquity.  In sculpture, architecture, poetry, and rhetoric of ancient morals and [the ancient] civil constitution.[133]  The ancients were closer to nature, we have much frivolous or luxurious or slavish corruption between ourselves and nature.  Our age is the seculum of beautiful trifles, bagatelles or sublime chimeras.  

 

{R57}Character in society

 

The sanguine person dives in where he is not invited; the choleric person does not enter where he is not invited in accordance with propriety; [72] the melancholic person doesn’t come at all makes sure that he is not invited at all.  In company, the melancholic person is still and observes; the sanguine person discusses what occurs to him; the choleric person makes observations and interpretations.  In domestic existence, the melancholic person is frugal, cheap[134] and poor; the sanguine is a bad host.[135] The choleric is greedy but magnificent.  For the melancholic person, generosity is magnanimity, for the choleric [it is] boasting, [and] for the sanguine [it is] thoughtlessness[136]

 

The melancholic person is jealous; the choleric, power-hungry; the sanguine, amorous

 

The coquette is an admirable maitresse but surely no wife, except for a Frenchmen.

 

On providence.  The fools that forsake the order of nature are astonished about providence, that it did not improve their terrible consequences; Augustine with his crapula.[xli]

 

[73] Union is possible where one can be whole without the other, e.g., between two friends and where none of the others is subordinated.  There can also be union in exchange or contracts of a way of life.  However, unity depends on two forming a whole together in a natural way, as much in consideration of needs as of agreeableness.  This is with a man and woman.  Indeed, here unity is tied to equality.  The man cannot enjoy a single gratification of life without the wife and she [cannot enjoy] a single need without the husband.  This also creates the distinction of their characters.  The man will [direct] his inclination solely in accordance with his needs [rather than also with his gratification], [and] in accordance with his judgment, and [to] seek gratification in making the wives’ [needs] into his needs.  A woman will seek gratification of her needs and leave the needs of the man [to him].

 

{58, back side, opposite Ob 41, at 2:225}

 

{R58}In countries where the societies consist mainly of men, one values personal income in accordance with the understanding of honesty and the useful zeal of friendship or also [with the understanding] of common use.  Where they are always intermingled with women, in accordance with the wit of good behavior, jest, amusements, malicious gossip.[137] [74] With the old Germans it must, before French morals corrupted us, the women had to be in special rooms like in England.

 

A man who has a wife is complete, detaches himself from his parents, and is alone in the state of nature.  He is so much disinclined to associate himself with others that he even fears the approach of others.  For this reason [we have] the condition of war.  Hobbes[xlii]

 

The well-bred woman does not need to have embarrassment and blushing as a part of herself; [she] is very charming and, characteristic of the gender where it is still encountered, she is thus a good bulwark of chastity

 

Womanly grace.  Womanly traits are laudable in a woman, if she has masculine traits, it is a reproach

 

With marriage, amorous blindness[138] disappears, so that the wife lacks the unlimited reign over the heart of the man and the rank of goddess that she had had before the marriage.  However, the man does not feel nearly as dominated as he was and wishes [to be]; the wife loses more in vanity; the man more in tenderness.  The fantasy of infatuation instills yet more exaggerated concepts in the man than in the woman

 

<The woman wished to keep dominating, while the man [wished] to be dominated.  The wife sees herself as obliged to flatter, the man finds no other inclination in himself than kindness>

 

The man is stronger not merely because of his build, but also in principles and the steadfastness in bearing things, therefore, his clothes must be so, the wife’s [must be] delicate and clean

 

{R59}[75] Taste in the choice of company.  Taste for virtue, friendship.[139]  One turns more on taste than on necessity

 

{59, sheet inserted after Ob 42, front side, at 2:225}

 

Nature equipped the wife to make [her husband] affectionate and to not be affectionate

 

They have are never truly tender, which men can see directly in [the fact that] all women want to rule and reasonable men let themselves be ruled; now he who reluctantly surrenders his power without noticing that he is stronger must have more tenderness than the one who is aware, for whom it [surrender] happens reluctantly, [while he] still prefers himself to the other

 

Women are more for lustful love, men are more for affectionate love.  All widows marry, but not all widowers

a woman must not marry a vain man

 

[76] Union can always find a place alongside equality, but unity never can; because unity must exist in marriage, so everything must be ruled through one, the man or the woman.  Now it is the inclination and not the understanding that rules here.  Therefore, the inclination of either the man or the woman can rule

the latter is the best

 

War can only produce virtues if it is patriotic, that is, if it doesn’t serve to gain money and support, but instead to preserve itself, and if the soldier becomes a civilian[140] again

 

{60, back side, opposite Ob 43, at 2:225}

 

Lustful love is the basis for sexual inclination.  For this reason, everything beautiful and sublime in this love is only a phantasm if this is not presupposed.  The husband must be a man by night and day.  This remark also serves to warn of affectionate and highly respectful love between the sexes, for this degenerates more often with the outbreak of lust.

 

{R60}[77] The woman must be kept from being unfaithful through good-heartedness love and honor, if she the man does not secure her affection, then he can count less on her duty.  That is a reason why women ought to be met with kindness.  For they have an widely extended capacity remaining[141]

 

Distinguish he who requires little because he lacks less from he who requires little because he can do without much.  Socrates.[xliii]  The enjoyment of [a] gratification that is not a need, that is, that one can do without, is agreeableness.  If, nonetheless, it is regarded as a need then it is concupiscence.  The condition of people who can go without is moderation, that which counts the dispensable as a need is luxury.

 

The contentment of a person originates either because he satisfies many inclinations or because he has few not let many inclinations sprout and is therefore content with fewer fulfilled inclinations.  The condition of someone who is content because he does not know agreeableness is moderate simple moderation.  The former demands no self-constraint and privation, but the latter does, the former is easy to mislead, the latter has been misled and is safer for the future.  The condition of a person without dissatisfaction because he does not know of greater gratifications that are possible <for him>, and therefore does not desire [them].

 

Virtue does not simply consist in one prevailing over acquired inclination in certain circumstances, but rather seeking to be rid of such inclinations and so learning to do without them.  It does not consist in [78] one combating with natural inclinations, but rather one making it so that he has nothing but natural ones, for then one can always serve them well

 

{61, sheet inserted after Ob 44, front side, at 2:226}

 

{R61}The characters of human nature are the degenerations of their vocation; likewise the necessity of war, the rule and servitude of religions and of science

 

It is the question of the noble and why it does not agree more with the useful than the beautiful[142]

 

Women will always prefer a man with masculine agreeablenesses who is wild, for they believe every time that they will rule him.  Most of the time they are right about this, and this excuses them if they fail.  This is also the beautiful side of the female gender, that they can rule men

 

One will perhaps find more men who deserve the gallows than women who get drunk

 

[79] If one wants to maintain the fantastical things of love in marriage, then jealousies and adventures must take place, if one wants to maintain the amorous things, then the wife must be a coquette; if both should cease to exist, then the mere simplicity of nature remains

 

In countries that are rich and monarchical where many, with their private employments of self-interest, have nothing to do with the public [dealings] of the state, everything arises from the skill of the society.  From this springs politeness.  In England there are rich people, but they are involved with the state, in Holland they are interlaced with self-interest

 

On fashionable disposition[143]

 

A woman is always ready to deceive a lover who is respectful and, without much ado, to abandon in secret the one who is bold and enterprising.  In the state of simplicity the man rules over the woman; in [the state of] luxury, the woman [rules over] the man.  The refined taste of free association makes this necessary

 

{62, reverse side, opposite Ob 45, at 2:226}

 

{R62}[80] [Latin] The power given by law to affect the senses of a subject well or badly does not depend on love, but the respect of the moral power of obligation [Noetigen].  The logical ability to enact laws (on account of wisdom) is non-moral nature

 

The still and peaceful serenity[144] in the beautiful is, with a man, turned into himself and, with a woman, turned outward

 

Pelisson and Madame Sévigné[xliv]

 

Bold position and amorous or ingratiating laughter.  <On the habit of women to take serious pause.>

 

Whoever is empty of sensations (that is, surely has feeling for opinion but not for need) can perpetually maintain them far easier with others.  For this reason, the woman must be less affectionate

 

Because we have so much vain jealousy,[145] friends are also rivals.  Thus only friendship can take place with needs

 

Light and warmth appear to distinguish themselves like noise and wind; light and colors like noise and sound; taut strings can must make undulations.  A coal fire in the hearth is a space empty of ether, the ether of which goes out through the chimney; since thereby all the bodies standing around are freed of ether, it gives warmth.  In such a way is warmth received those which receive warmth are k [breaks off]

 

It is a question whether, when bodies become warm, they let go[146] of fire [81] or take it in.  It depends on whether bodies are saturated with fire in absolute cold, for then a warm body becomes cold if it absorbs fire and this heats a body, that it forces to let go of it [the fire].  Is a heated oven empty of fire?  Yes, it absorbs it [fire] gradually in itself, [and] thereby frees the fire in others and makes them warm and becomes cold itself.  In this way, the suns and also those are the spaces emptiest of the element of fire.  Through this, the spreading of light can also be comprehended, for it is easier that a {R63}thread of agitated material is attracted into infinity by penetration into an empty space than by an impact.

 

{63, sheet inserted after Ob 46, front side, at 2: 227}

 

In this way, light might perhaps be a movement toward the sun rather than one away from it

 

Sound, although air is squeezed out of the lungs, can perhaps be generated through the withdrawing of air rather than the forcing out.  Fire above a body (earth) makes it cold underneath, but only to a certain extent, for it frees the fire element from the near [body], [82] [but] the more remote [body] attracts this already released fire element to itself, thus becoming numerous poles.

 

 

 

       a

             x      y       b                               c                    d

 

 

It is with fire ‘a’ that the fire element will be released out to ‘b’, but always weaker than at ‘y’ and ‘x’; to bring out movement from ‘b’ to ‘a’ in empty space is weaker than to be drawn from ‘b’ [and] move toward ‘c’, therefore ‘bc’ is attractive and consequently is cold only in that it penetrates, [and] accumulates in ‘c’, although with delayed movement, so that ‘c' is no doubt positively warm, that is, lets fire go, but behind ‘c’ until ‘d’, [it is] negative once again.

 

{R64}The sun warms the earth, that is, makes it so that the fire is released into it hence it must from above or better that there is a space empty of fire on the earth; assume a body high in the air, and it is in a space that is full of fire; thus, no fire comes out of itself or into itself because it is it [the body] does not give off such an element

 

{64, back side, opposite Ob 47, at 2: 227}

 

[83] The true concept of fire seems to consist in the fact that with heating the fire does not change from warmth to cold, but from cold to warmth; hence in cooling, the body that is becoming cold is put in the state of absorption and fire passes into it.  From this it follows that when a body is warmed it pulls other fire into itself and thereby always diminishes its state of absorption, that is to say, always becomes colder itself   From this follows that only the body which warms others becomes cold and conversely, one that becomes cold warms others, for it cannot warm without releasing the fire in others, that is. but the more it fills himself, the less is it in a state to release it in others.  Yet, if a body becomes cold, it falls into a state of absorption and thereby warms others.  A body is cold with respect to others if it cools them, that is, fills others with the element of fire and thereby lessens their absorbing condition in that it gets warm himself, that is, lets fire go.  Comets are, among all heavenly bodies, those which are mostly full of the fire element; they come into the empty space of the ether, or rather their elemental fire is violently released, which soars behind them

 

<If a fire is in the hearth, then the air in the whole area, and also the nearby bodies, will be warm.  Remote [objects], however, draw it out and become cold because the fire becomes released from the air.  Or so: the acrid hurrying ether makes waves and is denser in its own places than before, thus will the body found there absorb rather than emit>

 

All the affected rules for a wife come about in order to prevent others from pleasing us more or making us lustful.  Constrain your own concupiscence and your wife will be adequate

 

{R65}A valiant woman, she is something completely different from a romantic[147] [84] beauty, the latter is best for a lover, the former for a husband.  German women are brave, French [women are] coquettes

 

A good housewife is worthy of honor with a man, how will a gallant dame earn this name

 

A man must show some contemptuousness with respect to his finery; it must be seen that he has worn the hat.  His cuffs must not worry him

 

If I should choose a wife, I would want to take one who has not much wit, but feels it.

 

The corruption of our time allows it to come about that no person demands to be happy or good, but instead to appear so.

 

One laments that marriages are not as good as the unwed state.  The reason for this is above.  One never enjoys himself

 

{65, sheet inserted after Ob 48, front side, at Ri 65, 2:228}

 

{Latin} Punishment is either political or moral. The first is, as motive, [85] the cause of omission, the latter is the cause also of inspection of actions.  Moral punishment is, in an actual sense, disheartening or avenging, but it also has the function of being a means for improvement of the sinner in view of either earlier or future errors.

 

The cause of all moral punishment is this.  All evil action[148] would never happen if it were sensed through moral feeling with as much aversion as it deserves.  Yet if it is carried out, then it is a proof that it has sweetened the physical stimulation and the action has seemed good, but it is absurd and ugly that what is morally evil is yet good on the whole; consequently, as a result, a physical evil[149] must replace the loss of reluctance that was missing in the action.

 

<To a certain extent, it is fortunate that marriages become difficult, because if {R66}they became frequent, gentlemen would increase and injustice would become more common>

 

Women are far more capable than men among one another in the judgment of masculine merit and of their [men’s] useful weaknesses.  Men, on the other hand, more easily see the worth of a woman than a woman sees that of others, but [they do] not so easily [see] the failings as a woman [sees those] of others.  Thus, women rule over men and deceive them more easily than vice versa.  It is easy to deceive a man, but not vice versa.  Traitor. You don’t love me anymore, you believe more in what You see, etc.; no man can say such a thing to wife

 

 she sees even what he does not himself and sees correctly[150]

 

They rightly carry out the same intrigues [as us] in retaliation for the injustices we show them, that we want them to be chaste and have been unchaste ourselves

 

[86] <The reason why there are so many cuckolds is because the time of the debauches[151] of men has ended and that of women has begun.>

 

{66, back side, opposite Ob 49, at 2:228}

 

It is very good that the woman is chosen; she herself cannot chose

 

Why the aging of a woman is so terrible, of men not so, for the sublime takes care of the latter

 

Youth is a great perfection for a woman in marriage; one loves her afterwards in age for the sake of the memory of her youth.  That elderly women marry comes about because of our injustice.

 

Women are all covetous[152] except where vanity is stronger; they are all devout and devoted to the spiritual.  The honor of a man resides in his judgment of himself, while [the honor] of a woman [resides] in the judgment of others

 

{R67}[87] If there were a man by whom I was hated, it would trouble me.  Not as if I were frightened of him, but because I would find it ugly to have something in myself that could become a cause for hate in others, for I would assume that another would not have formed an aversion without any apparent occasion.  Therefore, I would search him out, I would give myself to be better understood by him, and after I the disadvantage had seen some benevolence toward me developing in him, I would let myself be satisfied with this without ever wanting to take advantage of it.  Yet, if I considered it to be inevitable that common and vulgar prejudices, a miserable envy, or a yet more despicable jealous vanity make it impossible to completely avoid all hate, well then I will say to myself it is better that I am hated than that I am despised.  Hate This motto is based on an entirely different cause than that which contrives only self-interest; I would rather be envied than pitied.  The hate of my fellow citizens does not overcome their concept of equality, but but of the scorn makes me unimportant in the eyes of others and always causes a very annoying delusion of inequality.  Yet, to be despised is much more injurious than to be hated.

 

{67, Page 50 of Ob, in the margin, next to lines 11-13, 2:229}

 

they laugh easily and gladly and it increases their charms

 

{68, sheet inserted after Ob 50, front side, 2:229}

 

Female pride.  Male pride.

 

The degenerate woman was Arria; Margaretha Maultasch[xlv]

 

It does not behoove a wife to make the husband happier by way of something other than by way of her person  With her money the wife buys for herself a jester or a tyrant

 

The greatest perfection is domesticity

 

{R68}[88] <[Women] can command incomparably in their countenances, [they] have more accent, [they] persuade>[153]

 

A human being has his own inclinations and his power of choice can arrange his actions so as to follow the beckoning of nature.  There can be nothing more terrible than that the actions of one person should be subordinated to the will of another.  Thus, no aversion can be more natural than that which a person has toward slavery.  For the sake of this [aversion] a child cries and embitters itself if it has to do what others want, without someone having bothered to endear it to [the child].  The child wishes only to be a man soon and to act in accordance with its will.  Which new slavery of things[154] they have to promote in order to usher in the former.[155]

 

In accordance with her build, a woman is already adapted to being sought after, [and] therefore knows to attract enlistments and to be adept at conceding or also refusing.  Thus, she must know [how] to capture [89] but also how to conceal desires in order to prevent disdain.  From this she can more easily adopt a modest and cool-headed nature,[156] can disguise herself excellently, and is equipped with all characteristics [needed] in order to appear at any time as she should be.  She is therefore soberly discussed, never imprudent, etc.

 

Shamefacedness is never a cause of chastity, but something that procures in its place incentives of decency [and] even produces the same effects

 

A woman wants to have men be enterprising in matters of love

 

{69, back side, opposite Ob 51, 2:229}

 

The sweetness we find in the beneficence of respecting people is an effect of the feeling for the universal welfare that would take place in the condition of freedom

[90] The refinement of the times is adeptness at deceiving and our academies furnish a bunch of swindlers

 

{R69}Drunkenness is the failing of a man

Roughness

Defiance Anger

 

The law-giving power of God among the first human beings is based on property.  The human being was freshly placed in the world, all trees belonged to God and he forbade one to them

 

This idea has ended.  The law-giving power of God over the Jewish people is based on the social contract.  God would lead them out of Egypt and give them another country if they obeyed him.*  Subsequent to their having kings, God always reserved supremacy for himself and they were only satraps [and] feudal tenants.  In the New Testament, this basis comes to an end.  It is presumed to be the universal basis of the law-giving power of God, yet the binding force is based solely on a kindness, which will not serve all severity.  Thereupon, this is kept entirely for the lawgiver in actual Christianity and the Father is established.

 

 

 

Paul judges that the law would only produce[157] reluctance, because it gives rise to one doing something unwillingly that has been commanded, and this is certainly how things are; for this reason he sees the law abolished through Christianity and mere grace [as] a basis to love God rightly from the heart, which is not possible in accordance with nature and whereby actions will be brought to morality and not to theocratic politics.

 

{70, Page 51 of Ob, marginal notes next to lines 22-25, at 2:230}

 

            is commonly [and] uncleanly like Magliabechi,[xlvi] he was disguised with a loose mouth.  As my brother says [breaks off]

 

{lower margin}

 

[91] One can hate he who is right, but one is forced to respect him.

 

{R70}Self-interest fights against common utility.[158] The latter makes[159] love out of inclination

 

{71, Page 52 of Ob, marginal notes next to lines 6-11, 2:230}

 

May men always devote troublesome, sleepless nights to their investigation if the woman only knows how she ought to rule them.

 

{72, sheet inserted after Ob 52, front side, at 2:230}

 

<On the mutterings against providence>

 

On freedom

 

May he find himself in what conditions he will, the human being is dependent on many <external> things.  On means of nourishment, the impression of the air, [and] the sun.  He always depends on some things by way of his needs and on others by his concupiscence and, in so far as he is surely the administrator of nature but not her master, he must often acquiesce to the yoke of necessity and bow to the order of nature and accommodate himself to its laws [92] conform to her force, for he will not find that she will always conform to his wishes.  Still, what is much harder and more unnatural than this yoke of necessity is the dependence subjection of one person under the will of another.  There is no misfortune more terrible for anyone who would be used to freedom, [who] has <enjoyed the good of freedom>, than to see himself delivered to a creature of his own kind who could coerce him to do whatever he wants (to take one’s own will to himself).  There is also no doubt that [breaks off]

 

 It must It also necessarily requires a very long habituation to make the horrifying terrible thoughts of subservience tolerable; for every person must sense in himself that even if there were many discomforts that he might not want to cast off at the risk of his life, nevertheless, in the choice between slavery and the risk of death one will have{R71} there would be no doubt that one’s first attempt his free- no reservations in preferring the latter.

 

{73, reverse side, opposite Ob 53, at 2:230}

 

The cause of this is also very clear and rightful.  All other evils[160] of nature follow laws evils[161] of nature are still subject to certain laws that one learns to know in order to choose subsequently how far one wants to give into them or be subject to them.  The heat of the burning sun, the harsh wind, [and] the motions of the water always allow something for a person to devise what will protect himself against them or [breaks off]

 

But the will of every human is the effect of his own drives [and] inclinations and true or imagined well-being and agrees only with his own true or imagined well-being.  But if I was once free, nothing can present a more terrible prospect of sorrow and despair than [93] that henceforth my condition should reside, not in my own will, but in the will of another.  Today it is bitingly cold, I can go out or stay at home, whichever I please, but the will of another does not determine what is most agreeable to me in this case, but what is agreeable <to him>.  I want to sleep so he wakes me.  I want to rest or play, and he forces me to work.  The wind outside is blustering [and] compels me to flee to a cave, but here or elsewhere it finally leaves me in peace, but my master seeks me out and, because the cause of my misfortune has reason, he is much more adept at tormenting me than all the elements.  Even if I presume that he is good, there is nothing in the way of his thinking otherwise.  The movements of matter do indeed maintain a certain definite rule, but the obstinacy of the human is without rules

 

{74, Page 53 of Ob, marginal notes at lines 15-23, at 2:230}

 

[95] They make the strongest satires of marriage who regard the marital excesses as trifles, which deserves no insult or punishment revenge, because then the state of marriage does not distinguish {R72}itself from that of gallantry [and] from the indifferent sort.

 

Lower margin

 

The woman accepts a satire of her sex as a joke because she knows well that the mockery of the little short-comings of her sex actually concerns the men, for the sake of which she loves him even more, but a satire of marriage insults all women because this seems to be more serious and because of some truthfulness [to it], they also feel this reproach.  Yet, if such a basic principle takes the upper hand, then her sex will be degraded to the man’s power of choice.

 

{75, sheet inserted after OB 54, front side, at 2:230}

 

<On the rightful expression ‘my lord’[162]>

 

 

In subjugation, not only are there things also something so of external danger, but also something so a certain ugliness and a contradiction that indicates its injustice.[163]  An animal is not quite a complete being because it is not conscious of itself and whether its drives and inclinations may become opposed to one another or not, it surely senses its evil,[164] but it [the evil] disappears before it [the animal] in a moment and it knows nothing of its own existence. However, that a human requires no soul, as it were, and through a should have no will of its own and that another soul should move my extremities is absurd and perverse: also in our constitutions any person who is subordinated to a great extent is also despicable [breaks off][xlvii]

 

Livery[xlviii]

 

<Instead of freedom raising me above cattle, it places {R73} me under them because I can be more easily coerced[165]>

 

Such a person is, as it were, nothing to himself but the household appliance of another.  I could just as well pay tribute to the boots of the master [94] as to his lackey.  In short, the person who depends on this is no longer a human, he has lost this rank, he is nothing except another person’s belonging.

 

Often Subjection and freedom are commonly mixed together the master to a certain degree it is not always called the m… and one depends on the other.  But even the smaller degree of dependence is too great an evil[166] than that it should not naturally terrify.  This feeling is very natural but one can also weaken it quite a bit.  The power to withstand the evils of others can become so small that slavery appears to be a lesser evil than discomfort.  Nevertheless, it is certain that in human nature it stands above [breaks off]

 

Indeed, cattle are forced by humans beings, but the human being [is forced] by another human being with delusion[167]

 

The momentary power of attack is much smaller than servitude.

{76, reverse side, opposite OB 55,  at 2:231}

 

There could certainly be enticements[168] that the human prefers to freedom for a moment, but at once he will be thoroughly sorry.

 

Society makes one value himself only comparatively.  If others are not better than I, then I am good, if all are worse, then I am perfect.

 

[96] Proportional evaluation is still distinguished from honor.

 

If Chastity cannot be a lack of amorous passion, {R74}for then it is really a flaw, if this same passion is too small for its whole purpose, still, it is good insofar as it is suitable to one’s age <and> capacity, but this goodness is not moral.

 

To preserve chastity of men is either a direct shamefacedness (the concern to make one’s sexual attribute contemptible) or an indirect consequence of the general concept of honor.  This last is either purely a concern to contract no dishonor, and it is a means of preserving virtue for which many institutions could be made, or a tender stimulation of self-censure in so far as it is connected to sincerity and might not conceal itself, therefore it shows itself in blushing; this characteristic is the best way to preserve chastity

 

[97] We have all kinds of drives that should serve us as means[169] to serve others, and [these drives] more often directly[170] rule.  First, to compare ourselves to others so that we can evaluate ourselves, from this springs the falsity of evaluating one’s worth comparatively, of arrogance, and of even evaluating his courage and good fortune in the same way; envy.  Second, to put ourselves in another’s place so that we know what he feels and judges.  From this springs the blind sympathy that also puts justice in disorder. Third, others of us to investigate the judgments of others because this can correct the truth morally as well as logically.  From this springs the desire for glory.  Fourth, to acquire and save all sorts of things for enjoyment; from this springs the greed that is miserly.

 

One says that the thirst for glory is the ultimate weakness of the wise.  I believe that where wisdom is not of the kind that comes with age, the love of women is the ultimate weakness

 

{77, Page 56 of Ob, marginal notes next to lines 9-14, at 2:231}

 

 

[99] That a wife has feminine traits is no evil,[171] but surely [it is an evil] that they be encountered in a man.  Just as it is a biting mockery rather than a eulogy that a woman has masculine traits in her

 

next to lines 18-22

 

{R75}A wife constricts the heart of a man and one commonly loses a friend when he marries

 

Lower margin

 

A man is such a dandy in marriage

 

 

{78, sheet inserted after Ob 56, front side, at 2:231}

 

The use of the terms women and hats,[172][xlix] although it is only a fashionable trifle in conversation among Germans, points out quite well the foolishness of taste that creeps into us and makes a mockery [98] of the ridiculous customs of a nation that is lively and deluded in its own character.  The everlasting conversation of the French with women is in accordance with their character, but this is not the case with the Teutons.  Our woman does not have near the lively coquetterie of the French.  Therefore, these manners of interaction must always be somewhat insipid.  They are still proud here

 

Because women are weak, they are much less capable of virtue, but they have things that can make it superfluous

 

Virtue becomes ever more necessary but also ever more impossible in our present political constitution

 

Because virtue shows strength, it must suit warlike states, more of Rome than of Carthage.[l]

 

Unity in society is not possible between many people

 

When we count among needs the works of another, why not also his wife [?]

 

When they are in society, men assess their worth only in relation to one another: the women [assess their worth] only in relation to the men because then each discovered charming characteristic or presumption [is] accepted, [while] every other {R76}wanton demand [is] questioned; in such a way they give each other very bad reputations

 

Each well-behaved woman tries to charm the entire [male] sex although she does not mean to profit by it.  This comes about from the fact that because she should be sought after, she must possess a general inclination to please, for were this restricted, she would perhaps stand out to someone she doesn’t want.  With marriages this inclination escapes from its bounds

 

{79, back side, opposite Ob 57, at 2:232}

 

<On the agreeablenesses that one makes into need and vice versa.  Ideal gratification.  Chimerical [gratification] that deceives in fulfillment>

 

1.      On need and agreeableness. Quiet, change, boredom

 

On luxury and sufficiency.  Preparation, foresight

 

On ambition. 

 

On courage and cowardice health and sickness

 

On the fine and goods of delusion.  Miserliness

 

On sexual inclination.  On science

 

On refined and crude sensation. 

 

On foresight

 

On the person of simplicity

 

On natural persons in comparison with civilized ones  <On the extent of the well-being of both>

 

On the value of human nature

 

{R77}A free person values himself more than a slave. 

 

Dependence on power is not as disgraceful as [dependence] on delusion

 

<On industriousness and laziness>

 

On the luxury of civilized people.

 

[101] On the sciences [and] on healthy and fine understanding

 

On enjoyment and delusion, foresight[173]

 

<On the capacity for enjoyment and delusion>

 

On well-being and misery

 

<Moral>[174]

 

On generosity and guiltiness

 

On the drive to acquire or defend.  War

 

On truth and lies.  On propriety and righteousness. 

 

On friendship.  On the perfection of human nature.

 

On sexual inclination

 

Virtue, religion.  On natural and artificial conditions, education[175]

 

The officer who got embarrassed, or pretended to do so, by the gaze of Ludwig XIV expressed the sentiment of a slave.[li]  The embarrassment of a man with a woman does not derogate his noble characteristics; here, his boldness is clumsy indifference.  A woman must not be embarrassed in consideration of masculine virtue consica decoris Venus.[lii]  Her noble propriety is quiet and gentle, not bold; I revere the beautiful girl in a noble or princely person[176].

 

{R78}If he is always talking about virtue, then he is corrupt; if he constantly talks of religion, then he is [corrupt] to the utmost

 

The priests in the country could maintain large schools for the education of children

 

{80, Page 57 of Ob, upper margin, 2:232}

 

Beauty is domineering.  Merit [is] peaceful and yielding.  The wife retains the affection of the man through jealousy

 

{marginal notes next to lines 2-19}

 

The man who slips away from tears held back with difficulty.  This is how he drowns the pain that he compresses in his chest whenever tender melancholy moves him, and the effort to bear it unwaveringly shines forth in his condolences.  A woman can let her sadness out in lamentations with dignity[177] and alleviate her feeling.  She also passes easily from pain to joy [100] even when the former has been serious, which is also good for a beautiful sex

The man loves more affectionately, the woman more steadily

 

{81, sheet inserted after Ob 58, front side, at 2:232}

 

[102] On inequality

 

Once this has begun, then the evil[178] of oppression is not nearly as great as [the evil] that the minds of the oppressed become abject and think little of themselves.  A farmer is a much more miserable person and has cruder vices than a savage who lacks everything, and also than a common worker.

 

If I go into the workshop of a craftsman, I do not wish that he be able to read my thoughts.  I dread this comparison: he would see the great inequality in which I evaluate myself in relation to him.  I accept as true that I could not live one day without his industriousness; that his children will be reared into useful people.

 

On the defensive passions

 

{R79}Although the person of nature hates no other person, he does indeed fear him.  Thus, he is alert and the equality that he thinks about losing every moment brings him to arm himself.  The state of war soon begins.[179]  But because it is based on a noble ground, [103] it certainly brings about great evil but not ignominy.[180]  It is less dangerous in terms of dishonoring human nature than is a slavish peace*

 

Virtue that depends on strength can only last long in warlike states.  The English still have the most virtue among all the European nations.  They are Their luxury[181] is acquired through hard work and is squandered away with savagery

 

{82, back side, opposite Ob 59, at 2:233}

 

Everything that unnerves kills virtue at its source.

 

The female sex is closer to nature than the male.  For the present age is the age of propriety, of beauty, of good behavior.  However, these are her specific inclinations.

 

[104] The male sex has come to an end and noble characteristics no longer endure because everything is trimmed with ornamentation

 

The condition of virtue is a violent one; therefore, it can only be encountered in violent conditions of an ordinary being.

 

The luxurious life enriches people to a certain degree.  The work of women ceases, they get more children.  There are enough whores who want to suckle children or poor women who neglect their own and raise upper-class children, etc.  In an even greater degree luxury makes for a stagnation of increase[182] and eventually even a diminishment.  From this comes poverty, but before this rises, or when it emerges, then the greatest vices occur

 

{R80}On religion in natural conditions.

 

One must not reproach the savages without religion for things that would make one think less of those with religion.  For whoever does what God wills that he should do, mediated by the motives that God set in his heart, is obedient to Him without knowing of His existence.  But whoever knows God, and is brought to such actions only through the naturally good morality has theology, or if he reveres God for the sake of his morality, then this is simply a morality whose object had been broadened.  Christians can hardly become blessed if their faith is not alive, as those who have had no revelation at all, although with them something more has happened than what naturally takes place.

 

{83, sheet inserted after Ob 60, front side, 2:233}

 

If Diogenes had farmed the field instead of rolling his barrel, he would have been great[liii]

 

[105] One must not ban any books now; it is the only way harm for them to destroy themselves.  We have now come to the point of return.  Rivers, if one lets them flood, form their own shores.  The dam that we set against them serves only to make their ravages unceasing.  For the author[s] of useless things have for their excuse the injustice of others before them.

 

In states where industriousness in things of need no honor is not honored and respected, where the people who work these same trades do not value themselves, there a man without honor is the worst good-for-nothing, wanton, a double-dealer, deceitful, and thieving.  But where the simplicity of nature rules, honor can very well be done without.

 

See there, honor wreaks much evil[183] and then[184] it also serves as means to prevent its greatest excesses.  The sciences wreak much evil and then they serve as a means to better their own evils.  War creates more evil than it takes away {R81} but, to a certain extent, it brings about a state of equality and noble [106] courage.  In such a way corruption as well as virtue in human nature cannot continuously increase.

 

{84, back side, opposite Ob 61, at 2:234}

 

He who is not so proud watches the noble ladies[185] game of vanity with not a small amount of pleasure

 

Shamefacedness, frailty.  Embarrassment

 

Satire never improves [anything]; for this reason, even if I had the talents [to satirize], I would not make use of them.  The vanity of a woman is either that of the sex of that of state.[186]

 

The pride of the sex or of state[187]

 

Because nobility and the honor based on it depend solely on the choice of the prince, pride over them is quite foolish.  <He who is angry and strong does not hate>

 

That the drive for honor originates only from the idea of equality, [107] one can see: 1. because as far as another is also stronger, but only appears not to make comparisons, we fear him completely but we (from which respect originates) but we do not hate him.  2. that the inclination to show his worth to superiors is noble, but to equals or inferiors is contemptible <worthy of hate>; and that a man who does not value himself is despised

 

The highest pinnacle of fashionable taste is <when young men get refined early> [and] acquire vulgar brazenness or [when] the young woman quickly abandons discreet modesty and has learned early how to carry on the game of coquetterie with liveliness.  For thereupon we this is necessarily the way the most charming manner most catches the eye; in such a society, a reasonable man looks like a blockhead or pedant, a decent modest and decent woman [looks] like a common landlady, and the more refined distillation of society plays the role of courtier.  Thus, they soon withdraw from the {R82}common taste, and reason and domestic virtue are kept on in memory of old, rusted characteristic memorials of taste.  But as with all of the evils[188] that one can never bring to the highest point without the weight on the other side turning the scale, here again stagnation and return[189] is found.  For gradually the women who have practiced the female art long before marriage will easily make use of this freedom where they can do it with certainty.  Men, warned by such examples, instruct themselves by the seduction that they instigated themselves and, with the prospect of a wild vanity that will never let them rest, love the marriages of others but make difficulties for their own.  The contempt for the beautiful sex follows from adoration and, what is most terrible for them, the masculine is prudent so as to no longer be deceived by them.  [108] The greatest hindrance preventing the male sex from returning to happy simplicity is the female sex.

 

{85, page 61 of Ob, upper margin,  2:234}

 

I plant human beings.  Propriety.  A helpful instinct of chastity.

 

{marginal notes at lines 1-4}

 

Men are exceedingly easy to deceive, women are not.

 

{lower margin}

 

Old-fashioned seclusion also has its troubles.  Conversation becomes speechless, countrified, full of stiff ceremony and craftsmen-like aloofness.[190]  The vanity and the trickery of gallant company serve to some extent to put passion to sleep among by way of always-changing games of distraction and to divert finery and vanity to fashion instead of seclusion, introducing that which society had forbidden.

 

{86, sheet inserted after Ob 62, front side, at 2:234}

 

{R83}Blushing is a pretty characteristic of a woman and impudence does not create destroy blushing; instead, she who do not easily blush becomes easily brazen and wanton

 

[109] There are many more men who have reason to praise the generosity of women who do not use the privilege that nature has given to them to fulfill the fair demand on their husband through other men than men who can complain about it.  With so many enervated people[191] men, a foolish or chimerical marriage-project arises, from which they want to make friendship out of the marriage and demand great virtues of the wife toward a self-overcoming[192] of those stirrings[193] that are quite acceptable and cannot be stilled

 

A woman is not so completely virtuous that she is able to make men so.  As strange as it is, they are the greatest means of chastity in men, for an otherwise scatterbrained man will not be made more chaste by anything other than love toward a girl.

 

A woman has a quick concept of everything concerning sentiments[194] but she does not exactly feel them.  For example, when a man is supposed to practice [heroic virtue] himself, he will think to call [something] a hero’s virtue, but the woman will only think so if it is done toward her or by her husband. If one were to face up to them If one speaks with great discretion, then she figures she has a lover.  For this reason, some virtues that have no noticeable direction for her sex will not be respected (for example, the simplicity of nature)

 

This is primarily because the woman is the whetstone of virtue, frangere vix cotis[195] etc. and male virtue against would have no object of exertion if the woman were the same, for then it could be dispensed with

 

 Perhaps this is a concealed reason why we always attach ourselves to women, [whether] we want to or not.

 

{87, back side, opposite Ob 65, at 2:235}

 

{R84}[110] Absolute cold is where a body is saturated with fire, the absolute warmth [is] where it has let go of all fire that is possible [to let go of], that is, that the attraction of expansive force is precisely identical to this

 

Whether I can impute prior deeds[196] to a morally changed person[197]

 

When a body pulls fire from another, it warms it, when it lets it [fire] go, it cools it.

 

 

 

 


     a                            b                        c

 

The heating is in ‘a’, so it is put in the condition of absorption through the loss of its fire element.[198]  At ‘b’, then, it must be cold as there is more fire element to be encountered in it and [it] will be drawn toward the same parts; because the fire element will accumulate will be drawn so that it becomes in c an empty space in ‘b’, it must spread and give an empty space in ‘c’ that will become warm, and so forth.  From the airwaves in warmth to those in light.  Yet this distinction can only last a short while.

 

[111] When water is over fire, then there is an empty space underneath, so when the water has let all the fire go, that is, boiled, then, if one removes it [the water], it [the fire] must go out the bottom and absorb from the top since the movement had at that time been given to the element; thus, above it is hot and below [it is] cool.  In boiling, bubbles must develop at the bottom, which soar up; the free fire-element will not go through copper as quickly as through water and gathers in bubbles; in these, vapors are created and soar up into the air since they are made of an elastic medium.

 

All bodies vitrify and are comparatively empty of fire element, therefore, while light brings warmth with others, at its innermost it here makes only light, that is, not so much overflowing of aether as vibrations.

 

{88, sheet inserted after Ob 64, front side, at 2:235}

 

{R85}The extent of punishment is either evaluated practically[199], namely, that it is great  enough to prevent the action and then no greater punishment is allowed, but then it is morally possible that punishment as serious as physical [punishment] is not always necessary

 

Or its [punishment’s] extent is evaluated in moral proportion[200]: e.g., [112] of the man who kills another in order to take his money, it will be judged that, because he has valued another’s life as less than his own money, one must also value his as less than as much money as any one allocates[201] in relation to life

 

Few go about deceiving their prince, which is a sign that they sense the injustice of the government

 

{Latin} <The fear of a simple nature is either of a childish kind or menial>

 

{Latin} The natural tendency< in view of the motives> is either simple servile  or menial, the latter is that of a mercenary or a slave[202]

 

On the method of morality[203]: where one regards all of  the characteristics that are now common from birth on as natural (not disposed to sin) and extracts from that the rules as to how they can be good in the situation[204], [one] does not err even if the supposition could be false.  In this way, I can say that the person of nature who does not know of God is not evil.

 

Because God was a political lawgiver in the Old Testament, he also gave an account of political grounds for rewards and punishments, but [he did] not [give] moral [grounds] until later times.  <A prince cannot draw up rewards for all his laws because he himself has nothing>

 

{Latin} The simple tendency is either that of love or reverence; the first predominates in the Gospels, the second in the law.  Love could not have taken place in the First Testament, in the New Testament love can only emerge through divine arrangement

 

{89, back side, opposite Ob 63, at 2:235}

 

{R86}[113] On the rèpublique Geneva; on Rousseau’s peculiar way of life[liv]

 

Love is either lustful <corporeal> or moral <spiritual>[205]

 

Toward women something from the former is always intermingled, it can also be toward the old or else they would only be valued as men.  Toward chi[206] Fathers spoil daughters and mothers spoil sons

 

All follies[207] have this in common with each other, that the pictures that appeal to them float in the air and have no support or stability.  They marry a woman without wit, without manners, without birth and family, which is the downfall of their taste.  Oh, that is not the rule of my taste, you might answer.  But what will people say, consider what the world will judge of you.  Before I engage myself in this important difficulty, I ask you what then are such peo what one understands by such people and the world whose opinion is critical for my happiness.  Those are, one answers me, a number of individuals in which each is just as troubled [by] what people will say, and I belong along with the number [114] of these so-called people whose judgment is so important.  Oh, I answer, we people collectively do not want to trouble ourselves any longer with another’s opinion because they robbed us of enjoyment, for we no longer understand ourselves or, at the least, I understand you all; I want am no comedian who can be paid with applause

 

Conceit and stingy greed are never to be healed.

 

A woman is never generous; this is also completely proper[208] because they are not actually the ones who acquire, but instead they save, so it would be reversed because if they gave away for nothing because that is something gentlemen do.  But they are just subordinated gentlemen;[209] and, although they never want them to be, nature retains their rights anyway.  They put effort into finery because this does not appear to be given away and with right they collectively negotiate what the man owns

 

{90, sheet inserted after Ob 66, front side, at 2:236}

 

{R87}Error is never more useful than truth, all things considered, but it is often [more useful than] ignorance

 

[115] The childish understanding[210] is one that only judges that which is presently useful to it.  The manly intellect judges about future use; the aged intellect judges about despises present use and has an imagined use of purpose whose future will never be.  With respect to the intellect, women are quite childish and, as concerns the future, they are devoted to miserliness instead of all foresight.[211]  More than that being troubled by external circumstances and sacrificing others to his worries, the valiant man acquires powers of his own with respect to the future.  In the household, a unity that is worthy of wonder arises out of this.

 

If one merely depends on things then one does not require much reason but only understanding

 

Arrogance[212] for religion’s sake is the most ridiculous, for the representation that others do not become blessed should make me much more sympathetic and actively helpful[213] than arrogant.  Arrogance for the sake of money is common and coarse because it bases itself on something that easily passes from one to another; thus, it is crude.  That for the sake of freedom is noble and proud.[214]  That for the sake of birth and for the sake of position is finer because it is permanent and that of office is the most permissible.

 

{91, back side, opposite Ob 67, at 2:236}

 

The Jews, Turks, and Spanish have religious pride; they are also either treacherous if they are cowardly or tyrannical if they are powerful.  The Dutch for the sake of money, the English for the sake of freedom and power.  The conceit[215] of nations on account of their Great Monarchs makes vanity and vanity also brings about the monarchical constitution.  A proud nation is free; a rough and industrious [nation is] also free and money-grubbing.  The Spanish arrogance will indicate a spirit of persecution in all religions, and so also with the Turks.

 

{R88}Where there are many aristocratic [people] and also many subjected [people], there is flattery on one side and arrogance on the other, like with the Poles.

 

[116] A woman troubles herself only with delightfulness[216] but not with the necessity[217] of life.  Therefore, they let the man see to the need,[218] while they attend to taste.  And in religion they let others determine what is true, but they are intent to fashionably imitate it with good form.

 

I want to observe yet one more thing (but this is said just amongst us men), through their presence behavior, they could be made more chaste than they really are and without [could] comfort themselves over the loss of an inclination through the satisfaction of vanity in having instilled esteem.

 

A woman wants a likes to see a strong man serve so that she can seem with good form to be forced

 

The woman makes of a man what she wants; she has formerly made heroes and now makes monkeys.  Whether she makes reasonable men is to be doubted; this [reasonable man] can not at all become educated by others, but he must become it [a reasonable man] himself

 

[117] On taste for society [that] is to be distinguished from that in society

 

{92, sheet inserted after Ob 68, front side, at 2:237}

 

The capacity for pleasure and displeasure is generally feeling.  Lack of feeling

 

The capacity for pleasure and displeasure in things that do not belong among our needs [is] taste.  This is coarse taste insofar as it is close to needs.   Fine [taste] is taste in that which is removed from needs.  Insofar this fine [taste] [breaks off]

 

The feelings for things that presuppose the perfections of a greater understanding is ideal

 

{R89}Insofar as the powers of the soul cannot be merely passive but active and poetically-creative, taste is called spiritual and ideal (if the foremost feeling is stirred not by external sensation  but by that which one poetically-creates)

 

With respect to ethical life, feeling belongs remains either merely for needs, i.e. obligation, or goes further; in the latter case it is sentiment[219]

 

The beautiful and sublime in the highest degrees are closely related.  If they are to be sensed, both presuppose the soul at [118] peace.  Therefore  Yet they are so different that if it is busyness, cheerfulness, and liveliness that dominates them, then beauty comes forth, if they cease and peaceful contentedness shines forth, then the sublime stands out.  The former is early morning, the latter is the evening

 

In its lesser forms, beauty is related to the change of fluctuating novelty.  The sublime, with constancy, uniformity, and unalterability.  With beauty, manifoldness, with the noble, unity.

 

{93, back side, opposite Ob 69, at 2:237}

 

Only the unnecessary is beautiful, but the noble can be combined with utility.  Yet in moral matters the noble must not be considered from the viewpoint of use.  With this fine sentiment, it is presupposed that the person is not dependent on things because of pressing need, otherwise the fine taste is ridiculous.  <Charmed by beauty, astonished by sublimity.>

 

 [119] The beautiful in a lesser degree is agreeable and pretty, if great but not sublimity fades away [it is] cute.[220]  If beauty is imitated, it is decorated, adornment like golden hens.

 

The sublime is in a lesser [breaks off]

 

{R90} In the feeling of the sublime, the powers of a person seem to be stretched, as it were; in that of the beautiful, they contract

 

The taste which expands itself with respect to the direct sexual inclination is the lustful one[221] and is a sign of corruption with respect to [breaks off]

 

There are moral and nonmoral necessities (obligations) which one presupposes before there is talk of beauty.  Before one The sciences in the head are, for most people, just as useless as the hair powder on the same, and, as it would be very foolish to have flour in one’s curls and none in one’s soup, it is absurd to know the dispensable arts without but none of those that constitute the welfare of life.

 

Before we consider civilities,[222] we must first be truthful and honest.  It is peculiar that the lover troubles himself over the free woman before he knows whether she is also faithful.  Before we inquire into generosity

 

<Spring is beautiful and girls are beautiful; autumn and wives are useful.  <The utility of girls is that they are sterile>>

 

{94, sheet inserted after Ob 70, front side, at 2:238}

 

we must recall obligation.  Stop, audacious one – shouts the merchant.[223]

 

Good manners[224] with inner dishonesty [and] the civility of a woman without domesticity are like a beautiful so much ribbon-work and a dirty shirt.

 

The common opinion that previous times were better comes from the evil[225] that one feels and the presupposition that otherwise everything would be good.

 

{R91}Clothes are only signs of comfort and the superabundance of life.  They do not have to be made so that they [120] draw attention exclusively to oneself.  (lurid colors are repugnant to the eyes, which get attacked too much).  Likewise with rank and title.  They themselves have little worth [and] are damned to golden frames

 

In marriage, pure love without respect is enough to fasten the man to the woman and pure respect without love [is enough to fasten] the woman to the man.  Therefore, although understanding and merit have little effect on a woman outside of marriage, marriage is the most harmonious when, even if the years are different, the man instills respect through understanding.  Wolmar[lv]              

                   

I would rather be the happy Saint-Preux than one who courts a wife[lvi]

 

{95, back side, opposite Ob 71, at 2:238}

 

The correct cognition of the universe in accordance with Newton[lvii] is perhaps the most beautiful product of the inquisitive[226] human reason; meanwhile, Hume noticed that the philosopher can get easily be disturbed in this delightful contemplation by a little, brown-haired maiden and that regents will not be moved to despise their conquests by the smallness of the world compared to the universe.  The reason is because it is indeed beautiful but unnatural to lose oneself outside of the circle that [121] the heavens have designed for us.  It is the same with sublime contemplations of the heaven of the blessed ones.

 

If light were to have a streaming[227] movement, then when striking a slanted surface not and [when] warming, it would retain its force[228] not as the square of the sine of the inclination, but as its cube.[lviii]

 

That the poles do not pull at all is clear from the experiment of Bougeurs who put a magnetic needle on a copper [plate][lix]

 

{R92}The Spectator says that the fool and the clever person are different in that the former thinks aloud, etc.[lx]  This is a very correct observation of our present type of prudence.  Because both sexes advance proportionately in this and the feminine [sex] generally surpasses the masculine in the art of illusion, the women must be much more perfect in it and rule.[229]

 

That the anticipation[230] of death is not from nature is to be seen from the fact that the consideration of death does nothing at all against inclination [to] orient it [122] to make preparations as though one were to live long, and the person just as seriously makes arrangements at the end of his life as if he had never lived at all.  Therefore, he is quite fond of vanity and the thirst for glory on dead grounds because the natural person flees shame and knows nothing of death.  Thus he extends the natural drive over the death that surprises him

 

It is with the moral as with the art of apothecary.  That doctor is the best who teaches me how I can be relieved of illnesses and remedies.  This art is easy and simple. Yet it is artificial and complicated[231] to allow all corruption and to improve afterwards.

 

The odium theologorum[lxi] has its basis in this: because it will again maintain the propriety of the priests [and] express the fast and forcible movement of anger, and where this is suppressed he degenerates into a secret bitterness.  Parallel with wives and Indians.

 

{97, back side, opposite Ob 73, at 2:239}

 

Being extremely large is a sickness; one could ask whether it is so even with respect to intellectual[232] characteristics; at any rate, it seldom makes them happy.  Cato, Brutus[lxii] [123] Colossal plans without power and emphasis are like the children whose heads are too big.  premature prudence.  Margarethe Maultasch.[lxiii]

 

{R93}Thank goodness for mediocrity.  Good, content citizens.

 

Difficult relationship between state[233] and talent.  Alexander had large weapons left behind not in order to form the opinion of the Indians[234] by the colossal size of his army but instead to reinforce it[lxiv]

 

Tender taste loves quiet and gentle beauty and will be wounded (screaming) by very strong prominence of annoyance, of affectation, [or] of loquacity.

 

Coarse taste (is very different from lack of feeling) requires stronger stimulation displayed in a lively way and shows its wear and tear.  Old, emaciated lover.  <Whether the virtue that loves tragedies would not have a coarse taste>

 

ugly and nasty.

 

The ideal of beauty is well preserved in hope but not in possession.  [124] <Wantons become very skeptical with respect to women’s chastity and make others so as well>

 

I do not know whether or not is true what they say about the very extended fidelity of married women in the most civilized nations and [I] let those who know from experience judge it; I do know enough [to say] that if all feelings increase beyond their borders, the female capacity, which is not so restricted, will go much further than the male.

 

Nothing can replace the loss of female charm, not even the most noble decency.

 

Impertinence,[235] which should be concealed by all means, it is most dangerous for women outside of marriage; in marriage it is most dangerous for men.  Thus, one can presume already, prior to any experience, the female sex will be reserved[236] before marriage and impertinent in marriage and vice versa for the man

 

{98, page 74 of Ob, marginal notes at lines 14-21, at 2:239}

 

{R94}The woman seems to lose more than a man because the beautiful characteristics end for the former while the noble [characteristics] stay with the man.  The old woman seems to be good for nothing more.[237]

 

{99, sheet inserted after Ob 74, front side, at 2:239}

 

Any gratification that is connected to the fulfillment of need is called coarse.  Drinking, sleeping, eating, and cohabitation.  The last is considered so crude that Tiresias had to endure an evil encounter from Juno because he ascribed it specifically to the female sex.[lxv]

 

Taste is therefore always attached to that which is actually no pressing need.  From this it follows that in painting when similarity to nature is called for, e.g., landscapes [and] portraits, then this nature must be captured, [but] otherwise ideal gratifications comprise the most noble [things].  Nature is not good enough for our gratification.  This comes from the frailty[238] and tenderness of our organs, and even our [125] imagination.  That is why painting can so thoroughly depart from nature, like poetry and theatrical action

 

Truth is more of an obligation than beauty.  One must therefore conceal obligations to be beautiful.

 

The tenderness of the nerves is one of the directed vocations of taste, for thereby the degree of contrast or affect will restrict the hardness of feelings, etc.

 

Harmony comes from the agreement of the manifold, in music just as in poetry[239] and painting.  Those are points of rest for some nerves

 

Unity is in accordance with comfort insofar as it is connected with activity, which multiplicity[240] desires.[241]

 

{R95} {100, back side, opposite Ob 75, at 2:240}

 

[126] On fineness and the scale of these feelings

 

The sense of the eye offers long and tender albeit very ideal gratification; dissatisfaction is small except when related to gender.  Terror [is] great.

 

The sense of hearing effects long-lasting gratification. but only through change[; the gratification] is less ideal but very lively[;] dissatisfactions are small and don’t last long. The sense of smell gives some ideal gratification[s]; they are short in gratification and short and strong.  Strong in dissatisfaction, that is to say, disgust demands change.

 

The sense of taste is not at all ideal; it is great in gratification but short and broken-up; [it] demands change (without pressing need); dissatisfaction is far more sensitive and [is] disgust.

 

The sense of feeling is short and exhausting in sensual pleasure, short and sensitive in warmth [and] in titillation; in pain it can last a long time and be coarse.  [It] can easily become outweighed by understanding (excepting sexual inclination).

 

The sense of the face reveals most things moral, but then so does hearing

 

[127] That it is harder for women to keep their chastity in marriage than it is for men to keep theirs has come about because their capacity to give is greater than the man’s.  Hence the fantastical desires go further with them

 

{101, sheet inserted after Ob 76, at 2:240}

 

On the old facial characters in comparison with the moral [ones]

 

Beautiful and gallant[242] actions consist primarily of those {R96}to which one has no obligation.  Obligation is a kind of moral need; whatever corresponds more closely to it is simple.

 

All affects that stimulate tenderness and moral feeling must therefore be taken from the vocations of a person

 

Because when one already presupposes beauty as necessary it becomes a kind of need, therefore simplicity is possible even with the beautiful and sublime

 

Because it [is] in accordance with all such feelings for the beautiful, which [128] are sometimes stronger than needs, it requires a great art to acquire the simplicity of nature, although it is superfluous because one wants of it only to keep from going astray; but [it is] still great, [and] so a special kind of the sublime

 

A pampered feeling that is not strong enough for simplicity is feminine.  Nature at peace is the greatest beauty (surely trickling brooks) because they lull people to sleep), grazing herds of cattle.  Therefore the evening is more moving than the morning

 

Gaiety is not beautiful [and] also does not last.  On the agreement of beautiful faces and beautiful bodies with the soul

 

{102, back side, opposite Ob 77, at 2:241}

 

The free enjoyment of sensual inclination and the unchecked discovery of its object[243] cancels everything ideal that can become diffused over inclination; this is the reason it is so difficult to preserve ideal gratification in marriage.  Unless one concedes rule[244] to the wife.

 

[129] Some people are more pleasing when one is away from them, others when one is more present; the former ones are more suitable for the idealistic gratification of marriage

 

When fantastical love mates well with knightly virtue.

 

{R97}Novels end with marriage <and the story begins>; however, they can be prolonged beyond the same [marriage] by jealousy, for example, a wife who is [a] coquette of her husband and of others

 

All female beauty is diffused over the sexual drive, for supposing you have[245] experienced that a woman has a certain ambiguity of her gender, all her infatuating charms[246] will cease, although this does nothing for agreeablenesses, which you believe alone will enchant you.

 

A pregnant wife is apparently more useful but not as pretty.  Virginity is useless but agreeable

 

{103, sheet inserted after Ob 78, front side, at 2:241}

 

[130] It is quite uncivil[247] that we do not want to allow women to be ugly, even when they are old.

 

Because needs are common, the domesticity of a wife will be considered a contemptuous matter by a gallant man.

 

If the masterpiece is from gratification, it will bore[248].

 

I love the French as such but not the Germans when they imitate them.

 

Many a wife misuses the license that wives have to be ignorant[249]

 

In proportion to their power to do evil, princes are by far not as corrupt as the common man.

 

Inner honor.  Self-valuation.[250]  External honor as a means for each to assert himself.  Thus, a man of honor.  honestas.[251][lxvi]  External honor as a means is, true as [its] purpose, a delusion.  This takes precedence over self-preservation, equality, or preservation of the species.  The {R98} desire for honor (direct) is either based on the opinion of important perfections (patriotism) and called ambition or [based] on trifles and called vanity.  The consciousness of his honor, as that the possession of which one believes in by himself and never by measuring himself against others, is called pride.  Worth.[252]  Gallantry is either of pride or of vanity; the former of a petitmaitres, the latter of a dandy.  The prideful person who others despise is arrogant. The vain person  If he wants to show it [131] through pomp [it is] haughty.[253]  The arrogant person who shows his disdain is pompous

 

{104, back side, opposite Ob 79, at 2:242}

 

The honor of man with respect to a woman is courage and [the honor] of woman [with respect to a man is] chastity.  These points are peculiar.  When the spirit of the age[254] becomes soft then the first honor is sweetness and the second is understanding and boldness, the former makes things romantic, while the latter makes things affected[255] and courtly or fashionable

 

Because philosophy is not a thing of pressing need but of agreeableness, thus it is strange that one wants to restrict it by way of careful laws

 

Because the lustful man chooses the wife as his ruler, he poetizes her quite admirably, because one does not want to be subordinated to even a wretched idol; conversely, the woman wants to rule.  The Spectator, black monkey.[lxvii]  applied to the hidden secret of all tender inclination toward the sex

 

The strongest preferences gratifications will at first be boring[256]

 

[132] What it is that is called being domestic; making a need out of society.  Boredom

 

The housewife is worthy of honor.  [The] beautiful decency of her domestic concern, intermixed with cleanliness and ornament, must appear to prefer being out of the house no more than [being] at home

 

The man is the one who courts, the woman the one who chooses; that is the point of making {R99}oneself hard to get[257].  Should they choose the romantic visionary,[258] fools dressed in finery,[259] or the selfish and phlegmatic unfeeling ones.

 

Saint-Evremond wanted to choose a wife and chose a coquette.[lxviii]  That happens because he is from a country where every where every woman is a coquette, though not toward her husband.[260]

 

The man who does not make his amusements into his business but into recreation, who knows how to live, that is, who makes his aim not acquisition but enjoyment, who is enjoined to the peaceful gratification of company and friendship, he is the man

 

All gratifications become insipid if they are not recreations but occupations.  The wife and husband who have something to do will not become tired of one another

 

The wife possesses the skill of always being womanly[261] to a further extent than the man, but she would rather not employ this skill except with her husband, who is insipid to her

 

{105, page 79 of Ob, marginal note at lines 3-4, at 2:242}

 

The standard of bliss is the household

 

{marginal notes at line 10 – lower margin, at 2:242}

 

I leave a blooming field and the Arcadian valleys for meager fields[lxix]

 

[133] The novel ends and the story begins.  Henceforth the magical haze gradually dissipates <through> he who saw the beloved madness of his idols.  The marriage-bed welcomes a humane girl[262] and the next morning, instead of being worshiped as a goddess, she, as a wife, suffocates her slaves’ opposition  Thereupon the understanding husband [drinks] the salubrious water The lover, previously drunk with his imaginations, wakes from beautiful dreaming and [breaks off]

 

The sight of blossoms.           A gallant person[263] always blossoms.

 

{106, page 80 of Ob, upper margin, at 2:242}

 

Love is a unity                        Solomon never loved [breaks off][lxx]

                                                The

{107, sheet inserted after Ob 80, front side, at 2:242}

 

Beauty is without utility because this [utility] is pressing a thing to another purpose, thus [it] indicates no perfection complete in itself.  Therefore, the more useful things are, the more corners they show, so to speak, as means to accommodate themselves to other relations; the roundness of a sphere is perfect in itself

 

Gallantry: a new kind of beauty of ethics.                                         Politesse.

 

[134] The former is a certain sweetness in pleasing[264] behavior; the latter is a certain gracious cautiousness

 

the former is affected, the latter peaceful and composed.  Not every woman is beautiful in the physical or spiritual understanding, but all of them encounter gallantry with that subjection that is shown by him who, through his inclination, will be ruled by a weaker person

 

The feeling for the beauty of young boys gave to the origin of Greek love the disgraceful most disgraceful passion that was at that time and he in nature that has ever depraved stained <human> nature, and they [the Greeks] completely deserved [the fact] that their criminals were given over to the revenge and abuse of the wives, etc.

 

{R101}The permitted illusion is a kind of untruth that is not then a lie; it is a cause for ideal gratification whose object is not in things

 

Illusion in a large gathering

as if they all would be cleverer than one

 

That one who thought himself the president[265] in the marriage-bed wanted to contrive something that could make the obscured magical power of illusion strong again

 

Illusion gets along so well with the beautiful that even when one is aware of it, it will please, but not so with the noble.  Appearing as clever, pious, sincere, honest.

 

{108, back side, opposite Ob 81, at 2:243}

 

Benevolence is a peaceful inclination to view the bliss of others as an object of one’s joy and also as a motive of one’s actions.  Sympathy is an affect of benevolence [135] toward people in need according to which we imagine that we would do whatever is in our power to help them.  It is therefore for the most part a chimera because it is neither always in our power nor in our will.  The commoner is sympathetic toward others who become suppressed by the princes; the nobleman [is sympathetic] toward another nobleman but callous toward peasants

 

With luxury the fantasy of human love refines itself[266] and lessens capacity and pleasure.  The simple person takes in no others except those he can help

 

Understanding creates no increase of moral feeling; he who ratiocinates has only cooled-off affects and is more cold-headed, [and] consequently less evil and less good.  The moral good makes much more reasonable

 

One has long tried to explain the feeling of pleasure about the ridiculous.  In nature nothing is ridiculous

 

{102}[136] One demands illusion of priests and women; the former should appear to take no part in frivolous gratification, the latter [should appear] to have no inclination for lustful intimacy.  Thereby one makes them deceitful

 

[The] illusion of religion as it is finally taken for the thing itself.  Then is a delusion.

 

One must pay respect to priests for the sacrifice of so many freedoms and gratifications (they are almost in as tight boundaries as a woman)

 

One must handle both with attentiveness because neither has either the capacity or the propriety to boldly resist insult on their side

 

{109, sheet inserted after Ob 82, front side, at 2:243}

 

The formality of all perfection consists in multiplicity (in addition to endurance and strength) and unity; it [perfection] can also give gratification by itself

 

Sensitive.  Insensitive.

 

The will is perfect in so far as, according to the laws of freedom, it is the greatest ground of good in general. 

the moral feeling is the feeling of the perfection of the will.

 

Whether God is the originator of morality, that is, whether we can only distinguish good and evil through the known will of God

 

Sulzer[lxxi] says that what the natural efficacy of the soul facilitates and promotes stirs me with gratification.  This says only that it promotes the natural attempt at gratification

 

{Latin} The corruption of one is the generation of another. {German} Through the smell of putrefaction, nature wanted to warn us of the greatest cause of dissolution and fermentation of the destruction of animals

 

{R103}The man is stronger in every capacity than the woman.  But he is weaker with respect to inclination, which he cannot tame so fully and also with respect to the susceptibility of his tenderness and confidence.  The woman is weaker with respect to power but also more cool-headed and therefore more capable

 

In all things the sexual inclination adopts the most ideal embellishment.

 

This is reason that women show off[267] their great understanding early on: that one puts up with them in the choice of matters so that at last they believe that there is no other [choice]

 

Women have a very quick but not thorough concept; they grasp something as much as is necessary in order to discuss it and believe there is nothing better

 

{110, back side, opposite Ob 83, at 2:244}

 

On the means to measure the dryness and humidity of the air

 

[138] With women, my courage makes me into a slave; with men, my cowardice [makes me into a slave]

 

Great respect for people is based on chimerical preferences that we lend to others

 

That author[lxxii] who said that when he observes a grave man in his serious or sublime attire, he mitigates his blind reverence through the representation of his intimacy with the wife or common pressing need.[268]  He did not need to have had this representation.  Still, this seems to be why the Roman [Catholic] church has forbidden priests to have wives

 

The free will (of one in need) is good for itself if it wills everything that contributes to its perfection (gratification) and good for the whole if at the same time it desires all perfection.  As incapable as the person who has this will may be, the will is indeed good.  Other things may be useful; other people may do much good in a certain action with a lesser degree of will but with more power; yet the ground of willing the good is unique and [is] alone moral

 

[139] The mathematician and the philosopher: they differ in that the former requires data from others while the latter examines them himself.  Hence the former can prove [things] from any revealed religion. 

 

The fable of the swallow that wanted to catch the bird[lxxiii]

 

{111, sheet inserted after Ob 84, front side, at 2:244}

 

The French love only laughing beauty, the Italians only peaceful beauty.

 

A selfish (lustful) human being requires a person[269] who he can love; a generous (affectionate) human being requires a person who loves him, that is, who he can make happy through his obliging behavior

 

No woman will readily admit, with her unhappiness in marriage, that the long fasting in her marital satisfaction[270] does her harm, for the woman always wants to appear to give and not to require; because she is already needy with respect to all other parts of the man, if she appears to be needy [in this], then an inequality will spring out of this

 

Her refusal is a kind of beautiful untruth

 

[140] All things, if they are only known as they are, have little agreeable in them; they elevate feeling only through the fact that they appear as they are not; all ideal gratifications will be promoted through the art of illusion.  If a woman could appear at any time as she liked,{R105}the skill would be one to love very much; the evil[271] therein [is] that the thing comes and the illusion disappears

 

{112, back side, opposite Ob 85, at 2:245}

 

He who does more than he owes is called kind[272] insofar as he has no obligation at all to the other, who nevertheless has nothing but obligation to him, so he is merciful

 

A natural person can be merciful toward no one, for he has obligations to each.  Nevertheless he can be merciful toward a captured enemy. 

 

In our conditions, when general injustice stands firm, the natural rights[273] of the lowly people cease; therefore, they alone are debtors; the nobles owe them nothing.  For this reason, these nobles are called merciful lords.  He who requires nothing from them but [141] justice and can hold them to their obligations does not need this subjection.

 

A woman’s modest (civil) behavior, if she is equal, is an obligation; female grace is kindness and must be requested, not demanded.  Therefore, noble women can certainly be called merciful ladies, but their husbands cannot [be called] merciful lords.  If she is defiant and pompous, then she passes off her obligation; if she is indifferent then she will be treated as equal.

 

On common and countrified faces

 

What the inequality of position maintains in delusion is, among other things, that people of low birth imagine this [inequality] themselves, whereby a simple[274] woman feels lowliness with herself; she hates and her disquiet shows itself, which [is] the pride of the noble

 

<A merciful lord who has no money is an absurdity, but a merciful lady without money can certainly exist>[275]

 

{R106}On the ‘he,’ ‘you,’ and ‘she’[276]

On even and uneven numbers

On the youthful feeling[277]

 

On the reasons why he who pays is thanked although he does not do more give more than he gets.  He merely makes money (Pope’s joke[278] if there was no money[lxxiv]).  For he who has money is richer than the one who has wares because he has choice.  He who sells superfluous things[279] (gallantry-monger, Caffetier[lxxv]) and lives on this must be more courteous than his customer, but not he who sells necessary things, especially if he finds a customer every time

 

{113, sheet inserted after Ob 86, front side, at 2:245}

 

[142] A married man acquires and earns more esteem than a single man and an old confirmed bachelor.

 

A wife [is] more than a girl.  A widow [is] also more than a girl.  The reason is because the vocation is then completed and also the other people[280] appear to be needy, that is, a girl wants to have a husband (without difficulties) but a wife never wants to be a girl.  Moreover, the encounter <with> a wife is looked upon as [a] double and at the same time just the opposite with the man

 

He must know much who is supposed to teach others how to be wise with little knowledge.  It is a lot to wish for, that this art become more refined[281]

dumb and wise ignorance.

 

The custom of imagining the deity as like princes has brought about many false concepts of religion, for example, insults.  The honor of God

 

If I presuppose that everything in relations between the sexes [143] runs inversely then there are two possibilities 1. that the girl is abstinent and debauches as a wife,[282] 2. that the girl yields to excess and is abstinent as wife; the second is more in accordance with nature, the first [is more in accordance with] the age {R107}of propriety, for if the wife gets pregnant it will seem every time as if her husband is the father.

 

Among friends, each can talk about himself, because the other acts as though it concerns him; among people and friends of fashion, one must not talk about oneself (not even in books); if one wants to talk about oneself, then it must be something that can be laughed about.

 

In a society based on fashion, I must regard each as exclusively egotistical, and therefore I must praise neither those who are present nor those who are absent, and thus, so that it be interesting, [I must] either joke or badmouth[283]<Calumny is based in part on the drive for equality.  Ostracism.  Aristides.[lxxvi]

 

{114, back side, opposite Ob 87, at 2:245}

 

 [144] The capacity to recognize something as a perfection in others does not at all bring about the consequence that we ourselves feel gratification in it.  But if we have a feeling that finds gratification in it, then we will also be moved to desire it and apply our powers to it.  Thus it is to be asked whether we feel gratification immediately in the well-being of another or whether the immediate pleasure actually lies in the possible exercise of our power to assist it.  Both are possible, but which is actual[?]  Experience teaches that in a simple condition a person regards others’ happiness with indifference, but if he assisted it, it pleases him infinitely more.  The evil of others is commonly just as indifferent, but if I precipitated it, it hurts more than if done by another.  And concerning the sympathetic instincts of compassion and good-naturedness, we have cause to believe they are merely great attempts to mitigate the evil[284] of others stemming from the self-approbation of the soul that brings about these sentiments.

 

 

We have gratification in certain of our perfections, but far more if we ourselves are the cause.  We have the most if we are the freely acting cause.  To subordinate everything to the free power of choice is the greatest perfection.  And the perfection [145] of the free {R108} power of choice as a cause of possibility is far greater than all other causes of the good even if they were to bring about [the good in] actuality

 

{115, page 88 of Ob, upper margin, at 2:246}

 

With the French, the mind is ready sooner than those <does not mature by way of> grounds, indeed he [the Frenchman] does not expect from them [grounds] either discovery or examination.  The German seeks grounds for all thoughts and is patient in fixing [breaks off]

 

{under line 17, at 2:246}

 

The French demand almost as much indulgence as a woman.  Maupertius[lxxvii]

 

{116, sheet inserted after Ob 88, front side, at 2:246}

{Latin} <Habit>

{Latin} Action for the singular will is moral solipsism

(Latin)                 communal           justice

 

The feeling of pleasure and displeasure concerns either something with respect to which we are passive or our self as an active principium of good and evil through freedom.  The latter is moral feeling.  Past physical evil aggrieves pleases us, but [past] moral [evil] grieves us, and it is a completely different kind of joy about the good that devolves upon us and that [good] which we do.

 

We have little feeling for whether the condition of another is evil[285] or good except insofar as we feel powerful to improve the former and promote the latter.  Sympathy is an instinct that works only in rare and important occasions, its other effects are contrived.

 

{R109} Because the greatest inner perfection and the perfection that arises from that consists in the subordination of all of our capacities and susceptibilities to the free power of choice, the feeling for the goodness[286] of the free power of choice must be directly far different and also larger than all the good consequences that can become actualized [287] through it.

 

This power of choice contains either <the mere> individual will as well as the universal [will], or it considers the person together in consensu with the universal will.

 

That which is necessary through the universal will is an obligation

 

{117, back side, opposite Ob 89, at 2:246}

 

Because the person of nature requires so little and the more he requires (egenus),[lxxviii] the more miserable he is, the person is perfect insofar as he can do without; insofar as he still has many powers left to promote the needs and bliss of others, he is  he has a feeling of a will beneficient[288] outside of himself.  Because the power of choice, insofar as it is useful to the acting subject, is physically necessary with respect to pressing need[s], it has no immediate goodness.  Hence, the moral goodness of action is unselfish[289]

 

In the condition of nature, one cannot be selfish, but in the same [condition of nature] neither can one be altruistic,[290] but friendships are possible

 

Adolescence is more enjoined to friendship because it is more unselfish, more participatory, more <benevolent>, and more sincere than the later [ages]

 

[147] On bliss in all ages of people.  Youthful inconstancy prevents and disquiet prevents many gratifications.  The old person has fewer lively inclinations, but the peaceful ones satisfy him.  Indeed, we must not exchange[291] the positions of life

 

{R110}One already has a biased attitude of a nation that has a single language.  Prussian Livonia.[lxxix]  Likewise the utter diversity of language makes national[292] hate.  But, if the language of the populace comes close to a language of the ruling tongue,[293] it creates contempt.  But all of this [is] still a long way off.

 

{118, sheet inserted after Ob 90, front side, at 2:247}

 

{Latin} The inner sense of pleasure and displeasure precede appetite and aversion, because receptivity of joy and aversion lies in the subject, also when it – the subject – still has no knowledge of the object of this sense, as there is no desire for something unknown[294].  Desire is either original or derived; the first is also different in regard to quality[295].  The inner sense is, if it is asserted as the logical principal of the judgment of moral law, an occult quality; if [it is asserted]  as the capacity of the soul, whose basis is unknown, [it is]  a phenomenon

 

[148] A pactum is not possible between a domino and mancipio.  God enters into a union[296] with humans because they have no sufficient, practical concept of his dominio and so that they be led through the analogy with the pacto of humans and not abhor[297] the commanding severity

 

A virtuous action is always an ethically good action that reluctantly occurs or at least has occurred

 

{Latin} All conditioned goodness of an action is either under a possible condition (like the problematic) or an actual [condition] (like the rules of prudence; every person wants to be healthy), but, in a mediated or conditioned good quality, the absolute will is not good if the powers and the circumstances of time and place are not there.  And it is a good insofar as the will is effective, but one will only be able to examine this good quality with regard to the will.  Also, if the powers might be lacking, then the will is certainly praiseworthy.  In great things, it will do to have had the will.  And this absolute perfection, insofar as it is indeterminate, [and] whether or not something will be affected by it, will be called moral.

 

{119, back side, opposite Ob 91, at 2:247}

 

<The wife can do without much more with respect to gratification [and] Ge needs, but not with respect to vanity>

 

{R111}[149] Balance of sensation is the soul at peace.  This smooth surface will only be roused to indignation through passions.  It is a primary ground of bliss not only to feel agreeable, but also to be conscious of one’s entire condition, which is hindered <by> strong sensation

 

The natural person is spared this disquiet through lack of feeling

 

Sufficiency* with respect to needs is called simplicity.  Insofar as the agreeablenesses themselves are counted among needs it is partly beautiful and partly noble simplicity.

 

Where superfluousness with respect to needs combined with the effort to effect agreeablenesses becomes evident, that is contrived; with respect to the beautiful [it is] adorned [and] decorated; with respect to the sublime [it is] magnificent [and] grandiose.

 

 Taste is not necessarily meant for needs, but it must not hinder them , as [happens] with pomp.

 

Regularity agrees with simplicity, for, das Man if the rule does not determine the kind of connection, it would be so random and indeterminate that it would also contradict needs.  For example, symmetry.  Following in pairs.  Thus, it serves to determine the purpose of each among those united together.

 

{120, sheet inserted after Ob 92, front side, at 2:248}

 

{Latin} <in Deo simul est subjective>

 

{Latin}The objective goodness[298] of a free action {R112} (is subjective in God at the same time) or, what is the same, the objective necessity[299] is either conditioned or categorical.  The first is the goodness of an action as a means, the latter [150] as an end;; hence the former is mediated, the latter is direct; the former contains a problematic, practical necessity, the latter etc.

 

{Latin}A conditioned, good, free action is for this reason not categorically necessary, for example, my munificence is useful to other needy people, and thus one must be munificent.  By no means.  But if the action of an open-hearted munificence is not only good for others but good in itself, then it is subject to an obligation[300].

 

{Latin}About the moral feeling and the possibility of the opposite. 

 

{Latin}Providence has linked the moral feeling to such an extent to public and universal usefulness, just like it also has with private benefit, that the goodness of the will will not be as highly valued as it should be.

 

When I say that this action will give me more honor than the other, I mean that I appeal to the universal judgment [and] that the judgment that I pass on my own action is grounded.

 

Disputes in world-wisdom[301] have the use that they [151] promote the freedom of understanding and provoke a mistrust towards the system[302] that was supposed to have been built upon the ruins of another.  In refutation, one is still so happy

 

In the majority of languages simplicity and stupidity mean pretty much the same thing.  That is because a person of simplicity is easily deceived by a falsehood that he considers to be as honorable as himself

 

{121, back side, opposite Ob 93, at 2:248}

 

One always talks so much about virtue.  One must first abolish injustice before one can become virtuous.  One must remove conveniences, luxury and everything else that oppresses others while it elevates me, so that I am not one of all those who oppress their own race.[303]  All virtue is impossible without this resolution.

 

All virtue is based on ideal feeling.  Hence in a state of luxury no virtue will be encountered in a person who has purely physical feeling; in the state of nature, however, simplicity in plain feeling[304] and simplicity in ethics exist completely together

 

{R113}[152] Where the lengths of days <throughout the year> are more equal, there one is it serves more orderly, thus in France and England more than in Petersburg.  For, because here at best one can wake up late on bright days in summer, one does so also in the winter.

 

It is funny that luxury makes the estates[305] poor, especially the princes

 

The misery of people is not to be pitied, but to be laughed at: Democrit[lxxx]

 

Swift’s linen weaver, etc.[lxxxi]

 

Among all vanities the most common is that one wants to appear to be happy; hence one would rather admit pretend that one does not want to do something good (for example, marriage serves the common being) than that one cannot do it, because the person who does without[306] something or refrains from doing it purely with his will is happy insofar as he has sufficient capacity to satisfy his desires

 

{122, sheet inserted after Ob 94, front side, at 2:249}

 

[153] We can see other worlds in the distance, but gravity forces us to remain on earth; we can see still more perfections of spirit above us, but our nature forces us to remain human beings.

 

Because in society everything [that is] mine or yours depends on pacta, but this [depends] on keeping one’s word; a love of truth is the foundation[307] of all societal virtue and lies [are] the main vices against others along with robbery, murder, and rape[308]

 

If people subordinate morality to religion (which is also only possible and necessary for the oppressed rabble) they will thereby become hostile, hypocritical, [and] slanderous; but if they subordinate religion to morality, then they are kind, benevolent and just

 

{R114}<All choice must have to do with future taste>

 

True marriage in its perfection, poetized marriage in its perfection.  Perfect bliss [and] peace

 

The human in his perfection is not in the state of simplicity [and] is also not in the sufficiency [and] also not in the state of luxury; instead [he is] returning from the latter state to the former.  Strange constitution of human nature.  This most perfect state rests on the tip of a hair; the state of nature can of simple and original nature does not last long; the state of re-established[309] nature is more lasting but never as innocent.

 

very social women do not blush anymore, and if they are untrue [they blush] still less than men[310]; the scatter-brain[311] who doesn’t blush

 

A great proof of luxury is that entire states are now becoming poorer and poorer.  National guilt.  Standing armies

 

[154] All amusements intoxicate, that is, prevent one from feeling the entire sum of bliss

 

{123, back side, opposite Ob 95, at 2:249}

 

It is to be asked whether all of morality could be derived from the soul at peace; with natural persons [it is] completely understood.  Delights and debauches are opposed to peace.  The sexual inclination finds its peace only in marriage.  To offend others disquiets oneself.  Affects generally disquiet one.  It is horrible that according to this morality, no other person has a use*

 

Religion determines the Jewish way of life.  For, because they at all times fear being forced by another, they abhor every way of life in which they would not have enough freedom to avoid this [being forced by another].  For this reason they do not till the ground

 

{R115}[155] In flourishing countries the landlords and workers are polite and seek to serve, whereas the customers and guests are domineering, and there is, so to speak, more diligence[312] than money, that is, even money has an inner principium of increase.  In poor countries there is still more money than diligence.

 

In rich lands the merchants (en detail) are cool-headed and it is the the customer is fair[313] without haggling because there is just as much merchandise as money; in poor [lands] there is more merchandise than money and the merchants are servile[314]

 

{124, page 95 of Ob, lower margin}

 

In all nations, the custom of drinking among men ceased as soon as the society was adorned with women.  The Greeks drank; the old Germans [and] Prussians. The English still drink because the women are separated.  That would still be good with certain women.  Our lifestyle is nowadays as though Arcadian;[lxxxii] one always has society and love and game to entertain.  But black sorrow, discord and tedium rule at home

 

{125, sheet inserted at Ob 96, front side, at 2:250}

 

Why an old woman is an object of disgust for both sexes, except when she is very clean and not coquettish

 

{Latin} The objective necessity of action (its goodness[315]) is either conditioned (under the condition of some desired good) or categorical.  The first is problematic and is a necessity of prudence if the drive, which is considered as a necessary condition of action, is considered not only possible but actual.  In order to recognize it, it will be necessary to recognize all drives and instincts of the human soul so that an account[316] can be made of what is better with[317] the subject’s inclination.  And this [applies] not only in the present condition, but also in the future condition.  The categorical necessity of an action does not cost much effort, but demands only[318] the application of circumstance to the moral feeling.

In certain life situations a lie is quite useful and thus [156] lying will be in accordance with the rule of prudence, but extensive prudence and a shrewdness for the consequences is required for that.  If one considers it on[319] moral terms it will be understood on the basis of moral simplicity, what one should do.

Also, if false testimony[320] might be useful sometimes for others, then it is still a lie if a strict obligation does not necessitate it.  From here on, one can see that truthfulness does not depend on general human love, but on the feeling of right, through which we learn to carefully distinguish what is just.  But[321] this feeling has its origin in the nature of the human spirit, through which it judges what is categorically good (not useful), not for private or foreign benefit, but through transferring[322] the same action into others; if then a contradiction and contrast arises, it displeases; if harmony and unison arise, they please.  Hence the ability to put oneself in the place of others as heuristic means.  Of course we are by nature social and could not in fairness sanction that in us which we criticize in others.  The public spirit[323] of true and false is, of course, no different than human reason, taken generally as the criteria of true and false and the public spirit of good and evil is the criteria just from that[324].  Opposing heads would cancel out knowledge-certainty[325], opposing hearts [would cancel out] moral certainty.

[157] The goodness[326] of the will leads itself away from the effects of private or public use and the immediate inclination for them, and the former has its basis in need, the latter [has its basis] in the power for the good;  the former relates to one own benefit, the latter [relates] to the general benefit, both feelings are concordant[327] with natural simplicity.  But the goodness[328] of the will as that of a free principal[329] will be recognized, not insofar as every advantage originates out of it, but insofar as it is possible in itself.  And the happiness of others is concordant [breaks off]

 

{126, back side, opposite Ob 97, at 2:250}

 

Obligation <naturally toward people> has a determinate measure, [but] the duty of love[330] has none.  The former consists in that nothing more is done than what I would have another do to me and that I give to him only what is his; {R117} consequently, in accordance with such an action, everything is the same (sympathy[331] is excepted from this.)

 

If I promise something to him, then I am robbing him of something, for I have made a hope that I cannot fulfill.  If he is hungry and I do not help him, then I have not overstepped any obligation.  But if I should, in the case that I myself were hungry, desire to get things from others only on the condition[332] of giving it in return, then it is [158] an obligation to also satisfy him with food.  I A robber certainly wishes that he might be pardoned, but knows well that he would not pardon himself if he were judge.  The judge punishes even if he knows that if he were [a] delinquent[333] he would not want to be punished, but detained with punishment it is different, the deprivation of life does not occur through the judge, but through the criminal on account of his misdeed.  No one in a time of need can imagine that, were he a rich man, he would help every needy person

 

{Latin} In the first condition of the human, his obedience was that of a slave, after that a subject, then a son.  The law-given power was that of a master, prince, father.

 

Whoever binds slaves to himself as master (despot), sets only punishment as incentives, the prince who has subjects bound to him (legitimately) [sets] rewards and punishments [as incentives], the father [sets] only love and rewards [as incentives] for his son.  The basis of obligation is natural slavery and guilt in the first case, the second contains a moral basis of a contract, [and] the third includes everything previous and at the same time an internal morality.

 

Christ tried to bring people to a simple sufficiency through religion, in which he presented to them the glory of heaven; his speeches could only produce perverted concepts with the Jews because they [the Jews] all along only posited their religion in empty concepts and also built these [concepts] on no other condition[334] than the recovery of their kingdom

 

All truthfulness presumes an idea of equality; hence the Jews who in their opinion have no duty at all to others are lying and deceiving without having any pangs of conscience.  haereticis non est fides

 

{127, page 98 of Ob, upper margin, at 2:250}

 

Honor cannot be a basic impulse[335] because it would depend on the opinion of others; when drinking and fighting (dueling[336]) is the fashion, one who does them is justified[337]

 

{128, sheet inserted after Ob 98, front side, at 2:250}

 

Women are much more domestic by nature than men because they [159] have children to suckle.  Our gallant wives who don’t have any [children] and our girls who know that they will never nurse are not domestic because it is not necessary.  Their beautiful natural aptitude[338] for clean housekeeping and for caring for a sick person, even if for more thrifty use of what has been acquired [breaks off]

 

Manly dignity and womanly grace are lost in society.  Mademoiselle Montagu[lxxxiii]

 

Authors seem to be profound when they dispel all wit, just as crude people seem to be honorable

 

Just as one deceives oneself through the illusion of wealth, so a woman at last believes herself to actually have those virtues to the illusion of which she has devoted herself from the beginning.

 

In order to be good as a common person, more belongs to this than to be a good prince.  If he is merely not exceptionally evil, then he is already good for it.

 

Duels orig[339]

 

 [160] The young person full of sentiment, even with as much understanding as he has, will be easily persuaded by womanly illusion and wants to be beguiled;[340] he is seriously submissive and meek.  The experienced and sharp-sighted[341] wanton has longest had insight into the mirage of illusion; for this reason he is bold, unabashed, and, because he has excused the other gender of coercion from being scrupulous about decency,[342] it [female illusion] is agreeable to him.

 

{R119}Duels have their true origin in the time of gallantry from the inclinations of women, for with common courtship the beauty[343] picks out the most courageous one and triumphs over her rivals in love so that thereby her lover is frightful to her [rivals].  With insults that befall her, he cannot maintain her appearance[344] other than through courageousness.

 

            Who wants the women to grasp propriety

 

It seems to me that Epicurus is different from Zeno in that the former imagined the virtuous soul at peace after having overcome moral hindrances, but the latter [imagined] it in the struggle and effort to prevail [over such hindrances].  Antisthenes never had such a high idea; he desired that one should reflect only on vain ostentation and false bliss and choose to be a simpler man rather than a great one[lxxxiv]

 

{129, back side, opposite Ob 99, at 2:251}

 

{Latin} As long as an object obeys my changeable[345] will, it is mine, but I can always transfer my will to another.

 

Obligation is communal[346] selfishness in equilibrium[347]

 

{Latin} Duty is either Christian duty any or obligation.  Actions of the first kind are morally [161] spontaneous, actions of the latter kind are morally forced.  (This is different[348] from political force.)  The will is either the individual will of the person or the universal will of the person XXX (the obligation from the universal to people[349]). XXX

 

{Latin} (Something necessary originates from [either] the good, particular will of the human or from the universal.) 

<Right, wrong.>

 Then an action considered from the point of view of the universal will of the human is, if it contradicts itself, externally, morally impossible (impermissible).  Permit me to be in the act of seizing the fruits of another.  If I then see that no person, under the condition that what he has acquired will be snatched from him, will want to acquire [anything], then I will just privately want that which belongs to another, while publicly refusing it.

Of course, insofar as something depends entirely on the will of a subject, it is impossible that it contradict itself[350] (objective[351]).  And yet, the divine will would contradict itself if it willed there to be humans whose will was opposed to its own.  The will of the human[352] would contradict itself if they wanted to stand in contradiction to the universal will.  In the case of a collision, the universal will, of course, carries more weight than the individual will.

 

[162] The hypothetical <conditioned[353]> necessity of an action as means to a possible end is problematic, [as a  means] to an actual end it is necessity of prudence, the categorical necessity is moral.

 

Making a station belongs to morality; first, in the judgment of others about the deed (from which, if it is an instinct, ambition originates and goes farther than the means for determining legitimacy[354]); secondly, in judgment the sentiments of others, so that one senses their hardship or happiness (hence moral sympathy[355] arises as an instinct)

 

The origin of love of honor regarding the beauty of actions therefore lies in a wicked-minded means[356] of managing one’s own morality, which falsely becomes an end

 

The origin of love of honor regarding the judgment of physical characteristics lies in the means to freedom, self-preservation, and style.

 

{130, page 99 of Ob, lower margin, at 2:251}

 

To compare oneself to others is a means of making comparative greatness or worth one’s intention, [but this] is perverted[357] and is the origin of envy

 

{R121}Bravery is only a means; the savage values it as an end.

 

In the end, honor can be placed in drinking and vice

 

{131, page 100 of Ob, upper margin, at 2:251}

 

The man and the woman do not have the same sentiment[358] and also should not have it, but even from this arises unity, not identity, but the subordination of inclinations, since everyone feels that the other is necessary to him for the greatest perfection.  Friendship presumes agreeing[359] sentiments[360]

 

{132, sheet inserted after Ob 100, front side, at 2:251}

 

With a great corruption of ethics, the girls remain chaste and the wives debauch[361] because the latter act purely against obligation, while the former act against decency

 

<It is already honor to not be despised.>

 

[163] The drive to I require things or also people.  Honor is either indirect or direct.  In the first case, it is a drive for enjoyment; in the second, for illusion.  In the first case, the imaginary needs are either true or imaginary, to which the honor is a means, and the former [needs are] either in the natural or unnat  degenerate conditions.  Needs in natural conditions for things <to be procured> do not require honor (because every person can procure them himself), but in order to preserve them and oneself, they demand that others have an opinion of equality for us so that our freedom doesn’t suffer, since we are able to seek our needs as we please.  People’s natural need of acquisition is a woman.  For this, he has need of the opinion not of advantage but of equality with other men, and [he] easily acquires it as well.  Still, in both cases the person will raise the drive for real honor above equality, partly so that freedom is more assured, partly because he begins to prefer one woman to the others, so that she also prefers him.  Finally, in the state of excess <inequality>, the {R122}drive for honor is either the true need or the [164] artificial one.  In Sparta it was a true [need] because one remained free by way of it, but in a luxurious country, where freedom is lost, it becomes all the more necessary.  At the same time the honor of illusion arises, primarily with respect to gender, which, in the end, will sacrifice the honor that is a means of enjoyment

 

{133, back side, opposite Ob 101, at 2:252}

 

Voluntary Slavery is either that of force of that of blindness. The latter is based on either dependency on things (luxury), or on the delusions of other people (vanity).  The latter is absurd[362] and also harder than the former because matters are far more in my power, rather than the opinions of others, and it is also more despicable

 

The loss of freedom is grounded on either devotedness or subservience.  In the first case one is ruled by means of his inclination (either for things or for people, as [165] in love, friendship, and parental love) or contrary to his inclination.  The former is a consequence of softish luxury, while the latter [is a consequence of] dreadful cowardice and is a result of the former

 

The drive for honor with respect to gender[363] also becomes pure delusion in the end.  And marriage, which should promote self-preservation, promotes this pure delusion, and vanity is a cause of singleness[364]

 

With women, the drive for honor is erected solely solely upon the sexual inclination and mediates the same upon needs, because she must be sought; since this is not necessary with men, they will only be advanced[365] through commerce and, therefore, can sooner be resolved to singleness

 

What well proves the fantastical nature[366] of love is that one loves the beloved object more is its absence than in its presence; with friendship it is different.

 

{134, page 102 of Ob, upper margin}

 

The drive for honor is grounded on the drive for equality and the drive for unity.  As it were, two powers that move the animal world.  The instinct for unity is either in judgments and thoughts or also in inclinations.  The former brings about logical perfection, the latter [brings about] moral [perfection].

 

{left margin, at 2:252}

 

The single, naturally necessary good of a person in relation to the wills of others is equality (freedom) and, with respect to the whole, unity. Analogy: Repulsion, through which the body fills its own space just as each other [body fills] its own.  Attraction, through which all parts combine into one.

 

 [166] The truth of a perfection consists in the magnitude of the pleasure that is not precluded, with respect to itself and other greater ones.  If falsity could be lasting and [offer] more gratification than truth, then the pleasure from this deception would be a true pleasure, though a false cognition

 

 

{lower margin, at 2:252}

 

The natural instincts of active benevolence toward others consist in love towards the opposite sex and toward children.  That toward other people depends purely on equality and unity

 

There is unity in the sovereign[367] state but not equality; when the latter is combined with unity of all, then it constitutes the perfect republic

 

{135, sheet inserted at Ob 102, front side, at 2:252}

 

{R124}The drive to evaluate oneself merely comparatively, with respect to one’s worth as well as one’s welfare, is far more extensive than the drive for honor, and contains the latter within itself.  It [the drive] does not lie in nature and [it] is an indirect result of the practice of knowing the means of one’s own condition better through comparison with others.  Ambition, which is a spur of science, arises from the comparison of our judgment with the judgment of others as a means, and thus presupposes respect for the judgment of others

 

The Indians are wondrously calm and not violent

The South Americans are indifferent and phlegmatic

The Negroes are very careless and vain

The Europeans are lively and hot-tempered

 

The affects of the Indians are nevertheless still stronger than the Europeans’.

 

A reason why Montesquieu was able to say so many admirable things is that he presupposed [that] whoever would introduce customs [167] or give laws always had a reasonable ground[lxxxv]

 

The main intention of Rousseau is that education be free and also make a free human

 

A woman does not like to give away, in contrast, she takes.  No one knows contentment; everyone asserts delightfulness in its place.  <Golden rain in the laps of Danae.  Jupiter [is] a bull.[lxxxvi]  Alcmene was faithful in Amphitryon>[lxxxvii]

 

How education helps the police is to be seen from the fact that the former makes many goods, e.g., silk [and] gold, entirely unnecessary, whereas the latter prohibits them in vain because it only offends[368] thereby

 

{R125}A woman loves less affectionately than a man or else she would not assume rule over him and obviously would demand prefer him to herself.  She is also aware that she bears more affection if the man does not have this refined sensation, so then he is called coarse and hard by her

 

Marriage gives no ideal gratification as mere sympathy[369]

 

Illusion is sometimes better than truth, for the [168] gratification from the former is a true gratification.  Make-up: if one knows it, then it is no longer a deception.

 

{136, back side, opposite Ob 103, at 2:253}

 

Living long and little or short and much living

Much living in enjoying or in acting

Both in the greatest proportion [are] the best.

 

That the capacity for living decreased from the 16th-century on

 

It is to be noted that we don’t value the goodness[370] of an action because it is useful to another; otherwise we would not value it more highly than the usefulness than it creates.

 

The moral feeling applied[371] to one’s own actions is conscience

 

Providence certainly wanted to give us this feeling for the universal perfection, yet such that it is not thought in its enormity, just as we have the sexual drive for reproduction without intending it.

 

[169] de stationibus:                            Physicis           the moon is occupied

                                                            Logicis            for want of egoism

                                                            Moralibus       for want of solipsism

{Latin} To morally put oneself in the place of another happens either through instinct, sympathy or pity.  Or through intellect.

 

{R126}Magnetic force is probably based on the dissimilarity (diversa gravitas specifica) of ethereal[372] material of which iron is full (the earth is full of iron), whereby the heavier things sink to the bottom

 

Hence the magnetic quality appears more in length, e.g., more if a clump of iron is long and vertical than [if it is] thick and short, because even the quantity of aether there must give more distinction to the thickness.  One can assume that the clumplings[373] that have negative and positive poles are small.

 

{137, sheet inserted after Ob 104, front side, at 2:253}

 

Electricity consists of parts that have been rubbed off; magnetism does not.  Hence the latter is pervasive and affects according to mass; the former does not.

 

[170] The two corresponding poles push each other back because two elastic spheres of aether of similar thickness push them, but the two non-corresponding, because one is of a lighter kind (according to the elements themselves, not purely by rarefaction[374]), will be engulfed by each other and will pull the magnet

 

The needle sinks with its heavy end in the universal magnetic atmosphere and the other end rises

 

The sensitive soul at peace, in faces, in societies, in eloquence

Poetry in marriages and sexual desire[375]

The difference of gender

Blessedness and cheerfulness

 

Perhaps the moon, by affecting the electrical  (referingirend)[lxxxviii] material that extends so much higher, causes the winds and the ebb and flow

 

Perhaps it is the pushed-together aether[376] itself from the Centro of gravity[377] to the Centro of the earth

 

{R127}[171] Paris, the seat of science and the ridiculous, also contains petit Maitressen[378]

 

Thoughtlessness[379] (insipid boldness) rises above the effort of appearing[380] and expresses only a certain high-spirited dependability with respect to that which can please.  The petitmaitre is a scatter-brain[381] who is gallant, but he must appear to be known by many in the great world.  He is lucky with women.  The Germans travel to France to become one, but they achieve only the illusion of a bold jester.  The coquette expresses the awareness of her rule over the hearts of men and makes their caresses[382] into her musical instrument.  The petitmaitre and coquettes never fall in love, but both act as if they are [in love].  A dandy[383] is actually a fancily dressed fool and is much different than the petitmaitre who even affects free carelessness.

 

{138, back side, opposite Ob 105, at 2:254}

 

Were the I posit magnetic matter to be a sphere of dissimilar aether that yet in its expanse contains all species, one beneath the other [172], although the thicker parts [are] nearer to the Centrum of the earth [while] the lighter [are] on top.  If this atmosphere were to have a joint Centrum[384] with the earth, then no direction[385] toward the poles would take place; were its Centrum in the axis, then no declination would take place.  For, since because the intersection of the horizons of two globes is a line of a compass[386], to which the needle must stand perpendicularly, if they should sink as far as possible into the magnetic circle,[387] while  all these compasses run parallel with the equator, then the needles will hold the meridian.

 

If this Centrum is not in the axis, then only the linea expers variationis is there where the meridian of the earth agrees with the magnetic meridian.[388]  It Now, because the axis magnetic axis lies on such a plane with the earth’s axis that the meridian that goes through the earth’s poles also goes through the magnetic poles, the linea expers variationis would be at all times a meridian.  Now, should it not be a meridian, then the magnetic horizon must be spherical or else irregular, in that case, however, the magnetic attractions must not {R127} aim at the center[389] of the magnetic spheroid, but instead diverge from it.  Suppose that this oblateness comes from the centrifugal force of the earth, then the size of the divergence from the magnetic Centro will suppress the divergence from the Centro of the earth in proportion to the strength of the conducted magnetic force.  Therefore, the magnetic horizon can be bent very differently and not only the inclination, but also the declination [can] be quite manifold

 

{139, sheet inserted after Ob 106, front side, at 2:254}

 

Moral delusion happens when one takes the opinion of a possible moral perfection for an actual one.

 

We have selfish and altruistic[390] sentiments.  The former are older than the latter and the latter create themselves first in the sexual inclination.  A human is needy but also powerful over needs. [173]  He who is in the state of nature is more capable of altruistic and active sentiments, the one in luxury has imagined needs and is selfish.  One takes more interest in evil, primarily the injustice that others suffer, than in welfare.  The sympathetic sentiment is true if it is equal to the altruistic powers, otherwise it is chimerical.[391]  It is universal in an indeterminate way as long as it is extended to one out of all those I can help, or [it is universal] in a determinate way [when it extends] to help every sufferer; the latter is chimerical.  Kind-heartedness originates through the culture of moral but inactive sensation and is a moral delusion.  On the negat private kind-heartedness to do no evil and the justice of doing one’s obligation

 

The morality[392] that wants nothing but genuine unselfishness is chimerical, also the one that is sympathetic to imagined needs.  The moral philosophy that only affirms self-interest is crude

 

The duties of benevolence[393] could never bring about that one would rob himself of his own needs, but surely the duties of obligation[394] [could], for these are moral needs

 

{R129}[174] Virtue carries along with it a natural wage, but not for goods of luxury, but [for goods] of sufficiency

 

It is worth commemorating a perfect person of nature, but not one of art

 

The former takes care to impose some obligations on himself.  [A]nd also the latter

 

{140, back side, opposite Ob 107, at 2:255}

 

The sweetness of present need is chimerical

 

Friendship of agreeableness or need. They must be similar, else it is not called friendship, but enjoyment

 

Friendship is always mutual, thus not between father and child and, since the wife never desires the man as much as the latter does her, marriage is only closely related to the most perfect friendship.

 

In the state of luxury, marriages must cease to become friendships.

 

The friendship of delusion that consists of mutual, good wishes [175] without effect is foolish[395] but beautiful, that of convivial friendliness and agreeing sensations is the most common, but such a person is a socializer, perhaps open-hearted and reticent[396] but no friend.[397]

 

The education of Rousseau is the only means to aid the flourishing of civil society again.  For since luxury always increases quicker where need,[398] oppression, contempt for position, and war arise, the laws can accomplish nothing against it, as in Sweden.  Thereby, the governments also become more orderly and wars more seldom.  Censors should be instituted; but where will the first come from [?]  Switzerland [is] the only country.  Russia.[lxxxix]

 

{R130}The doubt that I accept is not dogmatic, but a doubt of postponement.  Zetetics[399] (ζήτεĩν) searcher.  I will advance the grounds of both sides.  It is amazing that one be concerned about danger from that.  Speculation is not a matter of pressing need.  Knowledge with respect to the latter is certain.  The method of doubt is useful in that it preserves the mind, not to act upon speculation, but upon healthy understanding and sentiment.[400]  I seek the honor of Fabius Cunctator.[xc]

 

Truth has no value in itself, whether an opinion about the habitation of many worlds is true or false, it is all the same.  One must not confuse it with truthfulness.  Only the manner in which one arrives at truth has a determinate worth, because that which leads to error can also do so in practical matters

 

If gratification from the sciences should be the motive,[401] then it is all the same whether it is true or false.  In this, the ignorant and precocious[402] have an advantage over the reasonable and cautious.  The final end is to find the vocation of humanity

 

{141, page 107 of Ob, lower margin, at 2:255}

 

 [176] The opinion of inequality also makes people unequal.  Only the doctrine of Mr. Rousseau can make it so that the most learned philosopher with his knowledge, honestly and without the help of religion, does not regard himself as better than the common man

 

{142, sheet inserted after Ob 108, front side, at 2:255}

 

What a miserable condition it is when oppression is so universal and commonplace that an industrious and honest person cannot demand merely justice, but instead must invoke mercy.  The more we fail to recognize our obligations, if we are not yet entirely corrupted, the more gifts of goodwill[403] remain for us; we mostly neglect the obligations toward some and give gifts of goodwill[404] to others.

 

{R131}In order to make up for the weakness of women in the active characteristics, nature has made men weak insofar as they surrender themselves to illusion and let themselves be easily deceived.  The man is inclined to create great concepts of a beloved object and almost feel unworthy to them.  Yet the woman commonly imagines herself worthy of courtship and makes no fantastical ideas of preference[405] with respect to the man.  They soon believe that they are able to rule[406] over the heart of the man.  The man is inclined to value his wife or his beloved higher than himself, the wife never [does this]. [177] If one merely considers the purpose of the sexes[407], then the wife evidently rules[408] and is more clever.  The generous person believes more easily than the selfish and weak person.

 

Gallantry (of men) is the art of illusion in love.[409]  For women, coquetterie is the art of making an illusion of their inclination to conquer.[410]  Both are ridiculous in marriages.  If the wife and husband Propriety is the art of appearing virtuous and of appearing chaste; modesty, refined and selective in taste, coyness, appearing affable, politeness,[411] refinement.[412] If this The people who best understand this art make the worst marriages

 

If illusion of marriage is employed for the purpose of [entering into] marriage, then it is still good; if it lasts after marriage, then it is quite ridiculous.  Indeed, men demand such women, who, as they say, do them credit, who are sought after, who one would like to elude.[413]

 

{143, back side, opposite Ob 109, at 2:255}

 

{Latin} There is a strict duty toward the Lord from obedience/reverence, toward the benefactor from love; in the new covenant one can love God, in the old covenant [one can] worship him.

 

[178] Bodies are either positive transparent, or negative (reflective), or zero[414] (black).  All bodies on the surfaces are both at the same time, especially little membranes.[415]

The little membranes of iron magnets have this characteristic and pull in whole clumps with their different poles.  Electrical bodies only have it on the surface

 

{R132}<With women, book-reading occurs in order to seem learned>

<In the same way, the marriage that has no illusion has honesty>

 

{Latin} While justice is the epitome of the obligations of indebted people, the disposition of actions, which are decided on the basis of justice, establishes justice, which is either of the people owed (active) or the people owing (passive).  The former (gstr.: enforces the actions of others, but only as long as they correspond to right, the latter enforces only such actions and the latter only so long as and to the extent that they promote the basis of right.  The latter is a disposition[416]…) is the disposition to decide on actions that would be enforced through the legal grounds of others: … (both can from…)  If the disposition of actions corresponds to justice, then the former will [enforce] strict justice, the latter [breaks off]

 

{Latin} The disposition (of actions) of duties that overstep the boundaries of active justice [is] Equity,[417] such as of passive justice.[418]

 

Predisposition[419]

 

<The illusion of friendship.  Aristotle[xci]; [179] if we wake, then we have mundum communem>

 

{Latin} The sentence with regard to civil law: the greatest right is the greatest wrong.  It is true as concerns the civilian, not the judge.[420]

 

<A young groom is thus not good because he has not yet considered the falsity of illusion>

 

Hume means that priests very much practice the art of illusion.[xcii]  Truth adapts itself only to the robe, to the formal habit,[421] to the illusion. All kinds of illusion in clothes. Make-up. 

 

Alexander v. Antipater:   purple interior[xciii]

 

Envy ceases when I can wipe away the illusory appearance[422] of others’ bliss and perfection

 

{R133}On the means of imagining a president or dignified man with his wife

 

{144, page 110 of Ob, upper margin, at 2:256}

 

The most perfect wife.  Reasonable and brave, rational when she is willingly exempt from ratiocination.  <Clever, wise – witty, refined>  The exemption from domestic business makes foolish women <gallant.> Foolish woman.

 

He who knows how to satisfy his desires is clever; he who knows how to rule them is wise.  World-wisdom[423]

 

{left margin, at lines 21-28}

 

Costs and expenses.[424]  They are expenses if one can have the gratification [180] of money or of work and thus also forfeits[425] them.  The miser[426] has the greatest expenses; he who knows how to live, even with the expenditure of all money, [has] the greatest profit.  Also avaricious.  to spend it every time for his contentment (not delightfulness).[427]

 

{lower margin, between the text and the closing vignette}

 

Just as the greatest of people cannot grow above average without becoming weaker and also [cannot] remain below average without being too weak, so it is with the ethical and graceful[428] characteristics

 

{lower margin, under the vignette}

 

Greek Roman face.  Characters of nations in company: the Spanish, French, Germans, [and] English

 

That our youths and men are[429] still so childish is because they did not have enough permission to be children earlier.  Just so, the trees whose blossoms were not properly allowed to break out in the spring bloom in {R134} the fall

 

{145, inside of the back cover}

 

Simplicity is either that which is ignorant or that which is rational and wise

 

In all moral definitions, the expression mediocrity[430] is quite wretched and indefinite, e.g., in parsimony,[431] for it indicates only that there is a degree that is not good by reason of the size without saying how large the good must therefore be

 

This mediocritas aurea is an occult quality[432]

 

Distinction between: he knows how to appear or he knows how to live.

 

[181] One could say that metaphysics is a science of the bounds of human reason

 

Metaphysical doubt does not annul[433] useful certainty, but only useless certainty

 

Metaphysics is useful in that it puts an end to illusion, which can be harmful

 

In metaphysics, not to think of the opposite side is partiality, and not saying it is also a lie; in actions it is otherwise

 

One merely falls in love with illusion, but one loves truth

If one should discover most people’s illusion, then they would seem like every bride of whom it is said that she takes off her pretty, silken eyebrows, a pair of ivory teeth, some cloth that supported her bosom, [and] excellent ringlets and has wiped off her make-up for her confounded lover

 

Illusion requires refinement and art, truth requires simplicity and peace.  After Swift, everything in the world is clothes[xciv]

What is most ridiculous is this: that one creates illusion toward others for so long that one himself imagines it to be true; children do the same with religion.  Illusion, when the one for whom it is intended takes it as the thing itself, is delusion.[434]

 

The illusion that the woman intends as a means to the attainment of marital love is no delusion, but [it] surely is in any other case.  On the art of making easy things difficult

 

[183] Loose Leaves

to the

Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime

 

Women’s inclination to novels perhaps comes from the fact that they wish that love were the sole inclination by which men are ruled.

Just as the greatest superabundance that arises from free government ultimately amounts to casting off everything into slavery and eventually poverty, so does the unnatural freedom of the female sex and the agreeableness that they enjoy and give out through it [the freedom] at last amount to making them downright despicable and, in the end, making them into slaves.

 

Mr. Hume believes that a woman who has no knowledge of the history of her fatherland or of Greece and Rome cannot ever maintain company with people of understanding.[xcv]  But he does not consider that they are not meant to serve the men as support for reflection but for recovery of it.  History is of no use without a level of philosophy, even if it were just moral [philosophy].  However, in this the woman only needs the part of history that concerns ethical life, which relates to her sex.

 

The woman, because she always wants to rule, accepts, without consideration, a fool.

 

The valiant wife wants to be honored through her husband, the vain wife would not ask for this honor but wants to be striking herself.  The coquette has the intention of influencing inclinations, although she has none herself, it is merely a game of vanity.

 

All inclinations are either exclusive or sympathetic.  The former are selfish, the latter are altruistic.  However, self-love and self esteem are not exclusive according to their nature; however, egoism and self-conceit are.  In accordance with the law of nature, female love is exclusive with respect to other men.  The purely lustful drive or the lover’s rage can even be exclusive [184] with respect to the object of love, hence rape, Herod, etc.[xcvi]  The immediate drive for honor is exclusive with respect to honor.  The characteristic of the mind that exclusively desires everything in objects, [and] where this drive is not justified by nature, is called envy.  Envy is a kind of pain.  But emulation, a sadness about inequality, can only concern an imagined inequality; incidentally, it is then only a perverted application of a good law of nature.  The drives that are sympathetic are the best: only in sexual impulses must sympathy concern only the object of the amorous inclination.

 

Women’s refusals are an irresistible drive for illusion[435]; the men who have not yet become extremely wanton have the characteristic that they will be very easily deceived by this illusion; this relation holds the strength of the opposing inclination within its bounds.

 

The ethical condition, if the taste for a great number of feigned gratifications and attractions is missing, is simplicity; that which is acquired by way of this taste is virtue, but even heroic virtue has to do with overcoming needs.  Thus, one can be good without virtue.  Just judgment, which is acquired through experience that depends on needs, is understanding; if the taste for many things increases and magnifies the manifoldness of concerns, then reason, indeed even refined reason, is necessary.  But the healthy reason is a fine reason, which returns to what is necessary to judge and know.  One can be very reasonable without much fineness of reason.

Simple taste readily degenerates, and ethical simplicity, for lack of knowledge of seductive charm, is easily deceived; therefore it is the greatest perfection

 

That wife who has acquired no special taste for all distractions, gallantries, and vanities can be good without virtue and reasonable without brooding.  If she is pulled from the middle [185] and out of the seat of this fine gratification, then thousands of enticements affect her and she requires virtue to be a good wife.

 

In domestic life, he who is spirited, good-hearted, and peaceful in company does not need books and ratiocination, but if so much refined taste, concupiscence, and fashion is acquired, then reason belongs in order to prevent one from becoming a foolish woman.

 

The most perfect wife would be she who knows the various fine delights of life, [knows] the manners [and] gallantry of her lovely charms, and has taste, but willingly prepares herself for domesticity and simplicity by way of reasoning insight into their uselessness and knows how to oblige herself through virtue.

 

A wife needs even more virtue in marriage than the husband, primarily if the necessity of decent illusion has gone completely out of style and the gallant freedom, as innocent as they might call it, emerges.  For she has a sure game, as one can easily guess, and will be called upon more often.

 

According to the rule of prudence, one can assume that something will never be encountered if it is encountered exceedingly seldomly and where it is encountered, it is difficult to know; for this reason it is not in accordance with prudence to allow this deceitful[436] agreeableness of women to guide[437].

 

Aged people love jokes and whatever arouses laughter, youth is in love with moving tragedy that arouses strong sensations.  What is the cause[?]

 

I find almost universal the mistake that one does not ponder the brevity of human life enough.  Therefore, it is indeed perverse to have it [human life] in front of one’s eyes so that one despises it and only looks to the future.  Thereby, one would be correctly at his place and not postpone life too long by way of [186] a foolish imagining of the plan for our actions.  The epitaphs of various ages make use of the same as encouragement for lustful and luxurious enjoyments and as an avaricious greediness for gratification.  But if well understood, it serves only to free the mind, through sufficiency, from the rule of impulses that entangle us in preparations against the brevity of life that are not in accordance with the efforts of enjoyment.  Contemplation of the proximity of death is agreeable in itself and [is] a corrective [useful] for bringing people toward simplicity and assisting them in [attaining] the sensitive peace of the soul; this begins as soon as blind ardor, through which one previously chased after the imagined objects of his wishes, ceases.

 

The woman who is constantly busy with the management of exquisite attire must be kept in this practice in marriage.  For, since she is supported by no other inclination for purity and agreeableness than pleasing others, she will become filthy and swinish if she is to live alone with her husband.

 

In society, the man is more often lost in the contemplation of what pleases him about women, while the woman is more often lost in the contemplation of what in herself pleases men.

 

All the gratifications of life have their great charm in that one hunts after them; possession is cold and the enchanting spirit has evaporated.  Thus, the greedy merchant has thousands of gratifications as long as he is earning money.  If he considers enjoying this earning he will be tormented by thousands of worries.  The young lover is extremely happy in hope, and the day his happiness rises to its highest, it begins to decline again.

 

A certain quiet self-confidence combined with the attributes of respect and decency acquires trust and goodwill; on the other hand, a boldness that appears to give little respect to others brings about hate and opposition

 

[187] In disputes, the quiet place of the mind is combined with kindness and indulgence toward the people fighting, a sign of one being in possession of power whereby the understanding of his victory is certain.  Just as Rome sold the field on which Hannibal stood.[xcvii]

Few people will endure mockery and contempt with a peaceful mind if they are in front of a large crowd, even if they know that the people in the crowd are all ignoramuses or fools.  The greatest crowd always instills awe, indeed, even the spectator shivers with fright at the false step of whoever compromises himself in its presence, although each individual would find little disparaging in the speaker’s disapproval if he were alone with him.  But if the great crowd is absent, then a steady man can quite well inspect their judgment with complete indifference.

 

With respect to the beauty of objects, men are very well adorned with an intense passion, embarrassment and a languishing longing for women, but [also] a peaceful affection.  It cannot be good that the woman makes offers to the man or anticipates his declarations of love.  For he who alone has the power must necessarily be dependent upon whoever has nothing but charm, and the latter must be conscious of the value of her charm, else there would be slavery instead of equality

 

That which is mechanical in laughter is the shaking of the diaphragm and lungs together with a contorted face, since the mouth is pulled by others, etc.; women and fat people love to laugh.  One laughs most violently when one is supposed to remain serious.  One laughs most strongly about those who look serious.  Strong laughter is tiring [and] breaks out through tears as with sadness.  Laughter that is provoked by tickling is also quite fatiguing, while that which is provoked by imagination is certainly amusing, but can end up in convulsions.  If I am harmed by the one about whom I laugh, I cannot be evil[438] any more.  The memory of something ridiculous gives much pleasure and also does not wear off as easily [188] as other agreeable anecdotes.  The Abbot Terrasson with the cap on his head.[xcviii]

 

The basis for laughter seems to consist in the trembling of quickly pinched nerves that transmit themselves through the entire system; other gratifications come from uniform movements of the nervous fluid.  Therefore, if I hear something that has the appearance[439] of a prudent, purposeful connection, but is itself entirely nullified in trifles, then it will [have] bent nerves on one side and, at the same time, repelling and quivering [nerves].  I wouldn’t want to wager but I’ll swear to it any time.

Pelisson should have been painted in place of the devil.[xcix]

 

Sexual inclination is either amorous need or amorous concupiscence.  In the state of simplicity, the former rules and thus [there is] still no taste.  In the state of art the amorous concupiscence becomes either one of enjoyment of everything or of ideal taste.  The former constitutes lustful immoderacy.  In everything, the former is to be seen in two pieces.  The female sex is either mingled with the male sex in free company or excluded.  If the latter is the case then no moral taste takes place, but at most simplicity (lending the Spartan wives[c]), or it is a lustful delusion together with an amorous greed to possess much for enjoyment without being able to even rightly enjoy one; Salomon.[ci]  In the state of simplicity, mutual need rules.  Here need is on one side and scarcity on the other.  There, fidelity without temptation existed; here, guards of chastity that is not possible in itself.  In the free company of both sexes, which is a new invention, concupiscence grows but so does moral taste.  One of the characteristics of this drive is that it underlies the ideal charms but then must be promoted, always as a kind of secret; from this arises a kind of [189] modest decency but with strong desires, without which this would become common and, in the end, subjected to weariness.  Secondly, that the female sex takes on illusion as if it [illusion] were not a need for them [the sex]; this is necessary if the amorous inclination is supposed to remain united with ideal gratification and moral taste in the state of art.  In lustful passion this illusion is not at all necessary.  Therefore, female surrenders appear to be merely either forced or marks of favor[440]

A young man who expresses no amorous inclination will be indifferent in the eyes of the woman.

 

If religion really can provide a use that is directly focused on future bliss, then the most natural first [religion] is that which focuses ethics in such a way that they are good for the fulfilling of [one’s] station in the present world, so that one thereby becomes worthy of things to come.  For what concerns fasting, ceremony, and chastening does nothing to benefit the present world.  But if this native[441] benefit should be achieved, then morality must be refined[442] before religion.

Montesquieu says that it would be entirely unnatural for a wife to run a household, but it could very well happen that she would run a government.

If ethics [are] entirely simple and all luxury[443] is banned, then the husband rules; if public matters are in a few hands and the majority of men become idle, then the women go beyond their solitude and have great influence over the men.  If the women inspire virtue and roman respect in the men, then they rule hereafter in the household through kindness; if they do not acquire him through coquetterie before they mislead and make him foolish later, then they will rule him with thumping and willfulness.[444]  In a good marriage, both [partners] have only one will and that is the will of the wife, in a bad marriage as well, but with the distinction that the husband agrees with the will of the wife in the first case, in the second he opposes it but is outweighed.

 

[190] This is the age of rule by women, but with less honor because they degrade the worth of the man.  They make him firstly vain, flexible and foolish and, after they have taken from him the dignity of masculine honor, they have nothing standing in their way.  In all marriages the women rule, but also over men of dignity.

 

There are two ways of the Christian religion, insofar as it should improve morality, 1.: beginning with the revelation of mysteries, in that one expects a consecration of the heart from the divine supernatural influence  2. To begin from the improvement of morality in accordance with the order of nature and, after the greatest possible effort that is adept at it [the improvement of morality], expecting supernatural assistance in accordance with the divine order of his decree that has been expressed in revelation.  For it is not possible, insofar as one starts with revelation, to expect moral betterment from this instruction as a success in accordance with the order of nature.

 

The refined prospect of things to come, if it is carried out to the end, namely, the goal of impending death, brings its own remedy[445] with it.  For why should one torment oneself with many grievous preparations when death will soon cut them short anyways[?]

 

A man easily grasps a esteem toward a woman who takes him in, while the woman for her part has more inclination than respect.  Therefore it comes about that the man expresses a kind of courage in overcoming his own lustful inclination, without which many women would be led astray.  A tempted wanton is a dangerous person among women.

 

It is good[446] that although the sensitive heart at peace is always beautiful, the affect of love is nevertheless present in him before marriage, while for the woman it is quiet submissiveness: thus the man can appear to be in love without the least bit of bad manners, but the woman merely appears to love.

 

[191] It is strange that women have so much attentiveness and memory in things of decoration, propriety, and politesse, while men have so little.

 

One is not compassionate with regard to the grief and distress of another, but with regard to these insofar as their causes are natural and not imagined.  Therefore a craftsman has no compassion for a bankrupted merchant who is degraded to the position of broker or servant because he does not see that anything is different besides his being rid of imagined needs.  A merchant has no compassion for another merchant who has fallen out of favor and must live off his own merchandise for lack of business.  Indeed, if both are regarded as benefactors of the people, then one does not consider the evil according to his own sentiment, but that of the other.  But the merchant has compassion for the downfall of another who is otherwise honest if he does not have advantage because he has just the same imagined need as the other.  In any event, with an otherwise gentle woman one also has compassion for her grief about imagined misfortune because one despises the husband for his weakness in such a case, but not the wife.  But everyone has compassion for any evil that is in opposition to true needs.  From this it follows that the good-heartedness of a person of much luxury will contain a very extensive compassion, while that of a person of simplicity [will contain] a very restricted one.  One has unlimited compassion for one’s children

 

The more extensive the compassion is, if its powers remain, the more idle it is; the more the imagined needs keep growing from this, the greater the obstruction of yet other remaining capacity to do good.  Hence the kindness of the luxurious condition becomes pure delusion

 

[192] There is no sweeter idea than idleness and no other activity than that which is skilled at gratification.  This is also the object one has before his eyes if he wants one day to sit in peace, but all of this is a phantasm.  He who does not work dies of boredom and is, in any event, numbed to delights and never tires, but revives and satisfies

 

The drive for honor with respect to those characteristics whose higher worth can make the judgments of others more important and general is ambition, that [drive for honor] with respect to the characteristics of less meaning, about which the judgments of others are frivolous and fluctuating, is vanity.

Self-esteem, humility.  Ridiculous ridicule is better hated than despised.

Self-esteem is based on equality and this leads if they have understood evil out of respect.

Why incapacity is regarded as more disgraceful than an evil will, namely, in those cases where the incapacity overcomes the good consequences

That the desire for honor is based in part on the state of equality one can see from the fact that aristocratic people despise the judgment of the lower people a great deal.  That it would be based on sexual impulse one can see because the contempt of a woman is quite insulting[447]

 



[1] Vermögen

[2] Here follow Rischmueller in setting the previous two lines off from one another; the AA has the preceding two fragments as one continuous line.

[3] Annehmlichkeit

[4] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “stark” as opposed to the AA’s “stärker.”

[5] Selbstrache.  See note at 6:110.

[6] Geschlechterliebe

[7] wollüstige Liebe

[8] Translate

[9] Begierde

[10] Fähigkeit

[11] Erkenntnisse

[12] The end of the sentence reads “machen ent…”, suggesting that Kant meant to write “machen entartet” (made degenerate), for example, but it is clear he left this sentence incomplete.

[13] Vorstellung

[14] Seele in Ruhe.

[15] Witz.  In his Anthropology, Kant defines “Witz” as “the faculty of thinking up the universal for the particular” (7: 201).

[16] Vermögen

[17] Zweck

[18] erudativ (related to erudition) and Speculation (speculation) are Latin terms, left untranslated here.  The AA has speculativ italicized, where Rischmueller has Speculation.

[19] Weiberliebe

[20] Empfindungen

[21] Here we follow Rischmueller, whereas the AA has the preceding sentence as two sentences.

[22] The last sentence is not a separate sentence in Kant, but it is on a different line that the rest of the sentence (cf. R).

[23] Übel

[24] In the AA, this sentence is split into two separate remarks.  The second starts at “There is no man….”

[25] The German here is “romanische,” which could also mean Roman or romantic, but, in the context, seems to be an adjectival form of the noun Roman (see next footnote), or novel.

[26] “Die Romane” here could also refer to the Romans.

[27] Here we follow Rischmueller.  The AA has this clause as part of the preceding sentence.

[28] Luxus

[29] durch

[30] Das Herz das Menschen

[31] Bonität

[32] Blüthen.  This line only appears in Rischmueller.

[33] Blendwerk.

[34] Xxx Translate the Latin phrase in the footnote.

[35] Stand

[36] Vorschriften

[37] Zwecke

[38] vorbeugen können

[39] Mässigung

[40] Übel

[41] Bösen

[42] Rischmueller has “fantastica”l set off by itself, across page from last sentence.

[43] sinnlich

[44] weiblich

[45] Materie

[46] weichlich

[47] Bolded in R only.  In AA this paragraph appears on pp. 20:21-22.

[48] wohlgesittet

[49] seelig

[50] abgenutzt

[51] Mensch überhaupt.

[52] Here we follow Rischmueller’s punctuation; the AA offers a comma here.

[53] Stelle

[54] romanische.  See too footnote xxx.

[55] The AA has a semi-colon here.

[56] Darauf führet

[57] Bedenklichkeiten

[58] The AA does not include this fragment.

[59] Überfluss

[60] peinlich

[61] Geschlecht

[62] Moralität

[63] Übel

[64] ziehen.  Without a preposition, as in this case, “ziehen” typically means to raise, pull, cultivate, breed, or build.  However, one could import a preposition and translate this as “draw on Emile” (cf. Guyer 2005).

[65] Luxus

[66] bürgerlich

[67] Staat

[68] Gutartigkeit

[69] Gute

[70] Kant began this paragraph with and then struck out “Es kö”, possibly meaning “it could be.”

[71] weichlichen Üppigkeit

[72] Gewogenheit

[73] Ihnen nicht etwas auszuopfern

[74] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “Das scheinbar Edle is der <Ansehen> Anstand” as opposed to the AA’s “Das scheinbar Edle ist der Anstand.  Ansehen.”

[75] gekünstelt

[76] Here and throughout this paragraph, evil translates Übel.

[77] Stelle

[78] Eigenschaften

[79] Glieder

[80] Schaden anrichtet

[81] Büchergelehrsamkeit

[82] Unmässigkeit

[83] Beherrscher

[84] The AA has the two preceding clauses as one sentence.

[85] verständiger

[86] Befremdung

[87] was allgemein gangbar ist

[88] Vorzug

[89] The AA has a paragraph break here.

[90] Stelle

[91] Mensch zu sein

[92] so wird er doch von seinen angewiesenen Post recht gut sein.

[93] eingeartet

[94] zufällig

[95] natürlichen Grundlagen

[96] This sentence appears in the AA on page 48.

[97] fein

[98] unmoralisch

[99] Anfansgründen der Sittlichen Weltweisheit

[100] The AA does not set this line on it own, and instead has it immediately following the previous sentence.

[101] The AA has the two preceding fragments as one sentence.

[102] Tractamenten

[103] Gut

[104] Stützungspunkt

[105] ausgeartet

[106] Here we follow the AA and provide a comma.  Rischmueller has a sentence break here.

[107] sangivenous

[108] G: englisch. This could also be translated as “English.”

[109] Verstellung

[110] Aufrichtigkeit

[111] In the AA version, this sentence occurs after the following one.

[112] übel

[113] Ergebenheit

[114] Staatfintenmacher

[115] Kant’s deletion reads “es mangt,” a phrase that requires a preposition, usually “unter”, in which case Kant’s deletion would have read “it mixes with.”

[116] Mit Nachläßigkeit.  In the context, it is ambiguous whether this refers to the preceding phrase or the following one.

[117] den Gellert.  This may also be a reference to Christian Fürchtegott Gellert (1715-1769), professor of philosophy, and writer of hymns, fables, comedies, and the novel Die Schwedische Gräfin. 

[118] ärger

[119] potestatis legislatoriae divinae

[120] potestatis legislatoriae

[121] spontaneitatem.

[122] mein Ich

[123] das Mein

[124] sich nich selbst aufheben

[125] sein nenne

[126] erziehen

[127] Rischmueller notes that Kant’s footnote below, which begins “That this is true”, was connected to the sheet inserted after Ob 38 by a note.

[128] Übel

* [69] The expression (the female [Frauenzimmer]) is certainly polite and seems to demonstrate that ages ago they were together in a special room as they are now in England

[129] sich vergafft

** [69] That this is true one can see from the fact that the woman prefers herself because she wants to rule every time, but the man prefers his wife because he wants to be ruled, he even gets married because of it

[130] Unwahrheit

[131] sittsam

[132] Geschlecht

[133] Staatsverfassung

[134] geizig

[135] The AA has a comma here.

[136] Leichtsinn

[137] Fr: Medisance.

[138] Verblendung.

[139] Kant here omitted any punctuation, making it ambiguous whether he intended the above translation or “Taste for virtue [in] friendship.”

[140] Bürger

[141] Rischmueller notes that there is an unreadable line of text following this paragraph.

[142] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “warum es nicht mehr mit dem Nützlichen verträgt als das Schöne” (61) rather than the AA’s “warum es sich mehr mit dem Nützlichen verträgt als das Schöne” (20:226).

[143] Gemütsart

[144] Heiterkeit

[145] Jalousie

[146] fahren lassen

[147] romanische.  Cf. footnote xxx.

[148] böse Handlung

[149] Böse

[150] The AA has this line at the end of the preceding paragraph.

[151] Ausschweifungen

[152] geizig

[153] Rischmueller does not offer a noun for this sentence, but the AA has the noun as “women” [Frauenzimmer].

[154] Knechtschaft von Sachen

[155] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “Welche neue Kneckschaft von Sachen muss sie erheben um jenen einzuführen” (68) rather than the AA’s “Welche neue Kneckschaft von Sachen muss sich erheben um jenen einzuführen”(20:229).

[156] Wesen

* [90] <At that time he was not a God of human beings, but rather of the Jews>

[157] mache

[158] Gemeinnützlichkeit

[159] erwirbt.

[160] übel

[161] übel

[162] meine Herr

[163] Unrechtmässigkeit

[164] übel

[165] gezwungen

[166] Übel (here and throughout this paragraph)

[167] Here we follow’s Rischmueller’s “Wahn” as opposed to the AA’s “Wan.”

[168] Reizungen

[169] als Mittel

[170] unmittelbar.  The contrast is to “as means,” and the connotation is that they rule us as ends rather than as means.

[171] Übel

[172] dames u chapeaux

[173] {French} prevoiance

[174] Here, whether this is an adjective or adverb is unclear.

[175] Erziehung

[176] Persohn

[177] Anständigkeit

[178] Übel

[179] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “Der Stand des Krieges fängt bald an” as opposed to the AA’s “Der Stand des Kriegers fängt bald an.”

[180] Übel aber nicht Nichtträchtigkeit

* [103] Our present war only leads to the acquisition of money and luxury [Luxus].  [The wars] of the Ancients [led to] equality, and the superiority, not of wealth but of power, can hereby still coexist with virtue.

[181] Luxus

[182] Vermehrung.  This word also has a biological connotation, as in “fertility.”

[183] Übel (here and throughout this paragraph)

[184] Reading “dann” here for “denn.”

[185] Damen

[186] des Standes

[187] des Standes

[188] Übeln

[189] Rückkehr

[190] verzumpfter Sprödigkeit

[191] Persohnen

[192] Selbstüberwindung

[193] Regungen

[194] Fr/English: Sentiments

[195] Translate in footnote. xxx

[196] Anteactum imputiren.  Here Kant combines the Latin “anteactum” and the German “imputiren,” which is a Germanization of the French verb “imputer.”

[197] The AA has the order of the two preceding fragments reversed

[198] The AA has a comma here.

[199] The AA does not italicize this term.

[200] Here, Kant uses the English word “proportion.”

[201] austrägt

[202] In the AA, the order of these two sentences is reversed.

[203] Moral

[204] Zustand

[205] geistig

[206] Gegen Ki

[207] Narrheiten

[208] ordentlich

[209] untergeordnete Herren

[210] der Kinderverstand

[211] The AA has a paragraph break here.

[212] Hochmuth

[213] Hülfleistend

[214] stolz

[215] Einbildung

[216] Ergötzlichkeit

[217] Notwendigkeit

[218] Bedurfnis

[219] Fr./English: Sentiment

[220] niedlich

[221] das Wollüstige

[222] Die Artigkeiten

[223] The AA reads this fragment as continuous with the one beginning three lines above, “Before we inquire into generosity…”.

[224] Maniren

[225] Übel

[226] vorwitzig

[227] ströhmend

[228] Stärke

[229] herrschen

[230] Prospicientz

[231] verwickelt

[232] geistig

[233] Stand

[234] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “nicht um den Indianern die Meinung zu machen” (93) rather than the AA’s “nicht um den Indianern die Wenigen zu nehmen” (20:123).

[235] Ausschweifung

[236] zurückhaltend

[237] In AA, this appears below, after the sentence beginning “Unity conforms to….”  Cf. footnote xxx [279]

[238] Weichlichkeit

[239] Poesie

[240] Mannigfältigkeit

[241] In the AA, the remark beginning “The woman seems to lose more” comes here (cf. footnote xxx [275]).

[242] edelmütig

[243] Here Kant uses the word “object.”

[244] Herrschaft

[245] Rischmueller notes that here “Erf” is struck out.  Kant most likely began to write “experience” (Erfahrung).

[246] Verblendung

[247] unartig

[248] schaal

[249] unwissend

[250] Selbstschätzung

[251] L: honor.

[252] The AA offers a paragraph break here.

[253] hoffärtig

[254] L: seculum

[255] geziert

[256] schaal

[257] Rar.  Here Kant seems to draw on the French term “rare.”  Cf. Rousseau, Emile, Book V.

[258] Phantast

[259] Putznarren

[260] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “wo jede Ehefrau eine Coquette ist aber nicht gegen ihren Mann”{99} as opposed to the AA’s “wo jede Ehefrau eine Coquette ist launisch gegen ihren Mann” [132].

[261] Weib zu sein

[262] menschliches Mädchen

[263] Persohn.

[264] gefällig

[265] Here Kant uses the word “President.”

[266] excolirt

[267] Staat machen

[268] gemeinen Notdurft

[269] Person (here and in next clause).

[270] ehelichen Gnugtuung

[271] Übel

[272] gütig

[273] die naturlichen Rechtsame

[274] bürgerlich

[275] In the AA, this fragment comes after the paragraph below beginning “On the reasons why he who pays…”[141].

[276] Vom Er Ihr und Sie

[277] Jugend Gefühl

[278] Here we follow the AA’s “Popes Schertze” rather than Rischmueller’s “Pope Schertze.”

[279] entbehrliche Dinge

[280] Persohnen

[281] excolirt

[282] Als Frau ausschweift

[283] medisiren

[284] Übel

[285] Böse.

[286] Bonität

[287] actuirt

[288] guttätige

[289] uneigennützig

[290] gemeinnützlich sein

[291] vertauschen

[292] Here Kant uses the word “national.” xxx

[293] Wenn aber die Sprache des Poebels in einer Sprache der Herrschenden Sprache ein der andern kommt

[294] etwas Unbekanntem

[295] Qualität

[296] Bund

[297] abhorriren

* [149] <Agreeablenesses can very greatly oppose needs, but if they agree with them, then [we have] beautiful simplicity.  The needs of people relate very greatly to the ease of thinking and representing something.  From this comes the agreeableness of order.  Symmetry.>

[298] Gutsein

[299] Notwendigkeit

[300] Dann unterliegt sie einer Verpflichtung

[301] Weltweisheit.  This could also be translated “philosophy.”  See endnote xxxiv.

[302] Lehrbegriff

[303] Geschlecht

[304] in geraden Empfindungen

[305] die Stände

[306] entbehrt

[307] Fundament

[308] Here Kant uses the Latin “stuproviolatio.”

[309] wiederhergestellt

[310] Mannespersohnen

[311] F: étourdi.

* <Except that this: it is already a great virtue to do no evil.> With this soul at peace, friendship is not enthusiasm, sympathy is not weak-heartedness, gentleness is not ceremony.  Desire is not longing.  The feeling [empfindende] soul at peace is therefore not inactive regarding the body or understanding, but only regarding desires and gratifications>

[312] Fleis

[313] billig

[314] kriechend

[315] Bonitatis

[316] Berechnung

[317] Bei; awk here, not sure how to re-word; maybe, “”can be made of what is better with regard to the subject’s inclination”???

[318] Changed from “only demands”

[319] In?

[320] Aussagen; this is a legal term but seems to work; could also be information or statement

[321] “diese gefuehl aber…”, this reads to me more like “this feeling, however, …”

[322] verlegen; maybe, “but by passing this action onto others”

[323] Gemeinsinn

[324] Eben davon;  I like” and even the public spirit of good and evil comes from that”

[325] Erkenntnisgewissheit

[326] Gutsein

[327] This could also be translated as an active verb, which is closer to German; “both feelings comply with natural simplicity”

[328] Gutsein

[329] Prinzip

[330] Liebespflicht

[331] Here Kant uses the term “Sympathie.”

[332] Here Kant uses the term “condition” as opposed to “Bedingung” or “Zustand.”

[333] The AA does not italicize this term.

[334] Condition

[335] Grundtrieb

[336] Here Kant uses the French verb “duellieren.”

[337] In the AA this sentence comes on page 160, after the paragraph beginning “It seems to me....”

[338] Ihr schönes Naturel

[339] Duelle Urspr

[340] getäuschet

[341] abgewitzt.  See 7: 204 for Kant’s definition of abgewitzt.  (In the Cambridge edition, “abgewitzt” is translated there as “cunning.”)

[342] das andre Geschlecht des Zwanges.  The French edition has, “He delivers the fair sex from the constraint of having to be scrupulous about decency,” which makes sense in the context but does not fit the genitive tense of “des Zwanges.”

[343] die Schöne

[344] Ansehen

[345] veränderbar

[346] gemeinschaftlich

[347] Here Kant uses the Latin “in aequilibrio.”

[348] Sich unterscheiden; cut out “distinguishes itself”; reflexive verb that just translates as “to be different”

[349] Aus dem gemeinsamen der Menschen; doesn’t seem to mean to people because of the conjugation of “der Menschen”; maybe “the obligation from the universality of the human”

[350] MC had as “he”, but er here refers to der Wille

[351] Maybe adverb here?

[352] der Wille der Menschen

[353] Conditional?

[354] Rechtmaessigkeit; rectitiude?  Fits with Guyer.

[355] Here Kant again uses the term “Sympathie.”

[356] Here Kant uses the Latin “medio.”

[357] verkehrt

[358] Here Kant uses the word “sentiment.”

[359] übereinkommend

[360] This paragraph comes on page 164 of the AA ,after the sentence that begins “In the end….”

[361] schweifen aus

[362] ungereimnt

[363] Geschlecht

[364] Ehelosigkeit

[365] gezogen

[366] das Phantastische

[367] Here Kant uses the French “souverainen”

[368] kränket

[369] blos die Teilnehmung

[370] Bonität

[371] applicirt

[372] aetherisch

[373] Klumpchen

[374] ob rarefactionem

[375] Geschlechtertrieb.  Also, the AA has the two preceding lines as one sentence, not on separate lines as above, so that it reads “The sensitive soul at peace, in face, in societies, in eloquence, poetry in marriages, and sexual desire” [170].

[376] zusammengedrückte Himmelsluft

[377] Centro gravitatis Coeli.  Throughout this section, Kant uses the terms Centro and Centrum, both of which would normally be translated by the same English term, center.  Because Kant seems to distinguish between the two, we have left them untranslated.

[378] Here Kant uses the French “petites Maitressen.”

[379] Here Kant uses the French “etouderie.”

[380] Or “effort of illusion” [Bemühung zu scheinen]

[381] Here Kant uses the French “étourdi.”

[382] ihren Liebkosungen.  In this context, this could also mean “her caresses.”

[383] Stutzer

[384] Centrum

[385] Here Kant uses “direction.”

[386] Cirkellinie

[387] Kreis.

[388] meridiano magnetico

[389] Centro

[390] gemeinnützig

[391] The AA offers a comma here.

[392] die Moral

[393] officia beneplaciti

[394] officia debiti

[395] törigt

[396] verschiegen

[397] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “aber ein solcher ist ein Gesellschafter vielleicht offenherzig und verschwiegen aber kein Freund” {129} as opposed to the AA’s “aber ein solcher ist in Gesellschaften vielleicht offenherzig und verschwiegen aber kein Freund” [175].

[398] Not

[399] Zetetici

[400] Sentiment

[401] Bewegungsgründ

[402] Die Frühklugen

[403] Gewogenheitein

[404] Gunsten

[405] Vorzugsideen

[406] gebieten

[407] wenn man der Geschlechter Absicht nimmt

[408] regiert.

[409] die Kunst verliebt zu scheinen.  Throughout this paragraph, scheinen is translated as both illusion and appearing.

[410] Die Kunst den Schein der Eroberungsneigung zu machen

[411] Here Kant uses the French “politesse.”

[412] Geschliffenheit

[413] entziehen

[414] Zero

[415] Blätchen

[416] Gesinnung

[417] Billigkeit

[418] In the AA, the two preceding fragments are given as one sentence.

[419] L: Indoles

[420] In the AA, this sentence comes before the preceding sentence [132].

[421] Habit de Parade

[422] täuschenden Schein.  [xxx Cut this in final version xxx. We have chosen to translate “Schein” here as appearance because “illusory illusion” is too awkward and “deceitful illusion” is misleading.]

[423] Weltweisheit.  See too footnote xxx.

[424] Kosten und Unkosten.

[425] verliert

[426] der Karge

[427] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “Geitzig auch.  jede Zeit sie zu seiner Zufriedenheit (nicht Ergetzlichkeit) zu verwenden” {133} as opposed to the AA’s “Geitzig auf jede Zeit sie zu seiner Zufriedenheit (nicht Ergetzlichkeit) zu verwenden” [180].

[428] zierlich

[429] R; seyn.  AA: sehen.

[430] mediocritas

[431] in parsimonia

[432] qualitas occulta

[433] aufheben

[434] Wahn.  Kant could also be intending Wahn here as a shorthand for Wahnsinn, or “madness.”

[435] Trieb zu scheinen

[436] täuschend

[437] lenken

[438] xxx

[439] Schein

[440] Gunstbezeigungen

[441] einheimisch

[442] excolirt

[443] Luxus

[444] Pochend und eigenwillig

[445] L: remidium

[446] artig

[447] kränkend



[i] In his Le siècle de Louis XIV of 1751, Voltaire explains the origins of the term “petitmaitre.” See The Age of Louix IV, Trans. Martyn P. Pollack, (Dutton: New York, 1969), p. XXX The term “petitmaitre” will be left untranslated throughout the Remarks.

[ii] See 15:96 and 20:490.

[iii] Kant’s marginal note in his personal copy of Baumgartner’s Metaphysics reads, “Pain must creep in: dolce picqvante” (15:43).  Rousseau also strikes upon a similar theme in Brief an d’Alembert, in Writings I, 353ff.  Burke’s 1757 A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful differentiates between the “delightful horror” of the sublime and the “sweet sorrow” of the beautiful.  (At question, however, is whether would have read Burke at this point in time, for it did not appear in German until 1765.)  In his 1757 essay, “Of Tragedy,” which first appeared in German in 1759, Hume writes that it is “an unaccountable pleasure, which the spectators of a well-written tragedy receive from sorrow, terror, anxiety and other passions, that are in themselves disagreeable and uneasy….They are pleased in proportion as they are afflicted, and never are so happy, as when they employ tears, sighs, sobs, and cries to vent their sorrow, and relieve their heart, swollen with the most tender sympathy and compassion,” (218) in Hume, Four Dissertations.  The beauty of the depiction increases disagreeable sensations and, at the same time, the agreeable feeling emerges from the admiration of the beautiful: “It is thus the fiction of tragedy that softens the passion, by an infusion of a new feeling, not merely be weakening or diminishing the sorrow” (226).

[iv] Kant alludes here to a story told by Plutarch in his The Age of Alexander:, Trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert, (Harmondsworth, 1973). Alexander was informed in a letter that his doctor, Phillipus, would be bribed by the Persian king Darius to poison him; Alexander gave Phillipus this letter to read, while Alexander emptied the glass of poison, of which he had been warned, in one swallow.  Kant was probably thinking here not about Plutarch, but about Rousseau, who offers a more detailed account of this episode in Book II of Emile: Or, On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (1979).  While discussing the story with acquaintances at a country estate, Rousseau writes, “The greater number [of people present] blamed the temerity of Alexander; some after the governor’s example, admired his firmness and his courage – which made me understand that none of those present saw wherein lay the true beauty of this story:  ’As for me,’ I said to them, ‘it seems that if there is the least courage, the least firmness, in Alexander’s action, it is foolhardy’….It is that Alexander believed in virtue; it is that he staked his head, his own life on that belief; it is that his great soul was made for believing in it.  Oh, what a fair profession of faith was the swallowing of that medicine!  No, never did a mortal makes so sublime a one.  If there is some modern Alexander, let him be showed to me by like deeds” (111).   See also, 27:21-22. Montaigne also regarded Alexander’s act as a sign of moral firmness (Essays I 24).

[v] For the death of Marcus Portius Cato, the Younger (95-46 B.C.), see Plutarch, Cato the Younger, I-III. In the eighteenth-century his death was regarded as a heroic example of an instance in which suicide is justifiable.  Known was Joseph Addison’s 1713 tragedy Cato (currently available in Cato: A Tragedy, and Selected Essays, ed. Christine Dunn Henderson et. al., 2004), as well as Johann Christoph Gottsched’s 1732 Der sterbende Cato.  With Caesar’s victory at Thapsus, Cato saw the defeat of the free republic, and took his own life.  See Book IV of Emile: “If there is nothing moral in the heart of man, what is the source of these transports of admiration for heroic actions, these raptures of love for great souls?  What relation does this enthusiasm for virtue have to our private interest?  Why would I want to be Cato, who disembowels himself, rather than Caesar triumphant?”(287).  See also Book II of Emile: If Caeser had not lived, perhaps they would always have treated as a visionary this very Cato who discerned Caesar’s fatal genius and foresaw all his projects so far in advance”(106).

[vi] Note explaining what in the constitution does this.

[vii] Kant alludes here to Henry Fielding’s The Life of Mr. Jonathan Wilde the Great, published in London in 1743, available in The History Of The Life The Late Mr. Jonathan Wild The Great, (Kesssinger, 2004).) and which appeared in German in 1759 as Lebensgeschichte des Herrn Jonathan Wild des Grossen.  In Fielding’s satire, the powerful person is unkind.  Jonathan Wilde – who sends thieves and murderers to the gallows – is exhorted by Fielding as a great man, since he, like Caeser and Alexander, is free from the human weakness of “kindness” (334). See 7:163, 15:695ff., and Lehmann’s notes in 20:490ff.

[viii] Kant refers here again to Jonathan Wilde, which offers an example of a youngster who sets ablaze the Temple at Ephesos. 

[ix] “Vapeurs” were a spasmodic-neurotic complaint fashionable among French women in the eighteenth-century: “XXX” 15:841.

[x] Abbé Jean Terrasson (1670-1750), French author.  Brandt locates the anecdote in Johann Christoph Gottsched, ed., Des Abbts Terrassons Philosophie, nach ihrem allgemeine Einflusse, auf alle Gegenstände des Geistes und der Sitten  (Leipzig, 1756), pp. 45-46. Kant mentions Terrasson in a variety of texts – see, e.g., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (7:246), Critique of Pure Reason A xix, Essay on the Illness of the Mind 2: 269.

[xi] See Persius, Satires, 17. cf. AA 12:416 and 20:491.

[xii] Note explaining Greek origin of zetetics and clarify Kant’s use of word.

[xiii] Samuel Richardson, 1689-1761. English writer whose epistolary novels include Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded (1740) and Clarissa Harlowe (1747-48).   Kant may have been familiar with Richardson’s work from the 1757 Sammlung der gemeinnützig Lehren, Warnungenun moralischen Anmerkungen aus den Werken des Herrn Samuel Richardson, (ed. C.F. Weisse, 1757).

[xiv] Thespitious, king of Athens, devised for Hercules to sleep with fifty children so that they have children by such a hero.  According to one version of the story, Hercules did so in one night.  But according to another source, Hercules took fifty nights (Diodorus Siculus Bilblioteca Historica IV 29; Apollodorus Biblioteca II 10),  After discovering what he had done Hercules, plundered the the Oracle at Delphi and murdered Iphitus.  As punishment, Pythia commanded Hercules to serve Queen Omphale of Lydia who dressed him in woman’s clothes and made him do woman’s work – a case of confusion of the sexes..  See Emile as well: “The same Hercules who believed he raped the fifty daughters of Thespitius was nevertheless constrained to weave while he was with Omphale”(361).

[xv] XXX Aristotle on friendship XXX.

[xvi] Cervantes’ Don Quixote, written between 1605 and 1615, and appearing in German in 1753 under the title Des berühmten Ritters Don Quixote von Mancha lustige und sinnreiche Geschichte.  Avaliable in English as Don Quixote, Harold Bloom ed., (Roundhouse: 2001).

[xvii] XXX Rischmueller at 4.30: The question of when Kant  first read Emile appears in an anecdote told by Borowski in his biography of Kant: “Of J.J. Rousseau he was familiar with everything and his Emile kept hold of Kant at its first appearance as he made his usual afternoon walk back home” (Ludwig Ernst von Borowski, Darstellung des Lebens und Charakters Immanuel Kant in Kant Biographien, Manfred Kuehn ed.).  Emile appeared in Paris at the end of May 1762, yet it is unknown when Kant was first familiar with and first read the work.  Borowski wrote that Kant lectured on it the second half of 1762, but Borowski had already left Königsberg by that time.  When Julie had been published in January 1761, by the end of the year both Hamann and Scheffner had read it.  The active literary life of Königsberg substantiates the claim that Kant most certainly read Emile by 1762/1763.  Thus Kant had read all three of Rousseau’s works as he wrote his Bemerkungen.  Thus the Bemerkungen are not [the product of]a first reading of Rousseau’s works, rather a critical examination of Rousseau’s writings, including both Discourses.  When Kant says that Rousseau’s book serves to improve the “Ancients” he connects the idea of “the Ancients” to an earlier reference in one of his lectures.  See AA II:312. XXX

[xviii] Kant made note of this custom in his lectures on physical geography: “The scholars (in China) never trim the nails on their left hand, so as to indicate their profession” (9:378).

[xix] Antisthenes (440- ca. 370), who became one of Socrates’ most ardent followers, is regarded as the founder of the Cynics.  He believed that man’s happiness lay in cultivating virtue for its own sake.

[xx] XXX CUT LATER XXXThe intermixing of the sexes in social occasions is, according to Kant, to be lamented on the one hand, for it often results in an effeminacy of men; on the other hand, it is to be embraced, for it results in a refinement of taste: “No society is complete if no women are there, for one must regard women as the judge of the beautiful (Richterinnen des Schönen) in appearance.” (Anthropologie Philippi, 49)  During the Russian occupation of Königsberg, which lasted from 1758-1762, Kant had the opportunity to observe a decisive shift in social life and particularly a change in the understanding of gender roles: “The Russians contributed to a change in the cultural climate of Königsberg.  There was more money, and there was more consumption.”  Indeed, one of Kant’s closest acquaintances, Johann Georg Scheffner, said of this time in Königsberg, “ ’I date the genuine beginning of luxury in Prussia to the Russian occupation.’ “(Kuehn, 113)  For some people, the Russian occupation brought with it a veritable liberation from old Prussian prejudices and customs.  “The Russians liked everything that was ‘beautiful and well-mannered.’ The sharp distinction between nobility and commoners were softened….Russians cavaliers changed the social intercourse, and gallantry became the order of the day.  Drinking of punch was the rage.  Dinners, masked balls, and other diversions almost unknown and frowned on by its religious leaders, became more and more common.  Society was ‘humanized.’ “ (Kuehn, 113-4)  Kant benefited from this change in two ways.  First, he not only taught many Russian officers in his lectures but also gave them private instructions, greatly augmenting his income.    Second, Kant also saw increased opportunities for social engagement in liberalized Königsberg, attending dinners and parties with Russian officers, bankers, merchants, noble-men and women. XXX Maybe we should just cut this note? XXX

[xxi] The island of Celebes, or Malacca, where the pagan king of Malacca, proselytized by both Christian and Muslim missionaries, converts to Islam, because the priests expected by the Portugese arrived later than did the Muslims sent from Achin (in Sumatra).  Kant was an avid reader of numerous travelogues, and it is therefore difficult to know from what travelogue he draws this reference.  A possible source could be the classic geographic-historical work Allgemeine Historie der Reisen zu Wasser und zu Lande; oder Sammlung alller Reisebeschreibungen, in the chapter describing the island of Celebes.

[xxii]  XXX CUT LATER XXX Well before his numerous readings of Rousseau’s Emile in the 1760s, Kant was keenly interested in education.  At the occasion of becoming a Magister, for example, Kant delivered a lecture entitled “Of the Easier and More Thorough Presentation of Philosophy.”  But Kant’s interest in education was piqued at Johan Bernhard Basedow’s (1723-1790) founding of a progressive school, the Philanthropinum in Dessau.  Basedow desired that his school would educate the human being as a whole, and accordingly he emphasized pracitical knowledge over mere intellectual training.  The school week would include outings into the wilderness (Wandertage) and athletics.  The distinction between “work” and “play” would be blurred.  Languages, for example, would be taught not through memorization and recitation but through games.  And religious education would loom only in the background.  It was an educational approach “radically different from the Pietistic education Kant himself had suffered through” (Kuehn, 227).  Kant strongly supported the school; he showed himself willing to enlist students and to raise money for the school, writing an article for the Königsberger gelehrten und politischen Zeitungen, avidly endorsing the school’s principles and aims.  He also enlisted former students to collect subscriptions and wrote encouraging letters to the directors of the school. XXX  Cut this note too? XXX

[xxiii] See Adickes’ note at 20:492: “The Caribs never eat salt, although they have salt mines on their islands, because it does not meet their taste.”  Adickes identifies as the source for Kant’s claim the Allgemeine Historie der Reisen zu Wasser und zu Lande; oder Sammlung alller Reisebeschreibungen (see note above).  See also 17:482.

[xxiv] Agesilaus, King of Sparta (444-360 B.C.).  Again, Kant’s source for this allusion is Rousseau, Second Discourse, Part II, §38 in Gourevitch ed., page 176-7. See Herodot’s Historiae VII, 135 and Plutarch’s Apophthegmata Laconica, 255 F.

[xxv] See 15:195 and Adickes’ notes at 15:201.

[xxvi] Kant is referring to Charles XII of Sweden, (1682-1718), whose life Voltaire described in his Histoire de Charles XII. XXX more detail XXX

[xxvii] Academy of Sciences XXX Rischmueller doesn’t address this in note XXX

[xxviii] Theophrast (372-287).   See Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, III, 28. § 69.

[xxix] In eighteenth-century Germany, the term Weltweisheit was briefly adapted for the discipline of philosophy itself.  See Zammitto, 2005: 18, and Schneider, 1983.

[xxx] In Book V of Emile, Rousseau attempts to show how love could successfully develop Emile’s best talents: “XXX.”  Also Julie XXX

[xxxi] Rousseau’s model couples, Sophie and Emile in Emile and Julie and Wolmar in Julie live in villages.

[xxxii] Arcadia is a region of Greece in the Peloponnesus that takes its name from the mythological character Arcas.  A remote, mountainous region, in both antiquity and the Renaissance it has been portrayed as a place of refuge from civilization and as the epitome of pastoral simplicity in which people, usually represented by the shepherd, live unsophisticated but happy lives.  Virgil described Arcadia as a kind of idyllic paradise in his Eclogues.

[xxxiii] Diagoras  Greek poet and sophist of the 5th-century B.C..  Kant’s source for this allusion is an anecdote found in Pierre Bayle’s 1697 Dictionnaire historique et critique , which was translated into German as the Historiches and Critisches Wörterbuch (Leipzig, 1740-1741) and is available in English as The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter Bayle (Routledge, 5 vols., 1997). See Wörterbuch, vol. 2, 299.  See also Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods: “XXX”(Chapter 37, ).

[xxxvi] Kant alludes here to Voltaire’s tragedy Brutus, which appeared in French in 175X.  Marcus Junius Brutus (85-42 B.C.) helped to murder his cousin, Julius Caesar.  In the eighteenth-century the image of Brutus experienced a kind of reassessment, seen no longer as the unscrupulous murderer of Caesar, but rather as the philosopher willing to sacrifice himself for the Republic – a kind of analogy to Cato.  See above, note v.

[xxxvii] XXX Rischmueller’s note at 78.1 addresses the question of the French spoken in public among women and refers to Brief an d’Alembert.  Her note does not address the “chapeaux cornetten.”  Cornetten is Fr. Plural for “cornets,” but what is the “chapeaux”? XXX

[xxxviii] Antonio Allegri Correggio (1494-1534), artist.  Kant most likely was familiar with Correggio’s works from Raphael Mengs’ Gedanken über die Schönheit and über den Geschmack in der Malerei (Zurich, 1762) and Johann Joachim Winckelmann’s Abhandlung von der Empfindung des Schönen in der Kunst (Dresden, 1763).

[xxxix] Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), the French philosopher, theologian, and critic who especially influenced Voltaire and writers of encyclopedias.  See note above, xxxviii.   Specifically what Bayle’s “judgment” of women was, is unclear.

[xl] See above, xvi.

[xli] Aurelius Augustine (354-430), Bishop of Hippo.  The term “crapula” here is a reference to the feeling of dizziness and vertigo that comes with drunkenness.   Kant draws this reference from Bayle’s discussion of the possibility that Augustine was a heavy drinker and the difficulty of translating the term “crapula.”  See Bayle, Wörterbuch, v. 1, 400f.  Augustine wrote in his Confessions that: “XXX” (X, XXXI).

[xlii] XXX Hobbes and the state of war XXX

[xliii] Regarding Socrates, see 2:369: “XXX.”  Kant also drew on Rousseau’s discussion of Socrates: XXX (Last Reply, Schriften I).

[xliv] Paul Pelisson-Fontanier (1624-93), French philosopher and member of the Academy in Paris. Madame de Sévigné, or Marie Rabutin de Sévigné (1626-1696), XXX, famously said of Pelisson: “Pelisson abuses the privilege men have of being ugly” (7:298).  In Louis XIV, Voltaire characterized Pelisson so: “XXX.”  Voltaire said of Sévigné: “XXX.”

[xlv] Margarete von Tirol (1318-1369), whose castle at Terlan was named “Maultasch.”    That Margarete is “degenerate” comes from both her autocratic style of government and her infamous marriage: Kaiser Ludwig IV supported her efforts to obtain a divorce from her first husband so that Margarete could marry Ludwig’s son and thereby expand the power base of the Wittelsbach throne.  The marriage in 1342, done without regard to the canonical law of the time, was such a sensation that the entire affair led to King Ludwig IV’s deposing four years later.  See Rischmueller, ff. 68, p. 223. 

[xlvi] Antonio Magliabecchi, (1633-1714), Florentine librarian and book collector.    Kant’s source for the reference to Magliabecchi’s unseemliness is an article in Christian Gottlieb Jöcher’s 1751 Allgemeines Gelehrten-Lexicon: “He was of a quite poor external appearance, and always carried in the winter-time a coal lamp for warmth, on which he often managed to burn his hands and clothes.  To sleep, he attended to coarse books.  His library was horrible, and he was so eager in reading his books that he never took care to change his clothes so as not to lose time that could be spent reading; hence his clothing also was not all too respectable. At night he sent his servant home, as was his habit read until he fell asleep in his chair or threw himself, still clothed, on his bed; hence it also sometimes happened that his coal-pot set fire to his bed and the many books on it, and he would have to call to his neighbor’s for help.” (Quote in Rischmueller, p. 223, ff.70.)  See also 7:814.

[xlvii] XXX Risch doesn’t offer anything here XXX

[xlviii] “Liverey.”  As Grimm’s Dictionary explains, “XXX,” (v. 7, 1073).

[xlix] Rousseau discusses the “endless conversation among French women” in his Brief an d’Alembert: “XXX” (XXX).

[l] XXX R doesn’t offer anything here XXX

[li] Voltaire offers an anecdote of the officer who was embarrassed by the gaze of Ludwig XIV in The Age of Louis XIV, which appeared in French in Berlin in 1751 under the title Le siécle de Louis XIV: “XXX” Quoted in Kleinere historischen Schriften (1887, Leipzig, ed. R. Habs), p. 284.

[liii] Diogenes (born 323 B.C.), student of Antisthenes.  Kant’s source for this anecdote was Mendelsohn’s Ästhetische Schriften: “XXX” (25). 

[liv] See Rousseau’s Confessions.  For the rumors circulated in the 1760s regarding Rousseau’s lifestyle, see Rischmueller, ff. 89, p. 233-4.

[lv] For Julie’s marriage to Wolmar, see Julie, Letter 20, Third Section, in which she tries to convince her one-time lover Saint-Preux to… : “XXX”

[lvi]  Not true…this comment is actually very ambiguous, since Saint-Preux undergoes a conversion midway through the book…what’s more in the first section, he arguably is  courting a wife.  The issue is whether Kant is endorsing mistresses or happy bachelorhood! XXX I agree – I’ll cut out what I culled from Rischmueller and let you flesh this out a bit more coherently than I did! XXX

[lvii] XXX Newton XXX

[lviii] XXX square of the sine of the inclination, its cube XXX

[lix] Adickes elaborates on Bougeurs’ 1749 experiment at 14:79-80.

[lx] See The Spectator, (Number 225, Section Three, p. 225).  The Spectator was a periodical, written by Joseph Addison and Richard Steele during 1711 and 1712, devoted to commentary on the literature and life of 18th-century England.  It was enormously influential and was published in book form.  It first appeared in German as Der Zuschauer in 17XX.  See also 20:494.

[lxi] Odium theologorum

[lxii] Regarding Cato and Brutus, see above, note XXX.

[lxiii] See note above regarding Margarete Maultasch.

[lxiv] Kant’s remark here parallels to an observation in The Spectator: “XXX” (Number 122, Section 2, 215).  Kant demonstrates that The Spectator had falsely interpreted the anecdote.

[lxv] For the story of Juno and Tiresias, see Ovid, Metamorphoseon, III 316-38.  Kant discusses the same story with different emphasis in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer 2:341.

[lxvi] Give meaning and source.

[lxvii] For the relationship between The Spectator, monkeys, and the lustful man, see The Spectator (Number 122, Second Section, 215).

[lxviii] Kant means Charles de Saint-Evremond (1613-1703).  The French writer lived with Ninon de Lenclos, was condemned in light of his satirical writings, and fled to England, where he died.  His collected works first appeared in London in 1705.  In Kant’s time Saint-Evremond was still an oft-quoted figure.  Voltaire characterized Saint-Evremond as: “XXX” (Le siecle de Louis XIV).

[lxix] See note above, xxxviii..

[lxx] King Solomon, son of David, who lived around 1,000 B.C..  Renowned for his wisdom and power, the later half of his reign was plagued by accusations that his many wives and concubines of others faiths led him to idolatry.  His history is recorded in Kings 1-11 and 2 Chronicles 1-9.  See also  “XXX” (20:188),

[lxxi] In 1751 Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-1779) published Recherches sur l’origine des ídées agréables et désagréables, which appeared in German as Theorie der angenehmen und unangenehmen Empfindungen, and Kant owned as early as 1762.  Mendelssohn offered a similar critique of Sulzer: “XXX” (Ästhetische Schfriften in Auswahl, O.F. Best, ed., Darmstadt, 1974).

[lxxii] See Montaigne, Essays, v.2, Book 3, Section 2: “XXX.”

[lxxiii] La Fontaine has a fable in which the swallow warns the birds of the hunger of the coming winter, but the birds pay no attention to the warning.  La Fontaine ends with the moral: “XXX” (The Fables of La Fontaine, 2004).

[lxxiv] In the third letter of his Moral Essays, entitled Of the use of the Riches, Pope makes the “joke” to which Kant here alludes: “XXX” (XXX).

[lxxv] Caffetier…what is this?  Connection to gallantry monger?

[lxxvi] Ostracism was the Greek law whereby citizens voted to ban a fellow citizen from Athens for ten years.  It was first enforced in 487 B.C.  Introduced by Cleisthenes, the law proved absolute for Aristides (540-ca.467) who in 483 was banned for opposing Themistocles’ plan to turn Athens into a great naval power.  See Cicero, Aristides VII, 1-7.  Kant may have been familiar with this story from Bayle’s Dictionary: “XXX” (XXX).

[lxxvii] Pierre Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759), French physician and mathematician who in 1741 became president of the Academy of the Sciences in Berlin.  See 2:98 and 2:330.  See also 15:389, 586, 587, and 671.

[lxxviii] L: needy, destitute. XXX have this as footnote? XXX

[lxxix] Livonia, a region now split between Estonia and Latvia, was part of the Russian empire in the 18th century.  XXX Risch doesn’t offer anything here XXX

[lxxx] For Kant’s discussion of Democrit, see 15:215 and 476.

[lxxxi] Kant admired the writer Jonathan Swift.  Here Kant refers to Swift’s work Epilogue to a Play for the benefit of the Weavers in Ireland.  See Adickes’ note at 20:495.

[lxxxii] See note above, xxx.  Arcadian (also perhaps ref re: Greeks, Germans, Prussians.)

[lxxxiii] Mary Wortley Montagu (1689-1762).  At the age of twenty, she published translations from the Greek and wooed Alexander Pope, who wrote numerous poems and epigrams in her honor.  In 1711 she married Pope and accompanied him, first to Turkey, and then throughout Asia and Africa. Between 1716 and 1718 Montagu wrote elegant accounts of her travels, which circulated among her friends and were finally published in 1763.  Her writings appeared in German in 1764 under the title Die Briefe der Lady Marie Wortley Montagu, geschrieben während ihrer Reisen in Europe, Asien, und Afrika an Personen von Stande, Gelehrte, etc. in verschiedenen Teilen von Europa.

[lxxxiv] Epicurus (341-271 B.C.).  For a comparison of Epicurus to Zeno, see Cicero, Tusculan Disputations,  III, 28, and Kant’s remark at 19:174. XXX Discuss what needs to be said of Epicurus’ ethics in this context XXX

[lxxxv] Charles de Montesquieu (1689-1755), whose 1748 work The Spirit of Laws… XXX Discuss what needs to be said here XXX

[lxxxvi] For the story of Danae, see Ovid, Metamorphoseon, IV, 613.  Danae was the daughter of Acrisius, king of Argos.  When it was prophesied to Acrisius that Danae would have a son who would kill him, he locked her up in a bronze cave when she became fertile.  Zeus came to her in the form of a shower of gold and impregnated her.  She then gave birth to Persius.

[lxxxvii] In Molière’s 1668 comedy Amphitryon, Jupiter takes on the form of the Theban general Amphitryon and seduces his newly-wedded wife, Alcmene.  Bayle discusses the story of Amphitryon in his Dictionary, v. 1: “The game pleased him [Jupiter] so well that this night he continued three times longer than usual.  This is Hercules’ origin.” 

[lxxxviii] According to Adickes (see note at 14:97), “This probably can only mean: denser than the aether…, so that therefore light particles are refracted upon entry into the electrical matter.”

[lxxxix] Regarding censors in Switzerland, see Rousseau, Brief an d’Alembert, Schriften I, and The Social Contract, Book 4, Chapter 7.

[xc] Fabius Cuncator (280-203 B.C.), Roman commander who defeated a larger and superior Carthaginian army by delaying an open battle. XXX see Kuehn bio XXX

[xci] XXX Aristotle and the “illusion of friendship.” XXX

[xcii] Hume had written: “XXX.” (Vermischte Schriften, Chapter 4).  See also 16:872 and 20:496f..

[xciii] In his note Adickes identifies the source for this allusion as Plutarch and quotes from Elite des Bons Mots (15:115).  It is questionable whether Kant could have fully grasped this text given his ability to understand written French, but it is given here for lack of supporting sources: “Alexander disoit d’Antipater, que s’il étoit modeste en habits, il étoit couvert de pourpre au dedans.  Il y a bien de personnes dans le monde, de qui on peut dire la meme chose.”  

[xciv] In his Tonnenmärchen Swift writes of external appearance: “XXX.”  (Satirical Writings, quoted in 15:685)

[xcv] Note needed

[xcvi] Note needed.

[xcvii] Note needed.

[xcviii] Note needed.

[xcix] Note needed.

[c] Note needed, Spartan wives.

[ci] Note on Solomon (I can easily do this.)