Immanuel Kant’s
Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen
über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen
(Remarks on the Observations
on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime)
At
present, this translation is being made free of charge on the web. It is based on Marie Rischmueller’s German
edition of Kant’s Bemerkungen in den Beobachtungen
über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner
Verlag, 1991). Throughout, I have
included both references to page numbers in both Rischmueller {marked with an
R} and in the Academy Edition of Kant’s works [marked with square
brackets]. The Academy Edition version
is volume 20 of the Academy Edition of Kant’s
gesammelte Schriften (Vol 20, Ed. Gerhard Lehmann, Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter & Co: 1942), available on the web at www.ikp.uni-bonn.de. Kant’s text Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime is
available (in German) in volume 2 of the Academy Edition and at www.ikp.uni-bonn.de. The text has been translated into English as Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful
and Sublime (trans. John T. Goldthwait, Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1960) and in a forthcoming translation by Paul Guyer that
will be part of the Anthropology,
History, Pedagogy volume in the Cambridge
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.
Notations such as “{1, on the reverse of the cover, opposite 2:205}” give
Rischmueller’s notation (1), followed by an explanation of where in the
original Observations the relevant
Remark occurs (on the back side of the cover), followed by the Academy edition
page number of that original page.
Throughout,
struck out text (like this) is text that Kant struck out (based on
Rischmueller’s notation. Words that
appear in <wedge brackets> are words that Kant inserted into his
previously written remarks.
Throughout,
there are three sorts of notes. Notes
marked with asterisks (* or **) are Kant’s own footnotes. Notes in Arabic numerals (1, 2, 3 . . .) give
either the original term being translated here or note variations between
Rischmueller’s text and the Academy editions.
Roman numerals (i, ii, iii, . . .) give explanatory information. These notes are still quite rough; I hope to
refine them soon.
I
strongly welcome any comments or criticism of this translation. The current translation is a working draft, but
I plan to submit it for publication in the near future. Please send comments to frierspr@whitman.edu or Patrick
Frierson, Philosophy Department,
{1, on the reverse of the cover, opposite 2:205}
{R 7}
[3] The man’s art of appearing inconsiderate and the woman’s of appearing
prudent.
A person can employ
two kinds of beneficial emotions on others, respect and love, the former by way
of the sublime, the latter by way of the beautiful. A woman reconciles both. Never does a This composite feeling is the greatest that
can ever affect the human heart. Yet, it
[the heart] can only be strong enough for two faint feelings. Should one of the two be strong, then the
other must be weak. One now wonders
which of the two one wants to weaken.
Principles are of the greatest sublimity. For example, self-esteem demands
sacrifice. E.g. a man can be ugly but a
witty woman cannot.
The Coquette exceeds the feminine, the rough
Pedant the masculine; a prude is too masculine and a petit maitre[i]
too feminine
It is ridiculous that
a man, through understanding and a large income, wants to make a young woman
fall in love with him
The diversity of women
as that of faces. Characters
Parallels between feeling and capacity[1]
A more tender (dull) a
finer (coarser) taste[2]
<Sympathy with the natural misfortune of
others is not necessary, but it certainly is for the injustices suffered by
others.>
[4] The feeling with
which I am dealing is so constituted that I do not need to be taught to ratiocinate
in order to sense it
{R 8} The finer
feeling is that for which the idealistic does <not chimerically contain the
noble reason> of agreeableness[3]
Voltaire knew and I hope
<why women are embarrassed among one another>[ii]
dolce
piccante the
pleasant acidity[iii]
Bold <The third
gulp Alexander took from the chalice
was sublime though rash>[iv]
The splendor of the
rainbow of the setting sun
Cato’s
death.[v] Sacrifice <Our current constitution makes
it so that women can also live without men, which ruins everything>[vi]
strange and
peculiar
the powerful person is kind. Jonathan
Wild.[vii]
The brave
youngster.
[5] Women are strong[4]
because they are weak <their courage>
Menfolk will be casual
toward vapeurs and hysterical
coincidences[ix]
Hat under the arm[x]
Love and respect
<Taking revenge
oneself[5]
is sublime. Certain vices are
sublime. Assassination is cowardly and
low. Most do not even have the courage
for great vices.>
Sexual love[6]
always presupposes lustful love,[7]
either in feeling or memory.
This lustful love is
also either crude or refined
{R9}Tender love has a
great mixture of respect, etc.
A woman does not reveal
herself easily; for this reason she does not drink. Because she is weak, she is clever
In marriage unity not
union
Tender love is also
different from marital love
{2, Title Page, Front Side, Upper Margin}
- - {Latin} What you
desire is in you
do not seek yourself
outside of you Persius[xi]
On moral rebirth
What supplies a true
or imagined need is useful mihi bonum[8]
{Under “Observations”}
The desires that are
necessary for a person through his nature [6] are natural desires.[9] The person who has no other appetites and
none to a higher degree than through natural necessity is called the person of
nature and his satisfaction
ability[10]
to be satisfied by less is the sufficiency of nature
The first part of
science is zetetic, the other dogmatic[xii]
The number of
cognitions[11]
and other perfections required for the satisfaction of nature is simplicity of
nature. The person in {R10} which one
encounters as much simplicity as the sufficiency of nature is the person of
nature.
Whosoever has learned
to desire more than what is necessary through nature is luxurious.
The needs of the
person of nature are pressing
needs[12]
A reason why the
representation[13]
of death does not have the effect that it could is because as active creatures by
nature, we should hardly think about it at all
{3, reverse side}
Gaiety is wanton, irritating, and
disruptive; but the soul at peace[14]
is benevolent and kind.
Wit[15]
belongs to unnecessary things; a man who takes this to be essential in a woman
acts just like one who spends his fortune by buying parrots and monkeys
One of the reasons why
debauchery among the female sex while in an unmarried state is reprehensible is
because of the fact that [7] when men in this state are debauched they are not
thereby preparing themselves for infidelity in marriage, for their [men’s]
concupiscence has certainly increased but their capacity[16]
has decreased. On the other hand, with a
woman the desire is unrestrained if the concupiscence increases. So nothing holds one back from presuming
that loose women will become unfaithful, but the same is not the case for
similar men.
Every purpose[17]
of science is either eruditiv
(memory) or Speculation (reason).[18] Both must result in making a person more reasonable
(cleverer, wiser) and thus more sufficient in a world that is generally
suitable to human nature.
{R11}A tender
woman-love[19]
has the characteristic of developing other moral characteristics, but the
lustful ones suppress them.
<Moral taste is such
that one regards science that does not improve as unimportant>
The sensitive soul at
peace is the greatest perfection in speech, in poetry, [and in] society, but it
cannot always be so. Rather, it is the
final goal – even so in marriages. Young
people surely have much feeling but little taste; the enthusiastic or zealous
style ruins taste. Perverted taste
through novels and gallant flirtations.
The healthy, pampered, [and] spoiled taste.
A knowledgeable but not clever man [is]
not cunning
a clever but not wise man. Higher manners
[8] The woman has a
fine taste in the choice of that which can affect the feelings[20]
of a man and the man has a dull [taste].
Therefore, it pleases him most when he thinks least about pleasing. On the other hand, the woman has a dull healthy
taste for whoever is concerned with her own feelings
{4, sheet inserted after the title page, front side}
Bearded women
beardless men. Valiant domestic.
The honor of a man consists
in the valuation of his self, of women in the judgment of others. A man marries according to his judgment, a
woman not against the judgment of the parents.
A woman opposes injustice with tears, a man with anger.[21]
went so
far sometimes puts one of Seneca’s judgments in a
woman’s mouth and makes it “as my brother says.” Were she married it would be called “as my
husband tells me.”[xiii]
Men become sweet
toward women if the women become masculine.
Insult to women in the habit of flattering them. {R12} Softness roots out more virtue than
wantonness, the dignity of a housewife.[22]
The vanity of women
makes it so that they are only happy in the glimmer beyond the home
The bravery of a woman
consists of the patient bearing of evil[23]
for the sake of honor or love. That of a
man in the eagerness to defiantly drive it [evil] away.
[9] Omphale forced
Hercules to spin[xiv]
Because so many
foolish needs make us soft, the pure unaffected moral drive cannot give us
enough powers. Therefore, it must come
to something fantastic.
Whence the stoic says:
my friend is sick; what does it matter to me
There is no man who does not feel the heavy yoke of opinion, and no one
does away with it.[24]
The chimera of
friendship in our condition and the fantastical friendship in the ancient
condition. Aristotle[xv]
Cervantes
would have done better if instead of making the fantastical and novelistic[25]
passion ridiculous he had made something better of it. Novels[26]
make noble women fantastical and common ones absurd.[xvi]
noble men also
fantastic, common ones lazy[27]
Rousseau’s book serves
to improve the Ancients[xvii]
In accordance with the
simplicity of nature, a woman cannot do much good without the providing of a
man. In conditions of inequality and
wealth, she can [do so] immediately
Moral luxury.[28] In sentiments that are without effect
Inner grief about the
inability to help, or about the sacrifice when one helps, even when one’s own cowardice makes us
{R13}believe that others suffer much although they can fairly endure it, brings
about pity. Incidentally this is a great
[10] antidote against selfishness. These
drives are altogether very cold in natural persons.
The natural elevations
are degradations in one’s state, for example to raise oneself to the position
of craftsman
Relative evaluation is
quite unnecessary, but in the state of inequality and injustice, it is good to
set oneself against the pompous high-ups with a certain pride or at the least
indifference so as to disapprove of unimportant things
With a certain breadth
one must [breaks off]
{5, back side, opposite page 1 in
Although being tall
does not make a man great, physical greatness does indeed conform to moral
judgments
It is easier to
educate a nobleman than an [ordinary] person.
He would be a despiser of the common rabble. For he must call them the industrious and the
oppressed so that one believes he has been created to support him. The scholars in
In all states there is
no one more useless than a scholar as long as it is in natural simplicity; and
no one more necessary than the same in a state of oppression by means of
suspicion or force
Thoughtfulnesses belong to small and pretty
dispositions
A woman’s affects are just as large as a man’s,
but they are superior, especially when it comes to respectability, the man is
rash. The Chinese and Indians have
affects that are just as great [11] as Europeans but they are calmer. A woman is vengeful
The rising sun is just
as splendid as the setting sun, but the {R14} sight of the former strikes the
beautiful, the latter the tragic and sublime
What a woman does in marriage comes much more from natural bliss than
what the man does, at least in our civilized condition
Because so many
unnatural desires find themselves in a civilized relationship, the occasion for
virtue also sometimes originates, and science originates because so much luxury
is found in enjoyment and knowledge. In
a natural condition one can be good without virtue and reasonable without
science
It is now difficult to
have insight into whether a person would have it better in simple conditions 1.
because he has lost his feeling for simple gratification. 2. because he commonly believes that the
corruption that exists in a civilized state also exists in conditions of
simplicity.
{6, page 1 of
[12] Bliss without
taste is based on innocence and modesty of inclination. With taste it [is based on] the sensitive
soul at peace; for this reason it is possible for one to be happy without
society. Amusements, not needs. Rest after work is pleasant One must never chase after gratification.
{Lower margin}
One must distinguish
between he is in accordance with the taste of others, though he has taste in
the consideration
of judgments of others. Women know very well how to evaluate in
accordance with the taste of others, and for this reason easily know other minds
and have good taste to satisfy them. But
they have a bad taste for others, which is good. For this reason they also all marry the
richest
{7, page 2 of
{R15}Tenderness and
fondness of sensation.
Taste chooses in
trifles
{8, sheet inserter after
Logical egoism [is] <skillfulness in taking a
stance.>
Common duties do not
need as their motive the hope of another life, but greater sacrifice and
self-denial surely have an inner beauty. But our feeling of pleasure for them can never
be so strong in itself that it outweighs the annoyance of inconvenience unless
the representation of a future state in which the persistence of such moral
beauty and the bliss is thereby increased, so that one will find himself more
capable of acting, thus it [the representation of a future life] comes in
handy.
All pleasures and
pains are either physical or ideal. As
for the latter [breaks off]
[13] A woman is
offended <by[29]
crudeness> or oppressed by injustice where no
justification but only threat can help.
She uses her touching weapons of melancholic tears, reluctance, and
complaints, but she endures the evil anyhow before she ever returns the
injustice. See here the courage of
woman. The man gets angry that one might
be so bold so as to offend him; he returns force with force threatens,
frightens, and lets the insulter feel the consequences of his injustice. See here the courage of man. It is not necessary that the man be indignant
about the evil of delusion; he can despise it in a masculine way. Yet he will be as truly infuriated about this
evil as about true insults if it befalls a woman.
{R16}A woman never
uses scolding reproaches as the external weapon of her anger against a woman,
but rather against a man, except by means of the threats against another man
When men
women squabble or fight the men laugh about it, but not the other way around
Duels primarily have
their basis in nature for the sake of women.
[14] In the present condition,
a man can use no other means against injustice than a woman can, that is,
authority is arranged not in accordance with the order of nature, but rather
with the civil society
constitution
Rousseau. He proceeds synthetically and starts from the
natural person, I proceed analytically and start from the civilized person
The
country life delights everyone, especially the shepherd’s life. Indeed, [the country life] absorbs the
civilized person’s boredom.
{9, back side, opposite
The human heart[30]
may be constituted as it likes, so the question is simply whether the state of
nature or of ethical
civilization develops more actual sin and skill in it [the heart]. It can subdue moral evil so much that merely
a lack of great purity appears in action but never a noticeable degree of
positive vice (whoever is not so saintly is for that reason not vicious). On the other hand, this can develop so far
that it becomes detestable. The simple
person has little temptation to become vicious.
[15] Luxury alone accounts for great provocations, and the culture of
moral feelings and understanding will never hold itself back if the taste for
luxury is already great
Piety is the <means
of> complementi of moral goodness[31]
to holiness. Therefore, the {R17}question
is not in the relation of one person
to another. We cannot naturally be
saintly and we lost this through original sin, although we certainly can be
morally good.
Is it not enough for
us that we
a person never lies, whether or not he has a secret inclination which, were it
put in the right situation, would develop into lying?
We surely ask whether
a man undertakes his actions of honesty, of fidelity, etc. out of consideration
for a divine obligation, if he does them, although these actions are
condemnable before God insofar as they do not arise through this
[consideration]
In order to prove that
the person of nature is corrupt one appeals to the civilized condition. One ought to appeal to the natural.
Actions of justice are
those which, when neglected by another will, naturally move us to hate. Actions of love, when neglected, will be reason no reason for love of
others toward us.
{10, Page
Utility; counterfeit
money[32]
{Lower margin}
Because
the basic
talents basic
characteristics of women are used up in the research of the man [16] and his
inclinations and because they [women] also easily create illusion,[33]
they are made to rule and also to govern everything in nations that have taste
{11, sheet inserted after
There
is a perfect world (the moral) in
accordance with the order of nature, and we ask ourselves about this one to the
same extent that we do about the supernatural.
{R18}The virtuous one
sees the rank of others with indifference, although when it relates to himself,
with consideration
One can either confine
his luxurious impulses or, by maintaining them, discover remedies against their
diseases. To the latter belong science,
and respect for life for the sake of the imminence of death, and solace for the
future
Boredom is a kind of
longing for an ideal gratification
The Holy Scripture
more effectively brings about improvement if supernatural powers accompany
it. The good, moral upbringing [has more
effect] if everything should happen purely in accordance with the order of
nature
[17] I admit that
through the latter we cannot bring forth saintliness, which is justified, but
we can bring about a moral goodness coram
foro humano,[34]
and this is even promotable through the former.
Just as little as one
can say that nature has implanted in us an immediate inclination for acquiring (the
stingy greediness), so little can one say it has given us an immediate drive to
honor. Both develop and both are useful
in general state of luxury. But here
they let themselves be excluded: so that just as nature brings about healing
through hard work, it also provides remedies in its injuries
The difference of
position[35]
makes it so that, as rarely as one puts himself in the place of a subservient
horse in order to introduce himself to his wretched feed, just as rarely does
one put himself in the place of wretchedness in order to understand it.
{12, back side, opposite
The provisions[36]
for the blissful life can be twofold:
1. That
one reveals how, after all the already acquired inclinations of honor and of
luxury, one can maintain his purpose[37]
and at the same time prevent the {R19}grief that can originate[38] in ideas like that of a future life, the
nothingness of this life, etc.
2. Or
that one attempts to bring the inclinations themselves to moderation[39]
The Stoics: their mistake
[is that] that through virtue, they search for a mere counterweight to the pain
of luxury. Antisthenes’s school tried to eradicate luxury itself.[xix]
The
Stoic teaches of anger out of respect for others.
The current moralists presuppose much as evil[40]
and want to teach to overcome it and many temptations for evils[41]
and write motives for overcoming them.
The Rousseauian method teaches
to regard the former as not evil and the latter, then, as no temptation.
[18] There is no one
more moderate in enjoyment than a miser.
The miserly greediness comes from an eager desire for all kinds of
pleasure to which there is no actual, but only a chimerical, inclination in the
miser because from hearsay he regards it as a great good even if he himself is
already moderate. This is bold
miserliness. Cowardly miserliness.
The threat of eternal
punishment cannot be the immediate foundation of morally good actions, although
[it is] certainly a strong counterweight against impulses to evil ones, so that
the immediate sensation of morality
is not outweighed.
There is no immediate
inclination to <morally> evil actions, but certainly an immediate
[inclination] to good ones
{13, page 5 of
This idealistic feeling
sees life in dead nature or imagines seeing it.
Trees drink from the neighboring brook.
The zephyr whispers of loved ones.
Clouds cry on a melancholic day.
Cliffs threaten like giants.
Solitude is inhabited by dreamy shadows and the deathly silence of
graves.
{R20}Fantastical This is whence the pictures
and the picturesque spirit come.[42]
{right margin, next to lines 12-13}
Idealistic therefore beautiful
{Lower margin}
[19] Philosophical
eyes are microscopic. Their view is
exact but small and
is therefore and their intention is truth. The sensible[43]
view is bold and provides enthusiastic excess that is stirring, although it
will only be encountered in the imagination.
Beautiful and sublime
are not the same. The former swells the
heart and makes the attention fixed and tense, thereby exhausting it. The latter lets the heart melt in a kind of
softish sensation and, as it leaves the nerves behind here, the feeling becomes
a gentler emotion which, if it goes too far, transforms into feebleness,
boredom, and disgust
{14, page 6 of
bold
{marginal notes at lines 24-27, 2:209}
The majority of men
are primarily effeminate[44]
or common and thus still worse in company than women
{lower
margin}
Whence does it come that
without women our societies are somewhat without taste, because neither with
the Greeks nor with the {R21}Romans was it so.
At that time one spoke of virtue and fatherland. Now this is an empty matter[45]
in whose place false devotion at best
can tread. Among loud men pleasantries
have no life and also become uncivilized.
We are softish[46]
and effeminate and have to be among women.[47][xx]
{15, sheet inserted at
The good-natured and
the well-mannered[48]
person are quite different. The first
may not have drives that have been turned tame, for they are natural and
good. The representation of higher
natures. If he thinks about it perhaps
he will say he is in another life. One
must be good and expect the rest. The
second is [either] 1. only civilized [or] 2. well-mannered. In the former case he has many fantastical
friends whose any idea that cannot be intuitive he must oppose in order to
maintain himself well. The second one is
a civilized man who will extend his ethical life over the simplicity of nature
until it extends to the object for which he only wishes and believes.
This natural ethical
life must also be the touchstone of all religion. For if it is uncertain whether people in
other religions can become blessed[49]
and whether they cannot help the torments of this world become bliss in the
next, still it is certain that I should not follow them. This would not be the case if the natural
feeling were not sufficient for exercising all duties of this life.
[20] As the Portuguese Celebes discovered, the
inhabitants understood the correctness of their religion, but sent to Malacca
for Don Pedro as often as to Achin for the queen. [They] got double the priests and [breaks
off][xxi]
Everyone who is a
coward lies, but not vice versa.
Therefore, what makes one weak brings about lying. The foolish lust for honor and shame the
most.
Shame and modesty are
different. The former is a betrayal of a
secret through the natural flow of blood.
The latter is a {R22}means of concealing a secret for the sake of
vanity, in other words for a sexual excitement
It is far more
dangerous to be with free and greedy people than with the subjects of a monarch
in war. The utility they have from
vanity.
[21] I will say ‘of
everything’ where there are seldom exceptions.
For in accordance with the rule of prudence, that which occurs so seldom
that one thereupon
regards it as a stroke of luck [can be said to] never happen, and according to
that [is said to] be generally in accordance with the rule of prudence where
any cases that one can seek of the contrary accord with no rule. I speak of taste, I take then my own judgment
according
to the rule of so that it is generally true in accordance with
the rule of taste (aesthetic) whether
or not it is also exactly logical
in accordance with the rule of measured reason (logical) [or is] only valid on its own
{16, back side opposite
[22] A heart expanded
through sensibility prepares itself for longing and will finally be worn out[50]
from the sensations of all the things of life; for this reason it sighs for
something that is outside its circle, and as true as its devotion is to itself,
just as fantastical is it with respect to most people because they are
themselves chimerical, and [it] comes about that they offer their love [and]
their sincerity only with respect to God and are cold with respect to the
former [love] while misplaced with respect to the other [sincerity]. For one can be more easily deceived concerning
the former than the latter
Because one can make
for himself a concept of higher moral characteristics, sacrifice for the common
good, everlasting devotion, fulfillment of marital intentions without sensual
pleasure, immediate inclination to science without honor, one imagines all
these to be suitable for the state of humanity and finds the situation that one
sees to be corrupted. But they are the
same desires, fantastical and developing from precisely the [same] sources as
general corruption. Even these
shortcomings become no more blameworthy when regarded with respect to humanity
when the remaining corruption is raised up
{R23}Whole nations can deliver the example of a
human being generally.[51] One never finds great virtues where they are not
also combined with great excess, like with the English.[52] Canadian savages. What is the cause [?] The French are more proper and all the
sublimity of virtue is also missing.
The station[53]
of humankind in the order of created being
{17, page 8 of
Beautiful, cute
{18, sheet inserted after
[23] All devotion that
is natural has a use only when it is the result of a good morality. Under the same
[category] is also taken natural devotion that is related to a book. For this reason the spiritual teachers
correctly say that it [devotion] does no good except where it has been affected
by the spirit of God, whereupon here it is intuition, otherwise it is closely
enjoined to self-deception.
The reason why married
people are so cold-minded is this: because both members have so many external,
chimerical bonds of decorum, of grace, and if one or the other part depends
strongly on an opinion, he becomes indifferent toward the opinion of the other. From this arises contempt, finally hate. For this reason, in relation to novelistic[54]
love, it is only the characteristic of a hero.
Coquette.
Those who would make a
doctrine of virtue into a doctrine of piety would make a whole from a part, for
piety is only one kind of virtue.
It
often seems to us that the human race would have almost no value if it
contained no great artist and scholar.
Therefore, [24] the country people [and] the farmers appear to be
nothing in themselves and to be something only as some kind of support for the
former. The injustice of this judgment
{R24}already shows that it is false.
That is to say, one feels that if he has extended his inclinations, he may
do what he wants, [that] life would be nothing, and that the extension of these
inclinations is therefore injurious.
There is thus a great
difference [between] overcoming one’s inclinations and eradicating them, that
is to say, making it so that one loses them, this is again different from
restraining inclinations, namely, making sure no one gets them. The former is necessary for older people and
the latter for younger ones.
There is a great
difference between a good human being and being a good rational being. As the latter is perfect, it has no bounds
but finitude, the former has many limits.
{19, back side, opposite
To prevent children
from lying is a great art. For since they are far too wanton and far too
weak to tolerate denials or punishments, they have a very strong incitement to
lie, as old people never do. Especially
since they can provide nothing for themselves like grownups can, but instead
everything depends on the way in which they represent things according to the
inclinations that they notice in others.
Thus, one must only punish them for things that they cannot deny and not
grant them things on spurious grounds.
If one would approve of
develop morality, then one must not
introduce motives that do not lead to morally good actions, e.g., punishment,
reward. For this reason one must also
portray lying as repulsive, as it is in fact, and never subordinate it to any
other rule of morality, for example,
duty toward others.
(One has no duties
towards oneself, but one has absolute
[25] duties, that is, in and for itself an action is good. It is also nonsensical that in our morality
we should depend on ourselves)
In medicine, one says that the doctor is
the servant of nature: it works just the same in morality. Merely hold off external evil, [and] nature
already will take the right course
{R25}If the doctor
said that nature in itself is ruined, by what means does he want to improve it
[?] Likewise with the moralist
A person takes no more
share in the luck or misfortune of others than what makes him feel
contented. If it happens that he is
contented with very little, then it will produce kind people.[55] Otherwise it is for nothing.
Universal love of
humankind has something high and noble in itself, but among human beings it is
chimerical. When one acts upon[56]
this universal love of humankind, one becomes accustomed to deceive oneself
with longing and idle wishes. As long as
one is so very dependent on such things, one cannot participate in the
happiness of others.
{20, page 9 of
Because dubious things[57]
are small, one is called [breaks off][58]
{21, sheet inserted after
[26] The simple man
has a feeling of what is right early on, but very late, or never at all, does
he have a concept of it. That feeling must be developed long before the
concept. If one teaches him early on to
develop according to rules he will never feel [it]
It is difficult, after
the inclinations have developed, to represent good and evil in other
circumstances. Because I will waste away
from boredom without a perpetual pleasure, I also represent to myself that it
is the same with the Swiss man, who grazes his cows in the mountains. I And <this>
[Swiss man] cannot understand how a man who has had enough could want even
more. One can hardly conceive how, in
such a lowly state, this lowliness does fill one with pain. On the other hand, when the rest of {R26}the
people are also stuck with the evil of delusion, some cannot understand how
they could have gotten this delusion.
The noble man imagines the evil contempt of stolen splendor that could
have crushed a commoner, and the latter [the commoner] does not understand how
he [the noble man] could become used to [27] counting certain delights among
his needs.
The ruler who endowed
the nobility wanted to issue something that certain people could serve instead
of all other excess[59]. Yet they have a tidbit of nobility. Let the rest of the mob have the money.
Can anything be more
perverse than to tell tales to the children who have barely stepped into this
world, just as with the others?]
Indeed, one tires of
others. One does not listen long to
precocious talk. A person who does not
neglect himself at all becomes troublesome.
Too much attentiveness to oneself looks fastidious.[60]
{22, back side, opposite
Just as fruit, when it
is ripe enough, breaks away from the tree and approaches the earth to let its
own seeds take root, so the mature person also breaks away from his parents, plants
himself, and becomes the roots of a new generation[61]
[28] A man must depend on no one else so that the wife depends entirely on him.
It must be asked how
far inner moral grounds can bring a person.
Perhaps it
they will carry him far enough so that he is secured in a position of freedom
without great temptations, but if other injustices or the coercion of illusion
forces him, then this inner morality[62]
does not have enough power. He must have
religion and be {R27} encouraged by
means of the reward of a future life and human nature is not capable of an
immediate moral purity. But if
supernatural wisdom produces purity in him, future rewards will no longer have
the quality of motives
The difference between
a false and a healthy morality is that the former seeks only for antidotes for
evil,[63]
while the latter is concerned that the cause of this evil not exist at all
Appearance, if it
announces sublimity, is ‘the gleam’; if it announces beauty, it is ‘the pretty’
or, also, if it is contrived, the ‘ornamentation of finery’
Among all types of
finery there is also the moral.
Sublimity of condition consists of the fact that he deals with much
worth; here, the beautiful is called ‘the suitable’
The reason why those
of the nobility commonly pay so poorly
{23, page 11 of
It is a great shame
for a genius when criticism comes
before art. When in a nation it
[criticism] blinds them before a standard is set and they have revealed their
own talents.
{lower margin}
[29] Sublime attitude
that overlooks trivialities and notices the good among deficiencies.
Tobacco
{24, sheet inserted after
It is unnatural that a
person spends most of his life teaching one child how it should someday
live. A tutor like Jean Jacques is therefore artificial. In simple conditions a child would be
afforded very little service; as soon as he has a bit of strength {R28}he would
carry out small, useful adult activities, as by a farmer or craftsman, and will
gradually learn the rest.
It is therefore
fitting that a person spend his life teaching so many others how to live that
the sacrifice of his own is by contrast not to be considered. Hence schools are necessary. But for them to be possible, one must raise[64]
Emile. One would wish that Rousseau had shown how
schools could arise from it.[xxii]
Preachers in the
country could begin to do this with their own children and their neighbors
Taste is not attached
to our needs. A man must already be
civilized if he wants to choose a wife in accordance with taste.
[30] Do not be very
refined, because then only small traits will be noticed; substantial traits
will only be apparent to simple and coarse eyes.
To have taste is a
discomfort to the understanding. I must
read Rousseau so long that the beauty of [his] expression no longer disturbs
me, and then can I examine him with reason for the first time
That great people only
glimmer in the distance; that a ruler loses it in front of his valet comes from
the fact that no man is great
Something that is
again a great impediment to the doctrine of eternal bliss, and that allows one
to suppose that it [the doctrine] is not appropriate for our situation, is that
those who believe it become thereby no less zealous about the bliss of this
life, which must happen if our vocation to act for a great cause is to break
[forth]
{25, back side, opposite
If I want to put
myself into a great, though not complete independence [31] from people, then I
must be able to be poor without {R29}feeling it, and slightly obliged without
respecting it. But if I were a rich man
I would, especially in my gratification, bring about freedom from things and
people. I would not overburden myself
with things like guests, horses, or subjects from whose loss I must be
secured. I would have no jewels because
I can lose them, etc. I would neither my clothes
arrange myself according to the delusion of another so that he doesn’t actually
harm me, for example, reduce my acquaintance but not so that he makes me
comfortable.
How freedom in actual
understanding (the moral and not the metaphysical) is the topmost principium of all virtue and also of all
bliss
It is
necessary to comprehend how late the art of daintiness and civilized
disposition came about and how they are never in their own area of the world
(e.g. where there are no house pets) so that one distinguishes between what is
foreign and accidental to nature and what is natural to it. If one considers the bliss of the savage it
is not in order to turn back to the forest, but instead in order to see what
one has lost, by making gains elsewhere.
Thereby one does not paste enjoyment and the employment of sociable
luxury together with unfortunate and unnatural inclinations, and [one] remains
a civilized person of nature. That
consideration serves as the standard.
For nature never created a person into a citizen, and his inclinations
and his endeavors are aimed merely at the simple condition of life.
It appears that the
primary vocation of the majority of other creatures is that they live and that
their kind lives
If I assume this of
human beings, then I must not condemn the lowliest savage
{26, page 14 of
Greek profile: a thick body, great tallness,
wide shoulders
{27, sheet inserted after
{R30}[32] How, out of luxury[65],
simple[66]
religion and also the force of religion (at the very least every new
transformation) becomes necessary
Pure, natural religion
in no way suits a state,[67]
and skepticism still less.
Anger is a good
natured feeling of weak people. An
inclination to suppress it brings about unforgiving hate. Women, men of the cloth. One does not always hate those at which one is
angry. The good-naturedness[68]
of people who get angry. Feigned modesty
conceals anger and makes false friends
For such a weak
creature as a human being, the partly necessary, partly voluntary ignorance of
future things is quite suitable
I can never convince
another except by means of his own thoughts.
I must therefore presuppose that the other has a good and correct
understanding, otherwise it is futile to hope that he could [33] be won over by my reasons. Likewise I cannot even move someone morally
except through his own sentiments; consequently, I must presuppose that the
other has a certain goodness of the
heart, or else he will never feel abhorrence at my portrayal of vice nor feels
motives in himself from my praises of virtue.
Because if his evil was complete and he was truly evil,it would instead
be impossible that some morally
correct sentiment would be in him or for him to be able to suspect that his
sentiment was in harmony with that of the entire human race, so I must in that
sense grant partial goodness[69]
to him and must depict the slippery resemblance of innocence and crime as
deceptive
Greek profile. A thick body, great tallness, wide shoulders
{28, back side, opposite
{R31}[70]The
chief reason to create is because it is good.
A consequence of this is that because God, with his power and great
knowledge, finds himself to be good, he also finds good everything that is
possible to actualize. [34] Secondly, he has a liking for everything
that is good, but mostly whatever aims at the greatest good. The first is good as a result, the second as
a reason
Because revenge
assumes that people who hate each other stay close, failing which, if one can
withdraw himself when he wants, the reason to take revenge falls away, thus it
[revenge] cannot exist in nature because it [nature] does not assume that
people will be confined near one another.
But anger is a very necessary characteristic and suitable to a man, that
is to say, if it is not a passion (which is different from an affect), [it] is certainly found in
nature
One cannot imagine of
convenience what he has not required, just as the Carib detested salt, because
he was not used to it.[xxiii]
Agesilaus and the Persian
satrap both despised each other; the former said, “I know the Persian sensual
pleasure, but you know nothing of mine.”
He was wrong[xxiv]
The goods of softish
luxury[71]
and of delusion; the latter accrue from the comparative manner of evaluation in
science, in honor, etc.
Christianity says that
one should not attach his heart to temporal things. Under this it is also understood that early
on one should prevent himself from acquiring any such dependence. Lastly, to nurture inclinations and then
expect supernatural assistance to govern them, that is to tempt God.
{29, page 16 of
{32}The
adventurous taste parodies.
Grotesqueries
parody Hudibras[xxv]
Comically
sublime.
{30, sheet inserted after
Stages[:] freedom,
equality, honor. (Delusion). Foresight, henceforth he loses his entire
life.
[35] Two touchstones
for the difference from the natural [and] from the unnatural: 1. Whether it is
suitable to what one cannot change 2. Whether it can be common to all people or
to a few with the oppression of the rest
A certain great
monarch of the North civilized, as it is called, his nation; If God wanted, he
would have brought morals to it, but then everything he did was political
welfare and moral ruin[xxvi]
I can make no one
better than the remaining good that is in him, I can make no one more prudent
than the prudence remaining in him
Vicious people can be
considered with affability because vice comes to them externally through our
ruined constitution
From the feeling of
equality comes the idea of justice, [which is] as harm
much constrained as coerced. The former
is duty toward others, the latter is the sensed duty of others towards me.
[36] So that this has a
standard gauge in understanding, we are able to put ourselves in the place of
another in our thought and, so that it does not lack motives, {R33}we are moved
through sympathy by the misfortune
and distress of others, just as by our own.
This duty will be
recognized as something whose lack in another will let me consider him my enemy
and make me hate him. Nothing stirs
something up more than injustice, all other evils that we endure are nothing in
comparison. Duty concerns only necessary
self-preservation in so far as it is preservation of the kind, everything
remaining is favor and goodwill.[72] Still, I will also hate anyone who sees me
struggling in a pit and cold-heartedly passes by.
Kindnesses
find themselves only through inequality.
For I understand in kindness a readiness to create good, especially in
those cases where the general, natural sympathy would not be a sufficient
reason for it. Now it is simple and
natural even to sacrifice as much convenience as I provide for another because
one person is worth as much as another.
So if I should be ready and willing for it, I must judge myself more
harshly with respect to discomforts than another, I must consider it a great
evil from which I spare another and a small one that I suffer myself. A man would despise another if he showed such
kindnesses toward him.
The
first inequality is of a man and child and of a man and of a woman. To a certain extent, he considers it a duty,
since he is strong, and they are weak, not to sacrifice anything to them.[73]
{Linked by characters to
Apparent
nobleness is <appearance> decency.[74] The apparent splendor [is] the luster. The apparently beautiful [is] the
ornamented. [37] The beautiful is either
charming or pretty
{31, back side, opposite
Every
unjust valuation that does not belong to the purpose of nature also disturbs
the beautiful harmony of nature.
Because the {R34}arts and sciences are held to be so important, anyone
who does not have them is made disdainful and [this] brings us to injustices
that we would not bear if we were to consider them as more than resembling us.
If
something is not ultimately
suitable to the length of a lifetime, or not to its epochs, or not to a large
part of human beings, finally, to the extent that it is subjected to chance and
is only possible with difficulty, it does not belong to the blissfulness and
perfection of the human race. [38] How
many centuries have passed by before actual sciences existed and how many
nations exist in the world that will never have them.
One
must not say that nature calls us to the sciences because they have given us
skills. For what concerns pleasure can be merely contrived.[75] Because the insidiousness of the sciences has
been proven, there is much more to judge: we have a capacity for understanding
that goes further than our vocation in this life, thus there will be another
life. If we try to disentangle this
here, we will poorly satisfy our position.
A grub that would feel that it ought to become a butterfly.
Scholars
believe that everything is for their sake.
Noble people, too. If one has
traveled to barren
[39]
From the previous reasons, one should judge that those who want to know too
much prematurely here will thereby be castigated by weakness as
punishment. Just as a prematurely clever
child either dies or fades and becomes dumb at a young age.
A human
may tinker as much as he wants, but he cannot force nature to follow other
laws. He himself must either work or
{R35}others [work] for him, and this work will rob others of so much bliss that
he will increase his own beyond the average
If one
person wants to enjoy without working, then others will [have to] want to work
without enjoying
{32, sheet inserted after
One
could promote one’s welfare either by letting one’s desires expand, and
striving to satisfy them; one could promote righteousness if one allowed the inclinations
of illusion and luxury to grow and would endeavor to oppose them with moral
impulses. But to both problems there is yet another solution, that is, not
allowing the inclinations to arise.
Lastly, one could also promote good conduct by putting aside all
immediate moral goodness and merely
laying the ground for the commands of a punitive lord who issues rewards.
The
evil[76]
proper to science for humans is primarily this, that the largest part of them
who want to adorn themselves with it acquire not any improvement of the
understanding but instead only a depravity of it, not to mention that it
[science] serves the majority only as a tool of vanity. The use for which the sciences have is either
luxury, e.g. mathematics, or the hindrance of evil[s] that it itself wrought,
or also, as an indirect result, a certain modesty.
[40]
The concepts of civil justice and what is natural and the feeling of duty that
comes from it are almost directly opposed.
If I solicit from a rich person who got his fortune by extorting his
peasants, and I give this to the poor, then I carry out a very noble action in
the civil understanding, whereas I only do a common duty in the natural
[understanding].
[41]
With general luxury, one complains about the divine rule and about the rule of
the king. One does not consider that, as
{R36}concerns the latter, the very same desire for honor and immoderacy that
controls the commoner and have no other form on the throne than as they have 2.
that such commoners cannot be ruled otherwise.
The subject wants the master to overcome his inclinations of vanity in
order to promote the good of his lands and [he wants] to think that demands of
him do not occur in consideration of lowly things even with the law. Where people themselves are in the first
place wise, righteous, and moderate, these virtues will soon rise to the throne
and also make the prince good. See here
the weak princes who show kindness and courage in such times, could they
practice something completely different as with great injustice towards others,
because this puts the courage in nothing other than the distribution of robbery
that one stole from another. The freedom
that a prince accords to think and write like I am doing now is worth just as
much as many privileges of a greater luxury, because through that freedom
everything of this evil can still be improved.
{33, back side, opposite
The
greatest concern of the human being is to know how to properly fulfill his
station[77]
in creation and rightly understand what one must do in order to be a human
being. But if he becomes acquainted with
gratifications or learns ethical characteristics that are above or beneath him that may flatter him
but for
which he is not
organized so and which opposes the style of arrangement
that is by nature suitable to him, [or] when he learns ethical qualities[78]
that gleam, then he will himself disturb the beautiful order of nature and only
prepare the ruin of it, because he will have avoided his post he knows that
he cannot be content with that which is noble; for, since he is not content with that for which he is
destined, since he steps out of the sphere of humanity, he is nothing and the
hole that he has made spreads his own corruption to the neighboring members[79]
[42]
Among the harms wrought[80]
by the flood of books in which our part of the world is annually drowned, is
one that has not the slightest bit of real usefulness and that is seen swimming
here and back again over the wide abysses of booklearning {R37}ocean of booklearning[81]
and must share the fate of decrepitude with the residual chaff. The inclination to read much in order to say
that one has read. The habit of not
lingering long on a book, and [breaks off]
Luxury
brings people together to the city Rousseau wants to bring them to the
country
Evil
quite replaces the self-wrought intemperance[82]
of a person. The desire for freedom and
the exclusive force of a ruler[83]
is a great misfortune, but it becomes just as much an orderly system – in fact,
there is actually more order, though less [43] bliss – as in
One of
the greatest harms of science is that it takes away so much time that the youth
get neglected in virtue
Second,
that they so habituate the mind to the sweetness of speculation that good actions stop.[84]
{34, page 21 of
Moral
beauty, simplicity, sublimity. Justice;
righteousness is simple. The passion of
the sublime is enthusiasm. Beloved,
virtuous. Friendship. Beautiful ideal.
{35, sheet inserted after
The
first impression that a <reasonable[85]>
reader <who does not read out of vanity or for entertainment> gets from
the writings of Mr. J. J. Rousseau
{R38}is that he has encountered an great uncommon astuteness of spirit, a noble impetus of genius
and sensitive soul combined to such a high degree certainly
hardly at any time as
has perhaps never been possessed by a writer of any era or people. The next judgment that initially grows
concerns the The impression that follows is alienation[86]
from strange and absurd opinions that are in such opposition to what is
generally acceptable[87]
that one easily forms the suspicion that the author, by virtue of his
extraordinary talents, would want to show, < prove>, and provoke
admiration and the force of an
enchanting wit the [44]
magical power of his eloquence and make himself the queer man make himself the eccentric so that he
among who stands out
among all his rivals in wit by way of engaging novelty. The third thought to which one only arrives
with difficulty because it only seldom occurs [breaks off]
One
must teach youth to honor the common understanding as much for moral as for
logical reasons.
I
myself am a researcher by inclination. I
feel the entire thirst for knowledge and an eager restlessness to proceed further
in it, but also satisfaction in each forward step. There was a time when I believed that this
alone could constitute the honor of humankind and I despised the rabble, who
knows nothing. Rousseau brought me around. I This blinding prejudice[88]
vanished. I learned to honor human
beings and I would think myself less useful than the common worker if I did not
believe that this consideration could give worth to all others in establishing
the rights of humankind.
[45] It is quite ridiculous to say that you
should love other people, rather one must say you have good reason to love the
ones near you. This even goes for your
enemy.
Virtue
is strong, thus whatever weakens and makes one soft for pleasures or dependent
upon delusion is opposed to virtue.[89] Whatever makes life contemptible or even
hateful to us does not lie in nature.
Whatever makes vice easy and virtue difficult does not lie in nature
{R39}Universal
vanity makes it so that one says they know living only of those who never
understand living (outside themselves)
It is
not at all conducive to bliss to extend the inclinations to luxury, for there
are many uncommonly many cases where
circumstances are unfavorable [and] contrary to a desired situation, and they
become a source of displeasure, grief, and worry, of which the simple person
knows nothing
It also
does not help here to preach noble endurance.
{36, back side, opposite
If
<there is> any science necessary to the human being that a person truly requires, then it is the one that
teaches a person to properly fulfill the place[90]
which was allotted to him in creation and from which he can learn how one must
be in order to be human.[91] Suppose he got to know deceitful deceptive enticements above and beneath himself
that brought him unnoticed from his <proper> place, then this instruction
would lead him back again to the state of a human being and, [46] even if he
also might still find himself to be small or inadequate, in such a way he will
be correctly at his allotted post[92]
because he is
neither more nor less than
is exactly what he should be.
The
mistake of saying one knows none
this is universal among us [and thus] absolutely universal is easily avoided by
intelligent [people]. But consequent
judgments are apparent: nature has given us the opportunity for gratification,
why do we not want to attend to it; we have the capacity for sciences, it is a
call of nature to seek it; we feel in us a ethical voice that speaks to us [and] that is noble and righteous; this
is a duty to act in such a way
Everything
passes by us in a river and the changeable taste and the different forms of
people make the entire game {R40}uncertain and deceptive. Where do I find definite points of nature
that a person cannot displace and that could give him signs as to which bank he must head for
[47]
That all size is only relative and there is no absolute size can be seen here.
I measure the sky by the diameter of the earth, the earth’s diameter by
miles, the miles by feet, these by relation to my body
{37, page 23 of
Friendship,
young people
{in the margin, next to lines 16-18}
Respect
for his own equality
{38, sheet inserted after
The
question is which
characteristics which
condition suits human beings as inhabitants who are running around on a planet
200 sun-diameters from the sun
Just as
little as I can step onto the planet Jupiter
from here, so little can I demand to have characteristics that are that
planet’s own. The one who is so wise
regarding another place of creation is a fool regarding the one he inhabits
I
certainly do not have the ambition to want to be a seraphim, my pride is only
this, that I am a human being
The one phrase it is difficult to sort out:
that does not lie <or lies> [48] in nature, that is, nature has given no
drive for it, instead they are artificial; no such affliction is innate[93],
instead they are accidentally[94]
grown; the other [phrase] is easier, that does not conform with nature, that
is, that which opposes whatever actually is in nature. {R41}Often Rousseau proceeds according to the
former and because human nature has now acquired such a devastated form,
natural foundations[95]
become dubious and unrecognizable
The
moderate commoner can form no concept [of] what else the courtier can lack, who
can live on his goods just as he pleases, meanwhile the latter grieves to death
Many
people have theology and no religion
except perhaps to someday apologize for awful viciousness when they become
threatened by the terrors of hell
On the
worth of this life in itself or immediately and on the worth of this life only
as a means to another life.
The
life of the purely pleasurable without contemplation and morals appears to have
no worth
[49]
<A sign of crude taste nowadays is that one requires so much pretty make-up
but in fact the finest taste is of simplicity.>
With
people and animals, a certain average size has the most strength.[96]
<In
a civilized state, one becomes clever
very late in the game, one could certainly say along with the Theophrast, it is a shame then that one
ceases to live just when he hopes for success.>[xxviii]
Moral
taste with respect to sexual inclination, since in that everyone wants to appear
to be quite refined[97]
or even pure. Truth is not the highest
perfection of social life; the beautiful illusion drives it here just as it
does much more in painting. On taste in
marriage.
{39, back side, opposite
{R42}Certainty
in ethical judgments by means of comparison with the ethical feeling is just as
great as with logical sentiment, and through the analysis of a human being I
will make [the claim] that lying is repulsive just as certain as [the claim]
that a thinking body is incoherent.
Deception with respect to ethical judgment occurs just like that of
logical [judgment], but the latter is still more frequent
In the
metaphysical foundations of aesthetics the [50] differentiated nonmoral[98]
feeling is to be taken note of, with the first principles of ethical
world-wisdom,[99]
the differentiated moral feeling of people toward the difference of gender, of
age, of upbringing and governance of races and climates is to be taken note of[xxix]
On the
religion of a woman – on bold facial expression. A certain timidity, suspicion, etc. suits her
well. Her loquacity, usefulness
Why
difference in position is shown mostly among women.
The
woman is closer to nature
a man
who knows how to live – – what a woman he will marry
On
Rousseau’s attempt to move through love [to] the best talents[xxx]
Women
educate their men themselves; they can attribute it to themselves if the men
turn out badly.
Anyone
who is foolishly accommodating becomes a disgruntled husband
On
empty longing through a feeling of the sublime that is disproportionate and
poorly suited to humans. Novels.
Rousseau
took his sweetheart to the village[100][xxxi]
{R
43}[51] A marriage of an overly-refined <exquisite> man to a coquette.
One imagines
two marriages of which one has, so to say, a good sound, and the other is
domestic
Moral
taste is inclined to imitation; moral principles rise above this. Where there are courts and great distinctions
between people, everything amounts to taste, in republics it is otherwise.
Therefore the taste in society is more refined in the former and more
crude in the latter. One can be very
virtuous and have little taste. If the
social life should grow, taste must be expanded because the agreeableness of
society must be easy, while principles must be difficult. This taste is easiest among women. Moral taste does not easily reconcile itself
with the illusion of principles. [52]
Swiss, Dutch, English, French free cities.
Suicide in
Taste for
pure virtue is somewhat crude; if it [taste] is refined, then it must be able
to try mixing it [virtue] with folly
{40, sheet inserted after
What a
person calls the finer part of life is a wonderful weaving of trifling amusements <distractions, boring amusements>,
[and] still more troubles – – vanity and a whole swarm of silly
distractions. The loss of the same is
commonly regarded as death or even much worse than death (a person who knows
how to live) one who has lost the taste for it has died to gratification
Refined
crude feeling. Refined self-acting ideal, sometimes chimerical. One has reasons
for not refining his feeling too much, first so as not to open the gates of
pain, secondly in order to be closer to what is most useful
Sufficiency
and simplicity demand a crude feeling and make [one] happy
{R44}The
beautiful is loved, the noble respected
The ugly hated [is met] with disgust, the ignoble despised[101]
The
courage of a woman to follow a man in misfortune and her tenderness. With a more tender, a more valiant man, the
man feels himself in his woman and shares no pain with her
[53]
Small people are courageous and arrogant, large [people are] composed
The
natural person is moderate not because
of future health (for he does not foresee
[this]), but because of present well-being
A
reason that women are haughty toward each other is that they are more similar
to each other because the basis of nobility is in the men. The reason that they are embarrassed near one
another and are competitive is that they the happiness of men though the latter from favor and from does not come so much from kindness as
from service, so that they make themselves happy, while the latter are made
happy by others. On this is based their
inherent inclination to please
The
reason why the excesses of lust are sensed so sharply is because they concern
the basis of propagation, that is,
the preservation of the species; and because this is the only thing women are
good for, it constitutes their highest perfection, whereas the preservation of
their selves depends on the man
The
capacity to create usefulness with fertility is limited for a woman and broad
for a man.
{41, back side, opposite
Luxury
causes one to draw a great distinction between one woman and another
Desires
do not satisfy one through love, but through marriage; they are at the same
time the purest
{R45}[54]
The distinguishing feature of social life is to not always prefer another. To always prefer another is weak. The idea of equality regulates everything
In
society and in fashion,[102]
simplicity and equality make it easy and pleasant
Conquer
delusion and be a man so that your wife esteems you highest among all people,
do not yourself be a servant to the opinions of others.
When
your wife honors you, she does not see a slave of others’ opinions. Be domestic; [let] taste and not expense,
comfort and not superabundance, prevail in your society; more a choice of guests
than of food
– It
would be better for women if they actually worked.
[55] A
good[103]
of delusion consists in this, that only opinion is sought after, but the thing
itself is either regarded with indifference or even hated. The first delusion is that of honor. The second of spirit. The latter only loves the opinion that he can
have many goods of life through his money without ever really seriously wanting
it
Anyone
who is not convinced of what is obviously certain is a blockhead. Anyone who is not impelled by what is
obviously a duty is a scoundrel.
– A
dull head and corrupt heart.
That
the drive to honor comes from the desire for equality is seen here. Would a savage call upon another in order to
show his advantage? If he can relinquish
his [advantage], then he will enjoy his freedom. Only when he must be together with him, will
he try to outdo him, therefore the desire for honor is indirect
The
desire for honor is just as indirect as the miser’s desire for money. Both originate in the same way
{42, in
{R46}The
Arcadian shepherd’s life and our chivalrous life of the court are both in bad
taste and unnatural though alluring.[xxxii] For true gratification cannot take place when
it is done out of occupation. The
recreations of an employed person that are seldom or short and without
preparation are alone lasting and of genuine taste. Because she does not now have anything to do
but to muse about entertainments, a woman becomes annoying and gets a bad taste
for men who do not always know to quiet this frustrated inclination
{43, sheet inserted after
[56]
Others’ love of honor is so highly valued because it indicates so much
renunciation of other advantages
The
question is whether, [in order] to motivate my affects or those of others, I should take my footing[104]
outside of the world or in it. I answer
in the state of nature, that is, I find it [my footing] in freedom
Women
have feminine virtues.
Of
sympathy one must only note that it never governs, but must always be subordinated to the capacity and
reasonable demands to do good
He who
cannot do without much or is lazy has an idle sympathy.
[57]
The natural person without religion is preferred to the civilized [person] with
a purely natural religion. For the
latter must have his morality to a high degree if he should administer a
counterweight to his corruption.
Meanwhile,
a civilized person without any religion is much more dangerous
In
natural conditions, no correct concept of {R47}God can originate and a false
[one] that one constructs is detrimental.
Consequently, the theory of natural religion can only be true where
science is, therefore it cannot bind all people
Natural
theology, natural religion; a supernatural theology can nevertheless be
combined with a natural religion.
Nevertheless, those who believe Christian religion theology only have natural religion in
so far as the morality is natural. The
Christian religion is supernatural with respect to doctrine and also the powers
it exercises. How little cause ordinary
Christians have to linger over the natural.
Knowledge
of God is either speculative, and
this is uncertain and subject to dangerous errors, or moral through beliefs and
this thinks no other characteristics in God other than those that aim at
morality. This faith is either natural
or supernatural
{44, reverse side, opposite
Providence
is primarily to be praised for this reason, that it fits so well with people in
their present situation, namely, that the direction [of providence] does not
conform to their foolish wishes, that they suffer for their folly and [that]
nothing wants to harmonize with the person who has stepped out of the order of
nature. [58] If we consider the needs of
animals and plants, this conforms to providence. It would be quite perverse if the divine
governance were to change the order of things, just as man has changed himself,
in accordance with the delusion of humanity.
It is just as natural that, as far as one has deviated, everything must
seem to be perverse with respect to his degenerate[105]
inclinations.
Out of
this delusion springs a kind of theology as a phantasm of luxury (for this is
every time fraught
with feeble and superstitious)
and a certain sly cleverness to interweave through subjugation the highest
things into his business and schemes
{R48}Diagoras.[xxxiii]
Rousseau
was the first to discover, among the multiplicity of forms human beings have
taken on, humankind’s deeply concealed nature and the hidden law, in accordance
with which providence [59] through its observation is justified. Formerly, the
objections of Alfonso and Manes were still valid. After
{45,
pleasant
melancholy
true
virtue cries
{46, sheet inserted after
[60]
The savage is a part of human nature
A luxurious person roams further out of
its [human nature’s] borders and the morally affected person goes above it
[human nature].
On
friendship generally
On
beauty and nobility of company and on banquets; simplicity, magnificence.
If
something keeps a youth, who has become a man, from becoming a father, if something
gets in the way of enjoying life, if it is short and demands preparation for
future things in order to lose the present, if[106]
something makes us think that we hate life or that it is unworthy or too short,
then it does not lie in nature
{R49}Masculine
strength does not manifest itself in that one forces oneself to endure the
injustices of others when he can drive them back, but rather in bearing the
heavy yoke of necessity even while putting up with deprivations as a sacrifice
for freedom or for whatever else I love.
Endurance of insolence is a monkish virtue
[61]
The sanguine[107] endures insults because he fears the
great extent of revenging them
The
foolishness of conceit consists in [the fact] that the same one who values
another as so important that he believes their opinion to give him such great
worth nevertheless despises them so much that he considers them to be almost
nothing compared to himself
parallel to miserliness
{47, reverse side, opposite
The art of illusion fits well with the character of the
beautiful. For the beautiful does not
consist in the useful, but in mere opinion. Moreover, since the thing itself makes
loathsome that which is beautiful when it doesn’t appear to be new, [and] since
the simplicity of nature is all the same, the art of giving a pleasant illusion
to things is very beautiful. The female
sex possesses this art to a high degree, which also creates our entire
happiness. Through this the deceived
husband is happy, the lover or partner sees angelic[108]
virtues [62] and much to conquer and believes [himself] to have triumphed over
a strong enemy. Dissimulation[109]
is a perfection of women but a vice for men.
Uprightness[110]
complies with the noble
It
pleases the woman even if she is ill-bred but good-hearted
The
choleric person is honored in his presence and criticized in his absence, he
has few no friends. The melancholic, little and good
The
sanguine, much and careless.
{R50}The
choleric person looks as if [he is] filled with secrets
If one
keeps in mind that man and woman constitute a moral whole, then one must not
attach the same characteristics to them, but instead [attach] those
characteristics to one that the other is missing
<They
do not have as much feeling for the beautiful as man, but more vanity>[111]
A woman
endeavors to acquire much more love than men.
The latter content themselves with pleasing one person, the former
everyone. If this inclination is to be
understood as evil,[112]
then a person of universal fidelity[113]
arises
{48, Page 33 of
All
shocking delights are feverish and deadly languor and numb feeling follow the
ecstasies of joy. The heart gets used up
and the sensation gets coarse
{49, sheet inserted after
<The
melancholic person is just and embittered about injustice.>
[63]
Anger is a good-natured passion in the simplicity of nature, but in the silly
vanity of society it makes a fool.
The
melancholic person who is choleric is frightful. Extinguished blue eyes filled
the sickly face of Brutus.[xxxvi] (On humor, mood, [and] hypochondria. A woman and a softish visionary have moods) The melancholic
person who is sanguine is cowardly [and] depressed, afraid of people, [and]
jealous (the sanguine is galant). The melancholic person loves more strongly}
and becomes less loved by women because women are fickle. The choleric is a trickster of state,[114]
secretive, and important in bagatelles, the sanguine makes fun of
{R51}important things. The
melancholic-sanguine is a hermit or penitent in religion; the melancholic
choleric [breaks off]
[64]
The sanguine choleric is valiant like a choleric, vain like a sanguine drive to
fame without
and yet gracefully loves
change and is therefore brave. For this
reason [he] gives consideration to his pranks, loves the coquette and it mixes[115] his wife merely from the point of view
of how they please others. The
melancholic person is domestic, the choleric is a courtier. The sanguine person thrusts himself into
every jovial conversation. In misfortune
the melancholic choleric is rash and desperate, the sanguine is in tears and
disheartened, the choleric is ashamed of becoming obliged, the choleric
sanguine distracts himself through amusements and is pleased because he seems
to be happy. In clothing, the
melancholic sanguine is clean but something is always missing, the choleric
sanguine is in good quality, by neglect,[116]
the phlegmatic is dirty, the melancholic choleric is pure and simple
{50, reverse side, opposite
Before
one inquires into the virtue of a woman, one must first ask whether she needs
it. In the state of simplicity there is
no virtue. With men, to protect strong
inclinations and honesty; with women, loyal fidelity and flattery.
In
states of luxury the man must have virtue, the woman honor.
One can
hardly put the movement of refined moral feelings or decoration (moral
yeomanry. Alongside the pomade tin, the
greaseball)[117]
in the place of domestic occupation, [65] and she who weaves a gown for her
husband always puts to shame the gallant dame, who in place of this reads a
tragedy.
Longings.
In
discussion the melancholic person is still and serious. The sanguine person {R52} talks a lot when
one jests and changes the subject. The
choleric tries to set the tone and is affected himself. The choleric person laughs, forced by
propriety. The sanguine [laughs, forced]
by habit and friendliness. The
melancholic person laughs when everything has ceased.
When both
sexes degenerate, the degeneration of the man is worse[118]
He who
suffers nothing other than excessively furious expressions has a numb feeling,
he who suffers nothing but very beautiful people, only screaming colors, only
great heroic virtues has a numb feeling.
He who notices the impulse that soft handwriting and noble simplicity
hides in morals has a subtle feeling.
The feeling becomes more tender in middle age, but also gets gradually
weaker. The subtle feeling is not as
strong as the coarse one
{51, Page
Valiant
{52, sheet inserted
after
Good
consequences are surely signs of morality, but not always those the only ones, because they cannot
always become known with certainty. How
many lies could have good consequences.
The
ground for the divine legislative power[119]
does not lie in kindness. For the motive
would then be gratitude (subjective
moral ground, type of feeling) and consequently not strictly duty. The degree of legislative power [120]
presupposes inequality and causes one person to lose a degree of freedom to
another. [66] This can happen only if he himself sacrifices his will to
another. If he does this with respect to
all his actions, then he makes himself into a slave. A will that is
subjected to that of another is imperfect because a person and contradictory, for a person has spontaneity;[121]
if he is subjected to the will of a person {R53}(if he himself can still
choose) then he is repulsive and despicable; if he is subjected to the will of
God alone, then he is close to nature.
One must not perform actions out of obedience toward a person that one
could do out of inner motives, and to do everything out of obedience, where
inner motivating grounds would have done everything, produces slaves.
The
body is mine because it is a part of my self[122]
and is moved by my power of choice. The
entire animated or unanimated world that does not have its own power of choice
is mine in so far as I master it and can move it in accordance with my power of
choice. The sun is not mine. The same goes for another person, therefore
no property is a Prioprietat or an
exclusive property. But in so far as I
want to claim something as exclusively my own, I will presuppose that the will
of the other is at least not opposed to mine, nor [is] the action of the other
opposed to mine. [67] Therefore, I will
carry out the actions that indicate what is mine,[123]
chop the tree down, timber it, etc. The other person tells me that it is his
because, through the actions of his power of choice, it is as though it belongs
to his self.
{53, reverse side, opposite
A will
that should be good must not invalidate itself[124]
if it is taken universally and reciprocally; similarly, the other will not take
as his[125]
that on which I have worked, for otherwise he would thereby posit that his will
moved my body
By the
fact that a person calls many a thing his own, he thereby tacitly promises in similar circumstances through his will not to
[breaks off]
The
obedience of the children toward the parents is not based 1. on gratitude 2. on
the fact that they cannot sustain themselves, because that would be based on
use, but rather because they do not have their own complete will and [because]
it is good to be directed by the will of others. Because they are so much a thing of the
parents, for they live only through their will, it is morally good to be
governed by them [the parents]. If they
could support educate[126] themselves, obedience would cease.
{R54}[68]
We belong as it were to divine causes and exist through him [God] and his
will. Many things can be suitable to
God’s will that would not be good from inner motives, e.g., to slay one’s son. The goodness
of obedience is based on this. My will in accordance with its vocation
is constantly subject to the will of God, thus it is consistent with itself
best when it agrees with the divine; and it is impossible that, in accordance
with the divine will, [one’s will] be evil.
The
wife seeks gratification and expects [her] necessities from others, the man
seeks needs and expects gratification from women. When both seek necessities they are in
agreement but poor [and] when both seek gratification they are foolish
A man finds
more gratification in making a woman comfortable than a woman does, yet the
latter wants to appear to impart before enjoying; for, to be sure, the former
is opposed to her primary vocation of having the need to conceive
{54, Page 38 of
{55, sheet inserted after
I do
not know what solace those who regard their imagined needs as right and natural
could find in a providence whose fulfillment is promised to them. I, who I know suffer no evil[128]
but that which I cause and that it only depends on me to be happy through the
kindness of divine order, will never murmur against it
{R55}<Why
must one speak French in order to be polite.
Dames Messieurs. Chapeaux Cornetten. *>[xxxvii]
Now if
a woman marries a twenty year-old man, she takes for herself a fop. The reason for this is, among others, that he
has not yet become acquainted with the deceptive art of women to appear better
and more pleasant than they are. For
this reason, he will make a bad husband, because he will always believe that he
could have chosen better or also because he actually fell in love[129]
and chose poorly. On the other hand,
[69] if with more age he gets to know the sex and sees the empty illusion, then
he turns back to simplicity, where according to nature he already could have
been from the start. For this reason,
the path to a good marriage goes through wantonness, an observation that is
very unpleasant especially because it is true.
The
time of maturity of a lord and of a farmer is never different. A woman has never come of age without a man.
Men
fall much further in love than women,**
which also comes from nature. However,
if the latter grows in the art of illusion [70], an illusion that ceases in
marriage, then from this a kind of deceived reluctance in the marriage emerges,
which finds less agreeableness than it had expected. It is not good to make a future husband fall
too much in love; one must save something for the future
To do
without art, that is, to not let inclinations germinate in oneself, is the
means of bliss; therefore, one can either seek honor, that is to say, earn the
praiseworthy opinion of others, or strive to do without it [honor] completely
and be indifferent toward it.
That
the choleric person is angry comes from his love of honor because he
{R56}always believes himself to be insulted; the reasonable person desires
nothing but equality and has little occasion to be angry.
In
lands where the women are not beautiful they are treated tyrannically, as among
savages, because the weak person must influence inclination or else be
oppressed
[71]
The main ground for lasting beauty is illusion.
Make-up. A kind of falsehood[130]
that is lovelier than truth. Correggio goes off of nature[xxxviii]
Women
like to love bold men and these modest, decent[131]
men. Judgment of a woman by Bayle.[xxxix] Hercules
endeared himself more to Omphale
through his 72 girls than through his spinning.[xl]
As far
as gender[132]
is concerned, women have more of a firm taste, men more of a fine one. They love good behaviors and court manners more in order to display their
own vanity.
If the
savage had taste, eating-houses would please the best
If the
inclinations of women and men grow similarly, then they must come in disproportion, namely, that the latter have
less capacity according to the proportion
of their inclinations
{57, sheet inserted after
In
everything that belongs to beautiful and sublime feeling, we do best if we let
ourselves be led by the model of antiquity.
In sculpture, architecture, poetry, and rhetoric of ancient morals and
[the ancient] civil constitution.[133] The ancients were closer to nature, we have
much frivolous or luxurious or slavish corruption between ourselves and
nature. Our age is the seculum of beautiful trifles, bagatelles or sublime chimeras.
{R57}Character in
society
The
sanguine person dives in where he is not invited; the choleric person does not
enter where he is not invited in accordance with propriety; [72] the
melancholic person doesn’t come at all
makes sure that he is not invited at all.
In company, the melancholic person is still and observes; the sanguine
person discusses what occurs to him; the choleric person makes observations and
interpretations. In domestic existence,
the melancholic person is frugal, cheap[134]
and poor; the sanguine is a bad host.[135]
The choleric is greedy but magnificent.
For the melancholic person, generosity is magnanimity, for the choleric
[it is] boasting, [and] for the sanguine [it is] thoughtlessness[136]
The
melancholic person is jealous; the choleric, power-hungry; the sanguine,
amorous
The coquette is an admirable maitresse but surely no wife, except for
a Frenchmen.
On
providence. The fools that forsake the
order of nature are astonished about providence, that it did not improve their
terrible consequences; Augustine with
his crapula.[xli]
[73]
{58, back side, opposite
{R58}In
countries where the societies consist mainly of men, one values personal income
in accordance with the understanding of honesty and the useful zeal of
friendship or also [with the understanding] of common use. Where they are always intermingled with
women, in accordance with the wit of good behavior, jest, amusements, malicious gossip.[137]
[74] With the old Germans it must,
before French morals corrupted us, the women had to be in special rooms like in
A man
who has a wife is complete, detaches
himself from his parents, and is alone in the state of nature. He is so much disinclined to associate
himself with others that he even fears the approach of others. For this reason [we have] the condition of
war. Hobbes[xlii]
The well-bred
woman does not need to have embarrassment and blushing as a part of herself;
[she] is very charming and, characteristic of the gender where it is still
encountered, she is thus a good bulwark of chastity
Womanly
grace. Womanly traits are laudable in a
woman, if she has masculine traits, it is a reproach
With
marriage, amorous blindness[138]
disappears, so that the wife lacks the unlimited reign over the heart of the
man and the rank of goddess that she had had before the marriage. However, the man does not feel nearly as
dominated as he was and wishes [to be]; the wife loses more in vanity; the man
more in tenderness. The fantasy of
infatuation instills yet more exaggerated concepts in the man than in the woman
<The
woman wished to keep dominating, while the man [wished] to be dominated. The wife sees herself as obliged to flatter,
the man finds no other inclination in himself than kindness>
The man
is stronger not merely because of his build, but also in principles and the
steadfastness in bearing things, therefore, his clothes must be so, the wife’s
[must be] delicate and clean
{R59}[75]
Taste in the choice of company. Taste
for virtue, friendship.[139] One turns more on taste than on necessity
{59, sheet inserted after
Nature
equipped the wife to make [her husband] affectionate and to not be affectionate
They have are never truly tender, which men can
see directly in [the fact that] all women want to rule and reasonable men let
themselves be ruled; now he who reluctantly surrenders his power without
noticing that he is stronger must have more tenderness than the one who is
aware, for whom it [surrender] happens reluctantly, [while he] still prefers
himself to the other
Women
are more for lustful love, men are more for affectionate love. All widows marry, but not all widowers
a woman
must not marry a vain man
[76]
the
latter is the best
War can
only produce virtues if it is patriotic, that is, if it doesn’t serve to gain
money and support, but instead to preserve itself, and if the soldier becomes a
civilian[140]
again
{60, back side, opposite
Lustful
love is the basis for sexual inclination.
For this reason, everything beautiful and sublime in this love is only a
phantasm if this is not presupposed. The
husband must be a man by night and day.
This remark also serves to warn of affectionate and highly respectful
love between the sexes, for this degenerates more often with the outbreak of
lust.
{R60}[77]
The woman must be kept from being unfaithful through good-heartedness love and honor, if she the man does not secure her affection,
then he can count less on her duty. That
is a reason why women ought to be met with kindness. For they have an widely extended capacity
remaining[141]
Distinguish
he who requires little because he lacks less from he who requires little
because he can do without much. Socrates.[xliii] The enjoyment of [a] gratification that is
not a need, that is, that one can do without, is agreeableness. If, nonetheless, it is regarded as a need
then it is concupiscence. The condition
of people who can go without is moderation, that which counts the dispensable
as a need is luxury.
The
contentment of a person originates either because he satisfies many
inclinations or because he has few
not let many inclinations sprout and is therefore content with fewer fulfilled
inclinations. The condition of someone
who is content because he does not know agreeableness is moderate simple moderation. The former demands no self-constraint and
privation, but the latter does, the former is easy to mislead, the latter has
been misled and is safer for the future.
The condition of a person without dissatisfaction because he does not
know of greater gratifications that are possible <for him>, and therefore
does not desire [them].
Virtue
does not simply consist in one prevailing over acquired inclination in certain
circumstances, but rather seeking to be rid of such inclinations and so
learning to do without them. It does not
consist in [78] one combating with natural inclinations, but rather one making
it so that he has nothing but natural ones, for then one can always serve them
well
{61, sheet inserted after
{R61}The
characters of human nature are the degenerations of their vocation; likewise
the necessity of war, the rule and servitude of religions and of science
It is
the question of the noble and why it does not agree more with the useful than
the beautiful[142]
Women
will always prefer a man with masculine agreeablenesses who is wild, for they
believe every time that they will rule him.
Most of the time they are right about this, and this excuses them if
they fail. This is also the beautiful
side of the female gender, that they can rule men
One
will perhaps find more men who deserve the gallows than women who get drunk
[79] If
one wants to maintain the fantastical things of love in marriage, then jealousies
and adventures must take place, if one wants to maintain the amorous things,
then the wife must be a coquette; if
both should cease to exist, then the mere simplicity of nature remains
In
countries that are rich and monarchical where many, with their private
employments of self-interest, have nothing to do with the public [dealings] of
the state, everything arises from the skill of the society. From this springs politeness. In
On
fashionable disposition[143]
A woman
is always ready to deceive a lover who is respectful and, without much ado, to
abandon in secret the one who is bold and enterprising. In the state of simplicity the man rules over
the woman; in [the state of] luxury, the woman [rules over] the man. The refined taste of free association makes
this necessary
{62, reverse side, opposite
{R62}[80]
[Latin] The power given by law to affect the
senses of a subject well or badly does not depend on love, but the respect of
the moral power of obligation [Noetigen].
The logical ability to enact laws (on account of wisdom) is non-moral
nature
The
still and peaceful serenity[144]
in the beautiful is, with a man, turned into himself and, with a woman, turned
outward
Pelisson and Madame
Sévigné[xliv]
Bold
position and amorous or ingratiating laughter.
<On the habit of women to take serious pause.>
Whoever
is empty of sensations (that is, surely has feeling for opinion but not for
need) can perpetually maintain them far easier with others. For this reason, the woman must be less
affectionate
Because
we have so much vain jealousy,[145]
friends are also rivals. Thus only
friendship can take place with needs
Light
and warmth appear to distinguish themselves like noise and wind; light and
colors like noise and sound; taut strings can must make undulations. A coal fire in the hearth is a space empty of
ether, the ether of which goes out through the chimney; since thereby all the
bodies standing around are freed of ether, it gives warmth. In such a way is warmth received those which
receive warmth are k [breaks off]
It is a
question whether, when bodies become warm, they let go[146]
of fire [81] or take it in. It depends
on whether bodies are saturated with fire in absolute cold, for then a warm
body becomes cold if it absorbs fire and this heats a body, that it forces to
let go of it [the fire]. Is a heated
oven empty of fire? Yes, it absorbs it
[fire] gradually in itself, [and] thereby frees the fire in others and makes
them warm and becomes cold itself. In
this way, the suns and also those
are the spaces emptiest of the element of fire.
Through this, the spreading of light can also be comprehended, for it is
easier that a {R63}thread of agitated material is attracted into infinity by
penetration into an empty space than by an impact.
{63, sheet inserted after
In this
way, light might perhaps be a movement toward the sun rather than one away from
it
Sound,
although air is squeezed out of the lungs, can perhaps be generated through the
withdrawing of air rather than the forcing out.
Fire above a body (earth) makes it cold underneath, but only to a
certain extent, for it frees the fire element from the near [body], [82] [but]
the more remote [body] attracts this already released fire element to itself,
thus becoming numerous poles.
a
x y
b c d
It is
with fire ‘a’ that the fire element will be released out to ‘b’, but always
weaker than at ‘y’ and ‘x’; to bring out movement from ‘b’ to ‘a’ in empty space
is weaker than to be drawn from ‘b’ [and] move toward ‘c’, therefore ‘bc’ is attractive and consequently is cold only
in that it penetrates, [and] accumulates in ‘c’, although with delayed
movement, so that ‘c' is no doubt positively
warm, that is, lets fire go, but behind ‘c’ until ‘d’, [it is] negative once again.
{R64}The
sun warms the earth, that is, makes it so that the fire is released into it hence it must
from above or better
that there is a space empty of fire on the earth; assume a body high in the
air, and it is in a space that is full of fire; thus, no fire comes out of
itself or into itself because it is
it [the body] does not give off such an element
{64, back side, opposite
[83]
The true concept of fire seems to consist in the fact that with heating the
fire does not change from warmth to cold, but from cold to warmth; hence in cooling, the body that is becoming
cold is put in the state of absorption and fire passes into it. From this it follows that when a body is
warmed it pulls other fire into itself and thereby always diminishes its state
of absorption, that is to say, always becomes colder itself
From this follows that only the body which warms others becomes cold and
conversely, one that becomes cold warms others, for it cannot warm without
releasing the fire in others, that is. but the more it fills himself, the less is it in a state to
release it in others. Yet, if a body
becomes cold, it falls into a state of absorption and thereby warms
others. A body is cold with respect to
others if it cools them, that is, fills others with the element of fire and
thereby lessens their absorbing condition in that it gets warm himself, that
is, lets fire go. Comets are, among all
heavenly bodies, those which are mostly full of the fire element; they come
into the empty space of the ether, or rather their elemental fire is violently
released, which soars behind them
<If
a fire is in the hearth, then the air in the whole area, and also the nearby
bodies, will be warm. Remote [objects],
however, draw it out and become cold because the fire becomes released from the
air. Or so: the acrid hurrying ether
makes waves and is denser in its own places than before, thus will the body
found there absorb rather than emit>
All the
affected rules for a wife come about in order to prevent others from pleasing
us more or making us lustful. Constrain
your own concupiscence and your wife will be adequate
{R65}A
valiant woman, she is something completely different from a romantic[147]
[84] beauty, the latter is best for a lover, the former for a husband. German women are brave, French [women are] coquettes
A good
housewife is worthy of honor with a man, how will a gallant dame earn this
name
A man
must show some contemptuousness with respect to his finery; it must be seen
that he has worn the hat. His cuffs must
not worry him
If I
should choose a wife, I would want to take one who has not much wit, but feels
it.
The
corruption of our time allows it to come about that no person demands to be
happy or good, but instead to appear so.
One
laments that marriages are not as good as the unwed state. The reason for this is above. One never enjoys himself
{65, sheet inserted after
{Latin}
Punishment is either political or moral.
The first is, as motive, [85] the cause of omission, the latter is the cause
also of inspection of actions. Moral
punishment is, in an actual sense, disheartening or avenging, but it also has the
function of being a means for improvement of the sinner in view of either
earlier or future errors.
The
cause of all moral punishment is this.
All evil action[148]
would never happen if it were sensed through moral feeling with as much
aversion as it deserves. Yet if it is carried
out, then it is a proof that it has sweetened the physical stimulation and the
action has seemed good, but it is absurd and ugly that what is morally evil is
yet good on the whole; consequently, as a result, a physical evil[149]
must replace the loss of reluctance that was missing in the action.
<To
a certain extent, it is fortunate that marriages become difficult, because if
{R66}they became frequent, gentlemen would increase and injustice would become
more common>
Women
are far more capable than men among one another in the judgment of masculine
merit and of their [men’s] useful weaknesses.
Men, on the other hand, more easily see the worth of a woman than a
woman sees that of others, but [they do] not so easily [see] the failings as a
woman [sees those] of others. Thus,
women rule over men and deceive them more easily than vice versa. It is easy to deceive a man, but not vice
versa. Traitor. You don’t love me
anymore, you believe more in what You see, etc.; no man can say such a thing to
wife
she sees even what he does not himself and
sees correctly[150]
They
rightly carry out the same intrigues [as us] in retaliation for the injustices
we show them, that we want them to be chaste and have been unchaste ourselves
[86]
<The reason why there are so many cuckolds is because the time of the
debauches[151]
of men has ended and that of women has begun.>
{66, back side, opposite
It is
very good that the woman is chosen; she herself cannot chose
Why the
aging of a woman is so terrible, of men not so, for the sublime takes care of the latter
Youth
is a great perfection for a woman in marriage; one loves her afterwards in age
for the sake of the memory of her youth.
That elderly women marry comes about because of our injustice.
Women
are all covetous[152]
except where vanity is stronger; they are all devout and devoted to the spiritual. The honor of a man resides in his judgment of
himself, while [the honor] of a woman [resides] in the judgment of others
{R67}[87]
If there were a man by whom I was hated, it would trouble me. Not as if I were frightened of him, but
because I would find it ugly to have something in myself that could become a
cause for hate in others, for I would assume that another would not have formed
an aversion without any apparent occasion.
Therefore, I would search him out, I would give myself to be better
understood by him, and after I the disadvantage had seen some benevolence toward me
developing in him, I would let myself be satisfied with this without ever
wanting to take advantage of it. Yet, if
I considered it to be inevitable that common and vulgar prejudices, a miserable
envy, or a yet more despicable jealous vanity make it impossible to completely
avoid all hate, well then I will say to myself it is better that I am hated
than that I am despised. Hate This motto is based on an entirely
different cause than that which contrives only self-interest; I would rather be
envied than pitied. The hate of my
fellow citizens does not overcome their concept of equality, but but of the scorn makes me unimportant in the eyes
of others and always causes a very annoying delusion of inequality. Yet, to be despised is much more injurious
than to be hated.
{67, Page 50 of
they laugh easily and gladly and it increases their charms
{68, sheet inserted after
Female
pride. Male pride.
The
degenerate woman was Arria; Margaretha
Maultasch[xlv]
It does
not behoove a wife to make the husband happier by way of something other than
by way of her person With her money the
wife buys for herself a jester or a tyrant
The
greatest perfection is domesticity
{R68}[88]
<[Women] can command incomparably in their countenances, [they] have more
accent, [they] persuade>[153]
A human
being has his own inclinations and his power of choice can arrange his actions
so as to follow the beckoning of nature.
There can be nothing more terrible than that the actions of one person
should be subordinated to the will of another.
Thus, no aversion can be more natural than that which a person has
toward slavery. For the sake of this
[aversion] a child cries and embitters itself if it has to do what others want,
without someone having bothered to endear it to [the child]. The child wishes only to be a man soon and to
act in accordance with its will. Which
new slavery of things[154]
they have to promote in order to usher in the former.[155]
In
accordance with her build, a woman is already adapted to being sought after,
[and] therefore knows to attract enlistments and to be adept at conceding or
also refusing. Thus, she must know [how]
to capture [89] but also how to conceal desires in order to prevent
disdain. From this she can more easily
adopt a modest and cool-headed nature,[156]
can disguise herself excellently, and is equipped with all characteristics
[needed] in order to appear at any time as she should be. She is therefore soberly discussed, never
imprudent, etc.
Shamefacedness
is never a cause of chastity, but something that procures in its place
incentives of decency [and] even produces the same effects
A woman
wants to have men be enterprising in matters of love
{69, back side, opposite
The
sweetness we find in the beneficence of respecting people is an effect of the
feeling for the universal welfare that would take place in the condition of
freedom
[90]
The refinement of the times is adeptness at deceiving and our academies furnish a bunch of swindlers
{R69}Drunkenness
is the failing of a man
Roughness
Defiance
The
law-giving power of God among the first human beings is based on property. The human being was freshly placed in the
world, all trees belonged to God and he forbade one to them
This idea has ended. The law-giving power of God over the Jewish
people is based on the social contract.
God would lead them out of
Paul
judges that the law would only produce[157]
reluctance, because it gives rise to one doing something unwillingly that has
been commanded, and this is certainly how things are; for this reason he sees
the law abolished through Christianity and mere grace [as] a basis to love God
rightly from the heart, which is not possible in accordance with nature and
whereby actions will be brought to morality and not to theocratic politics.
{70, Page 51 of
is
commonly [and] uncleanly like Magliabechi,[xlvi]
he was disguised with a loose mouth. As
my brother says [breaks off]
{lower margin}
[91]
One can hate he who is right, but one is forced to respect him.
{R70}Self-interest
fights against common utility.[158]
The latter makes[159]
love out of inclination
{71, Page 52 of
May men
always devote troublesome, sleepless nights to their investigation if the woman
only knows how she ought to rule them.
{72, sheet inserted after
<On
the mutterings against providence>
On
freedom
May he find
himself in what conditions he will, the human being is dependent on many
<external> things. On means of
nourishment, the impression of the air, [and] the sun.
He always depends on some things by way of his needs and on others by
his concupiscence and, in so far as he is surely the administrator of nature
but not her master, he must often acquiesce to the yoke of necessity and bow
to the order of nature and accommodate himself to its laws [92] conform to her force, for he will
not find that she will always conform to his wishes. Still, what is much harder and more unnatural
than this yoke of necessity is the dependence subjection of one person under the will
of another. There is no misfortune more
terrible for anyone who would be used to freedom, [who] has <enjoyed the
good of freedom>, than to see himself delivered to a creature of his own
kind who could coerce him to do whatever he wants (to take one’s own will to
himself). There is also
no doubt that [breaks off]
It must It also necessarily requires a very long habituation to make the horrifying terrible thoughts of subservience
tolerable; for every person must sense in himself that even if there were many
discomforts that he might not want to cast off at the risk of his life,
nevertheless, in the choice between slavery and the risk of death one will
have{R71} there
would be no doubt that one’s first attempt his free- no reservations in preferring the
latter.
{73, reverse side, opposite
The
cause of this is also very clear and rightful.
All other evils
evils[161]
of nature are still subject to certain laws that one learns to know in order to
choose subsequently how far one wants to give into them or be subject to
them. The heat of the burning sun, the
harsh wind, [and] the motions of the water always allow something for a person
to devise what will protect himself against them or [breaks off][160]
of nature follow laws
But the
will of every human is the effect of his own drives [and] inclinations and true or
imagined well-being and
agrees only with his own true or imagined well-being. But if I was once free, nothing can present a
more terrible prospect of sorrow and despair than [93] that henceforth my
condition should reside, not in my own will, but in the will of another. Today it is bitingly cold, I can go out or
stay at home, whichever I please, but the will of another does not determine
what is most agreeable to me in this case, but what is agreeable <to
him>. I want to sleep so he wakes
me. I want to rest or play, and he forces
me to work. The wind outside is
blustering [and] compels me to flee to a cave, but here or elsewhere it finally
leaves me in peace, but my master seeks me out and, because the cause of my
misfortune has reason, he is much more adept at tormenting me than all the
elements. Even if I presume that he is
good, there is nothing in the way of his thinking otherwise. The movements of matter do indeed maintain a
certain definite rule, but the obstinacy of the human is without rules
{74, Page 53 of
[95]
They make the strongest satires of marriage who regard the marital excesses as
trifles, which deserves no insult or punishment revenge, because then the state of
marriage does not distinguish {R72}itself from that of gallantry [and] from the indifferent sort.
Lower margin
The
woman accepts a satire of her sex as a joke because she knows well that the
mockery of the little short-comings of her sex actually concerns the men, for
the sake of which she loves him even more, but a satire of marriage insults all
women because this seems to be more serious and because of some truthfulness
[to it], they also feel this reproach.
Yet, if such a basic principle takes the upper hand, then her sex will
be degraded to the man’s power of choice.
{75, sheet inserted after
<On the rightful expression ‘my lord’[162]>
In
subjugation, not only are there things also something so of external danger, but also something so a certain ugliness and a contradiction
that indicates its injustice.[163] An animal is not quite a complete being
because it is not conscious of itself and whether its drives and inclinations
may become opposed to one another or not, it surely senses its evil,[164]
but it [the evil] disappears before it [the animal] in a moment and it knows
nothing of its own existence. However, that a human requires no soul, as it
were, and through
a should have no will of
its own and that another soul should move my extremities is absurd and
perverse: also in our constitutions any person who is subordinated to a great
extent is also despicable [breaks off][xlvii]
Livery[xlviii]
<Instead
of freedom raising me above cattle, it places {R73} me under them because I can
be more easily coerced[165]>
Such a person
is, as it were, nothing to himself but the household appliance of another. I could just as well pay tribute to the boots
of the master [94] as to his lackey. In
short, the person who depends on this is no longer a human, he has lost this
rank, he is nothing except another person’s belonging.
Often
Subjection and freedom are commonly mixed together the master to a certain degree it is not
always called the m… and
one depends on the other. But even the
smaller degree of dependence is too great an evil[166]
than that it should not naturally terrify.
This feeling is very natural but one can also weaken it quite a
bit. The power to withstand the evils of
others can become so small that slavery appears to be a lesser evil than
discomfort. Nevertheless, it is certain
that in human nature it stands above [breaks off]
Indeed,
cattle are forced by humans beings, but the human being [is forced] by another
human being with delusion[167]
The
momentary power of attack is much smaller than servitude.
{76, reverse side, opposite
There
could certainly be enticements[168]
that the human prefers to freedom for a moment, but at once he will be
thoroughly sorry.
Society
makes one value himself only comparatively.
If others are not better than I, then I am good, if all are worse, then
I am perfect.
[96]
Proportional evaluation is still distinguished from honor.
If
Chastity cannot be a lack of amorous passion, {R74}for then it is really a
flaw, if this same passion is too small for its whole purpose, still, it is
good insofar as it is suitable to one’s age <and> capacity, but this goodness is not moral.
To
preserve chastity of men
is either a direct shamefacedness (the concern to make one’s sexual attribute contemptible)
or an indirect consequence of the general concept of honor. This last is either purely a concern to
contract no dishonor, and it is a means of preserving virtue for which many
institutions could be made, or a tender stimulation of self-censure in so far
as it is connected to sincerity and might not conceal itself, therefore it
shows itself in blushing; this characteristic is the best way to preserve
chastity
[97] We
have all kinds of drives that should serve us as means[169]
to serve others, and [these drives] more often directly[170]
rule. First, to compare ourselves to
others so that we can evaluate ourselves, from this springs the falsity of
evaluating one’s worth comparatively, of arrogance, and of even evaluating his
courage and good fortune in the same way; envy.
Second, to put ourselves in another’s place so that we know what he
feels and
judges. From this springs the blind sympathy that
also puts justice in disorder. Third, others of us to investigate the judgments of others
because this can correct the truth morally as well as logically. From this springs the desire for glory. Fourth, to acquire and save all sorts of
things for enjoyment; from this springs the greed that is miserly.
One
says that the thirst for glory is the ultimate weakness of the wise. I believe that where wisdom is not of the
kind that comes with age, the love of women is the ultimate weakness
{77, Page 56 of
[99]
That a wife has feminine traits is no evil,[171]
but surely [it is an evil] that they be encountered in a man. Just as it is a biting mockery rather than a
eulogy that a woman has masculine traits in her
next to lines 18-22
{R75}A
wife constricts the heart of a man and one commonly loses a friend when he
marries
Lower margin
A man
is such a dandy in marriage
{78, sheet inserted after
The use
of the terms women and hats,[172][xlix]
although it is only a fashionable trifle in conversation among Germans, points
out quite well the foolishness of taste that creeps into us and makes a mockery
[98] of the ridiculous customs of a nation
that is lively and deluded in its own character. The everlasting conversation of the French
with women is in accordance with their character, but this is not the case with
the Teutons. Our woman does not have
near the lively coquetterie of the
French. Therefore, these manners of
interaction must always be somewhat insipid.
They are still proud here
Because
women are weak, they are much less capable of virtue, but they have things that
can make it superfluous
Virtue
becomes ever more necessary but also ever more impossible in our present
political constitution
Because
virtue shows strength, it must suit warlike states, more of
Unity
in society is not possible between many people
When we
count among needs the works of another, why not also his wife [?]
When
they are in society, men assess their worth only in relation to one another:
the women [assess their worth] only in relation to the men because then each
discovered charming characteristic or presumption [is] accepted, [while] every
other {R76}wanton demand [is] questioned; in such a way they give each other
very bad reputations
Each
well-behaved woman tries to charm the entire [male] sex although she does not
mean to profit by it. This comes about from the fact that because
she should be sought after, she must possess a general inclination to please,
for were this restricted, she would perhaps stand out to someone she doesn’t
want. With marriages this inclination
escapes from its bounds
{79, back side, opposite
<On
the agreeablenesses that one makes into need and vice versa. Ideal gratification. Chimerical [gratification] that deceives in fulfillment>
1.
On
need and agreeableness. Quiet, change, boredom
On
luxury and sufficiency. Preparation,
foresight
On
ambition.
On
courage and cowardice health and sickness
On the fine and goods of delusion. Miserliness
On
sexual inclination. On science
On
refined and crude sensation.
On
foresight
On the
person of simplicity
On
natural persons in comparison with civilized ones <On the extent of the well-being of
both>
On the
value of human nature
{R77}A free
person values himself more than a slave.
Dependence
on power is not as disgraceful as [dependence] on delusion
<On industriousness and laziness>
On the luxury of civilized people.
[101]
On the sciences [and] on healthy and fine understanding
On
enjoyment and delusion, foresight[173]
<On
the capacity for enjoyment and delusion>
On
well-being and misery
<Moral>[174]
On
generosity and guiltiness
On the
drive to acquire or defend. War
On
truth and lies. On propriety and
righteousness.
On friendship. On the perfection of human nature.
On
sexual inclination
Virtue,
religion. On natural and artificial
conditions, education[175]
The
officer who got embarrassed, or pretended to do so, by the gaze of Ludwig XIV expressed the sentiment of a
slave.[li] The embarrassment of a man with a woman does
not derogate his noble characteristics; here, his boldness is clumsy
indifference. A woman must not be
embarrassed in consideration of masculine virtue consica decoris Venus.[lii] Her noble propriety is quiet and gentle, not
bold; I revere the beautiful girl in a noble or princely person[176].
{R78}If
he is always talking about virtue, then he is corrupt; if he constantly talks
of religion, then he is [corrupt] to the utmost
The
priests in the country could maintain large schools for the education of
children
{80, Page 57 of
Beauty
is domineering. Merit [is] peaceful and
yielding. The wife retains the affection
of the man through jealousy
{marginal notes next to lines 2-19}
The man
who slips away from tears held back with difficulty. This is how he drowns the pain that he
compresses in his chest whenever tender melancholy moves him, and the effort to
bear it unwaveringly shines forth in his condolences. A woman can let her sadness out in
lamentations with dignity[177]
and alleviate her feeling. She also
passes easily from pain to joy [100] even when the former has been serious,
which is also good for a beautiful sex
The man
loves more affectionately, the woman more steadily
{81, sheet inserted after
[102]
On inequality
Once
this has begun, then the evil[178]
of oppression is not nearly as great as [the evil] that the minds of the
oppressed become abject and think little of themselves. A farmer is a much more miserable person and
has cruder vices than a savage who lacks everything, and also than a common
worker.
If I go
into the workshop of a craftsman, I do not wish that he be able to read my
thoughts. I dread this comparison: he
would see the great inequality in which I evaluate myself in relation to
him. I accept as true that I could not
live one day without his industriousness; that his children will be reared into
useful people.
On the
defensive passions
{R79}Although
the person of nature hates no other person, he does indeed fear him. Thus, he is alert and the equality that he
thinks about losing every moment brings him to arm himself. The state of war soon begins.[179] But because it is based on a noble ground,
[103] it certainly brings about great evil but not ignominy.[180] It is less dangerous in terms of dishonoring
human nature than is a slavish peace*
Virtue
that depends on strength can only last long in warlike states. The English still have the most virtue among
all the European nations. They are Their luxury[181]
is acquired through hard work and is squandered away with savagery
{82, back side, opposite
Everything
that unnerves kills virtue at its source.
The
female sex is closer to nature than the male. For the present age is the age of propriety,
of beauty, of good behavior. However,
these are her specific inclinations.
[104]
The male sex has come to an end and noble characteristics no longer endure
because everything is trimmed with ornamentation
The
condition of virtue is a violent one; therefore, it can only be encountered in
violent conditions of an ordinary being.
The
luxurious life enriches people to a certain degree. The work of women ceases, they get more
children. There are enough whores who
want to suckle children or poor women who neglect their own and raise
upper-class children, etc. In an even
greater degree luxury makes for a stagnation of increase[182]
and eventually even a diminishment. From
this comes poverty, but before this rises, or when it emerges, then the
greatest vices occur
{R80}On
religion in natural conditions.
One
must not reproach the savages without religion for things that would make one
think less of those with religion. For
whoever does what God wills that he should do, mediated by the motives that God
set in his heart, is obedient to Him without knowing of His existence. But whoever knows God, and is brought to such
actions only through the naturally good morality
has theology, or if he reveres God for the sake of his morality, then this is simply a morality
whose object had been broadened.
Christians can hardly become blessed if their faith is not alive, as
those who have had no revelation at all, although with them something more has
happened than what naturally takes place.
{83, sheet inserted after
If
Diogenes had farmed the field instead of rolling his barrel, he would have been
great[liii]
[105]
One must not ban any books now; it is the only way harm for them to destroy themselves. We have now come to the point of return. Rivers, if one lets them flood, form their
own shores. The dam that we set against
them serves only to make their ravages unceasing. For the author[s] of useless things have for
their excuse the injustice of others before them.
In
states where industriousness in things of need no honor is not honored and respected, where the
people who work these same trades do not value themselves, there a man without
honor is the worst good-for-nothing, wanton, a double-dealer, deceitful, and
thieving. But where the simplicity of
nature rules, honor can very well be done without.
See
there, honor wreaks much evil[183]
and then[184]
it also serves as means to prevent its greatest excesses. The sciences wreak much evil and then they serve
as a means to better their own evils.
War creates more evil than it takes away {R81} but, to a certain extent,
it brings about a state of equality and noble [106] courage. In such a way corruption as well as virtue in
human nature cannot continuously increase.
{84, back side, opposite
He who
is not so proud watches the noble ladies’[185]
game of vanity with not a small amount of pleasure
Shamefacedness,
frailty. Embarrassment
Satire
never improves [anything]; for this reason, even if I had the talents [to
satirize], I would not make use of them.
The vanity of a woman is either that of the sex of that of state.[186]
The
pride of the sex or of state[187]
Because
nobility and the honor based on it depend solely on the choice of the prince, pride
over them is quite foolish. <He who
is angry and strong does not hate>
That
the drive for honor originates only from the idea of equality, [107] one can
see: 1. because as far as another is also stronger, but only appears not to
make comparisons, we fear him completely but we (from which respect originates) but we do not hate
him. 2. that the inclination to show his
worth to superiors is noble, but to equals or inferiors is contemptible <worthy of hate>; and that a man
who does not value himself is despised
The
highest pinnacle of fashionable taste is <when young men get refined
early> [and] acquire vulgar brazenness or [when] the young woman quickly
abandons discreet modesty and has learned early how to carry on the game of coquetterie with liveliness. For thereupon we this is necessarily the way the most
charming manner most catches the eye; in such a society, a reasonable man looks
like a blockhead or pedant, a decent
modest and decent woman [looks] like a common landlady, and the more refined distillation
of society plays the role of courtier.
Thus, they soon withdraw from the {R82}common taste, and reason and
domestic virtue are kept on in memory of old, rusted characteristic memorials of taste. But as with all of the evils[188]
that one can never bring to the highest point without the weight on the other
side turning the scale, here again stagnation and return[189]
is found. For gradually the women who
have practiced the female art long before marriage will easily make use of this
freedom where they can do it with certainty.
Men, warned by such examples, instruct themselves by the seduction that
they instigated themselves and, with the prospect of a wild vanity that will
never let them rest, love the marriages of others but make difficulties for
their own. The contempt for the
beautiful sex follows from adoration and, what is most terrible for them, the
masculine is prudent so as to no longer be deceived by them. [108] The greatest hindrance preventing the
male sex from returning to happy simplicity is the female sex.
{85, page 61 of
I plant
human beings. Propriety. A helpful instinct of chastity.
{marginal notes at lines 1-4}
Men are
exceedingly easy to deceive, women are not.
{lower margin}
Old-fashioned
seclusion also has its troubles.
Conversation becomes speechless, countrified, full of stiff ceremony and craftsmen-like aloofness.[190] The vanity and the trickery of gallant company serve to some extent to
put passion to sleep among
by way of always-changing games of distraction and to divert finery and vanity
to fashion instead of seclusion, introducing that which society had forbidden.
{86, sheet inserted after
{R83}Blushing
is a pretty characteristic of a woman and impudence does not create destroy blushing; instead, she who do
not easily blush becomes easily brazen and wanton
[109]
There are many more men who have reason to praise the generosity of women who
do not use the privilege that nature has given to them to fulfill the fair
demand on their husband through other men than men who can complain about
it. With so many enervated people[191] men, a foolish or chimerical
marriage-project arises, from which they want to make friendship out of the
marriage and demand great virtues of the wife toward a self-overcoming[192]
of those stirrings[193]
that are quite acceptable and cannot be stilled
A woman
is not so completely virtuous that she is able to make men so. As strange as it is, they are the greatest
means of chastity in men, for an otherwise scatterbrained man will not be made
more chaste by anything other than love toward a girl.
A woman
has a quick concept of everything concerning sentiments[194]
but she does not exactly feel them. For
example, when a man is supposed to practice [heroic virtue] himself, he will
think to call [something] a hero’s virtue, but the woman will only think so if
it is done toward her or by her husband. If one were to face up to them If one speaks with great discretion,
then she figures she has a lover. For
this reason, some virtues that have no noticeable direction for her sex will
not be respected (for example, the simplicity of nature)
This is
primarily because the woman is the whetstone of virtue, frangere vix cotis[195]
etc. and male virtue against
would have no object of exertion if the woman were the same, for then it could
be dispensed with
Perhaps this is a concealed reason why we
always attach ourselves to women, [whether] we want to or not.
{87, back side, opposite
{R84}[110]
Absolute cold is where a body is saturated with fire, the absolute warmth [is]
where it has let go of all fire that is possible [to let go of], that is, that
the attraction of expansive force is precisely identical to this
Whether
I can impute prior deeds[196]
to a morally changed person[197]
When a
body pulls fire from another, it warms it, when it lets it [fire] go, it cools
it.
a b c
The heating
is in ‘a’, so it is put in the condition of absorption through the loss of its
fire element.[198] At ‘b’, then, it must be cold as there is
more fire element to be encountered in it and [it] will be drawn toward the
same parts; because the fire element will accumulate will be drawn
so that it becomes in c an empty space
in ‘b’, it must spread and give an empty space in ‘c’ that will become warm,
and so forth. From the airwaves in warmth to those in
light. Yet this distinction can only
last a short while.
[111]
When water is over fire, then there is an empty space underneath, so when the
water has let all the fire go, that is, boiled, then, if one removes it [the
water], it [the fire] must go out the bottom and absorb from the top since the
movement had at that time been given to the element; thus, above it is hot and
below [it is] cool. In boiling, bubbles
must develop at the bottom, which soar up; the free fire-element will not go
through copper as quickly as through water and gathers in bubbles; in these,
vapors are created and soar up into the air since they are made of an elastic medium.
All
bodies vitrify and are comparatively
empty of fire element, therefore, while light brings warmth with others, at its
innermost it here makes only light, that is, not so much overflowing of aether
as vibrations.
{88, sheet inserted after
{R85}The
extent of punishment is either evaluated practically[199],
namely, that it is great enough to
prevent the action and then no greater punishment is allowed, but then it is
morally possible that punishment as serious as physical [punishment] is not
always necessary
Or its
[punishment’s] extent is evaluated in moral proportion[200]:
e.g., [112] of the man who kills another in order to take his money, it will be
judged that, because he has valued another’s life as less than his own money, one must also value his as less
than as much money as any one allocates[201]
in relation to life
Few go
about deceiving their prince, which is a sign that they sense the injustice of
the government
{Latin}
<The fear of a simple nature is either
of a childish kind or menial>
{Latin}
The natural tendency< in view of the
motives> is either simple servile or menial, the latter is that of a mercenary
or a slave[202]
On the
method of morality[203]:
where one regards all of the characteristics that are now common from
birth on as natural (not disposed to sin) and extracts from that the rules as
to how they can be good in the situation[204],
[one] does not err even if the supposition
could be false. In this way, I can say
that the person of nature who does not know of God is not evil.
Because
God was a political lawgiver in the Old
Testament, he also gave an account of political grounds for rewards and punishments,
but [he did] not [give] moral [grounds] until later times. <A prince cannot draw up rewards for all
his laws because he himself has nothing>
{Latin}
The simple tendency is either that of
love or reverence; the first predominates in the Gospels, the second in the
law. Love could not have taken place in
the First Testament, in the New Testament love can only emerge through divine
arrangement
{89, back side, opposite
{R86}[113]
On the rèpublique
Love is
either lustful <corporeal> or moral <spiritual>[205]
Toward
women something from the former is always intermingled, it can also be toward
the old or else they would only be valued as men. Toward chi[206] Fathers spoil daughters and mothers
spoil sons
All
follies[207]
have this in common with each other, that the pictures that appeal to them
float in the air and have no support or stability. They marry a woman without wit, without
manners, without birth and family, which is the downfall of their taste. Oh, that is not the rule of my taste, you
might answer. But what will people say,
consider what the world will judge of you.
Before I engage myself in this important difficulty, I ask you what then are
such peo what one
understands by such people and the world whose opinion is critical for my
happiness. Those are, one answers me, a
number of individuals in which each is just as troubled [by] what people will
say, and I belong along with the number [114] of these so-called people whose
judgment is so important. Oh, I answer,
we people collectively do not want to trouble ourselves any longer with
another’s opinion because they robbed us of enjoyment, for we no longer
understand ourselves or, at the least, I understand you all; I want am no comedian who can be paid with
applause
Conceit
and stingy greed are never to be healed.
A woman
is never generous; this is also completely proper[208]
because they are not actually the ones who acquire, but instead they save, so
it would be reversed because
if they gave away for nothing because that is something gentlemen do. But they are just subordinated gentlemen;[209]
and, although they never want them to be, nature retains their rights
anyway. They put effort into finery
because this does not appear to be given away and with right they collectively negotiate what the man owns
{90, sheet inserted after
{R87}Error
is never more useful than truth, all things considered, but it is often [more
useful than] ignorance
[115]
The childish understanding[210]
is one that only judges that which is presently useful to it. The manly intellect judges about future use;
the aged intellect judges about
despises present use and has an imagined use of purpose whose future will never
be. With respect to the intellect, women
are quite childish and, as concerns the future, they are devoted to miserliness
instead of all foresight.[211] More than that being troubled by external
circumstances and sacrificing others to his worries, the valiant man acquires
powers of his own with respect to the future.
In the household, a unity that is worthy of wonder arises out of this.
If one
merely depends on things then one does not require much reason but only
understanding
Arrogance[212]
for religion’s sake is the most ridiculous, for the representation that others
do not become blessed should make me much more sympathetic and actively helpful[213]
than arrogant. Arrogance for the sake of
money is common and coarse because it bases itself on something that easily
passes from one to another; thus, it is crude.
That for the sake of freedom is noble and proud.[214] That for the sake of birth and for the
sake of position is
finer because it is permanent and that of office is the most permissible.
{91, back side, opposite
The
Jews, Turks, and Spanish have religious pride; they are also either treacherous
if they are cowardly or tyrannical if they are powerful. The Dutch for the sake of money, the English
for the sake of freedom and power. The
conceit[215]
of nations on account of their Great Monarchs makes vanity and vanity also
brings about the monarchical constitution.
A proud nation is free; a rough and industrious [nation is] also free
and money-grubbing. The Spanish
arrogance will indicate a spirit of persecution in all religions, and so also
with the Turks.
{R88}Where
there are many aristocratic [people] and also many subjected [people], there is
flattery on one side and arrogance on the other, like with the Poles.
[116] A
woman troubles herself only with delightfulness[216]
but not with the necessity[217]
of life. Therefore, they let the man see
to the need,[218]
while they attend to taste. And in
religion they let others determine what is true, but they are intent to
fashionably imitate it with good form.
I want
to observe yet one more thing (but this is said just amongst us men), through
their presence behavior, they could be made more chaste
than they really are and without
[could] comfort themselves over the loss of an inclination through the
satisfaction of vanity in having instilled esteem.
A woman
wants
a likes to see a strong
man serve so that she can seem with good form to
be forced
The
woman makes of a man what she wants; she has formerly made heroes and now makes
monkeys. Whether she makes reasonable
men is to be doubted; this [reasonable man] can not at all become educated by
others, but he must become it [a reasonable man] himself
[117]
On taste for society [that] is to be
distinguished from that in society
{92, sheet inserted after
The
capacity for pleasure and displeasure is generally feeling. Lack of feeling
The
capacity for pleasure and displeasure in things that do not belong among our
needs [is] taste. This is coarse taste
insofar as it is close to needs. Fine [taste] is taste in that which is removed
from needs. Insofar this
fine [taste]
[breaks off]
The feelings for things that presuppose the
perfections of a greater understanding is ideal
{R89}Insofar
as the powers of the soul cannot be merely passive but active and
poetically-creative, taste is called spiritual and ideal (if the foremost
feeling is stirred not by external sensation
but by that which one poetically-creates)
With
respect to ethical life, feeling belongs remains either merely for needs, i.e.
obligation, or goes further;
in the latter case it is sentiment[219]
The
beautiful and sublime in the highest degrees are closely related. If they are to be sensed, both presuppose the
soul at [118] peace. Therefore
Yet they are so different that if it is busyness, cheerfulness, and
liveliness that dominates them, then beauty comes forth, if they cease and
peaceful contentedness shines forth, then the sublime stands out. The former is early morning, the latter is
the evening
In its
lesser forms, beauty is related to the change of fluctuating novelty. The sublime, with constancy, uniformity, and
unalterability. With beauty,
manifoldness, with the noble, unity.
{93, back side, opposite
Only
the unnecessary is beautiful, but the noble can be combined with utility. Yet in moral matters the noble must not be
considered from the viewpoint of use.
With this fine sentiment, it is presupposed that the person is not dependent
on things because of pressing need, otherwise the fine taste is
ridiculous. <Charmed by beauty,
astonished by sublimity.>
[119] The beautiful in a lesser degree is
agreeable and pretty, if great but not sublimity fades away [it is] cute.[220] If beauty is imitated, it is decorated, adornment like golden hens.
The sublime is in a lesser [breaks off]
{R90}
In the feeling of the sublime, the powers of a person seem to be stretched, as
it were; in that of the beautiful, they contract
The
taste which expands itself with respect to the direct sexual inclination is the
lustful one[221]
and is a sign of corruption with respect to [breaks off]
There
are moral and nonmoral necessities (obligations) which one presupposes before
there is talk of beauty. Before one The sciences in the head are, for most
people, just as useless as the hair powder on the same, and, as it would be
very foolish to have flour in one’s curls and none in one’s soup, it is absurd
to know the dispensable arts without
but none of those that constitute the welfare of life.
Before
we consider civilities,[222]
we must first be truthful and honest. It
is peculiar that the lover troubles himself over the free woman before he knows
whether she is also faithful. Before we
inquire into generosity
<Spring
is
beautiful and girls are
beautiful; autumn and wives are useful.
<The utility of girls is that they are sterile>>
{94, sheet inserted after
we must
recall obligation. Stop, audacious one –
shouts the merchant.[223]
Good
manners[224]
with inner dishonesty [and] the civility of a woman without domesticity are
like a
beautiful so much
ribbon-work and a dirty shirt.
The
common opinion that previous times were better comes from the evil[225]
that one feels and the presupposition that otherwise everything would be good.
{R91}Clothes
are only signs of comfort and the superabundance of life. They do not have to be made so that they
[120] draw attention exclusively to oneself.
(lurid colors are repugnant to the eyes, which get attacked too
much). Likewise with rank and
title. They themselves have little worth
[and] are damned to golden frames
In
marriage, pure love without respect is enough to fasten the man to the woman
and pure respect without love [is enough to fasten] the woman to the man. Therefore, although understanding and merit
have little effect on a woman outside of marriage, marriage is the most
harmonious when, even if the years are different, the man instills respect
through understanding. Wolmar[lv]
I would
rather be the happy Saint-Preux than
one who courts a wife[lvi]
{95, back side, opposite
The
correct cognition of the universe in accordance with Newton[lvii]
is perhaps the most beautiful product of the inquisitive[226]
human reason; meanwhile, Hume noticed that the philosopher can get easily be
disturbed in this delightful contemplation by a little, brown-haired maiden and
that regents will not be moved to despise their conquests by the smallness of
the world compared to the universe. The
reason is because it is indeed beautiful but unnatural to lose oneself outside
of the circle that [121] the heavens have designed for us. It is the same with sublime contemplations of
the heaven of the blessed ones.
If
light were to have a streaming[227]
movement, then when striking a slanted surface not and [when] warming, it would retain its
force[228]
not as the square of the sine of the inclination, but as its cube.[lviii]
That the
poles do not pull at all is clear from the experiment of Bougeurs who put a magnetic needle on a copper [plate][lix]
{R92}The
Spectator says that the fool and the clever person are different in that the
former thinks aloud, etc.[lx] This is a very correct observation of our
present type of prudence. Because both
sexes advance proportionately in this
and the feminine [sex] generally surpasses the masculine in the art of
illusion, the women must be much more perfect in it and rule.[229]
That
the anticipation[230]
of death is not from nature is to be seen from the fact that the consideration
of death does nothing at all against inclination [to] orient it [122] to make
preparations as though one were to live long, and the person just as seriously
makes arrangements at the end of his life as if he had never lived at all. Therefore, he is quite fond of vanity and the
thirst for glory on dead grounds because the natural person flees shame and
knows nothing of death. Thus he extends
the natural drive over the death that surprises him
It is
with the moral as with the art of apothecary.
That doctor is the best who teaches me how I can be relieved of
illnesses and remedies. This art is easy
and simple. Yet it is artificial and complicated[231]
to allow all corruption and to improve afterwards.
The odium theologorum[lxi]
has its basis in this: because it will again maintain the propriety of the
priests [and] express the fast and forcible movement of anger, and where this
is suppressed he degenerates into a secret bitterness. Parallel with wives and Indians.
{97, back side, opposite
Being
extremely large is a sickness; one could ask whether it is so even with respect
to intellectual[232]
characteristics; at any rate, it seldom
makes them happy. Cato, Brutus[lxii]
[123] Colossal plans without power and emphasis are like the children whose
heads are too big. premature
prudence. Margarethe Maultasch.[lxiii]
{R93}Thank
goodness for mediocrity. Good, content
citizens.
Difficult
relationship between state[233]
and talent. Alexander
had large weapons left behind not in order to form the opinion of the Indians[234]
by the colossal size of his army but instead to reinforce it[lxiv]
Tender
taste loves quiet and gentle beauty and will be wounded (screaming) by very
strong prominence of annoyance, of affectation, [or] of loquacity.
Coarse
taste (is very different from lack of feeling) requires stronger stimulation
displayed in a lively way and shows its wear and tear. Old, emaciated lover. <Whether the virtue that loves tragedies
would not have a coarse taste>
ugly
and nasty.
The
ideal of beauty is well preserved in hope but not in possession. [124] <Wantons become very skeptical with
respect to women’s chastity and make others so as well>
I do
not know whether or not is true what they say about the very extended fidelity
of married women in the most civilized nations and [I] let those who know from
experience judge it; I do know enough [to say] that if all feelings increase
beyond their borders, the female capacity, which is not so restricted, will go
much further than the male.
Nothing
can replace the loss of female charm, not even the most noble decency.
Impertinence,[235]
which should be concealed by all means, it is most dangerous for women outside
of marriage; in marriage it is most dangerous for men. Thus, one can presume already, prior to any
experience, the female sex will be reserved[236]
before marriage and impertinent in marriage and vice versa for the man
{98, page 74 of
{R94}The
woman seems to lose more than a man because the beautiful characteristics end
for the former while the noble [characteristics] stay with the man. The old woman seems to be good for nothing
more.[237]
{99, sheet inserted after
Any
gratification that is connected to the fulfillment of need is called
coarse. Drinking, sleeping, eating, and
cohabitation. The last is considered so
crude that Tiresias had to endure an
evil encounter from Juno because he
ascribed it specifically to the female sex.[lxv]
Taste
is therefore always attached to that which is actually no pressing need. From this it follows that in painting when
similarity to nature is called for, e.g., landscapes
[and] portraits, then this nature
must be captured, [but] otherwise ideal gratifications comprise the most noble
[things]. Nature is not good enough for
our gratification. This comes from the
frailty[238]
and tenderness of our organs, and even our [125] imagination. That is why painting can so thoroughly depart
from nature, like poetry and theatrical
action
Truth
is more of an obligation than beauty.
One must therefore conceal obligations to be beautiful.
The
tenderness of the nerves is one of the directed vocations of taste, for thereby
the degree of contrast or affect will restrict the hardness of
feelings, etc.
Harmony
comes from the agreement of the manifold, in music just as in poetry[239]
and painting. Those are points of rest
for some nerves
Unity
is in accordance with comfort insofar as it is connected with activity, which multiplicity[240]
desires.[241]
{R95} {100, back side, opposite
[126]
On fineness and the scale of these feelings
The
sense of the eye offers long and tender albeit very ideal gratification;
dissatisfaction is small except when related to gender. Terror [is] great.
The
sense of hearing effects long-lasting gratification. but only through change[;
the gratification] is less ideal but very lively[;] dissatisfactions are small
and don’t last long. The sense of smell gives some ideal gratification[s]; they
are short in gratification and short and strong. Strong in dissatisfaction, that is to say,
disgust demands change.
The
sense of taste is not at all ideal; it is great in gratification but short and
broken-up; [it] demands change (without pressing need); dissatisfaction is far
more sensitive and [is] disgust.
The
sense of feeling is short and exhausting in sensual pleasure, short and
sensitive in warmth [and] in titillation; in pain it can last a long time and
be coarse. [It] can easily become
outweighed by understanding (excepting sexual inclination).
The
sense of the face reveals most things moral, but then so does hearing
[127]
That it is harder for women to keep their chastity in marriage than it is for
men to keep theirs has come about because their capacity to give is greater
than the man’s. Hence the fantastical
desires go further with them
{101, sheet inserted after
On the
old facial characters in comparison with the moral [ones]
Beautiful
and gallant[242]
actions consist primarily of those {R96}to which one has no obligation. Obligation is a kind of moral need; whatever
corresponds more closely to it is simple.
All affects that stimulate tenderness and moral
feeling must therefore be taken from the vocations of a person
Because
when one already presupposes beauty as necessary it becomes a kind of need,
therefore simplicity is possible even with the beautiful and sublime
Because
it [is] in accordance with all such feelings for the beautiful, which [128] are
sometimes stronger than needs, it requires a great art to acquire the
simplicity of nature, although it is superfluous because one wants of it only
to keep from going astray; but [it is] still great, [and] so a special kind of
the sublime
A
pampered feeling that is not strong enough for simplicity is feminine. Nature at peace is the greatest beauty
(surely trickling brooks) because
they lull people to sleep), grazing herds of cattle. Therefore the evening is more moving than the
morning
Gaiety
is not beautiful [and] also does not last.
On the agreement of beautiful faces and beautiful bodies with the soul
{102, back side, opposite
The
free enjoyment of sensual inclination and the unchecked discovery of its object[243]
cancels everything ideal that can become diffused over inclination; this is the
reason it is so difficult to preserve ideal gratification in marriage. Unless one concedes rule[244]
to the wife.
[129]
Some people are more pleasing when one is away from them, others when one is
more present; the former ones are more suitable for the idealistic
gratification of marriage
When
fantastical love mates well with knightly virtue.
{R97}Novels
end with marriage <and the story begins>; however, they can be prolonged
beyond the same [marriage] by jealousy, for example, a wife who is [a] coquette of her husband and of others
All
female beauty is diffused over the sexual drive, for supposing you have[245]
experienced that a woman has a certain ambiguity of her gender, all her
infatuating charms[246]
will cease, although this does nothing for agreeablenesses, which you believe
alone will enchant you.
A
pregnant wife is apparently more useful but not as pretty. Virginity is useless but agreeable
{103, sheet inserted after
[130]
It is quite uncivil[247]
that we do not want to allow women to be ugly, even when they are old.
Because
needs are common, the domesticity of a wife will be considered a contemptuous
matter by a gallant man.
If the
masterpiece is from gratification, it will bore[248].
I love
the French as such but not the Germans when they imitate them.
Many a
wife misuses the license that wives have to be ignorant[249]
In
proportion to their power to do evil, princes are by far not as corrupt as the
common man.
Inner
honor. Self-valuation.[250] External honor as a means for each to assert
himself. Thus, a man of honor. honestas.[251][lxvi] External honor as a means is, true as [its]
purpose, a delusion. This takes precedence
over self-preservation, equality, or preservation of the species. The {R98} desire for honor (direct) is either
based on the opinion of important perfections (patriotism) and called ambition or [based] on trifles and called
vanity. The consciousness of his honor,
as that the possession of which one believes in by himself and never by
measuring himself against others, is called pride. Worth.[252] Gallantry
is either of pride or of vanity; the former of a petitmaitres, the latter of a dandy. The prideful person who others despise is
arrogant. The
vain person If he wants to show it [131] through pomp [it
is] haughty.[253] The arrogant person who shows his disdain is
pompous
{104, back side, opposite
The
honor of man with respect to a woman is courage and [the honor] of woman [with
respect to a man is] chastity. These
points are peculiar. When the spirit of the age[254]
becomes soft then the first honor is sweetness and the second is understanding
and boldness, the former makes things romantic, while the latter makes things
affected[255]
and courtly or fashionable
Because
philosophy is not a thing of pressing need but of agreeableness, thus it is
strange that one wants to restrict it by way of careful laws
Because
the lustful man chooses the wife as his ruler, he poetizes her quite admirably,
because one does not want to be subordinated to even a wretched idol;
conversely, the woman wants to rule. The Spectator, black monkey.[lxvii] applied
to the hidden secret of all tender inclination toward the sex
The
strongest preferences gratifications will at first be boring[256]
[132]
What it is that is called being domestic; making a need out of society. Boredom
The
housewife is worthy of honor. [The]
beautiful decency of her domestic concern, intermixed with cleanliness and
ornament, must appear to prefer being out of the house no more than [being] at
home
The man
is the one who courts, the woman the one who chooses; that is the point of
making {R99}oneself hard to get[257]. Should they choose the romantic visionary,[258]
fools dressed in finery,[259]
or the selfish and phlegmatic unfeeling ones.
Saint-Evremond wanted to choose a wife and chose a coquette.[lxviii] That happens because he is from a country where
every where every woman is a coquette,
though not toward her husband.[260]
The man
who does not make his amusements into his business but into recreation, who
knows how to live, that is, who makes his aim not acquisition but enjoyment,
who is enjoined to the peaceful gratification of company and friendship, he is
the man
All
gratifications become insipid if they are not recreations but occupations. The wife and husband who have something to do
will not become tired of one another
The
wife possesses the skill of always being womanly[261]
to a further extent than the man, but she would rather not employ this skill
except with her husband, who is insipid to her
{105, page 79 of
The
standard of bliss is the household
{marginal notes at line 10 – lower margin, at 2:242}
I leave
a blooming field and the Arcadian valleys for meager fields[lxix]
[133]
The novel ends and the story begins.
Henceforth the magical haze gradually dissipates <through> he who
saw the beloved madness of his idols.
The marriage-bed welcomes a humane girl[262]
and the next morning, instead of being worshiped as a goddess, she, as a wife, suffocates her slaves’
opposition Thereupon the
understanding husband [drinks] the salubrious water The lover, previously drunk with his
imaginations, wakes from beautiful dreaming and [breaks off]
The
sight of blossoms. A gallant
person[263]
always blossoms.
{106, page 80 of
Love is
a unity Solomon
never loved [breaks
off][lxx]
The
{107, sheet inserted after
Beauty
is without utility because this [utility] is pressing a thing to another
purpose, thus [it] indicates no perfection complete in itself. Therefore, the more useful things are, the more
corners they show, so to speak, as means to accommodate themselves to other
relations; the roundness of a sphere is perfect in itself
Gallantry:
a new kind of beauty of ethics. Politesse.
[134]
The former is a certain sweetness in pleasing[264]
behavior; the latter is a certain gracious cautiousness
the
former is affected, the latter
peaceful and composed. Not every woman
is beautiful in the physical or spiritual understanding, but all of them
encounter gallantry with that
subjection that is shown by him who, through his inclination, will be ruled by
a weaker person
The
feeling for the beauty of young boys gave to the origin of Greek love the disgraceful most disgraceful passion that was at
that time and he in nature
that has ever depraved stained
<human> nature, and they [the Greeks] completely deserved [the fact] that
their criminals were given over to the revenge and abuse of the wives, etc.
{R101}The
permitted illusion is a kind of untruth that is not then a lie; it is a cause
for ideal gratification whose object is not in things
Illusion
in a large gathering
as if
they all would be cleverer than one
That
one who thought himself the president[265]
in the marriage-bed wanted to contrive something that could make the obscured
magical power of illusion strong again
Illusion
gets along so well with the beautiful that even when one is aware of it, it
will please, but not so with the noble.
Appearing as clever, pious, sincere, honest.
{108, back side, opposite
Benevolence
is a peaceful inclination to view the bliss of others as an object of one’s joy
and also as a motive of one’s actions.
Sympathy is an affect of
benevolence [135] toward people in need according to which we imagine that we
would do whatever is in our power to help them.
It is therefore for the most part a chimera because it is neither always
in our power nor in our will. The
commoner is sympathetic toward others who become suppressed by the princes; the
nobleman [is sympathetic] toward another nobleman but callous toward peasants
With
luxury the fantasy of human love refines
itself[266]
and lessens capacity and pleasure. The
simple person takes in no others except those he can help
Understanding
creates no increase of moral feeling; he who ratiocinates has only cooled-off affects and is more cold-headed, [and]
consequently less evil and less good.
The moral good makes much more reasonable
One has
long tried to explain the feeling of pleasure about the ridiculous. In nature nothing is ridiculous
{102}[136]
One demands illusion of priests and women; the former should appear to take no
part in frivolous gratification, the latter [should appear] to have no
inclination for lustful intimacy.
Thereby one makes them deceitful
[The]
illusion of religion as it is finally taken for the thing itself. Then is a delusion.
One
must pay respect to priests for the sacrifice of so many freedoms and
gratifications (they are almost in as tight boundaries as a woman)
One
must handle both with attentiveness because neither has either the capacity or
the propriety to boldly resist insult on their side
{109, sheet inserted after
The
formality of all perfection consists in multiplicity (in addition to endurance
and strength) and unity; it [perfection] can also give gratification by itself
Sensitive. Insensitive.
The
will is perfect in so far as, according to the laws of freedom, it is the
greatest ground of good in general.
the
moral feeling is the feeling of the perfection of the will.
Whether
God is the originator of morality,
that is, whether we can only distinguish good and evil through the known will
of God
Sulzer[lxxi]
says that what the natural efficacy of the soul facilitates and promotes stirs
me with gratification. This says only that
it promotes the natural attempt at gratification
{Latin}
The corruption of one is the generation
of another. {German} Through the smell of putrefaction, nature wanted to
warn us of the greatest cause of dissolution and fermentation of the
destruction of animals
{R103}The
man is stronger in every capacity than the woman. But he is weaker with respect to inclination,
which he cannot tame so fully and also with respect to the susceptibility of
his tenderness and confidence. The woman
is weaker with respect to power but also more cool-headed and therefore more
capable
In all
things the sexual inclination adopts the most ideal embellishment.
This is
reason that women show off[267]
their great understanding early on: that one puts up with them in the choice of
matters so that at last they believe that there is no other [choice]
Women
have a very quick but not thorough concept; they grasp something as much as is
necessary in order to discuss it and believe there is nothing better
{110, back side, opposite
On the
means to measure the dryness and humidity of the air
[138]
With women, my courage makes me into a slave; with men, my cowardice [makes me
into a slave]
Great
respect for people is based on chimerical preferences that we lend to others
That author[lxxii]
who said that when he observes a grave man in his serious or sublime attire, he
mitigates his blind reverence through the representation of his intimacy with
the wife or common pressing need.[268] He did not need to have had this
representation. Still, this seems to be
why the Roman [Catholic] church has forbidden priests to have wives
The
free will (of one in need) is good for itself if it wills everything that contributes
to its perfection (gratification) and good for the whole if at the same time it
desires all perfection. As incapable as
the person who has this will may be, the will is indeed good. Other things may be useful; other people may
do much good in a certain action with a lesser degree of will but with more
power; yet the ground of willing the good is unique and [is] alone moral
[139]
The mathematician and the philosopher: they differ in that the former requires data from others while the latter examines
them himself. Hence the former can prove
[things] from any revealed religion.
The
fable of the swallow that wanted to catch the bird[lxxiii]
{111, sheet inserted after
The
French love only laughing beauty, the Italians
only peaceful beauty.
A
selfish (lustful) human being requires a person[269]
who he can love; a generous (affectionate) human being requires a person who
loves him, that is, who he can make happy through his obliging behavior
No
woman will readily admit, with her unhappiness in marriage, that the long
fasting in her marital satisfaction[270]
does her harm, for the woman always wants to appear to give and not to require;
because she is already needy with respect to all other parts of the man, if she
appears to be needy [in this], then an inequality will spring out of this
Her
refusal is a kind of beautiful untruth
[140]
All things, if they are only known as they are, have little agreeable in them;
they elevate feeling only through the fact that they appear as they are not;
all ideal gratifications will be promoted through the art of illusion. If a woman could appear at any time as she
liked,{R105}the skill would be one to love very much; the evil[271]
therein [is] that the thing comes and the illusion disappears
{112, back side, opposite
He who
does more than he owes is called kind[272]
insofar as he has no obligation at all to the other, who nevertheless has
nothing but obligation to him, so he is merciful
A
natural person can be merciful toward no one, for he has obligations to
each. Nevertheless he can be merciful
toward a captured enemy.
In our
conditions, when general injustice stands firm, the natural rights[273]
of the lowly people cease; therefore, they alone are debtors; the nobles owe
them nothing. For this reason, these
nobles are called merciful lords. He who
requires nothing from them but [141] justice and can hold them to their
obligations does not need this subjection.
A woman’s
modest (civil) behavior, if she is
equal, is an obligation; female grace is kindness and must be requested, not
demanded. Therefore, noble women can
certainly be called merciful ladies, but their husbands cannot [be called] merciful
lords. If she is defiant and pompous,
then she passes off her obligation; if she is indifferent then she will be
treated as equal.
On
common and countrified faces
What
the inequality of position maintains in delusion is, among other things, that
people of low birth imagine this [inequality] themselves, whereby a simple[274]
woman feels lowliness with herself; she hates and her disquiet shows itself,
which [is] the pride of the noble
<A
merciful lord who has no money is an absurdity, but a merciful lady without
money can certainly exist>[275]
{R106}On
the ‘he,’ ‘you,’ and ‘she’[276]
On even
and uneven numbers
On the
youthful feeling[277]
On the
reasons why he who pays is thanked although he does not do more give more than he gets. He merely makes money (Pope’s joke[278]
if there was no money[lxxiv]). For he who has money is richer than the one
who has wares because he has choice. He
who sells superfluous things[279]
(gallantry-monger, Caffetier[lxxv])
and lives on this must be more courteous than his customer, but not he who
sells necessary things, especially if he finds a customer every time
{113, sheet inserted after
[142] A
married man acquires and earns more esteem than a single man and an old
confirmed bachelor.
A wife
[is] more than a girl. A widow [is] also
more than a girl. The reason is because
the vocation is then completed and also the other people[280]
appear to be needy, that is, a girl wants to have a husband (without
difficulties) but a wife never wants to be a girl. Moreover, the encounter <with> a wife
is looked upon as [a] double and at the same time just the opposite with the
man
He must
know much who is supposed to teach others how to be wise with little
knowledge. It is a lot to wish for, that
this art become more refined[281]
dumb
and wise ignorance.
The
custom of imagining the deity as like princes has brought about many false
concepts of religion, for example,
insults. The honor of God
If I
presuppose that everything in relations between the sexes [143] runs inversely
then there are two possibilities 1. that the girl is abstinent and debauches as
a wife,[282]
2. that the girl yields to excess and is abstinent as wife; the second is more
in accordance with nature, the first [is more in accordance with] the age
{R107}of propriety, for if the wife gets pregnant it will seem every time as if
her husband is the father.
Among
friends, each can talk about himself, because the other acts as though it
concerns him; among people and friends of fashion, one must not talk about
oneself (not even in books); if one wants to talk about oneself, then it must
be something that can be laughed about.
In a
society based on fashion, I must regard each as exclusively egotistical, and
therefore I must praise neither those who are present nor those who are absent,
and thus, so that it be interesting, [I must] either joke or badmouth[283]<Calumny is based in part on the drive
for equality. Ostracism. Aristides.[lxxvi]
{114, back side, opposite
[144] The capacity to recognize something as a
perfection in others does not at all bring about the consequence that we
ourselves feel gratification in it. But
if we have a feeling that finds gratification in it, then we will also be moved
to desire it and apply our powers to it.
Thus it is to be asked whether we feel gratification immediately in the
well-being of another or whether the immediate pleasure actually lies in the
possible exercise of our power to assist it.
Both are possible, but which is actual[?] Experience teaches that in a simple condition
a person regards others’ happiness with indifference, but if he assisted it, it
pleases him infinitely more. The evil of
others is commonly just as indifferent, but if I precipitated it, it hurts more
than if done by another. And concerning
the sympathetic instincts of compassion and good-naturedness, we have cause to
believe they are merely great attempts to mitigate the evil[284]
of others stemming from the self-approbation of the soul that brings about
these sentiments.
We have
gratification in certain of our perfections, but far more if we ourselves are
the cause. We have the most if we are
the freely acting cause. To subordinate everything to the free power
of choice is the greatest perfection.
And the perfection [145] of the free {R108} power of choice as a cause
of possibility is far greater than all other causes of the good even if they
were to bring about [the good in] actuality
{115, page 88 of
With
the French, the mind is ready sooner than those <does not mature by way of>
grounds, indeed he [the Frenchman] does not expect from them [grounds] either
discovery or examination. The German
seeks grounds for all thoughts and is patient in fixing [breaks off]
{under line 17, at 2:246}
The French
demand almost as much indulgence as a woman.
Maupertius[lxxvii]
{116, sheet inserted after
{Latin}
<Habit>
{Latin}
Action for the singular will is moral
solipsism
(Latin) “ “ communal “ “ justice
The
feeling of pleasure and displeasure concerns either something with respect to
which we are passive or our self as an active principium of good and evil through freedom. The latter is moral feeling. Past physical evil aggrieves pleases us, but [past] moral [evil]
grieves us, and it is a completely different kind of joy about the good that
devolves upon us and that [good] which we do.
We have
little feeling for whether the condition of another is evil[285]
or good except insofar as we feel powerful to improve the former and promote
the latter. Sympathy is an instinct that
works only in rare and important occasions, its other effects are contrived.
{R109}
Because the greatest inner perfection and the perfection that arises from that
consists in the subordination of all of our capacities and susceptibilities to
the free power of choice, the feeling for the goodness[286]
of the free power of choice must be directly far different and also larger than
all the good consequences that can become actualized
[287]
through it.
This power
of choice contains either
<the mere> individual will as well as the universal [will], or it
considers the person together in consensu
with the universal will.
That
which is necessary through the universal will is an obligation
{117, back side, opposite
Because
the person of nature requires so little and the more he requires (egenus),[lxxviii]
the more miserable he is, the person is perfect insofar as he can do without;
insofar as he still has many powers left to promote the needs and bliss of
others, he
is he
has a feeling of a will beneficient[288]
outside of himself. Because the power of
choice, insofar as it is useful to the acting subject, is physically necessary
with respect to pressing need[s], it has no immediate goodness. Hence, the moral goodness of action is
unselfish[289]
In the
condition of nature, one cannot be selfish, but in the same [condition of
nature] neither can one be altruistic,[290]
but friendships are possible
Adolescence
is more enjoined to friendship because it is more unselfish, more
participatory, more <benevolent>, and more sincere than the later [ages]
[147]
On bliss in all ages of people. Youthful
inconstancy prevents
and disquiet prevents
many gratifications. The old person has
fewer lively inclinations, but the peaceful ones satisfy him. Indeed, we must not exchange[291]
the positions of life
{R110}One
already has a biased attitude of a nation that has a single language. Prussian
{118, sheet inserted after
{Latin}
The inner sense of pleasure and displeasure
precede appetite and aversion, because receptivity of joy and aversion lies in
the subject, also when it – the subject – still has no knowledge of the object
of this sense, as there is no desire for something unknown[294]. Desire is either original or derived; the
first is also different in regard to quality[295]. The inner sense is, if it is asserted as the
logical principal of the judgment of moral law, an occult quality; if [it is
asserted] as the capacity of the soul,
whose basis is unknown, [it is] a
phenomenon
[148] A
pactum is not possible between a domino and mancipio. God enters into a
union[296]
with humans because they have no sufficient, practical concept of his dominio
and so that they be led through the analogy
with the pacto of humans and not abhor[297]
the commanding severity
A
virtuous action is always an ethically good action that reluctantly occurs or
at least has occurred
{Latin}
All conditioned goodness of an action is
either under a possible condition (like the problematic) or an actual
[condition] (like the rules of prudence; every person wants to be healthy),
but, in a mediated or conditioned good quality, the absolute will is not good
if the powers and the circumstances of time and place are not there. And it is a good insofar as the will is
effective, but one will only be able to examine this good quality with regard
to the will. Also, if the powers might
be lacking, then the will is certainly praiseworthy. In great things, it will do to have had the
will. And this absolute perfection,
insofar as it is indeterminate, [and] whether or not something will be affected
by it, will be called moral.
{119, back side, opposite
<The
wife can do without much more with respect to gratification [and] Ge needs, but not with respect to
vanity>
{R111}[149]
Balance of sensation is the soul at peace.
This smooth surface will only be roused to indignation through
passions. It is a primary ground of
bliss not only to feel agreeable, but also to be conscious of one’s entire
condition, which is hindered <by> strong sensation
The
natural person is spared this disquiet through lack of feeling
Sufficiency* with respect to needs is called
simplicity. Insofar as the
agreeablenesses themselves are counted among needs it is partly beautiful and
partly noble simplicity.
Where
superfluousness with respect to needs combined with the effort to effect
agreeablenesses becomes evident, that is contrived; with respect to the
beautiful [it is] adorned [and] decorated; with respect to the sublime [it is]
magnificent [and] grandiose.
Taste is not necessarily meant for needs, but
it must not hinder them , as [happens] with pomp.
Regularity
agrees with simplicity, for, das Man
if the rule does not determine the kind of connection, it would be so random
and indeterminate that it would also contradict needs. For example, symmetry. Following in
pairs. Thus, it serves to determine the
purpose of each among those united together.
{120, sheet inserted after
{Latin}
<in Deo simul est subjective>
{Latin}The objective goodness[298]
of a free action {R112} (is subjective in God at the same time) or, what is the
same, the objective necessity[299]
is either conditioned or categorical.
The first is the goodness of an action as a means, the latter [150] as
an end;; hence the former is mediated, the latter is direct; the former
contains a problematic, practical necessity, the latter etc.
{Latin}A conditioned, good, free action is for this
reason not categorically necessary, for example, my munificence is useful to
other needy people, and thus one must be munificent. By no means.
But if the action of an open-hearted munificence is not only good for
others but good in itself, then it is subject to an obligation[300].
{Latin}About the moral feeling and the possibility
of the opposite.
{Latin}Providence has linked the moral feeling to
such an extent to public and universal usefulness, just like it also has with
private benefit, that the goodness of the will will not be as highly valued as
it should be.
When I
say that this action will give me more honor than the other, I mean that I
appeal to the universal judgment [and] that the judgment that I pass on my own
action is grounded.
Disputes
in world-wisdom[301]
have the use that they [151] promote the freedom of understanding and provoke a
mistrust towards the system[302]
that was supposed to have been built upon the ruins of another. In refutation, one is still so happy
In the
majority of languages simplicity and stupidity mean pretty much the same
thing. That is because a person of
simplicity is easily deceived by a falsehood that he considers to be as
honorable as himself
{121, back side, opposite
One
always talks so much about virtue. One
must first abolish injustice before one can become virtuous. One must remove conveniences, luxury and
everything else that oppresses others while it elevates me, so that I am not
one of all those who oppress their own race.[303] All virtue is impossible without this
resolution.
All
virtue is based on ideal feeling. Hence
in a state of luxury no virtue will be encountered in a person who has purely
physical feeling; in the state of nature, however, simplicity in plain feeling[304]
and simplicity in ethics exist completely together
{R113}[152]
Where the lengths of days <throughout the year> are more equal, there one
is it
serves more orderly,
thus in
It is
funny that luxury makes the estates[305]
poor, especially the princes
The
misery of people is not to be pitied, but to be laughed at: Democrit[lxxx]
Swift’s
linen weaver, etc.[lxxxi]
Among all
vanities the most common is that one wants to appear to be happy; hence one
would rather admit pretend that one does not want to do
something good (for example, marriage serves the common being) than that one
cannot do it, because the person who does without[306]
something or refrains from doing it purely with his will is happy insofar as he
has sufficient capacity to satisfy his desires
{122, sheet inserted after
[153]
We can see other worlds in the distance, but gravity forces us to remain on
earth; we can see still more perfections of spirit above us, but our nature
forces us to remain human beings.
Because
in society everything [that is] mine or yours depends on pacta, but this [depends] on keeping one’s word; a love of truth is
the foundation[307]
of all societal virtue and lies [are] the main vices against others along with
robbery, murder, and rape[308]
If
people subordinate morality to
religion (which is also only possible and necessary for the oppressed rabble)
they will thereby become hostile, hypocritical, [and] slanderous; but if they
subordinate religion to morality,
then they are kind, benevolent and just
{R114}<All
choice must have to do with future taste>
True
marriage in its perfection, poetized marriage in its perfection. Perfect bliss [and] peace
The
human in his perfection is not in the state of simplicity
[and] is also not in the
sufficiency [and] also not in the state of luxury; instead [he is] returning
from the latter state to the former.
Strange constitution of human nature.
This most perfect state rests on the tip of a hair; the state of nature can of simple and original nature does not
last long; the state of re-established[309]
nature is more lasting but never as innocent.
very
social women do not blush anymore, and if they are untrue [they blush] still
less than men[310];
the scatter-brain[311]
who doesn’t blush
A great
proof of luxury is that entire states are now becoming poorer and poorer. National guilt. Standing armies
[154]
All amusements intoxicate, that is, prevent one from feeling the entire sum of
bliss
{123, back side, opposite Ob 95, at 2:249}
It is
to be asked whether all of morality could be derived from the soul at peace;
with natural persons [it is] completely understood. Delights and debauches are opposed to
peace. The sexual inclination finds its
peace only in marriage. To offend others
disquiets oneself. Affects generally disquiet one.
It is horrible that according to this morality, no other person has a use*
Religion
determines the Jewish way of life. For,
because they at all times fear being forced by another, they abhor every way of
life in which they would not have enough freedom to avoid this [being forced by
another]. For this reason they do not
till the ground
{R115}[155]
In flourishing countries the landlords and workers are polite and seek to
serve, whereas the customers and guests are domineering, and there is, so to
speak, more diligence[312]
than money, that is, even money has an inner principium of increase. In
poor countries there is still more money than diligence.
In rich
lands the merchants (en detail) are
cool-headed and it is the
the customer is fair[313]
without haggling because there is just as much merchandise as money; in poor
[lands] there is more merchandise than money and the merchants are servile[314]
{124, page 95 of
In all
nations, the custom of drinking among men ceased as soon as the society was
adorned with women. The Greeks drank;
the old Germans [and] Prussians. The English still drink because the women are
separated. That would still be good with
certain women. Our lifestyle is nowadays
as though Arcadian;[lxxxii]
one always has society and love and game to entertain. But black sorrow, discord and tedium rule at
home
{125, sheet inserted at Ob 96, front side, at 2:250}
Why an
old woman is an object of disgust for both sexes, except when she is very clean
and not coquettish
{Latin}
The objective necessity of action (its
goodness[315])
is either conditioned (under the condition of some desired good) or
categorical. The first is problematic
and is a necessity of prudence if the drive, which is considered as a necessary
condition of action, is considered not only possible but actual. In order to recognize it, it will be
necessary to recognize all drives and instincts of the human soul so that an
account[316]
can be made of what is better with[317]
the subject’s inclination. And this
[applies] not only in the present condition, but also in the future
condition. The categorical necessity of
an action does not cost much effort, but demands only[318]
the application of circumstance to the moral feeling.
In certain life situations a lie is quite
useful and thus [156] lying will be in accordance with the rule of prudence,
but extensive prudence and a shrewdness for the consequences is required for
that. If one considers it on[319]
moral terms it will be understood on the basis of moral simplicity, what one
should do.
Also, if false testimony[320]
might be useful sometimes for others, then it is still a lie if a strict
obligation does not necessitate it. From
here on, one can see that truthfulness does not depend on general human love,
but on the feeling of right, through which we learn to carefully distinguish
what is just. But[321]
this feeling has its origin in the nature of the human spirit, through which it
judges what is categorically good (not useful), not for private or foreign
benefit, but through transferring[322]
the same action into others; if then a contradiction and contrast arises, it
displeases; if harmony and unison arise, they please. Hence the ability to put oneself in the place
of others as heuristic means. Of course
we are by nature social and could not in fairness sanction that in us which we
criticize in others. The public spirit[323]
of true and false is, of course, no different than human reason, taken
generally as the criteria of true and false and the public spirit of good and
evil is the criteria just from that[324]. Opposing heads would cancel out
knowledge-certainty[325],
opposing hearts [would cancel out] moral certainty.
[157] The goodness[326]
of the will leads itself away from the effects of private or public use and the
immediate inclination for them, and the former has its basis in need, the
latter [has its basis] in the power for the good; the former relates to one own benefit, the
latter [relates] to the general benefit, both feelings are concordant[327]
with natural simplicity. But the
goodness[328]
of the will as that of a free principal[329]
will be recognized, not insofar as every advantage originates out of it, but
insofar as it is possible in itself. And
the happiness of others is concordant [breaks
off]
{126, back side, opposite Ob 97, at 2:250}
Obligation
<naturally toward people> has a determinate measure, [but] the duty of
love[330]
has none. The former consists in that
nothing more is done than what I would have another do to me and that I give to
him only what is his; {R117} consequently, in accordance with such an action,
everything is the same (sympathy[331]
is excepted from this.)
If I
promise something to him, then I am robbing him of something, for I have made a
hope that I cannot fulfill. If he is
hungry and I do not help him, then I have not overstepped any obligation. But if I should, in the case that I myself were
hungry, desire to get things from others only on the condition[332]
of giving it in return, then it is [158] an obligation to also satisfy him with
food. I A
robber certainly wishes that he might be pardoned,
but knows well that he would not pardon himself if he were judge. The judge punishes even if he knows that if
he were [a] delinquent[333]
he would not want to be punished, but detained with punishment it is different, the
deprivation of life does not occur through the judge, but through the criminal
on account of his misdeed. No one in a
time of need can imagine that, were he a rich man, he would help every needy
person
{Latin}
In the first condition of the human, his
obedience was that of a slave, after that a subject, then a son. The law-given power was that of a master,
prince, father.
Whoever binds slaves to himself as master
(despot), sets only punishment as incentives, the prince who has subjects bound
to him (legitimately) [sets] rewards and punishments [as incentives], the father
[sets] only love and rewards [as incentives] for his son. The basis of obligation is natural slavery
and guilt in the first case, the second contains a moral basis of a contract,
[and] the third includes everything previous and at the same time an internal
morality.
Christ
tried to bring people to a simple sufficiency through religion, in which he presented to them the glory of heaven; his
speeches could only produce perverted concepts with the Jews because they [the
Jews] all along only posited their religion in empty concepts and also built
these [concepts] on no other condition[334]
than the recovery of their kingdom
All
truthfulness presumes an idea of equality; hence the Jews who in their opinion
have no duty at all to others are lying and deceiving without having any pangs
of conscience. haereticis non est fides
{127, page 98 of
Honor
cannot be a basic impulse[335]
because it would depend on the opinion of others; when drinking and fighting (dueling[336])
is the fashion, one who does them is justified[337]
{128, sheet inserted after Ob 98, front side, at 2:250}
Women
are much more domestic by nature than men because they [159] have children to
suckle. Our gallant wives who don’t have any [children] and our girls who know
that they will never nurse are not domestic because it is not necessary. Their beautiful natural aptitude[338]
for clean housekeeping and for caring for a sick person, even if for more
thrifty use of what has been acquired [breaks off]
Manly
dignity and womanly grace are lost in society.
Mademoiselle Montagu[lxxxiii]
Authors
seem to be profound when they dispel all wit, just as crude people seem to be
honorable
Just as
one deceives oneself through the illusion of wealth, so a woman at last
believes herself to actually have those virtues to the illusion of which she
has devoted herself from the beginning.
In
order to be good as a common person, more belongs to this than to be a good
prince. If he is merely not
exceptionally evil, then he is already good for it.
Duels orig[339]
[160] The young person full of sentiment, even
with as much understanding as he has, will be easily persuaded by womanly
illusion and wants to be beguiled;[340]
he is seriously submissive and meek. The
experienced and sharp-sighted[341]
wanton has longest had insight into the mirage of illusion; for this reason he
is bold, unabashed, and, because he has excused the other gender of coercion
from being scrupulous about decency,[342]
it [female illusion] is agreeable to him.
{R119}Duels have their true origin in the time
of gallantry from the inclinations of
women, for with common courtship the beauty[343]
picks out the most courageous one and triumphs over her rivals in love so that
thereby her lover is frightful to her [rivals].
With insults that befall her, he cannot maintain her appearance[344]
other than through courageousness.
Who wants
the women to grasp propriety
It
seems to me that Epicurus is
different from Zeno in that the former
imagined the virtuous soul at peace after having overcome moral hindrances, but
the latter [imagined] it in the struggle and effort to prevail [over such
hindrances]. Antisthenes never had such a high idea; he desired that one should
reflect only on vain ostentation and false bliss and choose to be a simpler man
rather than a great one[lxxxiv]
{129, back side, opposite Ob 99, at 2:251}
{Latin}
As long as an object obeys my changeable[345]
will, it is mine, but I can always transfer my will to another.
Obligation
is communal[346]
selfishness in equilibrium[347]
{Latin}
Duty is either Christian duty any or obligation. Actions of the first kind are morally [161]
spontaneous, actions of the latter kind are morally forced. (This is different[348]
from political force.) The will is
either the individual will of the person or the universal will of the person
XXX (the obligation from the universal to people[349]).
XXX
{Latin}
(Something necessary originates from
[either] the good, particular will of the human or from the universal.)
<Right, wrong.>
Then an
action considered from the point of view of the universal will of the human is,
if it contradicts itself, externally, morally impossible (impermissible). Permit me to be in the act of seizing the
fruits of another. If I then see that no
person, under the condition that what he has acquired will be snatched from
him, will want to acquire [anything], then I will just privately want that
which belongs to another, while publicly refusing it.
Of course, insofar as something depends
entirely on the will of a subject, it is impossible that it contradict itself[350]
(objective[351]). And yet, the divine will would contradict
itself if it willed there to be humans whose will was opposed to its own. The will of the human[352]
would contradict itself if they wanted to stand in contradiction to the
universal will. In the case of a
collision, the universal will, of course, carries more weight than the
individual will.
[162] The hypothetical
<conditioned[353]>
necessity of an action as means to a possible end is problematic, [as a means] to an actual end it is necessity of
prudence, the categorical necessity is moral.
Making
a station belongs to morality; first, in the judgment of
others about the deed (from which, if it is an instinct, ambition originates
and goes farther than the means for determining legitimacy[354]);
secondly, in judgment the sentiments of others, so that one
senses their hardship or happiness (hence moral sympathy[355]
arises as an instinct)
The origin
of love of honor regarding the beauty of actions therefore lies in a
wicked-minded means[356]
of managing one’s own morality, which falsely becomes an end
The
origin of love of honor regarding the judgment of physical characteristics lies
in the means to freedom, self-preservation, and style.
{130, page 99 of
To
compare oneself to others is a means of making comparative greatness or worth
one’s intention, [but this] is perverted[357]
and is the origin of envy
{R121}Bravery
is only a means; the savage values it as an end.
In the
end, honor can be placed in drinking and vice
{131, page 100 of
The man
and the woman do not have the same sentiment[358]
and also should not have it, but even from this arises unity, not identity, but the subordination of inclinations, since everyone feels that the other
is necessary to him for the greatest perfection. Friendship presumes agreeing[359]
sentiments[360]
{132, sheet inserted after
With a
great corruption of ethics, the girls remain chaste and the wives debauch[361]
because the latter act purely against obligation, while the former act against
decency
<It
is already honor to not be despised.>
[163] The drive to I require things or also people. Honor is either indirect or direct. In the first case, it is a drive for
enjoyment; in the second, for illusion.
In the first case, the imaginary needs are either true or imaginary, to which the honor is a
means, and the former [needs are] either in the natural or unnat degenerate conditions. Needs in natural conditions for things <to
be procured> do not require honor (because every person can procure them
himself), but in order to preserve them and oneself, they demand that others
have an opinion of equality for us so that our freedom doesn’t suffer, since we
are able to seek our needs as we please.
People’s natural need of acquisition
is a woman. For this, he has need of the
opinion not of advantage but of equality with other men, and [he] easily
acquires it as well. Still, in both
cases the person will raise the drive for real honor above equality, partly so
that freedom is more assured, partly because he begins to prefer one woman to
the others, so that she also prefers him.
Finally, in the state of excess
<inequality>, the {R122}drive for honor is either the true need or the
[164] artificial one. In
{133, back side, opposite
Voluntary Slavery is either that of force of that of blindness. The
latter is based on either dependency on things (luxury), or on the delusions of
other people (vanity). The latter is
absurd[362]
and also harder than the former because matters are far more in my power,
rather than the opinions of others, and it is also more despicable
The
loss of freedom is grounded on either devotedness or subservience. In the first case one is ruled by means of
his inclination (either for things or for people, as [165] in love, friendship,
and parental love) or contrary to his inclination. The former is a consequence of softish
luxury, while the latter [is a consequence of] dreadful cowardice and is a
result of the former
The
drive for honor with respect to gender[363]
also becomes pure delusion in the end.
And marriage, which should promote self-preservation, promotes this pure
delusion, and vanity is a cause of singleness[364]
With
women, the drive for honor is erected solely solely upon the sexual inclination and mediates the same
upon needs, because she must be sought; since this is not necessary with men,
they will only be advanced[365]
through commerce and, therefore, can sooner be resolved to singleness
What
well proves the fantastical nature[366]
of love is that one loves the beloved object more is its absence than in its
presence; with friendship it is different.
{134, page 102 of
The
drive for honor is grounded on the drive for equality and the drive for
unity. As it were, two powers that move
the animal world. The instinct for unity
is either in judgments and thoughts or also in inclinations. The former brings about logical perfection,
the latter [brings about] moral [perfection].
{left margin, at 2:252}
The
single, naturally necessary good of a person in relation to the wills of others
is equality (freedom) and, with respect
to the whole, unity. Analogy:
Repulsion, through which the body fills its own space just as each other [body
fills] its own. Attraction, through
which all parts combine into one.
[166] The truth of a perfection consists in
the magnitude of the pleasure that is not precluded, with respect to itself and
other greater ones. If falsity could be
lasting and [offer] more gratification than truth, then the pleasure from this
deception would be a true pleasure, though a false cognition
{lower margin, at 2:252}
The
natural instincts of active benevolence toward others consist in love towards
the opposite sex and toward children.
That toward other people depends purely on equality and unity
There
is unity in the sovereign[367]
state but not equality; when the latter is combined with unity of all, then it constitutes the perfect republic
{135, sheet inserted at
{R124}The
drive to evaluate oneself merely comparatively, with respect to one’s worth as
well as one’s welfare, is far more extensive than the drive for honor, and
contains the latter within itself. It
[the drive] does not lie in nature and [it] is an indirect result of the
practice of knowing the means of one’s own condition better through comparison
with others. Ambition, which is a spur
of science, arises from the comparison of our judgment with the judgment of
others as a means, and thus presupposes respect for the judgment of others
The
Indians are wondrously calm and not violent
The
South Americans are indifferent and phlegmatic
The
Negroes are very careless and vain
The
Europeans are lively and hot-tempered
The affects of the Indians are nevertheless still
stronger than the Europeans’.
A
reason why Montesquieu was able to say so many admirable things is that he
presupposed [that] whoever would introduce customs [167] or give laws always
had a reasonable ground[lxxxv]
The
main intention of Rousseau is that education be free and also make a free human
A woman
does not like to give away, in contrast, she takes. No one knows contentment; everyone asserts
delightfulness in its place. <Golden
rain in the laps of Danae. Jupiter [is]
a bull.[lxxxvi] Alcmene was faithful in Amphitryon>[lxxxvii]
How
education helps the police is to be seen from the fact that the former makes
many goods, e.g., silk [and] gold, entirely unnecessary, whereas the latter
prohibits them in vain because it only offends[368]
thereby
{R125}A
woman loves less affectionately than a man or else she would not assume rule
over him and obviously would demand
prefer him to herself. She is also aware
that she bears more affection if the man does not have this refined sensation,
so then he is called coarse and hard by her
Marriage
gives no ideal gratification as mere sympathy[369]
Illusion
is sometimes better than truth, for the [168] gratification from the former is
a true gratification. Make-up: if one
knows it, then it is no longer a deception.
{136, back side, opposite
Living
long and little or short and much living
Much
living in enjoying or in acting
Both in
the greatest proportion [are] the best.
That
the capacity for living decreased from the 16th-century on
It is
to be noted that we don’t value the goodness[370]
of an action because it is useful to another; otherwise we would not value it
more highly than the usefulness than it creates.
The
moral feeling applied[371]
to one’s own actions is conscience
[169] de stationibus: Physicis the moon is occupied
Logicis for
want of egoism
Moralibus for want of solipsism
{Latin}
To morally put oneself in the place of
another happens either through instinct, sympathy or pity. Or through intellect.
{R126}Magnetic
force is probably based on the dissimilarity (diversa gravitas specifica) of ethereal[372]
material of which iron is full (the earth is full of iron), whereby the heavier
things sink to the bottom
Hence
the magnetic quality appears more in length, e.g., more if a clump of iron is
long and vertical than [if it is] thick and short, because even the quantity of aether there must give more
distinction to the thickness. One can
assume that the clumplings[373]
that have negative and positive poles are small.
{137, sheet inserted after
Electricity
consists of parts that have been rubbed off; magnetism does not. Hence the latter is pervasive and affects
according to mass; the former does not.
[170]
The two corresponding poles push each other back because two elastic spheres of
aether of similar thickness push them, but the two non-corresponding, because
one is of a lighter kind (according to the elements themselves, not purely by rarefaction[374]),
will be engulfed by each other and will pull the magnet
The
needle sinks with its heavy end in the universal magnetic atmosphere and the
other end rises
The
sensitive soul at peace, in faces, in societies, in eloquence
Poetry
in marriages and sexual desire[375]
The
difference of gender
Blessedness
and cheerfulness
Perhaps
the moon, by affecting the electrical
(referingirend)[lxxxviii]
material that extends so much higher, causes the winds and the ebb and flow
Perhaps
it is the pushed-together aether[376]
itself from the Centro of gravity[377]
to the Centro of the earth
{R127}[171]
Thoughtlessness[379] (insipid boldness) rises above the
effort of appearing[380]
and expresses only a certain high-spirited dependability with respect to that
which can please. The petitmaitre is a scatter-brain[381]
who is gallant, but he must appear to
be known by many in the great world. He
is lucky with women. The Germans travel
to
{138, back side, opposite
Were the I posit magnetic matter to be a sphere of dissimilar aether
that yet in its expanse contains all species, one beneath the other [172], although
the thicker parts [are] nearer to the Centrum of the earth [while] the lighter
[are] on top. If this atmosphere were to have a joint Centrum[384]
with the earth, then no direction[385]
toward the poles would take place; were its Centrum in the axis, then no declination would take place. For, since because the intersection of the horizons of two globes is a
line of a compass[386],
to which the needle must stand perpendicularly, if they should sink as far as
possible into the magnetic circle,[387]
while all these compasses run parallel
with the equator, then the needles
will hold the meridian.
If this
Centrum is not in the axis, then only
the linea expers variationis is there
where the meridian of the earth agrees with the magnetic meridian.[388] It Now,
because the axis magnetic axis lies on such a plane with
the earth’s axis that the meridian that goes through the earth’s poles also
goes through the magnetic poles, the linea
expers variationis would be at all times a meridian. Now, should it not be a meridian, then the
magnetic horizon must be spherical or else irregular, in that case, however,
the magnetic attractions must not {R127} aim at the center[389]
of the magnetic spheroid, but instead diverge from it. Suppose that this oblateness comes from the
centrifugal force of the earth, then the size of the divergence from the
magnetic Centro will suppress the divergence from the Centro of the earth in
proportion to the strength of the conducted magnetic force. Therefore, the magnetic horizon can be bent
very differently and not only the inclination,
but also the declination [can] be
quite manifold
{139, sheet inserted after
Moral
delusion happens when one takes the opinion of a possible moral perfection for
an actual one.
We have
selfish and altruistic[390]
sentiments. The former are older than
the latter and the latter create themselves first in the sexual
inclination. A human is needy but also
powerful over needs. [173] He who is in
the state of nature is more capable of altruistic and active sentiments, the
one in luxury has imagined needs and is selfish. One takes more interest in evil, primarily
the injustice that others suffer, than in welfare. The sympathetic sentiment is true if it is
equal to the altruistic powers, otherwise it is chimerical.[391] It is universal in an indeterminate way as
long as it is extended to one out of all those I can help, or [it is universal]
in a determinate way [when it extends] to help every sufferer; the latter is
chimerical. Kind-heartedness originates through
the culture of moral but inactive
sensation and is a moral delusion. On
the negat private kind-heartedness to do no evil
and the justice of doing one’s obligation
The
morality[392] that
wants nothing but genuine unselfishness is chimerical, also the one that is
sympathetic to imagined needs. The moral
philosophy that only affirms self-interest is crude
The duties of benevolence[393]
could never bring about that one would rob himself of his own needs, but
surely the duties of obligation[394]
[could], for these are moral needs
{R129}[174]
Virtue carries along with it a natural wage, but not for goods of luxury, but
[for goods] of sufficiency
It is
worth commemorating a perfect person of nature, but not one of art
The
former takes care to impose some obligations on himself. [A]nd also the latter
{140, back side, opposite
The
sweetness of present need is chimerical
Friendship
of agreeableness or need. They must be similar, else it is not called
friendship, but enjoyment
Friendship
is always mutual, thus not between father and child and, since the wife never
desires the man as much as the latter does her, marriage is only closely
related to the most perfect friendship.
In the
state of luxury, marriages must cease to become friendships.
The
friendship of delusion that consists of mutual, good wishes [175] without
effect is foolish[395]
but beautiful, that of convivial friendliness and agreeing sensations is the
most common, but such a person is a socializer, perhaps open-hearted and
reticent[396]
but no friend.[397]
The
education of Rousseau is the only means to aid the flourishing of civil society
again. For since luxury always increases
quicker where need,[398]
oppression, contempt for position, and war arise, the laws can accomplish
nothing against it, as in
{R130}The
doubt that I accept is not dogmatic, but a doubt of postponement. Zetetics[399]
(ζήτεĩν) searcher. I will advance the grounds of both
sides. It is amazing that one be
concerned about danger from that.
Speculation is not a matter of pressing need. Knowledge with respect to the latter is
certain. The method of doubt is useful
in that it preserves the mind, not to
act upon speculation, but upon healthy understanding and sentiment.[400] I seek the honor of Fabius Cunctator.[xc]
Truth
has no value in itself, whether an opinion about the habitation of many worlds
is true or false, it is all the same.
One must not confuse it with truthfulness. Only the manner in which one arrives at truth
has a determinate worth, because that which leads to error can also do so in
practical matters
If
gratification from the sciences should be the motive,[401]
then it is all the same whether it is true or false. In this, the ignorant and precocious[402]
have an advantage over the reasonable and cautious. The final end is to find the vocation of
humanity
{141, page 107 of
[176] The opinion of inequality also makes
people unequal. Only the doctrine of Mr.
Rousseau can make it so that the most
learned philosopher with his knowledge, honestly and without the help of
religion, does not regard himself as better than the common man
{142, sheet inserted after
What a
miserable condition it is when oppression is so universal and commonplace that
an industrious and honest person cannot demand merely justice, but instead must
invoke mercy. The more we fail to
recognize our obligations, if we are not yet entirely corrupted, the more gifts
of goodwill[403]
remain for us; we mostly neglect the obligations toward some and give gifts of
goodwill[404]
to others.
{R131}In
order to make up for the weakness of women in the active characteristics,
nature has made men weak insofar as they surrender themselves to illusion and
let themselves be easily deceived. The
man is inclined to create great concepts of a beloved object and almost feel
unworthy to them. Yet the woman commonly
imagines herself worthy of courtship and makes no fantastical ideas of
preference[405]
with respect to the man. They soon
believe that they are able to rule[406]
over the heart of the man. The man is
inclined to value his wife or his beloved higher than himself, the wife never
[does this]. [177] If one merely considers the purpose of the sexes[407],
then the wife evidently rules[408]
and is more clever. The generous person
believes more easily than the selfish and weak person.
Gallantry (of men) is the art of illusion in love.[409] For women, coquetterie is the art of making an illusion of their inclination
to conquer.[410] Both are ridiculous in marriages. If the wife and husband Propriety is the art of appearing
virtuous and of appearing chaste; modesty, refined and selective in taste,
coyness, appearing affable, politeness,[411]
refinement.[412] If this The people who best understand this art
make the worst marriages
If
illusion of
marriage is employed for
the purpose of [entering into] marriage, then it is still good; if it lasts
after marriage, then it is quite ridiculous.
Indeed, men demand such women, who, as they say, do them credit, who are
sought after, who one would like to elude.[413]
{143, back side, opposite
{Latin}
There is a strict duty toward the Lord
from obedience/reverence, toward the benefactor from love; in the new covenant
one can love God, in the old covenant [one can] worship him.
[178]
Bodies are either positive transparent, or negative
(reflective), or zero[414]
(black). All bodies on the surfaces are
both at the same time, especially little membranes.[415]
The
little membranes of iron magnets have this characteristic and pull in whole
clumps with their different poles.
Electrical bodies only have it on the surface
{R132}<With
women, book-reading occurs in order to seem learned>
<In
the same way, the marriage that has no illusion has honesty>
{Latin}
While justice is the epitome of the
obligations of indebted people, the disposition of actions, which are decided
on the basis of justice, establishes justice, which is either of the people
owed (active) or the people owing (passive).
The former (gstr.: enforces the actions of others, but only as long as
they correspond to right, the latter enforces only such actions and the latter
only so long as and to the extent that they promote the basis of right. The latter is a disposition[416]…)
is the disposition to decide on actions that would be enforced through the
legal grounds of others: … (both can from…)
If the disposition of actions corresponds to justice, then the former
will [enforce] strict justice, the latter [breaks off]
{Latin}
The disposition (of actions) of duties
that overstep the boundaries of active justice [is] Equity,[417]
such as of passive justice.[418]
Predisposition[419]
<The
illusion of friendship. Aristotle[xci];
[179] if we wake, then we have mundum
communem>
{Latin}
The sentence with regard to civil law:
the greatest right is the greatest wrong.
It is true as concerns the civilian, not the judge.[420]
<A
young groom is thus not good because he has not yet considered the falsity of
illusion>
Hume
means that priests very much practice the art of illusion.[xcii] Truth adapts itself only to the robe, to the
formal habit,[421]
to the illusion. All kinds of illusion in clothes. Make-up.
Alexander v. Antipater:
purple interior[xciii]
Envy ceases
when I can wipe away the illusory appearance[422]
of others’ bliss and perfection
{R133}On
the means of imagining a president or dignified man with his wife
{144, page 110 of
The
most perfect wife. Reasonable and brave,
rational when she is willingly exempt from ratiocination. <Clever, wise – witty, refined> The exemption from domestic business makes
foolish women <gallant.>
Foolish woman.
He who
knows how to satisfy his desires is clever; he who knows how to rule them is
wise. World-wisdom[423]
{left margin, at lines 21-28}
Costs
and expenses.[424] They are expenses if one can have the
gratification [180] of money or of work and thus also forfeits[425]
them. The miser[426]
has the greatest expenses; he who knows how to live, even with the expenditure
of all money, [has] the greatest profit.
Also avaricious. to spend it
every time for his contentment (not delightfulness).[427]
{lower margin, between the text and the closing vignette}
Just as
the greatest of people cannot grow above average without becoming weaker and
also [cannot] remain below average without being too weak, so it is with the
ethical and graceful[428]
characteristics
{lower margin, under the vignette}
Greek
Roman face. Characters of nations in company: the Spanish, French,
Germans, [and] English
That
our youths and men are[429]
still so childish is because they did not have enough permission to be children
earlier. Just so, the trees whose
blossoms were not properly allowed to break out in the spring bloom in {R134}
the fall
{145, inside of the back cover}
Simplicity
is either that which is ignorant or that which is rational and wise
In all
moral definitions, the expression mediocrity[430]
is quite wretched and indefinite, e.g., in
parsimony,[431]
for it indicates only that there is a degree that is not good by reason of the
size without saying how large the good must therefore be
This mediocritas aurea is an occult quality[432]
Distinction
between: he knows how to appear or he knows how to live.
[181]
One could say that metaphysics is a science of the bounds of human reason
Metaphysical
doubt does not annul[433]
useful certainty, but only useless certainty
Metaphysics
is useful in that it puts an end to illusion, which can be harmful
In
metaphysics, not to think of the opposite side is partiality, and not saying it
is also a lie; in actions it is otherwise
One
merely falls in love with illusion, but one loves truth
If one
should discover most people’s illusion, then they would seem like every bride of
whom it is said that she takes off her pretty, silken eyebrows, a pair of ivory
teeth, some cloth that supported her bosom, [and] excellent ringlets and has
wiped off her make-up for her confounded lover
Illusion
requires refinement and art, truth requires simplicity and peace. After Swift, everything in the world is
clothes[xciv]
What is
most ridiculous is this: that one creates illusion toward others for so long
that one himself imagines it to be true; children do the same with religion. Illusion, when the one for whom it is intended takes it as the thing itself,
is delusion.[434]
The
illusion that the woman intends as a
means to the attainment of marital love is no delusion, but [it] surely is in
any other case. On the art of making
easy things difficult
[183]
Loose Leaves
to
the
Women’s inclination to
novels perhaps comes from the fact that they wish that love were the sole
inclination by which men are ruled.
Just as the greatest
superabundance that arises from free government ultimately amounts to casting
off everything into slavery and eventually poverty, so does the unnatural freedom of the female sex and
the agreeableness that they enjoy and give out through it [the freedom] at last
amount to making them downright despicable and, in the end, making them into
slaves.
Mr. Hume believes that
a woman who has no knowledge of the history of her fatherland or of
The woman, because she
always wants to rule, accepts, without consideration, a fool.
The valiant wife wants
to be honored through her husband, the vain wife would not ask for this honor
but wants to be striking herself. The coquette has the intention of
influencing inclinations, although she has none herself, it is merely a game of
vanity.
All inclinations are
either exclusive or sympathetic. The
former are selfish, the latter are altruistic.
However, self-love and self esteem are not exclusive according to their
nature; however, egoism and self-conceit are.
In accordance with the law of nature, female love is exclusive with
respect to other men. The purely lustful
drive or the lover’s rage can even be exclusive [184] with respect to the
object of love, hence rape, Herod, etc.[xcvi] The immediate drive for honor is exclusive
with respect to honor. The
characteristic of the mind that exclusively desires everything in objects,
[and] where this drive is not justified by nature, is called envy. Envy is a kind of pain. But emulation, a sadness about inequality,
can only concern an imagined inequality; incidentally, it is then only a
perverted application of a good law of nature.
The drives that are sympathetic are the best: only in sexual impulses
must sympathy concern only the object of the amorous inclination.
Women’s refusals are
an irresistible drive for illusion[435];
the men who have not yet become extremely wanton have the characteristic that
they will be very easily deceived by this illusion; this relation holds the
strength of the opposing inclination within its bounds.
The ethical condition,
if the taste for a great number of feigned gratifications and attractions is
missing, is simplicity; that which is acquired by way of this taste is virtue,
but even heroic virtue has to do with overcoming needs. Thus, one can be good without virtue. Just judgment, which is acquired through
experience that depends on needs, is understanding; if the taste for many
things increases and magnifies the manifoldness of concerns, then reason,
indeed even refined reason, is necessary.
But the healthy reason is a fine reason, which returns to what is
necessary to judge and know. One can be
very reasonable without much fineness of reason.
Simple taste readily
degenerates, and ethical simplicity, for lack of knowledge of seductive charm,
is easily deceived; therefore it is the greatest perfection
That wife who has
acquired no special taste for all distractions, gallantries, and vanities can be good without virtue and reasonable
without brooding. If she is pulled from
the middle [185] and out of the seat of this fine gratification, then thousands
of enticements affect her and she requires virtue to be a good wife.
In domestic life, he
who is spirited, good-hearted, and peaceful in company does not need books and
ratiocination, but if so much refined taste, concupiscence, and fashion is
acquired, then reason belongs in order to prevent one from becoming a foolish
woman.
The most perfect wife
would be she who knows the various fine delights of life, [knows] the manners
[and] gallantry of her lovely charms, and has taste, but willingly prepares
herself for domesticity and simplicity by way of reasoning insight into their uselessness
and knows how to oblige herself through virtue.
A wife needs even more
virtue in marriage than the husband, primarily if the necessity of decent
illusion has gone completely out of style and the gallant freedom, as innocent
as they might call it, emerges. For she
has a sure game, as one can easily guess, and will be called upon more often.
According to the rule
of prudence, one can assume that something will never be encountered if it is
encountered exceedingly seldomly and where it is encountered, it is difficult
to know; for this reason it is not in accordance with prudence to allow this
deceitful[436]
agreeableness of women to guide[437].
Aged people love jokes
and whatever arouses laughter, youth is in love with moving tragedy that
arouses strong sensations. What is the
cause[?]
I find almost
universal the mistake that one does not ponder the brevity of human life
enough. Therefore, it is indeed perverse
to have it [human life] in front of one’s eyes so that one despises it and only
looks to the future. Thereby, one would
be correctly at his place and not postpone life too long by way of [186] a
foolish imagining of the plan for our actions.
The epitaphs of various ages make use of the same as encouragement for
lustful and luxurious enjoyments and as an avaricious greediness for
gratification. But if well understood,
it serves only to free the mind, through sufficiency, from the rule of impulses
that entangle us in preparations against the brevity of life that are not in
accordance with the efforts of enjoyment.
Contemplation of the proximity of death is agreeable in itself and [is]
a corrective [useful] for bringing
people toward simplicity and assisting them in [attaining] the sensitive peace
of the soul; this begins as soon as blind ardor, through which one previously
chased after the imagined objects of his wishes, ceases.
The woman who is
constantly busy with the management of exquisite attire must be kept in this
practice in marriage. For, since she is
supported by no other inclination for purity and agreeableness than pleasing
others, she will become filthy and swinish if she is to live alone with her
husband.
In society, the man is
more often lost in the contemplation of what pleases him about women, while the
woman is more often lost in the contemplation of what in herself pleases men.
All the gratifications
of life have their great charm in that one hunts after them; possession is cold
and the enchanting spirit has evaporated.
Thus, the greedy merchant has thousands of gratifications as long as he
is earning money. If he considers
enjoying this earning he will be tormented by thousands of worries. The young lover is extremely happy in hope,
and the day his happiness rises to its highest, it begins to decline again.
A certain quiet
self-confidence combined with the attributes of respect and decency acquires
trust and goodwill; on the other hand, a boldness that appears to give little
respect to others brings about hate and opposition
[187] In disputes, the quiet place of the mind is
combined with kindness and indulgence toward the people fighting, a sign of one
being in possession of power whereby the understanding of his victory is
certain. Just as
Few people will endure
mockery and contempt with a peaceful mind if they are in front of a large
crowd, even if they know that the people in the crowd are all ignoramuses or
fools. The greatest crowd always
instills awe, indeed, even the spectator shivers with fright at the false step
of whoever compromises himself in its presence, although each individual would
find little disparaging in the speaker’s disapproval if he were alone with
him. But if the great crowd is absent,
then a steady man can quite well inspect their judgment with complete
indifference.
With respect to the
beauty of objects, men are very well adorned with an intense passion,
embarrassment and a languishing longing for women, but [also] a peaceful
affection. It cannot be good that the
woman makes offers to the man or anticipates his declarations of love. For he who alone has the power must
necessarily be dependent upon whoever has nothing but charm, and the latter
must be conscious of the value of her charm, else there would be slavery
instead of equality
That which is
mechanical in laughter is the shaking of the diaphragm and lungs together with
a contorted face, since the mouth is pulled by others, etc.; women and fat
people love to laugh. One laughs most
violently when one is supposed to remain serious. One laughs most strongly about those who look
serious. Strong laughter is tiring [and]
breaks out through tears as with sadness.
Laughter that is provoked by tickling is also quite fatiguing, while
that which is provoked by imagination is certainly amusing, but can end up in
convulsions. If I am harmed by the one
about whom I laugh, I cannot be evil[438]
any more. The memory of something
ridiculous gives much pleasure and also does not wear off as easily [188] as
other agreeable anecdotes. The Abbot Terrasson with the cap on his head.[xcviii]
The basis for laughter
seems to consist in the trembling of quickly pinched nerves that transmit
themselves through the entire system;
other gratifications come from uniform movements of the nervous fluid. Therefore, if I hear something that has the
appearance[439]
of a prudent, purposeful connection, but is itself entirely nullified in
trifles, then it will [have] bent nerves on one side and, at the same time,
repelling and quivering [nerves]. I
wouldn’t want to wager but I’ll swear to it any time.
Pelisson should have
been painted in place of the devil.[xcix]
Sexual inclination is
either amorous need or amorous concupiscence.
In the state of simplicity, the former rules and thus [there is] still
no taste. In the state of art the
amorous concupiscence becomes either one of enjoyment of everything or of ideal
taste. The former constitutes lustful
immoderacy. In everything, the former is
to be seen in two pieces. The female sex
is either mingled with the male sex in free company or excluded. If the latter is the case then no moral taste
takes place, but at most simplicity (lending the Spartan wives[c]), or it is a lustful
delusion together with an amorous greed to possess much for enjoyment without
being able to even rightly enjoy one; Salomon.[ci] In the state of simplicity, mutual need
rules. Here need is on one side and
scarcity on the other. There, fidelity
without temptation existed; here, guards of chastity that is not possible in
itself. In the free company of both sexes,
which is a new invention, concupiscence grows but so does moral taste. One of the characteristics of this drive is
that it underlies the ideal charms but then must be promoted, always as a kind
of secret; from this arises a kind of [189] modest decency but with strong
desires, without which this would become common and, in the end, subjected to
weariness. Secondly, that the female sex
takes on illusion as if it [illusion] were not a need for them [the sex]; this
is necessary if the amorous inclination is supposed to remain united with ideal
gratification and moral taste in the state of art. In lustful passion this illusion is not at
all necessary. Therefore, female
surrenders appear to be merely either forced or marks of favor[440]
A young man who expresses
no amorous inclination will be indifferent in the eyes of the woman.
If religion really can
provide a use that is directly focused on future bliss, then the most natural
first [religion] is that which focuses ethics in such a way that they are good
for the fulfilling of [one’s] station in the present world, so that one thereby
becomes worthy of things to come. For
what concerns fasting, ceremony, and chastening does nothing to benefit the
present world. But if this native[441]
benefit should be achieved, then morality must be refined[442]
before religion.
Montesquieu
says that it would be entirely unnatural for a wife to run a household, but it
could very well happen that she would run a government.
If ethics [are]
entirely simple and all luxury[443]
is banned, then the husband rules; if public matters are in a few hands and the
majority of men become idle, then the women go beyond their solitude and have
great influence over the men. If the
women inspire virtue and roman
respect in the men, then they rule hereafter in the household through kindness;
if they do not acquire him through coquetterie
before they mislead and make him foolish later, then they will rule him with
thumping and willfulness.[444] In a good marriage, both [partners] have only
one will and that is the will of the wife, in a bad marriage as well, but with
the distinction that the husband agrees with the will of the wife in the first
case, in the second he opposes it but is outweighed.
[190] This is the age of
rule by women, but with less honor because they degrade the worth of the
man. They make him firstly vain,
flexible and foolish and, after they have taken from him the dignity of
masculine honor, they have nothing standing in their way. In all marriages the women rule, but also
over men of dignity.
There are two ways of
the Christian religion, insofar as it should improve morality, 1.: beginning with the revelation of mysteries, in that
one expects a consecration of the heart from the divine supernatural
influence 2. To begin from the
improvement of morality in accordance with the order of nature and, after the
greatest possible effort that is adept at it [the improvement of morality],
expecting supernatural assistance in accordance with the divine order of his
decree that has been expressed in revelation.
For it is not possible, insofar as one starts with revelation, to expect
moral betterment from this instruction as a success in accordance with the
order of nature.
The refined prospect
of things to come, if it is carried out to the end, namely, the goal of
impending death, brings its own remedy[445]
with it. For why should one torment
oneself with many grievous preparations when death will soon cut them short
anyways[?]
A man easily grasps a
esteem toward a woman who takes him in, while the woman for her part has more
inclination than respect. Therefore it
comes about that the man expresses a kind of courage in overcoming his own
lustful inclination, without which many women would be led astray. A tempted wanton is a dangerous person among
women.
It is good[446]
that although the sensitive heart at peace is always beautiful, the affect of
love is nevertheless present in him before marriage, while for the woman it is
quiet submissiveness: thus the man can appear to be in love without the least
bit of bad manners, but the woman merely appears to love.
[191] It is strange
that women have so much attentiveness and memory in things of decoration,
propriety, and politesse, while men
have so little.
One is not
compassionate with regard to the grief and distress of another, but with regard
to these insofar as their causes are natural and not imagined. Therefore a craftsman has no compassion for a
bankrupted merchant who is degraded to the position of broker or servant
because he does not see that anything is different besides his being rid of
imagined needs. A merchant has no
compassion for another merchant who has fallen out of favor and must live off
his own merchandise for lack of business.
Indeed, if both are regarded as benefactors of the people, then one does
not consider the evil according to his own sentiment, but that of the
other. But the merchant has compassion
for the downfall of another who is otherwise honest if he does not have
advantage because he has just the same imagined need as the other. In any event, with an otherwise gentle woman
one also has compassion for her grief about imagined misfortune because one
despises the husband for his weakness in such a case, but not the wife. But everyone has compassion for any evil that
is in opposition to true needs. From
this it follows that the good-heartedness of a person of much luxury will
contain a very extensive compassion, while that of a person of simplicity [will
contain] a very restricted one. One has
unlimited compassion for one’s children
The more extensive the
compassion is, if its powers remain, the more idle it is; the more the imagined
needs keep growing from this, the greater the obstruction of yet other
remaining capacity to do good. Hence the
kindness of the luxurious condition becomes pure delusion
[192] There is no
sweeter idea than idleness and no other activity than that which is skilled at
gratification. This is also the object one has before his eyes if he
wants one day to sit in peace, but all of this is a phantasm. He who does not work dies of boredom and is,
in any event, numbed to delights and never tires, but revives and satisfies
The drive for honor
with respect to those characteristics whose higher worth can make the judgments
of others more important and general is ambition, that [drive for honor] with
respect to the characteristics of less meaning, about which the judgments of
others are frivolous and fluctuating, is vanity.
Self-esteem,
humility. Ridiculous ridicule is better
hated than despised.
Self-esteem is based
on equality and this leads if they have understood evil out of respect.
Why incapacity is
regarded as more disgraceful than an evil will, namely, in those cases where
the incapacity overcomes the good consequences
That the desire for
honor is based in part on the state of equality one can see from the fact that
aristocratic people despise the judgment of the lower people a great deal. That it would be based on sexual impulse one
can see because the contempt of a woman is quite insulting[447]
[1] Vermögen
[2] Here follow Rischmueller in setting the previous two lines off from one another; the AA has the preceding two fragments as one continuous line.
[3] Annehmlichkeit
[4] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “stark” as opposed to the AA’s “stärker.”
[5] Selbstrache. See note at 6:110.
[6] Geschlechterliebe
[7] wollüstige Liebe
[8] Translate
[9] Begierde
[10] Fähigkeit
[11] Erkenntnisse
[12] The end of the sentence reads “machen ent…”, suggesting that Kant meant to write “machen entartet” (made degenerate), for example, but it is clear he left this sentence incomplete.
[13] Vorstellung
[14] Seele in Ruhe.
[15] Witz. In his Anthropology, Kant defines “Witz” as “the faculty of thinking up the universal for the particular” (7: 201).
[16] Vermögen
[17] Zweck
[18] erudativ (related to erudition) and Speculation (speculation) are Latin terms, left untranslated here. The AA has speculativ italicized, where Rischmueller has Speculation.
[19] Weiberliebe
[20] Empfindungen
[21] Here we follow Rischmueller, whereas the AA has the preceding sentence as two sentences.
[22] The last sentence is not a separate sentence in Kant, but it is on a different line that the rest of the sentence (cf. R).
[23] Übel
[24] In the AA, this sentence is split into two separate remarks. The second starts at “There is no man….”
[25] The German here is “romanische,” which could also mean Roman or romantic, but, in the context, seems to be an adjectival form of the noun Roman (see next footnote), or novel.
[26] “Die Romane” here could also refer to the Romans.
[27] Here we follow Rischmueller. The AA has this clause as part of the preceding sentence.
[28] Luxus
[29] durch
[30] Das Herz das Menschen
[31] Bonität
[32] Blüthen. This line only appears in Rischmueller.
[33] Blendwerk.
[34] Xxx Translate the Latin phrase in the footnote.
[35] Stand
[36] Vorschriften
[37] Zwecke
[38] vorbeugen können
[39] Mässigung
[40] Übel
[41] Bösen
[42] Rischmueller has “fantastica”l set off by itself, across page from last sentence.
[43] sinnlich
[44] weiblich
[45] Materie
[46] weichlich
[47] Bolded in R only. In AA this paragraph appears on pp. 20:21-22.
[48] wohlgesittet
[49] seelig
[50] abgenutzt
[51] Mensch überhaupt.
[52] Here we follow Rischmueller’s punctuation; the AA offers a comma here.
[53] Stelle
[54] romanische. See too footnote xxx.
[55] The AA has a semi-colon here.
[56] Darauf führet
[57] Bedenklichkeiten
[58] The AA does not include this fragment.
[59] Überfluss
[60] peinlich
[61] Geschlecht
[62] Moralität
[63] Übel
[64] ziehen. Without a preposition, as in this case, “ziehen” typically means to raise, pull, cultivate, breed, or build. However, one could import a preposition and translate this as “draw on Emile” (cf. Guyer 2005).
[65] Luxus
[66] bürgerlich
[67] Staat
[68] Gutartigkeit
[69] Gute
[70] Kant began this paragraph with and then struck out “Es kö”, possibly meaning “it could be.”
[71] weichlichen Üppigkeit
[72] Gewogenheit
[73] Ihnen nicht etwas auszuopfern
[74] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “Das scheinbar Edle is der <Ansehen> Anstand” as opposed to the AA’s “Das scheinbar Edle ist der Anstand. Ansehen.”
[75] gekünstelt
[76] Here and throughout this paragraph, evil translates Übel.
[77] Stelle
[78] Eigenschaften
[79] Glieder
[80] Schaden anrichtet
[81] Büchergelehrsamkeit
[82] Unmässigkeit
[83] Beherrscher
[84] The AA has the two preceding clauses as one sentence.
[85] verständiger
[86] Befremdung
[87] was allgemein gangbar ist
[88] Vorzug
[89] The AA has a paragraph break here.
[90] Stelle
[91] Mensch zu sein
[92] so wird er doch von seinen angewiesenen Post recht gut sein.
[93] eingeartet
[94] zufällig
[95] natürlichen Grundlagen
[96] This sentence appears in the AA on page 48.
[97] fein
[98] unmoralisch
[99] Anfansgründen der Sittlichen Weltweisheit
[100] The AA does not set this line on it own, and instead has it immediately following the previous sentence.
[101] The AA has the two preceding fragments as one sentence.
[102] Tractamenten
[103] Gut
[104] Stützungspunkt
[105] ausgeartet
[106] Here we follow the AA and provide a comma. Rischmueller has a sentence break here.
[107] sangivenous
[108] G: englisch. This could also be translated as “English.”
[109] Verstellung
[110] Aufrichtigkeit
[111] In the AA version, this sentence occurs after the following one.
[112] übel
[113] Ergebenheit
[114] Staatfintenmacher
[115] Kant’s deletion reads “es mangt,” a phrase that requires a preposition, usually “unter”, in which case Kant’s deletion would have read “it mixes with.”
[116] Mit Nachläßigkeit. In the context, it is ambiguous whether this refers to the preceding phrase or the following one.
[117] den Gellert. This may also be a reference to Christian Fürchtegott Gellert (1715-1769), professor of philosophy, and writer of hymns, fables, comedies, and the novel Die Schwedische Gräfin.
[118] ärger
[119] potestatis legislatoriae divinae
[120] potestatis legislatoriae
[121] spontaneitatem.
[122] mein Ich
[123] das Mein
[124] sich nich selbst aufheben
[125] sein nenne
[126] erziehen
[127]
Rischmueller notes that Kant’s footnote below, which begins “That this is
true”, was connected to the sheet inserted after
[128] Übel
* [69] The
expression (the female [Frauenzimmer]) is certainly polite and seems to
demonstrate that ages ago they were together in a special room as they are now
in
[129] sich vergafft
** [69] That this is true one can see from the fact that the woman prefers herself because she wants to rule every time, but the man prefers his wife because he wants to be ruled, he even gets married because of it
[130] Unwahrheit
[131] sittsam
[132] Geschlecht
[133] Staatsverfassung
[134] geizig
[135] The AA has a comma here.
[136] Leichtsinn
[137] Fr: Medisance.
[138] Verblendung.
[139] Kant here omitted any punctuation, making it ambiguous whether he intended the above translation or “Taste for virtue [in] friendship.”
[140] Bürger
[141] Rischmueller notes that there is an unreadable line of text following this paragraph.
[142] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “warum es nicht mehr mit dem Nützlichen verträgt als das Schöne” (61) rather than the AA’s “warum es sich mehr mit dem Nützlichen verträgt als das Schöne” (20:226).
[143] Gemütsart
[144] Heiterkeit
[145] Jalousie
[146] fahren lassen
[147] romanische. Cf. footnote xxx.
[148] böse Handlung
[149] Böse
[150] The AA has this line at the end of the preceding paragraph.
[151] Ausschweifungen
[152] geizig
[153] Rischmueller does not offer a noun for this sentence, but the AA has the noun as “women” [Frauenzimmer].
[154] Knechtschaft von Sachen
[155] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “Welche neue Kneckschaft von Sachen muss sie erheben um jenen einzuführen” (68) rather than the AA’s “Welche neue Kneckschaft von Sachen muss sich erheben um jenen einzuführen”(20:229).
[156] Wesen
* [90] <At that time he was not a God of human beings, but rather of the Jews>
[157] mache
[158] Gemeinnützlichkeit
[159] erwirbt.
[160] übel
[161] übel
[162] meine Herr
[163] Unrechtmässigkeit
[164] übel
[165] gezwungen
[166] Übel (here and throughout this paragraph)
[167] Here we follow’s Rischmueller’s “Wahn” as opposed to the AA’s “Wan.”
[168] Reizungen
[169] als Mittel
[170] unmittelbar. The contrast is to “as means,” and the connotation is that they rule us as ends rather than as means.
[171] Übel
[172] dames u chapeaux
[173] {French} prevoiance
[174] Here, whether this is an adjective or adverb is unclear.
[175] Erziehung
[176] Persohn
[177] Anständigkeit
[178] Übel
[179] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “Der Stand des Krieges fängt bald an” as opposed to the AA’s “Der Stand des Kriegers fängt bald an.”
[180] Übel aber nicht Nichtträchtigkeit
* [103] Our present war only leads to the acquisition of money and luxury [Luxus]. [The wars] of the Ancients [led to] equality, and the superiority, not of wealth but of power, can hereby still coexist with virtue.
[181] Luxus
[182] Vermehrung. This word also has a biological connotation, as in “fertility.”
[183] Übel (here and throughout this paragraph)
[184] Reading “dann” here for “denn.”
[185] Damen
[186] des Standes
[187] des Standes
[188] Übeln
[189] Rückkehr
[190] verzumpfter Sprödigkeit
[191] Persohnen
[192] Selbstüberwindung
[193] Regungen
[194] Fr/English: Sentiments
[195] Translate in footnote. xxx
[196] Anteactum imputiren. Here Kant combines the Latin “anteactum” and the German “imputiren,” which is a Germanization of the French verb “imputer.”
[197] The AA has the order of the two preceding fragments reversed
[198] The AA has a comma here.
[199] The AA does not italicize this term.
[200] Here, Kant uses the English word “proportion.”
[201] austrägt
[202] In the AA, the order of these two sentences is reversed.
[203] Moral
[204] Zustand
[205] geistig
[206] Gegen Ki
[207] Narrheiten
[208] ordentlich
[209] untergeordnete Herren
[210] der Kinderverstand
[211] The AA has a paragraph break here.
[212] Hochmuth
[213] Hülfleistend
[214] stolz
[215] Einbildung
[216] Ergötzlichkeit
[217] Notwendigkeit
[218] Bedurfnis
[219] Fr./English: Sentiment
[220] niedlich
[221] das Wollüstige
[222] Die Artigkeiten
[223] The AA reads this fragment as continuous with the one beginning three lines above, “Before we inquire into generosity…”.
[224] Maniren
[225] Übel
[226] vorwitzig
[227] ströhmend
[228] Stärke
[229] herrschen
[230] Prospicientz
[231] verwickelt
[232] geistig
[233] Stand
[234] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “nicht um den Indianern die Meinung zu machen” (93) rather than the AA’s “nicht um den Indianern die Wenigen zu nehmen” (20:123).
[235] Ausschweifung
[236] zurückhaltend
[237] In AA, this appears below, after the sentence beginning “Unity conforms to….” Cf. footnote xxx [279]
[238] Weichlichkeit
[239] Poesie
[240] Mannigfältigkeit
[241] In the AA, the remark beginning “The woman seems to lose more” comes here (cf. footnote xxx [275]).
[242] edelmütig
[243] Here Kant uses the word “object.”
[244] Herrschaft
[245] Rischmueller notes that here “Erf” is struck out. Kant most likely began to write “experience” (Erfahrung).
[246] Verblendung
[247] unartig
[248] schaal
[249] unwissend
[250] Selbstschätzung
[251] L: honor.
[252] The AA offers a paragraph break here.
[253] hoffärtig
[254] L: seculum
[255] geziert
[256] schaal
[257] Rar. Here Kant seems to draw on the French term “rare.” Cf. Rousseau, Emile, Book V.
[258] Phantast
[259] Putznarren
[260] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “wo jede Ehefrau eine Coquette ist aber nicht gegen ihren Mann”{99} as opposed to the AA’s “wo jede Ehefrau eine Coquette ist launisch gegen ihren Mann” [132].
[261] Weib zu sein
[262] menschliches Mädchen
[263] Persohn.
[264] gefällig
[265] Here Kant uses the word “President.”
[266] excolirt
[267] Staat machen
[268] gemeinen Notdurft
[269] Person (here and in next clause).
[270] ehelichen Gnugtuung
[271] Übel
[272] gütig
[273] die naturlichen Rechtsame
[274] bürgerlich
[275] In the AA, this fragment comes after the paragraph below beginning “On the reasons why he who pays…”[141].
[276] Vom Er Ihr und Sie
[277] Jugend Gefühl
[278] Here we follow the AA’s “Popes Schertze” rather than Rischmueller’s “Pope Schertze.”
[279] entbehrliche Dinge
[280] Persohnen
[281] excolirt
[282] Als Frau ausschweift
[283] medisiren
[284] Übel
[285] Böse.
[286] Bonität
[287] actuirt
[288] guttätige
[289] uneigennützig
[290] gemeinnützlich sein
[291] vertauschen
[292] Here Kant uses the word “national.” xxx
[293] Wenn aber die Sprache des Poebels in einer Sprache der Herrschenden Sprache ein der andern kommt
[294] etwas Unbekanntem
[295] Qualität
[296] Bund
[297] abhorriren
* [149] <Agreeablenesses can very greatly oppose needs, but if they agree with them, then [we have] beautiful simplicity. The needs of people relate very greatly to the ease of thinking and representing something. From this comes the agreeableness of order. Symmetry.>
[298] Gutsein
[299] Notwendigkeit
[300] Dann unterliegt sie einer Verpflichtung
[301] Weltweisheit. This could also be translated “philosophy.” See endnote xxxiv.
[302] Lehrbegriff
[303] Geschlecht
[304] in geraden Empfindungen
[305] die Stände
[306] entbehrt
[307] Fundament
[308] Here Kant uses the Latin “stuproviolatio.”
[309] wiederhergestellt
[310] Mannespersohnen
[311] F: étourdi.
* <Except that this: it is already a great virtue to do no evil.> With this soul at peace, friendship is not enthusiasm, sympathy is not weak-heartedness, gentleness is not ceremony. Desire is not longing. The feeling [empfindende] soul at peace is therefore not inactive regarding the body or understanding, but only regarding desires and gratifications>
[312] Fleis
[313] billig
[314] kriechend
[315] Bonitatis
[316] Berechnung
[317] Bei; awk here, not sure how to re-word; maybe, “”can be made of what is better with regard to the subject’s inclination”???
[318] Changed from “only demands”
[319] In?
[320] Aussagen; this is a legal term but seems to work; could also be information or statement
[321] “diese gefuehl aber…”, this reads to me more like “this feeling, however, …”
[322] verlegen; maybe, “but by passing this action onto others”
[323] Gemeinsinn
[324] Eben davon; I like” and even the public spirit of good and evil comes from that”
[325] Erkenntnisgewissheit
[326] Gutsein
[327] This could also be translated as an active verb, which is closer to German; “both feelings comply with natural simplicity”
[328] Gutsein
[329] Prinzip
[330] Liebespflicht
[331] Here Kant uses the term “Sympathie.”
[332] Here Kant uses the term “condition” as opposed to “Bedingung” or “Zustand.”
[333] The AA does not italicize this term.
[334] Condition
[335] Grundtrieb
[336] Here Kant uses the French verb “duellieren.”
[337] In the AA this sentence comes on page 160, after the paragraph beginning “It seems to me....”
[338] Ihr schönes Naturel
[339] Duelle Urspr
[340] getäuschet
[341] abgewitzt. See 7: 204 for Kant’s definition of abgewitzt. (In the
[342] das andre Geschlecht des Zwanges. The French edition has, “He delivers the fair sex from the constraint of having to be scrupulous about decency,” which makes sense in the context but does not fit the genitive tense of “des Zwanges.”
[343] die Schöne
[344] Ansehen
[345] veränderbar
[346] gemeinschaftlich
[347] Here Kant uses the Latin “in aequilibrio.”
[348] Sich unterscheiden; cut out “distinguishes itself”; reflexive verb that just translates as “to be different”
[349] Aus dem gemeinsamen der Menschen; doesn’t seem to mean to people because of the conjugation of “der Menschen”; maybe “the obligation from the universality of the human”
[350] MC had as “he”, but er here refers to der Wille
[351] Maybe adverb here?
[352] der Wille der Menschen
[353] Conditional?
[354] Rechtmaessigkeit; rectitiude? Fits with Guyer.
[355] Here Kant again uses the term “Sympathie.”
[356] Here Kant uses the Latin “medio.”
[357] verkehrt
[358] Here Kant uses the word “sentiment.”
[359] übereinkommend
[360] This paragraph comes on page 164 of the AA ,after the sentence that begins “In the end….”
[361] schweifen aus
[362] ungereimnt
[363] Geschlecht
[364] Ehelosigkeit
[365] gezogen
[366] das Phantastische
[367] Here Kant uses the French “souverainen”
[368] kränket
[369] blos die Teilnehmung
[370] Bonität
[371] applicirt
[372] aetherisch
[373] Klumpchen
[374] ob rarefactionem
[375] Geschlechtertrieb. Also, the AA has the two preceding lines as one sentence, not on separate lines as above, so that it reads “The sensitive soul at peace, in face, in societies, in eloquence, poetry in marriages, and sexual desire” [170].
[376] zusammengedrückte Himmelsluft
[377] Centro gravitatis Coeli. Throughout this section, Kant uses the terms Centro and Centrum, both of which would normally be translated by the same English term, center. Because Kant seems to distinguish between the two, we have left them untranslated.
[378] Here Kant uses the French “petites Maitressen.”
[379] Here Kant uses the French “etouderie.”
[380] Or “effort of illusion” [Bemühung zu scheinen]
[381] Here Kant uses the French “étourdi.”
[382] ihren Liebkosungen. In this context, this could also mean “her caresses.”
[383] Stutzer
[384] Centrum
[385] Here Kant uses “direction.”
[386] Cirkellinie
[387] Kreis.
[388] meridiano magnetico
[389] Centro
[390] gemeinnützig
[391] The AA offers a comma here.
[392] die Moral
[393] officia beneplaciti
[394] officia
debiti
[395] törigt
[396] verschiegen
[397] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “aber ein solcher ist ein Gesellschafter vielleicht offenherzig und verschwiegen aber kein Freund” {129} as opposed to the AA’s “aber ein solcher ist in Gesellschaften vielleicht offenherzig und verschwiegen aber kein Freund” [175].
[398] Not
[399] Zetetici
[400] Sentiment
[401] Bewegungsgründ
[402] Die Frühklugen
[403] Gewogenheitein
[404] Gunsten
[405] Vorzugsideen
[406] gebieten
[407] wenn man der Geschlechter Absicht nimmt
[408] regiert.
[409] die Kunst verliebt zu scheinen. Throughout this paragraph, scheinen is translated as both illusion and appearing.
[410] Die Kunst den Schein der Eroberungsneigung zu machen
[411] Here Kant uses the French “politesse.”
[412] Geschliffenheit
[413] entziehen
[414] Zero
[415] Blätchen
[416] Gesinnung
[417] Billigkeit
[418] In the AA, the two preceding fragments are given as one sentence.
[419] L: Indoles
[420] In the AA, this sentence comes before the preceding sentence [132].
[421] Habit de Parade
[422] täuschenden Schein. [xxx Cut this in final version xxx. We have chosen to translate “Schein” here as appearance because “illusory illusion” is too awkward and “deceitful illusion” is misleading.]
[423] Weltweisheit. See too footnote xxx.
[424] Kosten und Unkosten.
[425] verliert
[426] der Karge
[427] Here we follow Rischmueller’s “Geitzig auch. jede Zeit sie zu seiner Zufriedenheit (nicht Ergetzlichkeit) zu verwenden” {133} as opposed to the AA’s “Geitzig auf jede Zeit sie zu seiner Zufriedenheit (nicht Ergetzlichkeit) zu verwenden” [180].
[428] zierlich
[429] R; seyn. AA: sehen.
[430] mediocritas
[431] in parsimonia
[432] qualitas occulta
[433] aufheben
[434] Wahn. Kant could also be intending Wahn here as a shorthand for Wahnsinn, or “madness.”
[435] Trieb zu scheinen
[436] täuschend
[437] lenken
[438] xxx
[439] Schein
[440] Gunstbezeigungen
[441] einheimisch
[442] excolirt
[443] Luxus
[444] Pochend und eigenwillig
[445] L: remidium
[446] artig
[447] kränkend
[i] In his Le siècle de Louis XIV of 1751, Voltaire explains the origins of the term “petitmaitre.” See The Age of Louix IV, Trans. Martyn P.
Pollack, (Dutton: New York, 1969), p. XXX The term “petitmaitre” will be left
untranslated throughout the Remarks.
[ii] See 15:96 and 20:490.
[iii] Kant’s marginal note in his personal copy of
Baumgartner’s Metaphysics reads,
“Pain must creep in: dolce picqvante” (
[iv] Kant alludes here to a story told by Plutarch in his The Age of Alexander:, Trans. Ian
Scott-Kilvert, (Harmondsworth, 1973). Alexander was informed in a letter that
his doctor, Phillipus, would be bribed by the Persian king Darius to poison
him; Alexander gave Phillipus this letter to read, while Alexander emptied the
glass of poison, of which he had been warned, in one swallow. Kant was probably thinking here not about
Plutarch, but about Rousseau, who offers a more detailed account of this
episode in Book II of Emile: Or, On
Education, trans. Allan Bloom (1979).
While discussing the story with acquaintances at a country estate,
Rousseau writes, “The greater number [of people present] blamed the temerity of
Alexander; some after the governor’s example, admired his firmness and his
courage – which made me understand that none of those present saw wherein lay
the true beauty of this story: ’As for
me,’ I said to them, ‘it seems that if there is the least courage, the least
firmness, in Alexander’s action, it is foolhardy’….It is that Alexander
believed in virtue; it is that he staked his head, his own life on that belief;
it is that his great soul was made for believing in it. Oh, what a fair profession of faith was the
swallowing of that medicine! No, never
did a mortal makes so sublime a one. If
there is some modern Alexander, let him be showed to me by like deeds”
(111). See also, 27:21-22. Montaigne also
regarded Alexander’s act as a sign of moral firmness (Essays I 24).
[v] For the death of Marcus Portius Cato, the Younger
(95-46 B.C.), see Plutarch, Cato the
Younger, I-III. In the eighteenth-century his death was regarded as a
heroic example of an instance in which suicide is justifiable. Known was Joseph Addison’s 1713 tragedy Cato (currently available in Cato: A Tragedy, and Selected Essays,
ed. Christine Dunn Henderson et. al., 2004), as well as Johann Christoph
Gottsched’s 1732 Der sterbende Cato. With Caesar’s victory at
[vi] Note explaining what in the constitution does this.
[vii] Kant alludes here to Henry Fielding’s The Life of Mr. Jonathan Wilde the Great,
published in
[viii] Kant refers here again to Jonathan Wilde, which offers an example of a youngster who sets
ablaze the
[ix] “Vapeurs” were a spasmodic-neurotic complaint
fashionable among French women in the eighteenth-century: “XXX” 15:841.
[x] Abbé Jean Terrasson (1670-1750), French author. Brandt locates the anecdote in Johann
Christoph Gottsched, ed., Des Abbts
Terrassons Philosophie, nach ihrem allgemeine Einflusse, auf alle Gegenstände
des Geistes und der Sitten (Leipzig,
1756), pp. 45-46. Kant mentions Terrasson in a variety of texts – see, e.g., Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (7:246),
Critique of Pure Reason A xix, Essay on the Illness of the Mind 2: 269.
[xi] See Persius, Satires,
17. cf. AA 12:416 and 20:491.
[xii] Note explaining Greek origin of zetetics and clarify
Kant’s use of word.
[xiii] Samuel Richardson, 1689-1761. English writer whose
epistolary novels include Pamela; or,
Virtue Rewarded (1740) and Clarissa
Harlowe (1747-48). Kant may have
been familiar with
[xiv] Thespitious, king of
[xv] XXX Aristotle on friendship XXX.
[xvi] Cervantes’ Don
Quixote, written between 1605 and 1615, and appearing in German in 1753
under the title Des berühmten Ritters Don Quixote von Mancha lustige und
sinnreiche Geschichte. Avaliable in English as Don Quixote, Harold Bloom ed., (Roundhouse: 2001).
[xvii] XXX Rischmueller at 4.30: The question of when
Kant first read Emile appears in an anecdote told by Borowski in his biography of
Kant: “Of J.J. Rousseau he was familiar with everything and his Emile kept hold of Kant at its first
appearance as he made his usual afternoon walk back home” (Ludwig Ernst von
Borowski, Darstellung des Lebens und
Charakters Immanuel Kant in Kant
Biographien, Manfred Kuehn ed.). Emile appeared in
[xviii] Kant made note of this custom in his lectures on
physical geography: “The scholars (in
[xix] Antisthenes (440- ca. 370), who became one of
Socrates’ most ardent followers, is regarded as the founder of the Cynics. He believed that man’s happiness lay in
cultivating virtue for its own sake.
[xx] XXX CUT LATER XXXThe intermixing of the sexes in
social occasions is, according to Kant, to be lamented on the one hand, for it
often results in an effeminacy of men; on the other hand, it is to be embraced,
for it results in a refinement of taste: “No society is complete if no women
are there, for one must regard women as the judge of the beautiful
(Richterinnen des Schönen) in appearance.” (Anthropologie Philippi, 49)
During the Russian occupation of Königsberg, which
lasted from 1758-1762, Kant had the opportunity to observe a decisive shift in
social life and particularly a change in the understanding of gender roles:
“The Russians contributed to a change in the cultural climate of Königsberg. There was more money, and there was more
consumption.” Indeed, one of Kant’s
closest acquaintances, Johann Georg Scheffner, said of this time in Königsberg,
“ ’I date the genuine beginning of luxury in
[xxi] The
[xxii] XXX CUT LATER
XXX Well before his numerous readings of Rousseau’s Emile in the 1760s, Kant was keenly interested in education. At the occasion of becoming a Magister, for example, Kant delivered a
lecture entitled “Of the Easier and More Thorough Presentation of
Philosophy.” But Kant’s interest in
education was piqued at Johan Bernhard Basedow’s (1723-1790) founding of a
progressive school, the Philanthropinum
in
[xxiii] See Adickes’ note at 20:492: “The Caribs never eat
salt, although they have salt mines on their islands, because it does not meet
their taste.” Adickes identifies as the source
for Kant’s claim the Allgemeine Historie
der Reisen zu Wasser und zu Lande; oder Sammlung alller Reisebeschreibungen
(see note above). See also 17:482.
[xxiv] Agesilaus, King of
[xxv] See 15:195 and Adickes’ notes at 15:201.
[xxvi] Kant is referring to Charles XII of
[xxvii]
[xxviii] Theophrast (372-287). See Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, III, 28. § 69.
[xxix] In eighteenth-century
[xxx] In Book V of Emile,
Rousseau attempts to show how love could successfully develop Emile’s best
talents: “XXX.” Also Julie XXX
[xxxi] Rousseau’s model couples, Sophie and Emile in Emile and Julie and Wolmar in Julie live in villages.
[xxxii]
[xxxiii] Diagoras Greek
poet and sophist of the 5th-century B.C.. Kant’s source for this allusion is an
anecdote found in Pierre Bayle’s 1697 Dictionnaire
historique et critique , which was translated into German as the Historiches and Critisches Wörterbuch (
[xxxvi] Kant alludes here to Voltaire’s tragedy Brutus, which appeared in French in
175X. Marcus Junius Brutus (85-42 B.C.)
helped to murder his cousin, Julius Caesar.
In the eighteenth-century the image of Brutus experienced a kind of
reassessment, seen no longer as the unscrupulous murderer of Caesar, but rather
as the philosopher willing to sacrifice himself for the Republic – a kind of
analogy to Cato. See above, note v.
[xxxvii] XXX Rischmueller’s note at 78.1 addresses the
question of the French spoken in public among women and refers to Brief an
d’Alembert. Her note does not address
the “chapeaux cornetten.” Cornetten is
Fr. Plural for “cornets,” but what is the “chapeaux”? XXX
[xxxviii] Antonio Allegri Correggio (1494-1534), artist. Kant most likely was familiar with
Correggio’s works from Raphael Mengs’ Gedanken
über die Schönheit and über den Geschmack in der Malerei (
[xxxix] Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), the French philosopher,
theologian, and critic who especially influenced Voltaire and writers of
encyclopedias. See note above,
xxxviii. Specifically what Bayle’s
“judgment” of women was, is unclear.
[xl] See above, xvi.
[xli] Aurelius Augustine (354-430), Bishop of Hippo. The term “crapula” here is a reference to the
feeling of dizziness and vertigo that comes with drunkenness. Kant draws this reference from Bayle’s
discussion of the possibility that Augustine was a heavy drinker and the
difficulty of translating the term “crapula.”
See Bayle, Wörterbuch, v.
1, 400f. Augustine wrote in his Confessions that: “XXX” (X, XXXI).
[xlii] XXX Hobbes and the state of war XXX
[xliii] Regarding Socrates, see 2:369: “XXX.” Kant also drew on Rousseau’s discussion of
Socrates: XXX (Last Reply, Schriften I).
[xliv] Paul Pelisson-Fontanier (1624-93), French philosopher
and member of the Academy in
[xlv] Margarete von Tirol (1318-1369), whose castle at
Terlan was named “Maultasch.” That
Margarete is “degenerate” comes from both her autocratic style of government
and her infamous marriage: Kaiser Ludwig IV supported her efforts to obtain a
divorce from her first husband so that Margarete could marry Ludwig’s son and
thereby expand the power base of the Wittelsbach throne. The marriage in 1342, done without regard to
the canonical law of the time, was such a sensation that the entire affair led
to King Ludwig IV’s deposing four years later.
See Rischmueller, ff. 68, p. 223.
[xlvi] Antonio Magliabecchi, (1633-1714), Florentine
librarian and book collector. Kant’s
source for the reference to Magliabecchi’s unseemliness is an article in
Christian Gottlieb Jöcher’s 1751 Allgemeines
Gelehrten-Lexicon: “He was of a quite poor external appearance, and always
carried in the winter-time a coal lamp for warmth, on which he often managed to
burn his hands and clothes. To sleep, he
attended to coarse books. His library
was horrible, and he was so eager in reading his books that he never took care
to change his clothes so as not to lose time that could be spent reading; hence
his clothing also was not all too respectable. At night he sent his servant
home, as was his habit read until he fell asleep in his chair or threw himself,
still clothed, on his bed; hence it also sometimes happened that his coal-pot
set fire to his bed and the many books on it, and he would have to call to his
neighbor’s for help.” (Quote in Rischmueller, p. 223, ff.70.) See also 7:814.
[xlvii] XXX Risch doesn’t offer anything here XXX
[xlviii] “Liverey.” As
Grimm’s Dictionary explains, “XXX,”
(v. 7, 1073).
[xlix] Rousseau discusses the “endless conversation among
French women” in his Brief an d’Alembert:
“XXX” (XXX).
[l] XXX R doesn’t offer anything here XXX
[li] Voltaire offers an anecdote of the officer who was
embarrassed by the gaze of Ludwig XIV in The
Age of Louis XIV, which appeared in French in Berlin in 1751 under the
title Le siécle de Louis XIV: “XXX” Quoted in Kleinere
historischen Schriften (1887, Leipzig, ed. R. Habs), p. 284.
[liii] Diogenes (born 323 B.C.), student of
Antisthenes. Kant’s source for this
anecdote was Mendelsohn’s Ästhetische Schriften: “XXX” (25).
[liv] See Rousseau’s Confessions. For the rumors circulated in the 1760s
regarding Rousseau’s lifestyle, see Rischmueller, ff. 89, p. 233-4.
[lv] For Julie’s marriage to Wolmar, see Julie, Letter 20, Third Section, in
which she tries to convince her one-time lover Saint-Preux to… : “XXX”
[lvi] Not true…this
comment is actually very ambiguous, since Saint-Preux undergoes a conversion
midway through the book…what’s more in the first section, he arguably is courting a wife. The issue is whether Kant is endorsing
mistresses or happy bachelorhood! XXX I agree – I’ll cut out what I culled from
Rischmueller and let you flesh this out a bit more coherently than I did! XXX
[lvii]
XXX
[lviii] XXX square of the sine of the inclination, its cube
XXX
[lix] Adickes elaborates on Bougeurs’ 1749 experiment at
14:79-80.
[lx] See The
Spectator, (Number 225, Section Three, p. 225). The Spectator was a periodical, written by
Joseph Addison and Richard Steele during 1711 and 1712, devoted to commentary
on the literature and life of 18th-century
[lxi] Odium theologorum
[lxii] Regarding Cato and Brutus, see above, note XXX.
[lxiii] See note above regarding Margarete Maultasch.
[lxiv] Kant’s remark here parallels to an observation in The Spectator: “XXX” (Number 122,
Section 2, 215). Kant demonstrates that The Spectator had falsely interpreted
the anecdote.
[lxv] For the story of Juno and Tiresias, see Ovid, Metamorphoseon, III 316-38. Kant discusses the same story with different
emphasis in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer
2:341.
[lxvi] Give meaning and source.
[lxvii] For the relationship between The Spectator, monkeys, and the lustful man, see The Spectator (Number 122, Second
Section, 215).
[lxviii] Kant means Charles de Saint-Evremond
(1613-1703). The French writer lived with
Ninon de Lenclos, was condemned in light of his satirical writings, and fled to
[lxix] See note above, xxxviii..
[lxx] King Solomon, son of David, who lived around 1,000
B.C.. Renowned for his wisdom and power,
the later half of his reign was plagued by accusations that his many wives and
concubines of others faiths led him to idolatry. His history is recorded in Kings 1-11 and 2
Chronicles 1-9. See also “XXX” (20:188),
[lxxi] In 1751 Johann Georg Sulzer (1720-1779) published Recherches sur l’origine des ídées agréables et désagréables, which appeared in German as Theorie
der angenehmen und unangenehmen Empfindungen, and Kant owned as early as
1762. Mendelssohn offered a similar
critique of Sulzer: “XXX” (Ästhetische Schfriften in Auswahl, O.F. Best, ed., Darmstadt, 1974).
[lxxii] See Montaigne, Essays,
v.2, Book 3, Section 2: “XXX.”
[lxxiii] La Fontaine has a fable in which the swallow warns
the birds of the hunger of the coming winter, but the birds pay no attention to
the warning. La Fontaine ends with the
moral: “XXX” (The Fables of La Fontaine, 2004).
[lxxiv] In the third letter of his Moral Essays, entitled Of the
use of the Riches, Pope makes the “joke” to which Kant here alludes: “XXX”
(XXX).
[lxxv] Caffetier…what is this? Connection to gallantry monger?
[lxxvi] Ostracism was the Greek law whereby citizens voted to
ban a fellow citizen from
[lxxvii] Pierre Moreau de Maupertuis (1698-1759), French
physician and mathematician who in 1741 became president of the Academy of the
Sciences in
[lxxviii] L: needy, destitute. XXX have this as footnote? XXX
[lxxix]
[lxxx] For Kant’s discussion of Democrit, see 15:215 and
476.
[lxxxi] Kant admired the writer Jonathan Swift. Here Kant refers to Swift’s work Epilogue to a Play for the benefit of the
Weavers in Ireland. See Adickes’
note at 20:495.
[lxxxii] See note above, xxx.
Arcadian (also perhaps ref re: Greeks, Germans, Prussians.)
[lxxxiii] Mary Wortley Montagu (1689-1762). At the age of twenty, she published
translations from the Greek and wooed Alexander Pope, who wrote numerous poems
and epigrams in her honor. In 1711 she
married Pope and accompanied him, first to
[lxxxiv] Epicurus (341-271 B.C.). For a comparison of Epicurus to Zeno, see
[lxxxv] Charles de Montesquieu (1689-1755), whose 1748 work The Spirit of Laws… XXX Discuss what
needs to be said here XXX
[lxxxvi] For the story of Danae, see Ovid, Metamorphoseon, IV, 613. Danae was the daughter of Acrisius, king of
[lxxxvii] In Molière’s 1668 comedy Amphitryon, Jupiter takes on the form of
the Theban general Amphitryon and seduces his newly-wedded wife, Alcmene. Bayle discusses the story of Amphitryon in
his Dictionary, v. 1: “The game
pleased him [Jupiter] so well that this night he continued three times longer
than usual. This is Hercules’
origin.”
[lxxxviii] According to Adickes (see note at 14:97), “This
probably can only mean: denser than the aether…, so that therefore light
particles are refracted upon entry into the electrical matter.”
[lxxxix] Regarding censors in
[xc] Fabius Cuncator (280-203 B.C.), Roman commander who
defeated a larger and superior Carthaginian army by delaying an open battle.
XXX see Kuehn bio XXX
[xci] XXX Aristotle and the “illusion of friendship.” XXX
[xcii] Hume had written: “XXX.” (Vermischte Schriften, Chapter 4).
See also 16:872 and 20:496f..
[xciii] In his note Adickes identifies the source for this
allusion as Plutarch and quotes from Elite
des Bons Mots (15:115). It is
questionable whether Kant could have fully grasped this text given his ability
to understand written French, but it is given here for lack of supporting
sources: “Alexander disoit d’Antipater, que s’il étoit modeste en habits, il étoit couvert de pourpre
au dedans. Il y a bien de personnes dans
le monde, de qui on peut dire la meme chose.”
[xciv] In his Tonnenmärchen Swift
writes of external appearance: “XXX.” (Satirical Writings, quoted in 15:685)
[xcv] Note needed
[xcvi] Note needed.
[xcvii] Note needed.
[xcviii] Note needed.
[xcix] Note needed.
[c] Note needed, Spartan wives.
[ci] Note on Solomon (I can easily do this.)