Immanuel Kant’s
Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen
(Remarks in the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime)
At present, this translation is being made free of charge on the web. It is based on Marie Rischmueller’s German edition of Kant’s Bemerkungen in den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1991, currently out of print). Throughout, I have included both references to page numbers in both Rischmueller {marked with an R} and in the Academy Edition of Kant’s works [marked with square brackets]. The Academy Edition version is volume 20 of the Academy Edition of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften (Vol 20, Ed. Gerhard Lehmann, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co: 1942), available on the web at http://www.ikp.uni-bonn.de/dt/forsch/kant/aa20/. Kant’s text Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime is available (in German) in volume 2 of the Academy Edition and at http://www.ikp.uni-bonn.de/dt/forsch/kant/verzeichnisse-gesamt.html. The text has been translated into English as Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (trans. John T. Goldthwait, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1960) and in a forthcoming translation by Paul Guyer that will be part of the Anthropology, History, Pedagogy volume in the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Notations such as “{1, on the reverse of the cover, opposite 2:205}” give Rischmueller’s notation (1), followed by an explanation of where in the original Observations the relevant Remark occurs (on the back side of the cover), followed by the Academy edition page number of that original page.
Throughout, struck out text (like this)
is text that Kant struck out (based on Rischmueller’s notation). Words
that appear in <wedge brackets> are words that Kant inserted into his
previously written remarks. The Academy Edition does not include struck
out material and does not note insertions as such.
Throughout, there are three sorts of notes. Notes marked with asterisks (* or **) are Kant’s own footnotes. Notes in Arabic numerals (1, 2, 3 . . .) give either the original term being translated here or note variations between Rischmueller’s text and the Academy editions. Roman numerals (i, ii, iii, . . .) give explanatory information. These notes are still quite rough; I hope to refine them soon.
I strongly welcome any comments or criticism of
this translation. The current translation is a working draft, but I hope
to publish it in the near future. Please send comments to frierspr@whitman.edu or Patrick
Frierson, Philosophy Department,
[On the reverse of the cover, opposite 2:205][1]
[R 7] [20:3]
The man’s art of appearing inconsiderate and the woman’s of appearing prudent.
A person can employ two
kinds of beneficial emotions on others, respect and love, the former by way of
the sublime, the latter by way of the beautiful. A woman reconciles both. Never does a
This composite sentiment is the
greatest that can ever affect the human heart.
But only two faint sensations can be equally strong. Should one of the two be strong, then the
other must be weak. One now wonders
which of the two one wants to weaken. Principles
are of the greatest sublimity. For
example, self-esteem demands sacrifice.
E.g. a man can be ugly but a witty woman cannot.
The Coquette oversteps the feminine, the
rough Pedant the masculine; a prude is too masculine and a petit maitre[i]
too feminine
It is ridiculous that
a man, through understanding and a large income, wants to make a young woman
fall in love with him
The diversity of minds[2]
as that of faces. Characters
Parallels between feeling and capacity
A more tender (dull) a
finer (coarser) taste[3]
<Sympathy with the natural misfortune of
others is not necessary, but it certainly is for the injustice suffered by
others.>
[20:4] The feeling
with which I am dealing is so constituted that I do not need to be taught to ratiocinate
in order to feel it
[R 8] The finer feeling
is that wherein is contained what is idealistic <not chimerically the noble ground>
of agreeableness
Voltaire knew and I hope
<why women are embarrassed among one another>
dolce
piccante the
pleasantly bitter[ii]
Bold <The audacious
gulp Alexander took from the chalice
was sublime though rash>[iii]
The splendor of the
rainbow of the setting sun
Cato’s
death.[iv] Sacrifice <Our current constitution makes
it so that women can also live without men, which ruins everything>
strange and
peculiar
the powerful person is kind. Jonathan
Wild.[v]
The brave youngster.
[20:5] Women are
strong[4]
because they are weak <their courage>
Menfolk will be casual
toward vapeurs and hysterical coincidences[vii]
Hat under the arm[viii]
<Taking revenge oneself
is sublime. Certain vices are
sublime. Assassination is cowardly and
low. Many do not even have the courage
for great vices.>
Love and respect
Sexual love always
presupposes lustful love, either in sensation or memory.
This lustful love is
also either crude or refined
[R9] Tender love has a
great mixture of respect, etc.
A woman does not
reveal herself easily; for this reason she does not drink. Because she is weak, she is clever
In marriage unity not union
Tender love is also
different from marital love
[Title Page, Front Side, Upper Margin]
- - [Latin] What you
desire is in you
nor should you inquire
outside [of yourself] Persius[ix]
On moral rebirth
What supplies a true
or imagined need is useful good for me[5]
[Title Page, Under “Observations”]
The
first part of science is zetetic, the other dogmatic.[6]
The desires that are
necessary for a person through his nature [20:6] are natural desires.
The person who has no
other appetites and none to a higher degree than through natural necessity is
called the person of nature and his satisfaction ability to be
satisfied by less is the sufficiency of nature[7]
The
number of cognitions and other perfections required for the satisfaction of
nature is the simplicity of nature. A person
in [R10] whom one encounters simplicity as well as the sufficiency of nature is
a person of nature.
Whosoever has learned
to desire more than what is necessary through nature is luxurious.
[Under “beautiful and sublime”]
The needs of the person
of nature are pressing
needs
A reason why the representation
of death does not have the effect that it could is because as active creatures
by nature, we should hardly think about it at all
[Reverse side of title page]
Gaiety is wanton, irritating, and
disruptive; but the soul at peace is benevolent and kind.
Wit belongs to
unnecessary things; a man who takes this to be essential in a woman acts just
like one who spends his fortune by buying monkeys and parrots.
One of the reasons why
debauchery among the female sex while in an unmarried state is more reprehensible
is because of the fact that [20:7] when men in this state are debauched they
are not thereby preparing themselves for infidelity in marriage, for their
[men’s] concupiscence has certainly increased but their capacity has decreased,
while by contrast, with a woman the desire is unrestrained if the concupiscence
increases. So nothing holds one back
from presuming that loose women will become unfaithful, but the same is not the
case for similar men.
Every purpose of
science is either eruditiv (memory)
or Speculation (reason).[8] Both must result in making a person more
reasonable (cleverer, wiser) and thus more sufficient in a world that is
generally suitable to human nature.
[R11] A tender love
for women has the characteristic of developing other moral characteristics, but
a lustful one suppresses them.
<The taste that is
moral is such that one regards science that does not improve as unimportant>
The sensitive soul at
peace is the greatest perfection in speech, in poetry, [and in] society, but it
cannot always be so, rather, it is the final goal – even in marriages. Young people surely have much sentiment but
little taste; the enthusiastic or zealous style ruins taste. Perverted taste through novels and gallant
flirtations. The healthy, pampered,
spoiled taste.
A knowledgeable but not clever man [is] not
cunning. A clever but not wise man.
Higher manners
[20:8] The woman has a
fine taste in the choice of that which can affect the sensations of a man and
the man has a dull [taste] . Therefore, he
pleases most when he thinks least about pleasing. On the other hand, the woman has a dull healthy
taste for that which is concerned with her own sensations
[Sheet inserted after the title page, front side]
Bearded women
beardless men. Valiant domestic.
The honor of a man
consists in the valuation of his self, of a woman in the judgment of others. A man marries according to his judgment, a
woman not against the judgment of the parents.
A woman opposes injustice with tears, a man with anger.[9]
went so
far sometimes puts one of Seneca’s judgments in a
woman’s mouth and makes it “as my brother says.” Were she married it would be called “as my
husband tells me.”[x]
Men become sweet
toward women if the women become masculine.
Insult to women in the habit of flattering them. [R12] Softness roots out more virtue than
wantonness, the dignity of a housewife.
The vanity of women
makes it so that they are only happy in the glimmer beyond the home
The courage of a woman
consists of the patient bearing of ills for the sake of honor or love. That of a man in the eagerness to defiantly
drive them away.
[20:9] Omphale forced Hercules
to spin[xi]
Because so many
foolish needs make us soft, the pure unaffected moral drive cannot give us
enough powers. Therefore, it must come
to something fantastic.
Whence the stoic says:
my friend is sick; what does it matter to me.
There is no man who does not feel the heavy yoke of opinion, and no one does
away with it.
The chimera of
friendship in our condition and the fantastical friendship in the ancient condition. Aristotle[xii]
Cervantes
would have done better if instead of making the fantastical and romantic[10]
passion ridiculous he had made something better of it. Novels[11]
make noble women fantastical and common ones absurd.[xiii]
noble men also
fantastic, common ones lazy[12]
Rousseau’s book serves
to improve the ancients
In accordance with the
simplicity of nature, a woman cannot do much good without the mediation of a
man. In conditions of inequality and
wealth, she can [do so] immediately
Moral luxury.
In sentiments that are without effect
Inner grief about the
inability to help, or about the sacrifice when one helps, even when one’s own
cowardice makes us [R13] believe that others suffer much although they can reasonably
endure it, brings about pity.
Incidentally this is a great [20:10] antidote against selfishness. These drives are altogether very cold in natural
persons.
Natural elevations are
degradations in one’s status, for example to raise oneself to the position of
craftsman
Relative evaluation is
quite unnecessary, but in the state of inequality and injustice, it is good to
set oneself against the pompous magnates with a certain pride or at the least
indifference so as to disapprove of unimportant things
With a certain breadth
one must [breaks off]
[Back side, opposite page 1 in Observations, 2: 207]
Although being tall
does not make a man great, physical greatness does indeed conform to the judgment
about moral greatness
It is easier to educate
a nobleman than an [ordinary] person. He
would be a despiser of the common rabble, for he must call them the industrious
and the oppressed so that one believes he has been created to support him. The scholars in
In all conditions
there is no one more useless than a scholar as long as it is one of natural
simplicity; and no one more necessary than the same in a condition of
oppression by means of superstition or force
Thoughtfulnesses belong to small and pretty casts
of mind. A woman’s affects are just as great
as a man’s, but they are superior, especially when it comes to respectability,
the man is rash. The Chinese and Indians have affects that are just as great [20:11] as Europeans’
but they are calmer. A woman is vengeful
The rising sun is just
as splendid as the setting sun, but the [R14] sight of the former strikes the
beautiful, the latter the tragic and sublime
What a woman does in marriage comes much more from natural happiness
than what the man does, at least in our civilized condition
Because so many
unnatural desires find themselves in civilized conditions, the occasion for
virtue also sometimes arises, and science arises because so much luxury is
found in enjoyment and knowledge. In the
natural condition one can be good without virtue and reasonable without science
It is now difficult to
see whether a person would have it better in simple conditions 1. because he
has lost his feeling for simple gratification.
2. because he commonly believes that the corruption that exists in a
civilized state also exists in conditions of simplicity.
[Page 1 of Observations,
upper margin, at 2:207]
[20:12] Happiness
without taste is based on innocence and modesty of inclination, happiness with
taste is based on the sensitive soul at peace; for this reason it is possible
for one to be happy without society.
Amusements, not needs. Rest after
work is pleasant One must never chase
after gratification.
[Lower margin]
One must distinguish “he
is in accordance with the taste of others” from “he has taste in regard to
the judgment about others.” Women know
very well how to evaluate in accordance with the taste of others, and for this
reason easily know other minds and have good taste to satisfy them, but they
have a bad taste in other persons, which is good. For this reason they also all marry the
richest
[Page 2 of Observations
(2:208), marginal notes]
[R15] Tenderness and fondness
of sensation.
Taste chooses in
trifles
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 2, at 2:207-8]
Logical egoism [is] <skillfulness in taking a
stance.>
Common duties do not need
the hope of another life as their motive, but greater sacrifice and self-denial
surely have an inner beauty; but our feeling of pleasure for them can never be
so strong in itself that it outweighs the annoyance of inconvenience unless the
representation of a future state in which the persistence of such moral beauty
and the happiness is thereby increased, so that one will find himself more
capable of acting, thus the representation of a future life comes in handy.
All pleasures and
pains are either physical or ideal. As
for the latter [breaks off]
[20:13] A woman is offended
<by crudeness> or oppressed by injustice where no justification
but only threat can help. She uses her touching weapons of melancholic tears, reluctance,
and complaints, but she endures the ill anyway before she ever returns the
injustice. See here the courage of
woman. The man gets angry that one might
be so bold so as to offend him; he returns force with force threatens,
frightens, and lets the insulter feel the consequences of his injustice. See here the courage of man. It is not necessary that the man be indignant
about the ill of delusion; he can despise it in a masculine way. Yet he will be as truly infuriated about this
ill as about true insults if it befalls a woman.
[R16] A woman never
uses scolding reproaches as the external weapon of her anger against a woman,
but rather against a man, except by means of the threats against another man
When men
women squabble or fight the men laugh about it, but not the other way around
Duels primarily have
their basis in nature for the sake of women.
[20:14] In the present
condition, a man can use no other means against injustice than a woman can,
that is, authority is arranged not in accordance with the order of nature, but rather
with the civil society
constitution
Rousseau. He proceeds synthetically and starts from the
natural person, I proceed analytically and start from the civilized person
The
country life delights everyone, especially the shepherd’s life. Indeed, [the country life] absorbs the
civilized person’s boredom.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 3, at 2:208]
The human heart may be
constituted as it wants, so the question here is simply whether the state of
nature or of ethical
civilization develops more actual sin and skill in it [the heart] . Moral ill can be so subdued that merely a
lack of great purity appears in action but never a noticeable degree of positive
vice (whoever is not so saintly is for that reason not vicious), or on the
contrary this can develop so far that it becomes detestable. The simple person has little temptation to
become vicious. [20:15] Luxury alone
accounts for great provocations, and the culture of moral sentiments and
understanding will never hold itself back if the taste for luxury is already
great.
Piety is the <means
of> complement[13]
of moral goodness[14]
towards holiness. Therefore, the [R17] question
is not in the relation of one person
to another. We cannot naturally be holy
and we lost this through original sin, although we certainly can be morally
good.
Is it not enough for
us that we
a person never lies although he has a secret inclination which, were it put in
the right situation, would develop into lying?
We surely ask whether
a man undertakes his actions of honesty, of fidelity, etc. out of consideration
for a divine obligation, if he does them, although these actions are
condemnable before God insofar as they do not arise through this [consideration]
In order to prove that
the person of nature is corrupt one appeals to the civilized condition. One ought to appeal to the natural.
Actions of justice are
those which, when neglected by another, will naturally move us to hate; actions of love, when
neglected, will be reason no reason for love
of others toward us.
[Page 3 of Observations, on the margin, next to
lines 13 and 14, at 2:207]
Utility; counterfeit
money[15]
[Lower margin]
Because
the basic
talents basic characteristics
of women are used up in the research of the man [20:16] and his inclinations
and because they [women] also easily create illusion,[16]
they are made to rule and also to govern everything in nations that have taste
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 4, front side, at 2:208]
There
is a perfect world (the moral) in
accordance with the order of nature, and we ask ourselves about this one to the
same extent that we do about the supernatural.
[R18] The virtuous person
looks upon the rank of others with indifference, although when he looks upon
his own rank with contempt
One can either confine
his luxurious impulses or, while maintaining them, discover remedies against
their diseases. To the latter belong
science, and contempt for life on account of the imminence of death, and solace
for the future
Boredom is a kind of
longing for an ideal gratification
The Holy Scripture
more effectively brings about improvement if supernatural powers accompany
it. The good, moral upbringing [has more
effect] if everything should happen purely in accordance with the order of
nature
[20:17] I admit that
through the latter we cannot bring forth holiness, which is warranted, but we
can nevertheless bring about a moral
goodness coram foro humano,[17]
and this is even conducive to the former.
Just as little as one
can say that nature has implanted in us an immediate inclination for acquiring
(stingy greediness), so little can one say it has given us an immediate drive
to honor. Both develop and both are
useful in a general state of luxury. But
from this it can only be concluded that just as nature brings about healing
through hard work, it also provides remedies in its injuries
The difference of
position makes it so that one no more puts himself in the place of the wretched
in order to understand than one puts himself in the place of a subservient
horse in order to represent to oneself his wretched feed.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 5, at 2:208]
The provisions for the
happy life can be twofold:
1.
That one reveals how, after all of the
already acquired inclinations of honor and of luxury, one can maintain his
purposes and at the same time prevent the [R19] grief that can originate in
ideas like that of a future life, the nothingness of this life, etc.
2.
Or that one attempts to bring the
inclinations themselves to moderation
The mistake of the Stoics
is that through virtue they search for a mere counterweight to the pain of
luxury. Antisthenes’s school tried to eradicate luxury itself.[xv]
The
Stoic doctrine of anger out of respect for others.
Contemporary moralists presuppose much as ill and
want to teach to overcome it and presuppose many temptations for evils and prescribe
motives for overcoming them. The Rousseauian method teaches us to regard
the former as no ill and to regard the latter as thus no temptation.
[20:18] There is no
one more moderate in enjoyment than a miser.
The miserly greediness comes from an eager desire for all kinds of
pleasure to which there is no actual, but only a chimerical, inclination in the
miser because from hearsay he regards it as a great good even if he himself is
already moderate. This is bold miserliness. Cowardly miserliness.
The threat of eternal
punishment cannot be the immediate ground of morally good actions, although [it
is] certainly a strong counterweight against impulses to evil ones, so that the
immediate sensation of morality is
not outweighed.
There is no immediate
inclination to <morally> evil actions, but certainly an immediate
inclination to good ones
[Page 5 of Observations,
upper margin, 2:208]
This idealistic
feeling* sees life in dead nature or imagines
seeing it. Trees drink from the
neighboring brook. The zephyr whispers
of loved ones. Clouds cry on a melancholic
day. Cliffs threaten like giants. Solitude is inhabited by dreamy shadows and
the deathly silence of graves.
[R20]
Fantastical This is
whence the pictures and the picturesque spirit come.[18]
[Right margin, next to lines 12-13]
Idealistic therefore beautiful
[next to lines 18-24]
[20:19] Philosophical
eyes are microscopic. Their view is
exact but small and
is therefore and their intention is truth. The sensible view is bold and provides enthusiastic
excess that is stirring, although it will only be encountered in the
imagination.
[Lower margin]
Beautiful and sublime
are not the same. The [latter] swells
the heart and makes the attention fixed and tense, thereby exhausting it. The [former] lets the heart melt in a kind of
soft sensation and, as it leaves the nerves behind here, the feeling becomes a
gentler emotion which, if it goes too far, transforms into feebleness, surfeit,
and disgust
[Page 6 of Observations,
marginal notes at line 2]
bold[19]
[lower
margin]
Whence does it come
that without women our societies are somewhat without taste, since neither with
the Greeks nor with the [R21] Romans was it so.
At that time one spoke of virtue and fatherland, now this is an empty matter[20]
in whose place, at best, false devotion
can tread. Among loud men pleasantries
have no proper life and also become uncivilized. We are soft and effeminate and have to be
among women.[21]
[Sheet inserted at Observations
p. 6, front side, at 2:209]
The good-natured and the
well-mannered person are quite different.
The first need not have drives that have been turned tame, for they are
natural and the representation of higher natures is good. If he thinks about it perhaps he will say he
is in another life. One must be good and
expect the rest. The second is [either] 1.
only civilized [or] 2. well-mannered. In
the former case he has many fantastical joys to which he must oppose a
representation that can never be intuited in order to conduct himself
well. The second one is a civilized man
who will extend his ethics beyond the simplicity of nature until it extends to
the object for which he only wishes and believes.
This natural ethics must
also be the touchstone of all religion. For
if it is uncertain whether people in other religions can become blessed and
whether they cannot help the torments of this world become happiness in the
next, still it is certain that I should not follow them. This would not be the case if the natural sentiment
were not sufficient for exercising all duties of this life.
[20:20] When the Portuguese discovered Celebes the inhabitants understood the nullity
of their religion, but one sent to Malacca for Don Pedro as well as to Achin
for the queen, and they got two the priests, etc.[xvi]
Everyone who is a
coward lies, but not vice versa.
Therefore, what makes one weak brings about lying. The foolish lust for honor and shame the
most.
Shame and bashfulness
are different. The former is a betrayal
of a secret through the natural flow of blood.
The latter is a [R22] means of concealing a secret for the sake of
vanity, in other words for a sexual excitement
It is far more
dangerous to be with free and greedy people than with the subjects of a monarch
in war. The utility they have from
vanity.
[20:21] I will say ‘of
everything’ where there are seldom exceptions.
For in accordance with the rule of prudence, that which occurs so seldom
that one thereupon
regards it as a stroke of luck [can be said to] never happen, and according to
that [is said to] be generally in accordance with the rule of prudence where
any cases of the contrary that one can seek accord with no rule. I speak of taste, I thus take my own judgment
according
to the rule of so that it is generally true in accordance with
the rule of taste (aesthetic) whether
or not it is also exactly logical
in accordance with the rule of measured reason (logical) [or is] only valid for oneself.[22]
[Back side opposite Observations
p. 7, 2:209]
[20:22] A heart
expanded through sensibility prepares itself for longing and will finally be worn
out from the sensations of all the things of life; hence it sighs for something
that is outside its circle, and as true as its devotion is to itself, just as
fantastical is it with respect to most people because they are themselves
chimerical, and [it] comes about that they demonstrate their love [and] their
sincerity only with respect to God and are cold with respect to the former
while they dissemble with respect to the other, since one can be more easily
deceived concerning the former than the latter
Because one can form a
concept of higher moral characteristics, sacrifice for the common good,
everlasting devotion, fulfillment of marital intentions without sensual
pleasure, immediate inclination to science without honor, one imagines all
these to be suitable for the condition of
humanity and finds the situation that one sees to be corrupted. But such desires are fantastical and develop
from precisely the same sources as common corruption. Even these shortcomings will no longer be
esteemed blameworthy with respect to humanity when the remaining corruption is eliminated
[R23] Whole nations can provide the example of a human
being in general. One never finds great
virtues where they are not also combined with great excesses, as with the
English.[23] Canadian savages. What is the cause [?] The French are more proper and all the
sublimity of virtue is also missing.
The station of humankind
in the order of created being
[Page 8 of Observations, marginal notes at line 7, 2:210]
Beautiful, cute
[Sheet inserted after Observations p. 8, front side, 2:210]
[20:23] All devotion
that is natural has a use only when it is the result of a good morality. The same goes for natural devotion that is
related to a book. For this reason the
spiritual teachers correctly say that devotion does no good except where it has
been effected through the spirit of God, in which case it is intuition,
otherwise it is closely enjoined to self-deception.
The reason why marriages
are so cold is this: because both members have so many external, chimerical
bonds of dignity and decorum, and if one or the other depends strongly on [his
own] opinion, he becomes indifferent toward the opinion of the other. From this arises contempt, finally hate. For this reason, in relation to novelistic[24]
love, it is only the characteristic of a hero.
Coquette.
Those who would make a
doctrine of virtue into a doctrine of piety would make a whole from a part, for
piety is only one kind of virtue.
It often
seems to us that the human race would have almost no value if it contained no
great artists and scholars. Therefore, [20:24]
the country people [and] the farmers appear to be nothing in themselves and to
be something only as means of support for the former. The injustice of this judgment [R24] already
shows that it is false. That is to say,
one feels that if he has extended his inclinations, he may do what he wants,
that life would be nothing, and that the extension of these inclinations is
therefore injurious.
There is thus a great
difference between overcoming one’s inclinations and eradicating them, that is
to say, making it so that one loses them, this is again different from
restraining inclinations, namely, making sure no one gets them. The former is necessary for old people and
the latter for young ones.
There is a great difference
between being a good human being and being a good rational being. As the latter [a human being] has no limits
to its perfection but its finitude, but as the former it has many limits.
[Back side, opposite Observations p. 9, at 2:210]
It takes great art to prevent
lies among children. For since they are far too wanton and far too
weak to tolerate denials or punishments, they have a very strong incitement to
lie, as adults never do. Especially
since they can provide nothing for themselves as adults can, but instead
everything depends on the way in which they represent things according to the
inclinations that they notice in others.
Thus, one must only punish them for things that they cannot deny and not
grant them things on spurious grounds.
If one would approve of
develop morality, then one must not
introduce motives that do not lead to morally good actions, e.g., punishment,
reward. Hence one must also portray
lying as repulsive, as it is in fact, and never subordinate it to any other
rule of morality, for example, duty
toward others.
(One has no duties
towards oneself, but one has absolute
[20:25] duties, that is, an action is good in and for itself. It is also nonsensical that in our morality
we should depend on ourselves)
In medicine, one says that the doctor is
the servant of nature: the same is true in morality. Merely stave off external ill, [and] nature already
will take the right course
[R25] If the doctor
said that nature in itself is ruined, by what means would he improve it [?] Likewise
with the moralist
A person takes no part
in the luck or misfortune of others until he feels contented himself. If it happens that he is contented with very
little, then he will produce kind people.[25] Otherwise it is in vain.
There is something
elevated and noble in universal love of humankind, but among human beings it is
chimerical. When one aims for this
universal love of humankind, one becomes accustomed to deceiving oneself with
longing and idle wishes. As long as one
is himself so very dependent on such things, one cannot participate in the
happiness of others.
[Page 9 of Observations, marginal notes at lines 16-19,
2:211]
Because dubious things
are small, one is called [breaks off] [26]
[Sheet inserted after Observations p. 10, front side, 2:211]
[20:26] The simple man
has a sentiment of what is right early on, but very late, or never at all, does
he have a concept of it. That sentiment must be developed long before the
concept. If one teaches him early on to
develop according to rules he will never feel
Once the inclinations
have developed, it is difficult to represent good and ill in other circumstances. Because I will waste away from boredom
without a perpetual pleasure, I also suppose that it is the same with the Swiss
who grazes his cows in the mountains. I <And he> cannot understand how a man who has had enough
could want even more. One can hardly conceive how, in such a lowly
state, this lowliness does not fill him with pain. On the other hand, when the rest of [R26] the
people are also stuck with the ills of delusion, some cannot understand how
they could have gotten this delusion.
The noble man imagines the ill contempt of stolen splendor that could
have crushed a commoner, and the latter does not understand how the former
could become used to [20:27] counting certain delights among his needs.
The ruler who created the
nobility wanted to distribute something that certain people could serve instead
of all other excess[u1] . After all, they have a tidbit of
nobility. Let the rest of the mob have
the money.
Can anything be more
perverse than to tell tales to children who have barely stepped into this world,
just as with others.
Indeed, one tires of
others. One does not listen long to
precocious talk. A person who does not
neglect himself at all becomes troublesome.
Too much attentiveness to oneself looks fastidious.
[Back side, opposite Observations p. 11, at 2:211]
Just as fruit, when it
is ripe enough, breaks away from the tree and approaches the earth to let its own
seeds take root, so the mature person also breaks away from his parents, plants
himself, and becomes the roots of a new generation[27]
[20:28] The husband must depend on no one else so that his wife depends
entirely on him.
It must be asked how
far inner moral grounds can bring a person.
Perhaps it
they will carry him far enough so that he is secured in a position of freedom
without great temptations, but if other injustices or the coercion of illusion
forces him, then this inner morality does not have enough power. He must have religion and be [R27] encouraged by means of the rewards of a
future life and human nature is not capable of an immediate moral purity. But if purity were to be produced in him
supernaturally, then future rewards would no longer have the quality of motives
The difference between
a false and a healthy morality is that the former seeks only for antidotes for ill,
while the latter is concerned that the cause of this ill not exist at all
Appearance, if it
announces sublimity, is ‘the gleam’; if it announces beauty, it is ‘the pretty’
or, also, if it is contrived, the ‘ornamentation of finery’
Among all types of
finery there is also the moral.
Sublimity of condition consists of the fact that he deals with much
worth; here, the beautiful is called ‘the suitable’
The reason why those
of the nobility commonly pay so poorly
[Page 11 of Observations, upper margin, at 2:211]
It is a great shame
for a genius when criticism comes
before art. If in a nation received
models blind it before it has developed its own talents.
[lower margin]
[20:29] Sublime
attitude that overlooks trivialities and notices the good among deficiencies.
Tobacco
[Sheet inserted after Observations p. 12, front side, at
2:212]
It is unnatural that a
person should spend most of his life teaching one child how it should someday
live. A tutor like Jean Jacques is therefore artificial. In simple conditions a child would be
afforded very little service; as soon as he has a bit of strength [R28] he
would carry out small, useful adult activities, as by a farmer or craftsman,
and will gradually learn the rest.
It is therefore fitting
that a person spend his life teaching so many others how to live that the
sacrifice of his own is by contrast not to be considered. Hence schools are necessary. But for them to be possible, one must raise[28]
Emile. One would wish that Rousseau had shown how
schools could arise from it.
Preachers in the
country could begin to do this with their own children and those of their
neighbors
Taste is not connected
to our needs. A man must already be
civilized if he wants to choose a wife in accordance with taste.
[20:30] One should not
be very refined, because then only small traits will be noticed; substantial
traits will only be apparent to simple and coarse eyes.
To have taste is a burden
to the understanding. I must read
Rousseau so long that the beauty of [his] expression no longer disturbs me, and
then can I examine him with reason for the first time
That great people only
glimmer in the distance; that a ruler loses it in front of his valet comes from
the fact that no man is great
Something that is
again a great impediment to the doctrine of eternal happiness, and that allows
one to suppose that it is not very appropriate for our situation, is that those
who believe it become thereby no less zealous about the happiness of this life,
which must happen if our vocation to act for a great cause is to break [forth]
[Back side, opposite Observations p. 13, at 2:212]
If I want to put
myself into a great, though not complete independence [20:31] from people, then
I must be able to be poor without [R29] feeling it, and slightly obliged
without attending to it. But if I were a
rich man I would, especially in my gratification, seek independence from things
and people. I would not overburden
myself with things like guests, horses, or subjects about the loss of which I
must be concerned. I would have no
jewels because I can lose them, etc. I
would neither
my clothes comport myself according to the delusion of
another so that he doesn’t actually harm me, for example, reduce my
acquaintance but not so that he makes me comfortable.
How freedom in actual
understanding (the moral and not the metaphysical) is the supreme principium of all virtue and also of all
happiness
It is
necessary to see how late art produced daintiness and civilized disposition and
how they are never found in some areas of the world (e.g. where there are no house
pets) so that one distinguishes between what is foreign and accidental to
nature and what is natural to it. If one
considers the happiness of the savage it is not in order to turn back to the
forests, but rather in order to see what one has lost in making gains
elsewhere. Thereby one does not paste
enjoyment and the employment of sociable luxury together with unfortunate and unnatural
inclinations, and one remains a civilized person of nature. That consideration serves as the
standard. For nature never created a
person into a citizen, and his inclinations and his endeavors are aimed merely
at the simple condition of life.
It appears that the
primary vocation of the majority of other creatures is that they should live
and that their kind should live. If I
assume this of human beings, then I must not condemn the lowliest savage
[Page 14 of Observations,
marginal notes at lines 4-8, at, 2:213]
Greek profile: a thick body, great tallness, wide
wigs[29]
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 17, front side, at 2:213]
[R30] [20:32] How, out
of luxury, civil religion and also
the force of religion (at the very least every new transformation) becomes
necessary
Merely natural
religion in no way suits a state, and skepticism
still less.
Anger is a good-natured
sentiment of weak people. An inclination
to suppress it brings about irreconciliable hate. Women, men of the cloth. One does not always hate those at whom one is
angry. The good-naturedness of people
who get angry. Feigned modesty conceals
anger and makes false friends
For such a weak
creature as a human being, the partly necessary, partly voluntary ignorance of
future things is quite suitable
I can never convince
another except by means of his own thoughts.
I must therefore presuppose that the other has a good and correct
understanding, otherwise it is futile to hope that he could [20:33] be won over by my reasons. Likewise I cannot move someone morally except
through his own sentiments; consequently, I must presuppose that the other has
a certain goodness of heart, or else
he will never feel abhorrence at my portrayal of vice nor feel motives in
himself from my praises of virtue.
Because if his evil were complete and he were truly evil, it would instead
be impossible that some morally
correct sentiment would be in him or for him to be able to suspect that his sentiment
was in harmony with that of the entire human race, so I must grant partial
goodness to him and must depict the slippery resemblance of innocence and crime
as deceptive[30]
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 15, 2:213]
[R31] [31]The
chief reason to create is because it is good.
From this it must follow that since God, with his power and great
knowledge, finds himself to be good, he also finds good everything that it is
possible to actualize. [20:34] Second, that he takes satisfaction in
everything that is good, but most of all in whatever aims at the greatest
good. The first is good as a result, the
second as a reason
Because revenge presupposes
that people who hate each other remain close, contrarily, if one can distance
himself when he wants to, the reason for taking revenge will fall away, thus revenge
cannot exist in nature because nature does not assume that people will be
confined near one another. But anger is
a very necessary passion characteristic and suitable to a man, that is to
say, if it is not a passion (which is different from an affect), [it] is certainly found in nature
One cannot imagine the
convenience of what one has not required, just as the Carib detested salt
because he was not used to it.[xvii]
Agesilaus and the
Persian satrap both despised each other; the former said, “I know the Persian
sensual pleasure, but you know nothing of mine.” He was wrong[xviii]
The goods of soft
luxury and of delusion; the latter accrue from the comparative manner of
evaluation in science, in honor, etc.
Christianity says that
one should not attach his heart to temporal things. By this it is also understood that one should
prevent oneself early on from acquiring any such dependence. Lastly, to nurture inclinations and then
expect supernatural assistance to govern them, that is to tempt God.
[Page 16 of Observations,
marginal notes at lines 8-12, at 2:214]
[20:32]
The adventurous taste parodies.
Hudibras
parodies grotesqueries.[xix]
Comically
sublime.
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 16, front side, at 2:213]
Stages[:] freedom,
equality, honor. (Delusion). Foresight, henceforth he loses his entire
life.
[20:35] Two
touchstones for the difference between the natural and the unnatural: 1. Whether
it fits with what one cannot change 2. Whether it can be common to all people
or to a few with the oppression of the rest
A certain great
monarch of the North so to speak civilized his nation; Would to God that he had
brought morals to it; consequently, however, everything he did was political
welfare and moral ruin[xx]
I can make no one
better than the remnant of good that is in him, I can make no one more prudent
than the remnant of prudence that is in him
Vicious people can be
considered with affability because vice comes to them externally through our
ruined constitution
From the feeling of
equality comes the idea of justice, both that which is necessitated and that
which necessitates. The former is obligation
toward others, the latter is the sensed obligation of others towards me.
[20:36] In order for
this to have a standard in the understanding, we are able to put ourselves in
the place of another in our thought and, so that it does not lack motives, [R33]
we are moved through sympathy by the
misfortune and distress of others, just as by our own.
This obligation will
be recognized as something whose lack in another will let me consider him my
enemy and make me hate him. Nothing is
more enraging than injustice, all other ills that we endure are nothing in
comparison. Obligation concerns only
necessary self-preservation in so far as it is preservation of the kind,
everything else is favor and goodwill. Still,
I will also hate anyone who sees me struggling in a ditch and cold-heartedly
passes by.
Kindnesses
find themselves only through inequality.
For I understand by kindness a readiness to create good, especially in
those cases where the general, natural sympathy would not be a sufficient
reason for it. Now it is simple and
natural even to sacrifice as much convenience as I provide for another since
one person is worth as much as another.
So if I should be ready and willing for it, I must judge myself more
harshly with respect to discomforts than another, I must consider it a great ill
from which I spare another and a small one that I suffer myself. A man would despise another if he showed such
kindnesses toward him.
The
first inequality is of a man and child and of a man and of a woman. To a certain extent, he considers it an
obligation, since he is strong, and they are weak, not to sacrifice anything to
them.
[Linked by characters to Observations p. 16, line 2, at 2:213]
Apparent
nobleness is <appearance> decency.[32] Apparent splendor [is] luster. The apparently beautiful [is] the ornamented. [20:37] The beautiful is either charming or
pretty
[Back side, opposite Observations p. 17, 2:214]
All
unjust valuations that do not belong to the purpose of nature also disturb the
beautiful harmony of nature. Because the
[R34] arts and sciences are held to be so important, anyone who does not have
them is made contemptible and [this] brings us to injustices that we would not commit
if we were to regard them as more equal to us.
If
something is not ultimately
suitable to the length of a lifetime, nor to its epochs, nor to the great part
of humankind, if it is, finally, subject to chance and possible only with
difficulty, it does not belong to the happiness and perfection of the human
race.[33] [20:38] How many centuries have passed by
before there were genuine sciences and how many nations there are in the world
that will never have them.
One
must not say that nature calls us to the sciences because they have given us
skills, for what concerns pleasure can be merely contrived. Because the availability
of the sciences has been proven, we should rather judge that we have a capacity
for understanding that goes further than our vocation in this life, thus there
will be another life. If we try to develop
this here, we will not serve our position well.
A grub that would feel that it ought to become a butterfly.
Scholars
believe that everything is for their sake.
Nobles also. If one has traveled
through barren
[20:39]
Precisely from the preceding reasons, one should judge that those who want to
know too much prematurely here will thereby be castigated with weakness as
punishment. Just as a prematurely clever
child either dies or fades and becomes dumb at a young age.
A human
may tinker as much as he wants, but he cannot force nature to follow other
laws. He must either work himself or [R35]
others [must work] for him, and this work will rob others of as much happiness as
he wants to increase his own beyond the average
If one
person wants to enjoy without working, then others will [have to] want to work
without enjoying
[Sheet inserted after Observations p. 20, front side, at
2:215]
One
could promote one’s welfare either by letting one’s desires expand, and
striving to satisfy them; one could promote righteousness if one allowed the
inclinations of illusion and luxury to grow and endeavored to oppose them with
moral impulses. But to both problems there is yet another solution, namely, not
allowing the inclinations to arise. Finally,
one could also promote good conduct by putting aside all immediate moral goodness and merely following the
commands of an overlord who issues rewards and punishments.
The ill
that is inherent in science for human beings is primarily this, that the
largest part of them who want to adorn themselves with it acquire not any
improvement of the understanding but instead only a perversion of it, not to
mention that it serves the majority only as a tool of vanity. The use that the sciences have is either luxury,
e.g. mathematics, or the hindrance of ills that it has wrought itself, or also,
as an indirect result, a certain modesty.
[20:40]
The concepts of civil and natural justice and the sentiments of obligation that
arise from them are almost directly opposed.
If I solicit from a rich person who got his fortune by oppressing his
peasants and I give this to the poor, then I carry out a very noble action in
the civil sense, but only a common obligation in the natural sense.
[20:41]
With general luxury, one complains about the divine rule and about the rule of
the king. One does not consider that, as
[R36] concerns the latter, the very same desire for honor and immoderacy that controls
the citizens could have no other form on the throne than what it has 2. that
such citizens cannot be ruled otherwise.
The subject wants the master to overcome his inclinations of vanity in
order to promote the good of his lands and does not consider that his inferiors
could rightly make the same demand of him.
If he were himself wise, righteous, and moderate in the first place, these
virtues would soon rise to the throne and also make the prince good. Look at the weak princes who put on an
appearance of kindness and courage in such times, could they really do this
otherwise than with great injustice towards others, because the courage is placed
in nothing other than the distribution of loot that one stole from
another. The freedom that a prince accords
to think and write as I am doing now is worth just as much as many privileges
of greater luxury because through that freedom all of this ill can yet be made
better.
[33, back side, opposite Observations p. 21, at 2:216]
The
greatest concern of the human being is to know how to properly fulfill his station
in the creation and to understand rightly what one must do in order to be a
human being. But if he becomes acquainted
with gratifications or learns ethical characteristics that are yet above or beneath him that may flatter him
but which he is not organized for so and which oppose the (style) of
arrangement that is by nature suitable to him, [or] when he learns ethical qualities
that gleam, then he will himself disturb the beautiful order of nature and only
prepare the ruin of it, because he will have evaded his post he knows that
he cannot be content with that which is noble; for, since he is not content with that for which he is
destined, since he steps out of the sphere of a human being, he is nothing and
the hole that he has made spreads his own corruption to the neighboring members
[20:42]
Among the harms wrought by the flood of books in which our part of the world is
annually drowned, not one of the least is that the actually useful ones that
here and there swim upon the wide abysses of booklearning [R37] ocean of booklearning are
overlooked and must share under the fate of desuetude with the other
chaff. The inclination to read much in
order to say that one has read. The
habit of not lingering long with a book, and [breaks off]
Luxury
brings people together to the city Rousseau wants to bring them to the
country
The ill
in the self-developed intemperance of people quite multiplies itself. The loss of freedom and the exclusive power
of a ruler is a great misfortune, but it becomes just as much an orderly system
– indeed, there is actually more order, though less [20:43] happiness – as in
One of
the greatest harms of science is that it takes away so much time that the youth
are neglected in virtue
Second,
that they so accustom the mind to the sweetness of speculation that good actions remain undone.[34]
[Page 21 of Observations,
upper margin, at 2:216]
Moral
beauty, simplicity, sublimity. Justice; righteousness
is simplicity. The passion of the
sublime is enthusiasm. Beloved,
virtuous. Friendship. Beautiful ideal.
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 22, front side, at 2:217]
The
first impression that a <reasonable> reader <who does not read out of
vanity or to pass the time> gets from the writings of Mr. J. J. Rousseau [R38] is that he has
encountered an great
uncommon astuteness of spirit, a noble impetus of genius and a sensitive soul combined
to such a high degree certainly hardly at any time as has perhaps never been possessed by a
writer of any era or people. The next
judgment that initially grows concerns the The impression that
follows is alienation from strange and absurd opinions that are in such
opposition to what is generally acceptable that one easily forms the suspicion
that the author, by virtue of his extraordinary talents, would merely want to show,
< prove>, and provoke admiration and the force of an enchanting wit prove the [20:44] magical power of his eloquence
and make
himself the queer man make
himself the eccentric so that he among who stands out among all his rivals in
wit by way of engaging novelty. The
third thought, to which one only arrives with difficulty because it only seldom
occurs [breaks off]
One
must teach youth to honor the common understanding as much for moral as for
logical reasons.
I
myself am a researcher by inclination. I
feel the entire thirst for knowledge and an eager restlessness to proceed
further in it, but also satisfaction in each forward step. There was a time
when I believed that this alone could constitute the honor of humankind and I
despised the rabble, who know nothing. Rousseau brought me around. I This blinding prejudice vanished, I learned to honor human beings
and I would think myself less useful than the common worker if I did not
believe that this consideration could impart worth to all others in
establishing the rights of humankind.
[20:45] It is quite ridiculous to say that you
should love other people, rather one must say you have good reason to love those
closest to you. This goes even for your
enemy.
Virtue
is strong, thus whatever weakens and makes one soft for pleasures or dependent
upon delusion is opposed to virtue.[35] Whatever makes life contemptible or even
hateful to us does not lie in nature.
Whatever makes vice easy and virtue difficult does not lie in nature
[R39] Universal
vanity makes it so that one says only of those who never understand how to live
(for themselves) that they know how to live.
It is
not at all conducive to happiness to extend the inclinations to the level of
luxury, for there are many
uncommonly many cases where circumstances are unfavorable [and] contrary to a
desired situation, and they become a source of displeasure, grief, and worry of
which the simple person knows nothing
It also
does not help here to preach noble endurance.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 23, at 2:217]
If <there
is> any science necessary to the human being that a human being truly requires, then it is the one that
teaches a person to properly fulfill the place that was allotted to him in the creation
and from which he can learn how one must be in order to be human. Suppose he got to know deceitful deceptive enticements above or beneath
himself that brought him unnoticed from his <proper> place, then this
instruction would lead him back again to the state of a human being and, [20:46]
even if he also might still find himself to be small or inadequate, in such a
way he will be correctly at his assigned post because he is neither more
nor less than is exactly
what he should be.
The
mistake of saying one knows none
“this is universal among us and therefore absolutely universal” is easily
avoided by intelligent people. But the
following judgments seem more plausible: nature has given us the opportunity
for gratification, why do we not want to attend to it; we have the capacity for
sciences, it is a call of nature to seek them; we feel in us a ethical voice that speaks to us [and] that is noble
and righteous; this is a duty to act in such a way
Everything
passes by us in a river and the changeable taste and the different forms of people
make the entire game [R40] uncertain and deceptive. Where do I find fixed points in nature that a
person can never mistake and that could give him signs as to which bank he must
head for
[20:47]
That all size is only relative and there is no absolute size can be seen here.
I measure the sky by the diameter of the earth, the earth’s diameter by
miles, the miles by feet, these by relation to my body
[Page 23 of Observations,
marginal notes at lines 11-12, at 2:217]
Friendship,
young people
[in the margin, next to lines 16-18]
Respect
for his own equality
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 24, front side, at 2: 217]
The
question is which
characteristics which
condition suits human beings as inhabitants of the planet that orbits the sun
at a distance of 200 sun-diameters
Just as
little as I can step onto the planet Jupiter
from here, so little can I demand the characteristics that are proper only to that
planet. The one who is so wise regarding
another place in the creation is a fool regarding the one that he inhabits
I certainly
do not have the ambition to want to be a seraphim, my pride is only this, that
I am a human being
The one proposition it is difficult to sort
out: that does not lie <or lies> [20:48] in nature, that is, nature has
given no drive for it, instead they are artificial; no such affliction is innate,
instead they have grown accidentally; the other proposition is easier: that
does not conform with nature, that is, that which opposes whatever actually is
in nature. [R41] Rousseau more often proceeds
according to the former and since human nature has now acquired such a
devastated form, natural foundations become dubious and unrecognizable
The
moderate commoner can form no concept [of] what the courtier can lack, who can
live on his goods just as he pleases, meanwhile the latter grieves to death
Many
people have theology and no religion
except perhaps to someday apologize for awful viciousness when they are
threatened by the terrors of hell
On the
worth of this life in itself or immediately and on the worth of this life only
as a means to another life.
The
life of one who merely enjoys without consideration and morals appears to have
no worth
<A
sign of crude taste nowadays is that one requires so much pretty make-up but in
fact the finest taste is of simplicity.>[36]
With
people and animals, a certain average size has the most strength.
<In
a civilized state, one becomes clever very late in the game, one could
certainly say with Theophrastus that
it is a shame that one ceases to live just when he hopes for success.>[37][xxii]
Moral
taste with respect to sexual inclination, since in that everyone wants to appear
to be quite refined or even pure.
[20:49]
[38]Truth
is not the highest perfection of social life; the beautiful illusion drives it
here just as it does much more in painting.
On taste in marriage
[Back side, opposite Observations p. 25, at
2:218]
[R42] Certainty
in ethical judgments by means of comparison with ethical feeling is just as great
as with logical sentiment, and through the analysis of a human being I will
make it just as certain that lying is repulsive as that a thinking body is
incoherent. Deception with respect to ethical
judgment occurs just like that of logical judgment, but the latter is still
more frequent
In the
metaphysical foundations of aesthetics the [20:50] differentiated nonmoral
feeling is to be taken note of, in the first principles of ethical world-wisdom,[xxiii]
the differentiated moral feeling of people toward the difference of sex, of
age, of upbringing and governance of races and climates is to be taken note of
On the
religion of a woman – on bold facial expression. A certain timidity, suspicion, etc. suits her
well. Her loquacity, usefulness
Why
difference in position is shown mostly among women.
The
woman is closer to nature. A man who
knows how to live – – what sort of woman he will marry
On Rousseau’s
attempt to move the best talents through love [xxiv]
Women
educate their men themselves; they can attribute it to themselves if the men
turn out badly.
Anyone
who is foolishly accommodating becomes a disgruntled husband
On empty
longing through a feeling of the sublime that is disproportionate and poorly
suited to humans. Novels.
Rousseau
took his sweetheart to the village[39][xxv]
[R 43] [20:51]
A marriage of an overly-refined <exquisite> man to a coquette.
One
imagines two marriages of which one is, so to say, of good fashion, and the
other is domestic
Moral
taste is inclined to imitation; moral principles rise above this. Where there are courts and great distinctions
between people, everything amounts to taste, in republics it is otherwise.
Therefore taste in the societies is more refined in the former and more
crude in the latter. One can be very
virtuous and have little taste. If
social life is to grow, taste must be expanded because the agreeableness of
society must be easy, while principles must be difficult. This taste is easiest among women. Moral taste does not easily reconcile itself
with the illusion of principles. [20:52]
Swiss, Dutch, English, French free cities.
Suicide in
Taste
for virtue alone is somewhat crude; if taste is refined, then it must be able
to try mixing virtue with folly
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 26, front side, at 2: 218]
What the
finer part of mankind calls life is a wonderful weaving of trifling amusements <distractions, boring amusements>,
[and] still more troubles – – vanity and a whole swarm of silly
distractions. The loss of the same is
commonly regarded as death or even as much worse than death (a person who knows
how to live) one who has lost the taste for it has died to gratification
Refined
crude feeling. Refined self-acting ideal, sometimes chimerical. One has cause
not to refine his feeling too much, first in order not to open the gates of
pain, second in order to be closer to what is most useful
Sufficiency
and simplicity demand a crude feeling and make [one] happy
[R44] The
beautiful is loved, the noble respected
The ugly hated [is met] with disgust, the ignoble despised[40]
The
courage of a woman to follow a man in misfortune and her tenderness. With a more tender, a more valiant man, the
man feels himself in his woman and shares no pain with her
[20:53]
Little people are courageous and arrogant, great ones are composed
The
natural person is temperate not because of future health (for he does not foresee), but because of present
well-being
A reason
that women are haughty toward each other is that they are more similar to each
other because the basis of nobility is in the men. The reason that they are embarrassed near one
another and are competitive is that they the happiness of men though the latter from favor and from does not come so much from kindness as
from service, so that they make themselves happy, while the latter are made
happy by others. On this is based their
inherent inclination to please
The
reason why the excesses of lust are sensed so sharply is because they concern
the basis of propagation, that is,
the preservation of the species; and because this is the only thing women are
good for, it constitutes their highest perfection, whereas their own preservation
depends on the man
The
capacity to create usefulness with fertility is limited for a woman and extensive
for a man.
[Back side, opposite Observations p. 27, at 2:218]
Luxury
causes one to draw a great distinction between one woman and another
One
does not satisfy desires through love, but through marriage; they are at the
same time the purest
[R45] [20:54]
The mark of socialibility is not always to prefer oneself to another. To always prefer oneself to another is
weak. The idea of equality regulates everything
In
society and in fashion,[41]
simplicity and equality make it easy and pleasant
Conquer
delusion and be a man so that your wife esteems you highest among all people,
do not yourself be a servant to the opinions of others.
If your
wife is to honor you, she should not see in you a slave of the opinions of
others. Be domestic; let taste and not
expense, comfort and not superabundance, prevail in your society; more a choice
of guests than of food
– It
would be better for women if they actually worked.
[20:55]
A good of delusion consists in this, that only opinion is sought after, but the
thing itself is either regarded with indifference or even hated. The first delusion is that of honor. The second of avarice. The latter only loves the opinion that he can
have many goods of life through his money without ever really seriously wanting
them
Anyone
who is not convinced of what is obviously certain is a blockhead. Anyone who is not impelled by what is
obviously a duty is a scoundrel.
– A
dull head and corrupt heart.
That
the drive to honor comes from the desire for equality is to be seen from this. Would a savage search for another in order to
show him his preeminence? If he can
relinquish that, then he will enjoy his freedom. Only when he must be together with him, will
he try to outdo him, therefore the desire for honor is indirect
The
desire for honor is just as indirect as the miser’s desire for money. Both originate in the same way
[Page 27 of Observations,
lower margin, at 2:219]
[R46] The
Arcadian shepherd’s life and our chivalrous life of the court are both in bad
taste and unnatural though alluring.[xxvi] For true gratification cannot take place when
one makes it into one’s occupation. The
recreations of a person with an occupation that are infrequent or short and
without preparation are alone lasting and of genuine taste. Because she does not now have anything to do
but to muse about entertainments, a woman becomes annoying and gets a bad taste
for men who do not always know to quiet this frustrated inclination
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 28, front side, at 2:219]
[20:56]
Others’ love of honor is so highly valued because it indicates so much
renunciation of other advantages
The
question is whether in order to motivate my affects
or those of others, I should take my footing outside of the world or in
it. I answer in the state of nature,
that is, I find it my footing in freedom
Women
have feminine virtues.
Of
sympathy one must only note that it never dominates, but must always be subordinated to the capacity and
reasonable demands to do good. He who
cannot do without much or is lazy has an idle sympathy.
[20:57]
The natural person without religion is much to be preferred to the civilized person
with a merely natural religion. For the
latter must have his morality to a high degree if he should administer a
counterweight to his corruption.
Meanwhile,
a civilized person without any religion is much more dangerous
In
natural conditions, namely, no correct concept of [R47] God can arise at all and
the false one that one constructs is detrimental. Consequently, the theory of natural religion
can only be true where science is, therefore it cannot bind all people
Natural
theology, natural religion. A
supernatural theology can nevertheless be combined with a natural
religion. Nevertheless, those who
believe Christian religion
theology have only a natural religion in so far as the morality is
natural. The Christian religion is
supernatural with respect to doctrine and also the powers it exercises. How little cause ordinary Christians have to
linger over the natural.
Knowledge
of God is either speculative, and
this is uncertain and subject to dangerous errors, or moral through beliefs,
and this conceives of no characteristics in God other than those that aim at
morality. This faith is either natural
or supernatural. The former is [breaks
off]
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 29, at 2:219]
Providence
is to be praised primarily because it accords so well with people in their
present situation, namely, that the direction [of providence] does not conform
to their foolish wishes, that they suffer for their folly and [that] nothing wants
to harmonize with the person who has stepped out of the order of nature. [20:58] If we consider the needs of animals
and plants, these conform to providence.
It would be quite perverse if the divine governance were to alter the
order of things, just as man has altered himself, in accordance with the delusion
of humanity. It is just as natural that,
as far as one has deviated, everything must seem to be perverse with respect to
his degenerate inclinations.
Out of
this delusion springs a kind of theology as a phantasm of luxury (for this is always
fraught
with feeble and superstitious)
and a certain sly cleverness to interweave through subjugation the highest
things into his business and schemes
[R48] Diagoras.[xxvii]
Rousseau
was the first to discover, among the multiplicity of forms human beings have
taken on, humankind’s deeply concealed nature and the hidden law in accordance
with which providence [20:59] is justified through its observation. Formerly, the
objections of Alfonso and Manes were still valid. After
[Page 30 in Observations,
marginal notes at lines 12-25, at 2:220]
pleasant
melancholy
true
virtue cries
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 32, front side, at 2:221]
[20:60]
The savage is a part of human nature. A luxurious person roams further beyond
the borders of human nature and the morally affected person goes above it.
On
friendship in general
On beauty
and nobility of company and on banquets; simplicity, magnificence.
If
something keeps a youth who has become a man from becoming a father, if
something gets in the way of enjoying life, if it is short and demands
preparation for future things in order to lose the present, [42]
if something makes us think that we hate life or that it is unworthy or too
short, then it does not lie in nature
[R49] Masculine
strength does not manifest itself in one forcing oneself to endure the
injustices of others when he can drive them back, but rather in bearing the
heavy yoke of necessity even while putting up with deprivations as a sacrifice
for freedom or for whatever else I love.
Endurance of insolence is a monkish virtue
[20:61]
The sanguine[43] endures insults because he fears the
great extent of revenging them
The
foolishness of conceit consists in the fact that the one who values others as
so important that he believes their opinion to give him such great worth
nevertheless despises them so much that he considers them to be almost nothing
compared to himself
parallel to miserliness
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 33, 2:221]
The art of illusion fits well with the character of the beautiful. For the beautiful does not consist in the
useful, but in mere opinion. Moreover, since a thing that is beautiful
even becomes loathsome if it does not appear to be new, [and] since the
simplicity of nature is all the same, the art of giving a pleasant illusion to things
is very beautiful. The female sex
possesses this art to a high degree, which also creates our entire
happiness. Through this the deceived
husband is happy, the lover or partner sees angelic[44]
virtues [20:62] and much to conquer and believes himself to have triumphed over
a strong enemy. Dissimulation is a
perfection of women but a vice in men.
Uprightness
complies with the noble. It pleases the
woman even if she is ill-bred but good-hearted
The
choleric person is honored in his presence and criticized in his absence, he
has few no friends. The melancholic, little and good. The sanguine, much and careless.
[R50] The
choleric person makes faces filled with secrets
If one
keeps in mind that man and woman constitute a moral whole, then one must not
attach the same characteristics to them, but instead [attach] those
characteristics to one that the other is missing
<They
do not have as much sentiment for the beautiful as the man does, but more
vanity>[45]
A woman
endeavors to acquire much more love than men.
The latter content themselves with pleasing one person, the former
everyone. If this inclination is poorly
understood, then there arises a person of universal devotion
[Page 33 of Observations,
lower margin, at 2:222]
All shocking
delights are feverish, and deadly languor and numb feeling follow the ecstasies
of joy. The heart is used up and the sensation
becomes coarse
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 34, front side, at 2:222]
<The
melancholic person is just and embittered about injustice.>
[20:63]
Anger is a good-natured passion in the simplicity of nature, but in the silly
vanity of society it makes a fool.
The
melancholic person who is choleric is frightful. Extinguished blue eyes filled
the sickly face of Brutus.[xxx] (On humor, mood, [and] hypochondria. A woman and a softish visionary have moods) The melancholic
person who is sanguine is cowardly, depressed, afraid of people, jealous (the
sanguine is galant). The melancholic person loves more strongly
and is less loved by women because women are fickle. The choleric is a trickster of state,
secretive, and important in bagatelles, the sanguine makes fun of [R51] important
things. The melancholic-sanguine is a
hermit or penitent in religion; the melancholic choleric [breaks off]
[20:64]
The sanguine choleric is valiant like a choleric, vain like a sanguine drive to
fame without
and yet gracefully loves
change and is therefore brave. For this
reason [he] gives consideration to his pranks, loves the coquette and it mixes[46] his wife merely from the point of view of
how they please others. The melancholic
person is domestic, the choleric is a courtier.
The sanguine person thrusts himself into every jovial company. In misfortune the melancholic choleric is rash
and desperate, the sanguine is in tears and disheartened, the choleric is
ashamed of becoming obliged, the choleric sanguine distracts himself through
amusements and is satisfied because he seems to be happy. In clothing, the melancholic sanguine is clean
but something is always missing, the choleric sanguine makes good choices carelessly,[47]
the phlegmatic is dirty, the melancholic choleric is pure and simple
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 35, at 2:222]
Before
one inquires into the virtue of a woman, one must first ask whether she needs
it. In the state of simplicity there is
no virtue. With men, to protect strong
inclinations and honesty; with women, loyal devotion and flattery.
In states
of luxury the man must have virtue, the woman honor.
One can
hardly put the movement of refined moral sentiments or decoration (moral
yeomanry. Alongside the pomade tin, the [writings
of] Gellert[xxxi])
in the place of domestic occupation, [20:65] and she who weaves a gown for her
husband always puts to shame the gallant dame, who in place of this reads a
tragedy.
Longings.
In discussion
the melancholic person is still and serious.
The sanguine person [R52] talks a lot when one jests and changes the
subject. The choleric tries to set the
tone and is affected himself. The
choleric person laughs, forced by propriety.
The sanguine [laughs, forced] by habit and friendliness. The melancholic person laughs when everything
has ceased.
When
both sexes degenerate, the degeneration of the man is worse
He who
suffers nothing other than excessively furious expressions has a numb feeling,
he who suffers nothing but very beautiful people, only screaming colors, only
great heroic virtues has a numb feeling.
He who notices the impulse that soft handwriting and noble simplicity
hides in morals has a subtle feeling.
The feeling becomes more tender in middle age, but also gets gradually
weaker. The subtle feeling is not as
strong as the coarse one
[Page 36 of Observations,
in the margin, next to line 18f., at 2:223]
Valiant
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 36, front side, at 2:222]
Good
consequences are surely signs of morality, but not always those the only ones, because they cannot
always become known with certainty. How
many lies could have good consequences.
The ground
for the divine legislative power[48]
does not lie in kindness. for the motive would then be gratitude (subjective moral ground, type of
feeling) and consequently not strict duty.
The degree of legislative power
[49]
presupposes inequality and causes one person to lose a degree of freedom to another.
[20:66] This can happen only if he himself sacrifices his will to another. If he does this with respect to all his
actions, then he makes himself into a slave. A will that is subjected to that of another
is imperfect because
a person and
contradictory, for a person has spontaneity;[50]
if he is subjected to the will of a person [R53] (if he himself can still choose)
then he is hateful and contemptible; if he is subjected to the will of God
alone, then he is close to nature. One
must not perform actions out of obedience toward a person that one could do out
of inner motives, and to do everything out of obedience, where inner motivating
grounds would have done everything, produces slaves.
The
body is mine because it is a part of my I[51]
and is moved by my power of choice. The
entire animated or unanimated world that does not have its own power of choice
is mine in so far as I master it and can move it in accordance with my power of
choice. The sun is not mine. The same goes for another person, therefore
no property is a Prioprietat or an
exclusive property. But in so far as I
want to claim something as exclusively my own, I will presuppose that the will
of the other is at least not opposed to mine nor that the action of the is other
opposed to mine. [20:67] Therefore, I
will carry out the actions that indicate what is mine, chop the tree down,
timber it, etc. The other person tells me that it is his because, through the
actions of his power of choice, it is as though it belongs to his self.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 37, at 2:223]
A will
that is to be good must not invalidate itself if it is taken universally and reciprocally;
similarly, the other will not take as his that on which I have worked, for
otherwise he would thereby presuppose that his will moved my body
By the
fact that a person calls many a thing his own, he thereby tacitly promises in similar circumstances through his will not to [breaks
off]
The
obedience of children toward parents is not based 1. on gratitude 2. on the
fact that they cannot sustain themselves, because that would be based on utility,
but rather because they do not have their own complete will and it is good to
be directed by the will of others.
Because they are so much a thing of the parents, for they live only
through their will, it is morally good to be governed by them. If they could support educate themselves, obedience would cease.
[R54] [20:68]
We belong as it were to divine causes and exist through God and his will. Many things can be suitable to God’s will
that would not be good from inner motives, e.g., to slay one’s son. The goodness
of obedience depends on this. My will is constantly subject to the will
of God in its determinations, thus it is consistent with itself best when it
agrees with the divine; and it is impossible for it to be evil if it is in
accordance with the divine will.
The
wife seeks gratification and expects [her] necessities from others, the man
seeks needs and expects gratification from women. When both seek necessities they are in
agreement but poor [and] when both seek gratification they are foolish
A man finds more gratification in making a woman comfortable
than a woman does, yet the latter wants to appear to share rather than to enjoy,
since the former is surely opposed to her primary vocation of having to receive
necessities[52]
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 38, front side, at 2:223]
I do
not know what solace those who regard their imagined needs as right and natural
could find in a providence that denies their fulfillment to them. I, whom I certainly know to suffer no ill but
that which I cause and that it only depends on me to be happy through the
kindness of divine order, will never gripe about it
[R55] <Why
must one speak French in order to be polite.
Dames Messieurs. Chapeaux Cornetten.*>[53]
Now if
a woman marries a twenty year-old man, she takes herself a fop. The reason for
this, among others, is that he has not yet become acquainted with the deceptive
art of women to appear better and more pleasant than they are. For this reason, he will make a poor husband,
because he will always believe that he could have chosen better or also because
he actually fell for her and chose poorly.
On the other hand, [20:69] if with more age he gets to know the sex and sees
the empty illusion, then he turns back to simplicity, where according to nature
he already could have been from the start.
Hence the path to a good marriage goes through wantonness, an
observation that is very unpleasant especially because it is true.
The
time of maturity of a lord and of a farmer is never different. A woman is never mature without a man.
Men fall
much further in love than women,** which
also comes from nature. However, if the
latter grows in the art of illusion [20:70] , an illusion that ceases in
marriage, then from this a kind of deceived reluctance emerges in the marriage,
which finds less agreeableness than it had expected. It is not good to make a future husband fall
too much in love; one must save something for the future
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 39]
The art
of doing without, that is, not letting inclinations germinate in oneself, is
the means to happiness, hence one can either seek honor, that is, earn the praiseworthy
opinion of others, or strive to do without it completely and be indifferent
toward it.
That
the choleric person is angry comes from his love of honor because he [R56] always
believes himself to be insulted; the reasonable person desires nothing but
equality and has little occasion to be angry.
In lands
where the women are not beautiful they are treated tyrannically, as among
savages, because the weak person must influence inclination or else be
oppressed
[20:71]
The main ground of lasting beauty is illusion.
Make-up. A kind of untruth that is lovelier than truth. Correggio
departs from nature[xxxii]
Women gladly
love bold men and these modest, decent men.
Judgment of a woman by Bayle.[xxxiii] Hercules
endeared himself more to Omphale
through his 72 girls than through his spinning.[xxxiv]
As far
as sex[54]
is concerned, women have more of a firm taste, men more of a fine one. They love civilities and court manners more in order to display their
own vanity.
If the
savage had taste, eating-houses would please the best
If the
inclinations of women and men grow similarly, then they must come in disproportion, namely, that the latter
have less capacity in proportion to their
inclinations
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 40, front side, at 2:224]
In
everything that belongs to beautiful and sublime sentiment, we do best if we
let ourselves be led by the model of antiquity.
In sculpture, architecture, poetry, and the rhetoric of ancient morals
and the ancient civil constitution. The
ancients were closer to nature, we have much frivolous or luxurious or slavish
corruption between ourselves and nature.
Our age[55]
is the age[56]
of beautiful trifles, bagatelles or
sublime chimeras.
[R57] Character in
society
The
sanguine person dives in where he is not invited; the choleric person does not
enter where he is not invited in accordance with propriety; [20:72] the
melancholic person doesn’t come at all
makes sure that he is not invited at all.
In company, the melancholic person is still and observes; the sanguine
person discusses what occurs to him; the choleric person makes observations and
interpretations. In domestic existence,
the melancholic person is frugal, cheap and poor; the sanguine is a bad host.[57]
The choleric is greedy but magnificent.
For the melancholic person, generosity is magnanimity, for the choleric
it is boasting, for the sanguine it is thoughtlessness
The
melancholic person is jealous; the choleric, power-hungry; the sanguine,
amorous
The coquette is an admirable maitresse but surely no wife, except for
a Frenchman.
On
providence. The fools that forsake the
order of nature are astonished about providence, that it did not improve their
terrible consequences; Augustine with
his crapula.[xxxv]
[20:73]
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 41, at 2:225]
[R58] In
countries where societies consist mainly of men, one values personal merit according
to one’s sense of honesty and the useful zeal of friendship or also [with the
understanding] of common use. Where they
are always intermingled with women, in accordance with the wit of good
behavior, jest, amusements, malicious
gossip.[58] [20:74]
With the old Germans it must,
before French morals corrupted us, the women had to be in special rooms like in
A man
who has a wife is complete, detaches
himself from his parents, and is alone in the state of nature. He is so much disinclined to associate
himself with others that he even fears the approach of others. For this reason [we have] the condition of
war. Hobbes[xxxvi]
The
well-bred woman does not need to have embarrassment and blushing as a part of
herself; she is very charming and, characteristic of the sex where it is still
encountered, she is thus a good bulwark of chastity
Womanly
grace. Womanly traits are laudable in a
woman, if she has masculine traits, it is a reproach
With
marriage the blindness of first love disappears, so that the wife lacks the
unlimited reign over the heart of the man and the rank of goddess that she had
had before the marriage. However, the
man does not feel nearly as dominated as he was and wishes [to be] ; the wife
loses more in vanity; the man more in tenderness. The fantasy of infatuation instills more
exaggerated concepts in the man than in the woman
<The
woman wished to keep dominating, while the man wished to be dominated. The wife sees herself as obliged to flatter,
the man finds no other inclination in himself than kindness>
The man
is stronger not merely because of his build, but also in principles and the
steadfastness in bearing things, therefore, his clothes must be so, the wife’s
[must be] delicate and clean
[R59] [20:75]
Taste in the choice of company. Taste
for virtue, friendship.[59] One turns more on taste than on necessity
[Sheet inserted after Observations p. 42, front side, at
2:225]
Nature has
equipped women to make affectionate and not to be affectionate
They have are never equal to men in true tenderness,
which can be seen in the fact that all women want to dominate and reasonable
men let themselves be dominated; now he who has more tenderness in spite of the
fact that he is stronger more reluctantly surrenders his power than the one who
is aware, who surrenders it reluctantly, still preferring himself to the other
Women
are more for lustful love, men are more for affectionate love. All widows marry, but not all widowers. A woman must not marry a vain man
[20:76]
War can
only produce virtues if it is patriotic, that is, if it doesn’t serve to gain
money and support, but instead to preserve itself, and if the soldier becomes a
civilian again
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 43, at 2:225]
Lustful
love is the basis for sexual inclination.
Hence everything beautiful and sublime in this love is only a phantasm
if this is not presupposed. The husband
must be a man by night and day. This
remark also serves to warn of affectionate and highly respectful love between
the sexes, for this degenerates more often with the outbreak of lust.
[R60] [20:77]
The woman must be kept from being unfaithful through good-heartedness love and honor, if she the man does not secure her affection,
then he can count less on her duty. That
is a reason why women ought to be met with kindness. For otherwise they have an widely extended
capacity[60]
The
difference between he who requires little because he lacks little and he who
requires little because he can do without much.
Socrates.[xxxvii] The enjoyment of [a] gratification that is
not a necessity, that is, something one can do without, is agreeableness. If, nonetheless, it is regarded as a necessity
then it is concupiscence. The condition
of people who can go without is moderation, that which counts the dispensable
as a necessity is luxury.
The
contentment of a person originates either because he satisfies many
inclinations or because he has few
not let many inclinations sprout and is therefore content with fewer fulfilled
inclinations. The condition of someone
who is content because he does not know agreeableness is moderate simple moderation, that of he who knows
them but voluntarily dispenses with them because he fears unrest is wise
moderation. The former demands no
self-constraint and privation, but the latter does, the former is easy to
mislead, the latter has been misled and is safer for the future. The condition of a person without dissatisfaction
because he does not know of greater possible gratifications, and therefore does
not desire [them] .
Virtue
does not simply consist in one prevailing over acquired inclination in certain
circumstances, but rather seeking to be rid of such inclinations and so
learning to do without them. It does not
consist in [20:78] combating natural inclinations, but rather on one making it
so that he has nothing but natural ones, for then one can always satisfy them
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 44, front side, at 2:226]
[R61] The
characters of human nature are the degenerations of their vocation, as in the
necessity of war, of the rule and servitude of religions, and of science
It is
the question of the noble and why it does not agree more[61]
with the useful than the beautiful
Women
will always prefer a man with masculine agreeablenesses who is wild, for they always
believe that they will rule him. Most of
the time they are right about this, and this excuses them if they fail. This is also the beautiful side of the female
sex, that they can rule men
One
will perhaps find more men who deserve the gallows than women who get drunk
[20:79]
If one wants to maintain the fantastical side of love in marriage, then
jealousies and adventures must take place, if one wants to maintain the amorous
side, then the wife must be a coquette;
if both should cease to exist, then the mere simplicity of nature remains
In
countries that are rich and monarchical where many, with their private business
of self-interest, have nothing to do with the public business of the state,
everything comes down to the skill for society.
From this arises politeness. In
On
fashionable casts of mind
A woman
is always ready to deceive a lover who is respectful and, without much ado, to abandon
in secret the one who is bold and enterprising.
In the state of simplicity the man rules over the woman; in the state of
luxury, the woman rules over the man.
The more refined taste of free association makes this necessary
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 45, at 2:226]
[R62] [20:80]
[Latin] The legislative power to affect
the senses of a subject well or badly does not depend on love but on respect and
on the moral power of necessitation. The
logical ability to enact laws (on account of wisdom) is not moral
The
still and peaceful serenity in the beautiful is, with a man, turned into
himself and, with a woman, turned outward
Pelisson and Madame
Sévigné[xxxviii]
Bold attitude
and amorous or ingratiating laughter. <To
take a serious position toward the custom[s] of women.>
Whoever
is himself empty of sensations (that is, has a feeling for judging but has no
need for feeling) can much more easily maintain them in others. For this reason, the woman must be less
affectionate
Because
we have so much vain jealousy,
friends are also rivals. Thus friendship
can only take place with needs
Light
and warmth appear to differ like noise and wind; light and colors like noise
and sound; taut strings can
must make undulations. A coal fire in the hearth is a space empty of
ether, which goes out through the chimney; since thereby all the bodies
standing around are freed of ether, they provide warmth. In such a way is warmth received those which
receive warmth are c [breaks off]
It is a
question whether, when bodies become warm, they let go of fire [20:81] or take
it in. It depends on whether bodies are
saturated with fire in absolute cold, for then a warm body becomes cold if it
absorbs fire and this heats a body if it is released. Is a heated oven empty of fire? Yes, it gradually absorbs the fire itself, [and]
thereby frees the fire in others and makes them warm and becomes cold itself. In this way, the suns and also those are the spaces emptiest of the element
of fire. The dissemination of light can thereby
also be comprehended, for it is easier that penetration into [R63] an empty
space should be followed by an infinite line of agitated matter than that an
impact should.
29 29 29
12 33 14
58 87 116
29 87 294
957 406
122 34
36
4 8[62]
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 46, front side, at 2: 227]
In this
way, light might perhaps be a movement toward the sun rather than one away from
it
Sound,
although air is squeezed out of the lungs, can perhaps be generated through the
withdrawing rather than by the expulsion of air
Fire
above a body (earth) makes it cold underneath, but only to a certain extent,
for it frees the fire element from the closest body, [20:82] [but] the more
remote body attracts this already released fire element to itself. Thus numerous poles are formed.
a
x y
b c d
If
there is fire at ‘a’ then the fire element will be released out to ‘b’, but
always more weakly than at ‘y’ and ‘x’; the movement that will penetrate from
‘b’ to ‘a’ in empty space is weaker than that which will be attracted from ‘b’ toward
‘c’, therefore ‘bc’ is attractive and
consequently is cold only in that it penetrates, [and] accumulates in ‘c’,
although with delayed movement, so that ‘c’ is no doubt positively warm, that is, lets fire go, but the movement beyond ‘c’
towards ‘d’ is once again negative.
[R64] The
sun warms the earth, that is, makes it so that the fire is released into it hence it must
from above or better that
there is a space empty of fire on the earth; assume a body high in the air, and
it is in a space that is full of fire; thus, no fire comes out of itself or
into itself because it is
it does not give off such an element
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 47, at 2: 227]
[20:83]
The true concept of fire seems to consist in the fact that with heating the
fire does not change from warmth to cold, but from cold to warmth; hence in cooling, the body that is becoming
cold is put in the state of absorption and fire passes into it. From this it follows that when a body is
warmed it pulls other fire into itself and thereby always diminishes its state
of absorption, that is to say, always becomes colder itself From this follows that only the body which
warms others becomes cold and conversely, one that becomes cold warms others,
for it cannot warm without releasing the fire into others, that is. but the more it fills itself, the less
is it in a state to release it into others.
Yet, if a body becomes cold, it falls into a state of absorption and
thereby warms others. A body is cold
with respect to others if it cools them, that is, fills others with the element
of fire and thereby lessens their absorbing condition in that it gets warm itself,
that is, releases fire. Comets are,
among all heavenly bodies, those which are most full of the fire element; they
come into the empty space of the ether, or rather their elemental fire is
violently released, which soars behind them
<If there
is a fire in the hearth, then the air in the whole area, and also the nearby
bodies, will become warm. Remote
[objects] , however, draw it out and become cold because the fire becomes
released from the air. Or so: the ether that
is rushing by makes waves and is denser in some places than before, hence the
body found there will absorb rather than emit>
All the
contrived rules for a wife exist in order to prevent others from pleasing us
more or making us lustful. Constrain
your own concupiscence and your wife will be adequate
[R65] A
valiant woman is something completely different from a romantic[63]
[20:84] beauty, the latter is best for a lover, the former for a husband. German women are brave, French women coquettes
A good
housewife is honorable for the husband, how will a gallant dame earn this
name
A man
must show some contemptuousness with respect to his finery; it must be seen
that he has worn the hat. His cuffs must
not trouble him
If I
should choose a wife, I would want to take one who has not much wit, but feels it.
The
corruption of our time allows it to come about that no person demands to be
happy or good, but instead to appear so.
One
laments that marriages are not as good as the unwed state. The reason for this is above. One never enjoys himself
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 48, front side, 2:228]
[Latin]
Punishment is either political or moral.
The first is the motivating [20:85] cause of the omission, the latter is the
cause of the commission of actions.
Moral punishment is strictly speaking disheartening or avenging, but it
also has the function of being a means for improvement of the sinner in view of
either previous or future misdeeds.
The
cause of all moral punishment is this.
All evil action would never happen if it were sensed through moral
feeling with as much aversion as it deserves.
Yet if it is carried out, then it is a proof that it has sweetened the
physical stimulation and the action has seemed good, but it is absurd and ugly
that what is morally evil is yet good on the whole; consequently, as a result,
a physical evil must replace the loss of the repugnance that was missing in the
action.
<To
a certain extent, it is fortunate that marriages become difficult, because if [R66]
they became frequent, the masters would increase and the injustice would become
more common>
Women
are far more adept than men are in judging of masculine merit and their
weaknesses that can be put to use. Men, by
contrast, more easily see the worth of a woman than a woman sees that of
others, but they do not so easily see the failings as a woman sees those of
others. Thus, women dominate over men
and deceive them more easily than vice versa.
It is easy to deceive a man, but not vice versa. Traitor. You don’t love me anymore, you
believe more in what you see, etc.; no man can say such a thing to wife
she sees even what he does not himself, and she
sees correctly[64]
They
rightly carry out the same intrigues in retaliation for the injustices we show
them, that we want them to be chaste and have been unchaste ourselves
[20:86]
<The reason why there are so many cuckolds is because the time of the
debauches of men has ended and that of women has begun.>
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 49, at 2:228]
It is
very good that the woman is chosen; she herself cannot chose
Why the
aging of a woman is so terrible, of men not so, for the latter is sublime
Youth
is a great perfection for a woman in marriage; one still loves her afterwards
in age on account of the memory of her youth.
That elderly women marry comes about because of our injustice.
Women
are all covetous except where vanity is stronger; they are all devout and devoted to the spiritual. The honor of a man resides in his judgment of
himself, that of a woman in the judgment of others
[R67] [20:87]
If there were a man by whom I was hated, it would trouble me. Not as if I were frightened of him, but
because I would find it hateful to have something in myself that could become a
cause for hate in others, for I would suspect that another would not have
formed an aversion without any apparent occasion. Therefore, I would search him out, I would give
myself to be better understood by him, and after I the
disadvantage had seen
some benevolence toward me developing in him, I would let myself be satisfied
with this without ever wanting to take advantage of it. But if I considered it to be inevitable that
common and vulgar prejudices, a miserable envy, or a yet more despicable
jealous vanity make it impossible to completely avoid all hate, well then I
will say to myself it is better that I am hated than that I am despised. Hate This saying is based on an entirely different cause than
that which self-interest cooks up, namely that I would rather be envied than
pitied. The hate of my fellow citizens
does not overcome their concept of equality, but but of the scorn makes me unimportant in the eyes
of others and always causes a very annoying delusion of inequality. Yet, to be despised is much more injurious
than to be hated.
[Page 50 of Observations,
in the margin, next to lines 11-13, 2:229]
they laugh easily and gladly and it increases their charms
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 50, front side, 2:229]
Female
pride. Male pride.
The
degenerate woman was Arria
Margaretha Maultasch[xxxix]
It does
not behoove a wife to make the husband happier by way of something other than
by way of her person With her money the
wife buys for herself a jester or a tyrant
The
greatest perfection is domesticity
[R68] [20:88]
<[Women] can command incomparably in their countenances, [they] have more
accent, [they] persuade>[65]
A human
being has his own inclinations and through his power of choice a hint from
nature to arrange his actions in accordance with these. There can be nothing more terrible than that
the actions of one person should be subordinated to the will of another. Hence no aversion can be more natural than that
which a person has toward slavery. On
this account a child cries and becomes bitter if it has to do what others want
without one having bothered to make this attractive to him. The child wishes only to be a man soon and to
act in accordance with its will. What
new slavery to things must they eliminate[66]
in order to usher this in.
In
accordance with her build, a woman is already adapted to being sought after,
[and] therefore knows to attract approaches and to be adept at conceding or
also refusing. Hence she must know how
to capture [20:89] but also how to conceal desires in order to prevent disdain. From this she can more easily adopt a modest
and cool-headed nature, can dissemble excellently, and is equipped with all
characteristics for appearing at any time as she should. She is therefore soberly discussed, never
imprudent, etc.
Shamefulness
is never a cause of chastity, but something that in its place, by means of
incentives of propriety, produces the very same effects
A woman
wants to have men be enterprising in matters of love
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 51, 2:229]
The
sweetness that we find in respecting beneficence toward people is an effect of
the feeling for the universal well-being that would occur in the condition of
freedom
[20:90]
The refinement of the times is adeptness at deceiving and our academies furnish a bunch of swindlers
[R69] Drunkenness
is the failing of a man
Roughness
Defiance
The
law-giving power of God among the first human beings is based on property. The human being was freshly placed in the
world, all trees belonged to God and he forbade one to them
This idea has ended. The law-giving power of God over the Jewish
people is based on the social contract.
God would lead them out of
Paul
judges that the law would only produce reluctance, because it causes one to do
unwillingly what has been commanded, and this is certainly how things are. For this reason he sees the law as abolished by
Christ and grace alone as a basis for loving God rightly from the heart, which
is not possible in accordance with nature, and by means of which actions will
be brought to morality and not to theocratic
politics.
[Page 51 of Observations,
marginal notes next to lines 22-25, at 2:230]
is
commonly [and] uncleanly like Magliabechi,[xl] he
was disguised with a loose mouth. As my
brother says [breaks off]
[lower margin]
[20:91]
One can hate him who is right, but one is forced to respect him.
[R70] Self-interest
fights against common utility. The latter brings love out of inclination
[Page 52 of Observations,
marginal notes next to lines 6-11, 2:230]
May men
always devote troublesome, sleepless nights to their research if the woman only
knows how she ought to rule them.
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 52, front side, at 2:230]
<On
the mutterings against providence>
On freedom
FOn means of
nourishment, the impression of the air, [and] the sun.
He always depends on some things because of his needs and on others because
of his concupiscence and, in so far as he is surely the administrator of nature
but not her master, he must often acquiesce to the yoke of necessity and bow
to the order of nature and accommodate himself to its laws [20:92] conform to her coercion, for he
will not find that she will always conform to his wishes. Still, what is much harder and more unnatural
than this yoke of necessity is the dependence subjection of one person under the will
of another. There is no misfortune more
terrible for anyone who would be used to freedom <has enjoyed the good of
freedom> than to see himself delivered to a creature of his own kind who
could coerce him to do whatever he wants (to take his own will to himself). There is also no doubt that [breaks off]
It must It also necessarily requires a very long habituation to make the horrifying terrible thoughts of subservience tolerable;
for every person must feel in himself that even if there were many discomforts
that he might not want to cast off at the risk of his life, nevertheless, in
the choice between slavery and the risk of death one will have[R71] there would be
no doubt that one’s first attempt his free- no reservations in preferring the latter.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 53, at 2:230]
The
cause of this is also very clear and rightful.
All other ills of nature follow laws ills of nature are still subject to certain laws that one learns
to know in order to choose subsequently how far one wants to give into them or
be subject to them. The heat of the
burning sun, the harsh wind, the motions of the water always allow for a person
to devise something that will protect himself against them or [breaks off]
But the
will of every human is the effect of his own drives, inclinations, and true or
imagined well-being and
agrees only with his own true or imagined well-being. But if I was once free, nothing can present a
more terrible prospect of sorrow and despair than [20:93] that in the future my
condition should reside, not in my own will, but in the will of another. Today it is bitingly cold, I can go out or
stay at home, whichever I please. But
the will of another does not determine what is most agreeable to me this time,
but what is most agreeable <to him>.
I want to sleep so he wakes me. I
want to rest or play, and he forces me to work.
The wind that rages outside compels me to flee to a cave, but here or
elsewhere it finally leaves me in peace, but my master seeks me out and,
because the cause of my misfortune has reason, he is much more adept at
tormenting me than all the elements. Even
if I presume that he is good, nothing stands in the way of his considering otherwise. The movements of matter do indeed maintain a
certain definite rule, but the obstinacy of the human being is without rules
[Page 53 of Observations,
marginal notes at lines 15-23, at 2:230]
[20:95]
They make the strongest satires of marriage who regard the marital excesses as
trifles, which deserves no insult or punishment revenge, because then the state of
marriage does not differ [R72] from that of gallantry
of the most indifferent sort.
[Lower margin]
The
woman accepts a satire of her sex as a joke because she knows well that the
mockery of the little short-comings of her sex actually concerns the men, for
the sake of which she loves them even more, but a satire of marriage insults
all women because this seems to be more serious and because of they also feel
there is some truthfulness in this reproach.
Yet, if such a principle gets the upper hand, then her sex will be degraded
to the man’s power of choice.
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 54, front side, at 2:230]
<On the rightful expression ‘my lord’>[67]
[20:93]
In subjugation there is not only also something so something externally dangerous but also something so a certain hatefulness and a
contradiction that at the same time indicates its injustice. An animal is not yet a complete being because
it is not conscious of itself and whether its drives and inclinations are
opposed by another or not, it surely feels its ill, but the ill disappears for
it in a moment and it knows nothing of its own existence. But that a human
being should as it were require no soul and through a have no will of its own and that another
soul should move my extremities is absurd and perverse: also in our
constitutions every person who is subordinated to a great extent is also
despicable to us [breaks off]
Livery
<Instead
of freedom raising me above cattle, it places [R73] me beneath them because I
can be more easily coerced>
Such a
person is, as it were, nothing to himself but the household appliance of
another. I could just as well pay
tribute to the boots of the master [20:94] as to his lackey. In short, the person who depends on this is
no longer a human being, he has lost this rank, he is nothing except another
person’s belonging.
Often
Subjection and freedom are commonly mixed together the master to a certain degree it is not
always called the m and
one depends on the other. But even the
smaller degree of dependence is too great an ill than that it should not
naturally terrify. This feeling is very
natural but one can also weaken it quite a bit.
The power to withstand the ills of others can become so small that
slavery appears to be a lesser ill than discomfort. Nevertheless, it is certain that in human
nature it stands above [breaks off]
Indeed,
cattle are forced by human beings, but the human being by the delusion[68]
of another human being
The
momentary power of attack is much smaller than servitude.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 55, at 2:231]
There
could certainly be enticements that the human prefers to freedom for a moment,
but at once he will be thoroughly sorry.[69]
[20:95]
Society makes one value himself only comparatively. If others are not better than me, then I am
good, if all are worse, then I am perfect.
[20:96]
Relative evaluation is still distinguished from honor.
If
Chastity cannot be a lack of amorous passion, [R74] for then it is really a
flaw, namely that this same passion is
too small for its whole purpose, still, it is good insofar as it is suitable to
one’s age <and> capacity, but this goodness
is not moral.
To
preserve chastity of men
is either a direct shamefulness (the concern to make one’s sexual attribute
contemptible) or an indirect consequence of the general concept of honor. This last is either purely a concern to draw no
dishonor upon oneself, and this is a means of preserving virtue for which many
institutions could be made, or a tender stimulation of self-censure in so far
as it is connected to sincerity and may not conceal itself, therefore it shows
itself in blushing; this characteristic is the best way to preserve chastity
[20:97]
We have all kinds of drives that should serve us as means to serve others and that
often dominate as ends. First, for
comparing ourselves to others so that we can evaluate ourselves; from this springs
the falsity of evaluating one’s worth comparatively, of arrogance, and of even
evaluating one’s courage and good fortune in the same way; envy. Second, for putting ourselves in the place of
another so that we know what he feels and judges.
From this springs the blind pity that also puts justice in disorder.
Third, others
of us for investigating
the judgments of others because this can correct the truth morally as well as
logically. From this springs the desire
for glory. Fourth, for acquiring and
save all sorts of things for enjoyment; from this springs the greed that is
miserly.
One
says that the thirst for glory is the ultimate weakness of the wise. I believe that where wisdom is not of the
kind that comes with age, the love of women is the ultimate weakness
[Page 56 of Observations,
marginal notes next to lines 9-14, at 2:231]
[20:99]
[70]
That a wife has feminine traits is no ill, but surely it is an ill that they be
encountered in a man. Just as it is a
biting mockery rather than a eulogy that a woman has masculine traits in her
[next to lines 18-22]
[R75] A
wife constricts the heart of a man and one commonly loses a friend when he
marries
[Lower margin]
A man
is such a dandy in marriage
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 56, front side, at 2:231]
[20:97]
The use of the terms dames u chapeaux,[71]
although it is only a fashionable trifle in conversation among Germans, shows
quite well the foolishness of taste that creeps into us and makes a mockery [20:98]
of the ridiculous customs of a nation[72]
that is lively and deluded in its own character. The everlasting conversation of the French
with women is in accordance with their character, but this is not the case with
the Teutons. Our woman does not have anything
near the lively coquetterie of the
French. Therefore, these manners of
interaction must always be somewhat insipid.
They are still proud here
Because
women are weak, they are much less capable of virtue, but they have that which can
make it superfluous
Virtue
becomes ever more necessary but also ever more impossible in our present constitution
Because
virtue shows strength, it must suit warlike states,
Unity in
society is not possible between many people
When we
count among necessities the works of another, why not also his wife
When
they are in society, men assess their worth only in relation to one another:
the women only in relation to the men, because then each charming
characteristic or presumption discovered is accepted, every other [R76] wanton
demand questioned; in such a way they give each other very bad reputations
Each
well-mannered woman tries to charm the entire [male] sex although she does not
mean to profit by it. This comes about from the fact that because
she should be sought after, she must possess a general inclination to please,
for were this restricted, she would perhaps stand out to someone she doesn’t
want. With marriages this inclination
escapes from its bounds
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 57, at 2:232]
[20:100]
<On the agreeablenesses that one makes into need and vice versa. Ideal gratification. Chimerical [gratification] that deceives in
fulfillment>
1. On need and agreeableness. Quiet, change,
boredom
On
luxury and sufficiency. Preparation, foresight
On
ambition.
On
courage and cowardice, health and sickness
On the fine and goods of delusion. Miserliness
On
sexual inclination. On science
On
refined and crude sensations.
On
foresight
On the
person of simplicity
On
natural persons in comparison with civilized ones <On the extent of the well-being of both>
On the
value of human nature
[R77] A
free person values himself more than a slave.
Dependence
on power is not as disgraceful as [dependence] on delusion
<On industriousness and laziness>
On the luxury of civilized people.
[20:101]
On the sciences, on healthy and fine understanding
On
enjoyment and delusion, foresight[73]
<On the capacity for enjoyment and delusion>
On well-being
and misery
<moral>
On
generosity and guiltiness
On the
drive to acquire or defend. War
On
truth and lies. On propriety and
righteousness.
On
friendship. On the perfection of human nature.
On
sexual inclination
Virtue,
religion. On natural and artificial
conditions, education
The
officer who got embarrassed, or pretended to do so, by the gaze of Louis XIV expressed the sentiment of a
slave.[xli] The embarrassment of a man with a woman does
not derogate his noble characteristics; here, his boldness is clumsy
indifference. A woman must not be embarrassed
in consideration of masculine virtue conscia
decoris Venus[74]. Her noble propriety is quiet and gentle, not
bold; I revere the beautiful girl in a noble or princely person.
[R78] If
he is always talking about virtue, then he is corrupt; if he constantly talks
of religion, then he is [corrupt] to the utmost
The
priests in the country could maintain large schools for the education of
children
[Page 57 of Observations,
upper margin, 2:232]
[20:99]
Beauty is domineering. Merit peaceful
and yielding. The wife retains the
affection of the man through jealousy
[marginal notes next to lines 2-19]
The man
who slips away from tears held back with difficulty. This is how he drowns the pain that he
compresses in his chest whenever tender melancholy moves him, and the effort to
bear it unwaveringly shines forth in his condolences. A woman can let her sadness out in
lamentations with propriety and alleviate her feeling. She also passes easily from pain to joy [20:100]
even when the former has been serious, which is also good for a beautiful sex. The
man loves more affectionately, the woman more steadily
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 58, front side, at 2:232]
[20:102]
On inequality
Once
this has begun, then the ill of oppression is not nearly as great as [the ill] that
the minds of the oppressed become abject and think little of themselves. A peasant is a much more miserable person and
has cruder vices than a savage who lacks everything, and also than a common
worker.
If I go
into the workshop of a craftsman, I do not wish that he be able to read my
thoughts. I dread this comparison: he
would see the great inequality in which I evaluate myself in relation to
him. I recognize that I could not live
one day without his industriousness; that his children will be reared into
useful people.
On the
defensive passions
[R79] Although
the person of nature hates no other person, he does indeed fear him. Hence he is alert and the equality that he
thinks about losing every moment brings him to arm himself. The state of war[75]
soon begins. But because it is based on
a noble ground, [20:103] it certainly brings about great ill but not ignominy. It is less dangerous in terms of dishonoring
human nature than is a slavish peace*
Virtue
that depends on strength can only last long in warlike states. The English still have the most virtue among
all the European nations. They are Their luxury is acquired through hard work and is squandered away with savagery
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 59, at 2:233]
Everything
that unnerves kills virtue at its source.
The
female sex is closer to nature than the male.
For the present age is the age of propriety, of beauty, of good
behavior. However, these are her specific
inclinations.
[20:104]
The male sex has come to an end and noble characteristics no longer endure
because everything is trimmed with ornamentation
The condition
of virtue is a violent one; therefore, it can only be encountered in a violent conditions
of the commonwealth.
The
luxurious life enriches people to a certain degree. The work of women ceases, they get more
children. There are enough whores who
want to suckle children or poor women who neglect their own and raise
upper-class children, etc. In an even
greater degree luxury makes for a stagnation of increase[76]
and eventually even a diminishment. From
this comes poverty, but before this rises, or when it emerges, then the
greatest vices occur
[R80] On
religion in natural conditions.
One
must not reproach the savages without religion for things that would make one
think less of those with religion. For
whoever does what God wills that he should do, mediated by the motives that God
set in his heart, is obedient to Him without knowing of His existence.[xlii] But whoever knows God, and is brought to such
actions only through the naturally good morality
has theology, or if he reveres God for the sake of his morality, then this is simply a morality
whose object had been broadened.
Christians can become blessed if their faith is not alive just as little
as those who have had no revelation at all, although with them something more
has happened than what naturally takes place.
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 60, front side, 2:233]
If
Diogenes had farmed the field instead of rolling his barrel, he would have been
great[xliii]
[20:105]
One must not ban any books now; it is the only way harm for them to destroy themselves. We have now come to the point of return. Rivers, if one lets them flood, form their
own banks. The dam that we set against them
serves only to make their ravages unceasing.
For the authors of useless things have for their excuse the injustice of
others before them.
In states
where industriousness concerning necessities no honor is not honored and respected, where the
people who work these trades do not value themselves, there a man without honor
is the worst good-for-nothing, wanton, a double-dealer, deceitful, and thieving. But where the simplicity of nature rules,
honor can very well be done without.
See
there, honor wreaks much ill and then[77]
it also serves as means to prevent its greatest excesses. The sciences wreak much ill and then they
serve as a means to better their own evils.
War creates more ill than it takes away [R81] but to a certain extent it
brings about a state of equality and noble [20:106] courage. In such a way corruption as well as virtue in
human nature cannot continuously increase.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 61, at 2:234]
He who
is not so proud watches the game of vanity among the noble Damen [78] with no small amount of pleasure
Shamefulness,
frailty. Embarrassment
Satire
never improves [anything] ; for this reason, even if I had the talents for it,
I would not make use of them. The vanity
of a woman is either that of her sex or that of her status.
The
pride of the sex or of the status
Because
nobility and the honor based on it depend solely on the choice of the prince,
pride over them is quite foolish. <He
who is angry and strong does not hate>
That
the drive for honor originates only from the idea of equality[20:107] can be seen
from this: 1. because as far as another is also stronger, but only appears not to
make comparisons, we fear him completely but we (from which respect originates) but we do not hate
him. 2. that the inclination to show his
worth to superiors is noble, but to equals or inferiors is contemptible <worthy of hate>; and that a man
who does not value himself is despised
The
highest pinnacle of fashionable taste is <when young men get refined early>
[and] acquire vulgar brazenness, when the young woman quickly abandons discreet
modesty and has learned early how to carry on the game of coquetterie with liveliness.
For thereupon
we this is necessarily
the way the most charming manner best catches the eye; in such a society, a
reasonable man looks like a blockhead or pedant, a decent modest and decent woman like a common
landlady, and the more refined in society play the role of courtier. Thus, they soon withdraw from the [R82] common
taste, and reason and domestic virtue are kept on in memory as old, rusted characteristic memorials of taste. But as with all of the ills that one can
never bring to the highest point without the weight on the other side turning
the scale, here again stagnation and return is found. For gradually the women who have practiced
the female art long before marriage will easily make use of this freedom where
they can do it with certainty. Men, warned
by such examples, instruct themselves by the seduction that they instigated
themselves and, with the prospect of a wild vanity that will never let them
rest, love the marriages of others but make difficulties for their own. The contempt for the beautiful sex follows
from adoration and, what is most terrible for them, the masculine is prudent so
as to no longer be deceived by them. [20:108]
The greatest hindrance preventing the male sex from returning to happy
simplicity is the female sex.
[Page 61 of Observations,
upper margin, 2:234]
I plant
human beings. Propriety. A helpful instinct of chastity.
[marginal notes at lines 1-4]
Men are
exceedingly easy to deceive, women are not.
[lower margin]
Old-fashioned
withdrawal also has its troubles. Conversation
becomes speechless, countrified, full of stiff ceremony and craftsmen-like aloofness. The vanity and the trickery
of gallant company serve to some
extent to put passion to sleep among
by way of always-changing games of distraction and to divert finery and vanity
to fashion instead of seclusion, introducing that which society had forbidden.
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 62, front side, at 2:234]
[R83] Blushing
is a pretty characteristic of a woman and impudence does not create destroy blushing; rather, she who does
not easily blush becomes easily brazen and wanton
[20:109]
There are many more men who have reason to praise the generosity of women who
do not use the privilege that nature has given to them to fulfill the fair
demand on their husband through other men than men who can complain about
it. With so many enervated persons men, a foolish or chimerical
marriage-project arises in which they want to make friendship out of the
marriage and demand great virtues of the wife toward a self-overcoming of those
stirrings that are quite acceptable and cannot be stilled
A woman
is not so completely virtuous that she is able to make men so. As strange as it is, they are the greatest
means of chastity in men, for an otherwise scatterbrained man will not be made more
chaste by anything other than love toward a girl.
A woman
has a quick concept of everything concerning sentiments but she does not exactly feel them. For example, take heroic virtue: a man will
think of it when he is supposed to practice it himself, but the woman will only
think of it if it is done toward her or by her husband. If one were to
face up to them If one
speaks with great discretion, then she figures she has a lover. For this reason, some virtues that have no
noticeable direction for her sex will not be respected (for example, the
simplicity of nature)
This is
primarily because the woman is the whetstone of virtue, the whetstone breaks with difficulty[79]
etc. and male virtue against
would have no object of exertion if the woman were the same, for then it could
be dispensed with
Perhaps this is a concealed reason why we
always attach ourselves to women, whether we want to or not.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 65, at 2:235]
[R84] [20:110]
Absolute cold is where a body is saturated with fire, absolute warmth where it
has let go of all fire that is possible, that is, where the attraction is precisely identical to its
expansive force
Whether
I can impute prior deeds[80]
to a morally changed person[81]
When a
body draws fire from another, it warms it, when it lets it go, it cools it.
a b c
If the
heating is in ‘a’, then it is put into the state of absorption through the loss
of its fire element. There must therefore
be cold in ‘b’ since there is more fire element to be encountered in it and [it]
will be drawn toward the same parts; because the fire element will accumulate will be drawn
so that it becomes in c an empty space
in ‘b’, it must spread and yield an empty space in ‘c’ that will become warm,
and so forth. From the ethereal waves in warmth to those in
light. Yet this distinction can only
last a short while.
[20:111]
When water is over fire, then there is an empty space underneath, thus when the
water has let all the fire go, that is, has boiled, then, if one removes it
[the water] , it [the fire] must go out the bottom and absorb from the top
since the movement had at that time been given to the element; thus, it is hot above
and cool below. In boiling, bubbles must
develop at the bottom, which soar up; the free fire-element will not go through
copper as quickly as through water and gathers in bubbles; in these, vapors are
created and soar up into the air since they are made of an elastic medium.
All
bodies vitrify and are comparatively
empty of fire element, therefore, while light brings warmth with others, at its
innermost it here makes only light, that is, not so much overflowing of ether as
vibrations.
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 64, front side, at 2:235]
[R85] The
magnitude of punishment is either evaluated practically[82],
namely, that it be great enough to prevent
the action and then no greater punishment is allowed, but as great a punishment
as is physically necessary is not always morally possible.
Or its magnitude
is evaluated in moral proportion:
e.g., [20:112] of the man who kills another in order to take his money, it will
be judged that, because he has valued another’s life as less than his own money, one must also value his life as
less than as much money as any one allocates in relation to life
Few go
about deceiving their prince, which is a sign that they feel the injustice of
the government
[Latin]
<The fear of a simple nature is either
childish or menial>
[Latin]
The natural tendency <with regard to
motives> is either simple servile
or menial, the latter is that of a
mercenary or that of a slave[83]
On the
method of morality: where one regards all of the characteristics
that are now common from birth on as natural (not disposed to sin) and extracts
from that the rules as to how they can be good in [this] condition, [one] does
not err even if the supposition could
be false. In this way, I can say that
the person of nature who does not know of God is not evil.
Because
God was a political lawgiver in the Old
Testament, he also gave an account of political grounds for rewards and
punishments, but he did not give moral grounds until later times. <A prince cannot draw up rewards for all
his laws because he himself has nothing>
[Latin]
The simple tendency is either that of
love or reverence; the first in the Gospels, the second in the law. Love could not have taken place in the Old
Testament, in the New Testament love can only emerge through divine provision
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 63, at 2:235]
[R86] [20:113]
On the Republic of Geneva; on Rousseau’s peculiar way of life[xliv]
Love is
either lustful <corporeal> or moral <spiritual>
Toward
women something from the former is always intermingled, even toward the
elderly, or else they would only be valued as men. Toward chi[84] Fathers spoil daughters and mothers
spoil sons
All
follies have this in common with each other, that the pictures that appeal to
them float in the air and have no support or stability. You marry a woman without wit, without
manners, without birth and family, which is the downfall of your taste. Oh, that is not the rule of my taste, you
might answer. But what will people say,
consider what the world will judge of you.
Before I involve myself in this important difficulty, I ask you what then are such
peo what one understands
by such people and the world whose opinion is critical for my happiness. Those are, one answers me, a number of
individuals in which each is just as troubled [by] what people will say, and I
belong along with the number [20:114] of these so-called people whose judgment
is so important. Oh, I answer, we people
collectively do not want to trouble ourselves any longer with another’s opinion
because they robbed us of enjoyment, for we no longer understand ourselves or,
at the least, I understand you all; I want am no comedian who
can be paid with applause
Conceit
and stingy greed are never to be healed.
Women are
never generous; this is also completely proper because they are not actually
the ones who acquire, but instead they save, so it would be reversed because if they gave away for nothing because
that is a matter for the men. But they
are just subordinated men; and, although they never want to be them, nature retains
their rights anyway. They put effort
into finery because this does not appear to be given away and with right do they
collectively negotiate what the man
owns
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 66, front side, at 2:236]
[R87] Error
is never more useful than truth, all things considered, but it is often more
useful than ignorance
[20:115]
The childish understanding is one that only judges that which is presently
useful to it. The manly intellect judges
about future use; the aged intellect judges about despises present use and has an imagined
use towards a purpose whose future will never be. With respect to the intellect, women are
quite childish and, as concerns the future, they are devoted to miserliness instead
of any foresight.[85] More than that being troubled by external
circumstances and sacrificing others to his worries, the valiant man acquires
powers of his own with respect to the future.
In the household, an admirable unity arises out of this.
If one merely
depends on things then one does not require much reason but only understanding
Arrogance
on account of religion is the most ridiculous, for the thought that others do
not become blessed should make me much more sympathetic and actively helpful than
arrogant. Arrogance on account of money
is common and coarse because it bases itself on something that easily passes from
one to another; thus, it is crude. Arrogance
on account of freedom is noble and proud.
Arrogance on account of birth and for the sake of position is finer because it is permanent and
that on account of office is the most permissible.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 67, at 2:236]
The
Jews, Turks, and Spaniards have religious arrogance; they are also either
treacherous if they are cowardly or tyrannical if they are powerful. The Dutch have arrogance on account of money,
the English on account of freedom and power.
The conceit of nations on account of their great monarchs constitutes
vanity and vanity also brings about the monarchical constitution. A proud nation is free; a coarse and
industrious nation is also free and money-grubbing. Spanish arrogance demonstrates a spirit of
persecution in all religions, and so also with the Turks.
[R88] Where
there are many aristocrats and also many subjects, there is flattery on one
side and arrogance on the other, as with the Poles.
[20:116]
A woman troubles herself only with delightfulness but not with the necessity of
life. Therefore, they let the man see to
the necessities, while they attend to taste.
And in religion they let others determine what is true, but they are
intent to imitate it fashionably with good form.
I want
to observe one more thing (but this is said just amongst us men): through their
presence behavior, they could be made more chaste
than they really are and without
could console themselves over the loss of an inclination through the
satisfaction of vanity in having instilled esteem. A woman wants a likes to see a strong man serve so that she can seem to be forced though in good form
women make
of men what they want; they formerly made heroes and now make monkeys. Whether they make reasonable men is to be
doubted; the latter cannot be formed by others, but must become so on their own
[20:117]
On taste for society in distinction
from that in society
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 68, front side, at 2:237]
The
capacity for pleasure and displeasure in general is feeling. Lack of feeling
The
capacity for pleasure and displeasure in things that do not belong among our necessities
[is] taste. This is coarse taste insofar
as it is close to necessities, fine taste is taste in that which is removed
from needs. Insofar this
fine [taste] [breaks off]
The feelings for things that presuppose the
perfections of a greater understanding is ideal
[R89] Insofar
as the powers of the soul cannot be merely passive but active and poetically
creative, taste is called spiritual and ideal (if the foremost feeling is
stirred not by external sensation but by that which one poetically creates)
Feeling
with respect to morality[86]
belongs either remains
merely with necessities, i.e. obligation,
or goes further; in the latter case it is sentiment
The
beautiful and sublime in the highest degree are closely related. If they are to be sensed, both presuppose the
soul at [20:118] peace. Therefore Yet
they are so different that if it is busyness, cheerfulness, and liveliness that
dominates them, then beauty comes forth, if they cease and peaceful
contentedness shines forth, then the sublime stands out. The former is early morning, the latter is
the evening
In its
lesser forms, beauty is related to the change of fluctuating novelty. The sublime, with constancy, uniformity, and
unalterability. With beauty, multiplicity,
with the noble, unity.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 69, at 2:237]
Only that
which is dispensable is beautiful, but the noble can be combined with utility. Yet in moral matters the noble must not be
considered from the viewpoint of utility.* Blossoms
are beautiful, fruit useful. In these
fine sentiments it is presupposed that the person is not dependent on things
because of pressing need, otherwise the fine taste is ridiculous. <Charmed by beauty, astonished by
sublimity.>
[20:119] The beautiful in a lesser degree is
agreeable and pretty, if great but not sublimity fades away [it is] cute. If beauty is imitated,
it is decorated, adornment
like golden hens.
The sublime is in a lesser [breaks off]
[R90] In
the feeling of the sublime, the powers of a person seem to be stretched, as it
were; in that of the beautiful, they are drawn together
The
taste that extends itself with respect to the direct sexual inclination is lustful
and is a sign of corruption with respect to [breaks off]
There
are moral and nonmoral necessities (obligations) which one presupposes before
there is talk of beauty. Before one Sciences in the head are, for most
people, just as useless as hair powder on the head, and, just as it would be
very foolish to have flour in one’s curls and none in one’s soup, it is absurd
to know the dispensable arts without
but none of those that constitute the welfare of life.
Before
we consider civilities, we must first be truthful and honest. It is peculiar that the lover troubles
himself over a free woman before he knows whether she is also faithful. Before we inquire into generosity
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 70, front side, at 2:238]
we must
recall obligation. Stop, audacious one –
shouts the merchant.[87]
Good
manners with inner dishonesty, fine manners in a woman without domesticity are
like a
beautiful so much
ribbon-work and a dirty shirt.
The
common opinion that previous times were better comes from the ill that one
feels and the presupposition that otherwise everything would be good.
[R91] Clothes
are only signs of comfort and superabundance for life. They must not be made so that they [20:120] draw
attention exclusively to oneself. (lurid
colors are repugnant to the eyes, which get attacked too much). Likewise with rank and title. They themselves have little worth [and] are
damned to golden frames
In
marriage, pure love without respect is enough to fasten the man to the woman
and pure respect without love is enough to fasten the woman to the man. Therefore, although understanding and merit
have little effect on a woman outside of marriage, marriage is the most
harmonious when, even if the years are different, the man instills respect
through understanding. Wolmar[xlv]
I would
rather be the happy Saint-Preux than the
one who courts a wife[xlvi]
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 71, at 2:238]
The
correct cognition of the cosmos according to
If
light were to have a streaming movement, then when striking a slanted surface not and [when] warming, it would retain its strength
not as the square of the sine of the inclination, but as its cube.
That
the poles do not pull at all is clear from the experiment of Bougeurs who put a magnetic needle on a
copper [plate] [xlviii]
[R92] The
Spectator says that the fool and the clever person are different in that the
former thinks aloud, etc.[xlix]
This is a very correct observation of
our present type of prudence. Because
both sexes advance proportionately in
this and the feminine in general surpasses the masculine in the art of illusion,
the women must be much more perfect in it and dominate.
That the
anticipation of death is not from nature is to be seen from the fact that the
consideration of death accomplishes nothing at all against inclination [20:122]
nor leads one to make preparations as though one were to live long, and the human
being just as seriously makes arrangements at the end of his life as if he had
never lived at all. Hence vanity and the
thirst for glory after death are grounded in the fact that the natural human
being flees shame and knows nothing of death.
Hence he extends the natural drive beyond the death that surprises him
It is
with the moral as with the art of medicine.
That doctor is the best who teaches me how I can be relieved of
illnesses and remedies. This art is easy
and simple. Yet it is artificial and complicated to allow all corruption and to
improve afterwards.
The odium theologorum[l]
has its basis in this: because it is maintained against the propriety of the
priests, the fast and forcible movement of anger is expressed, and where this
is suppressed it degenerates into a secret bitterness. Parallel with wives and Indians.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 73, at 2:239]
Being
extremely large is a sickness; one could ask whether it is so even with respect
to intellectual characteristics; at any rate,
it seldom makes [one] happy. Cato, Brutus[li]
[20:123] Colossal plans without power and emphasis are like the children whose
heads are too big. premature prudence. Margarethe
Maultasch.[lii]
[R93] Thank
goodness for mediocrity. Good, content
citizens.
Difficult
relationship between status and talent. Alexander
had large weapons left behind not in order to form the opinion of the Indians[88]
by the colossal size of his army but instead to reinforce it[liii]
Tender
taste loves peaceful and gentle beauty and will be wounded (screaming) by very
strong prominence of annoyance, of affectation, [or] of loquacity.
Coarse
taste (is very different from lack of feeling) requires stronger stimulation
displayed in a lively way and shows its wear and tear. Old, emaciated lover. <Whether the youth that loves tragedies would
not have a coarse taste>
ugly
and nasty.
The
ideal in beauty is very well preserved in hope but not in possession. [20:124] <Wantons become very skeptical
with respect to women’s chastity and make others so as well>
I do
not know whether or not is true what they say about the very extended fidelity
of married women in the most civilized nations and I let those who know from
experience judge it; This much I do know, that if all sensations increase
beyond their borders, the female capacity, which is not so restricted, will go much
further than the male.
Nothing
can replace the loss of female charm, not even the most preeminent propriety.
Impertinence,
which should be concealed by all means, it is most dangerous for women outside
of marriage; in marriage it is most dangerous for men. Hence one can already suspect prior to any
experience that the female sex will be reserved before marriage and impertinent
in marriage and vice versa for the man
[Page 74 of Observations,
marginal notes at lines 14-21, at 2:239]
[R94] The
woman seems to lose more than the man because the beautiful characteristics end
for the former while the noble ones stay with the man. The old woman seems no longer to be good for anything.[89]
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 74, front side, at 2:239]
Any gratification
that is connected to the fulfillment of needs is called coarse. Drinking, sleeping, eating, and cohabitation. The last is considered so crude that Tiresias had to endure an ill encounter
from Juno because he ascribed it
specifically to the female sex.[liv]
Taste
is therefore always attached to that which is actually not a pressing need. From this it follows that in painting when
similarity to nature is called for, e.g., landscapes, portraits,
then this nature must be captured, otherwise ideal gratifications are the most
preeminent. Nature is not good enough
for our gratification. This comes from
the frailty and tenderness of our organs, and even our [20:125] imagination. That is why painting can so thoroughly depart
from nature, like poetry and theatrical
action
Truth
is more of an obligation than beauty. One
must therefore conceal obligations on order to be beautiful.
The
tenderness of the nerves is one of the directing determinants of taste, for
thereby the degree of contrast or affect will restrict the hardness of sensations,
etc.
Harmony
comes from the agreement of the manifold, in music just as in poetry and
painting. Those are points of rest for
some nerves
Unity
is in accordance with comfort insofar as it is connected with activity, which desires multiplicity.[90]
[R95] [Back side, opposite Observations
p. 75, at 2:240]
[20:126]
On refinement and the scale of these sentiments
The
sense of the eye offers long and tender albeit very ideal gratification; dissatisfaction
is small except when related to sex[91]. Terror [is] great.
The
sense of hearing effects enduring gratification. but only through change; [the
gratification] is less ideal but very lively; dissatisfactions are small and short-lived.
The sense of smell gives a sort of ideal gratification; they are short in
gratification and strong and short.
Strong in dissatisfaction, that is to say, disgust demands change.
The
sense of taste is not at all ideal; it is great in gratification but short and
broken off; [it] demands change (without pressing need); dissatisfaction is far
more sensitive and is disgust.
The
sense of feeling is short and exhausting in sensual pleasure, short and sensitive
in warmth [and] in titillation; in pain it can last a long time and be
coarse. [It] can easily be outweighed by
understanding (excepting sexual inclination).
The
sense of the face reveals most things moral, but then so does hearing
[20:127]
That it is harder for women to keep their chastity in marriage than it is for
men to keep theirs has come about because their capacity to give is greater
than the man’s. Hence the fantastical
desires go further with them
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 76, at 2:240]
On the
old facial characters in comparison with the moral ones
Beautiful
and noble actions consist primarily of those [R96] to which one has no
obligation. Obligation is a kind of moral
need; whatever corresponds more closely to it is simple.
All affects that stimulate tenderness and
moral sentiment must therefore be taken from the vocations of a human being
Because
when one already presupposes beauty as necessary it becomes a kind of need, therefore
simplicity is possible even with the beautiful and sublime
Because
of all such sentiments for the beautiful, [20:128] which are sometimes stronger
than needs, it requires a great art to acquire the simplicity of nature,
although it is superfluous because one wants of it only to keep from going
astray, yet still great, thus it is a special kind of the sublime
A
pampered feeling that is not strong enough for simplicity is feminine. Nature at peace is the greatest beauty (surely
trickling brooks) because they lull people to sleep), grazing
herds of cattle. Hence the evening is
more moving than the morning
Gaiety
is not beautiful [and] also does not last.
On the agreement of beautiful faces and beautiful bodies with the soul
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 77, at 2:241]
The
free enjoyment of sensual inclination and the unchecked discovery of its object cancels everything ideal that can
become diffused over inclination; this is the reason it is so difficult to
preserve ideal gratification in marriage.
Unless one concedes dominance to the wife.
[20:129]
Some people are more pleasing when one is away from them, others when one is
more present; the former ones are more suitable for the idealistic
gratification of marriage
When
fantastical love mates well with knightly virtue.
[R97] Novels
end with marriage <and the story begins>; however, they can be prolonged
beyond the marriage by jealousy, for example, a wife who is [a] coquette of her husband and of others
All
female beauty is diffused over the sexual drive, for supposing you have[92]
experienced that a woman has a certain ambiguity of her sex, all her
infatuating charms will cease, although this does nothing for agreeablenesses,
which you believe alone will enchant you.
A
pregnant wife is apparently useful but not so beautiful. Maidenhood is useless but agreeable
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 78, front side, at 2:241]
[20:130]
It is quite uncivil that we do not want to allow women to be ugly, even when
they are old.
Because
needs are common, the domesticity of a wife will be considered a contemptuous matter
by a gallant man.
If the
masterpiece is from gratification, it will bore.
I love
the French as such but not the Germans when they imitate them.
Many a woman
misuses the license that wives have to be ignorant
In
proportion to their power to do evil, princes are by far not as corrupt as the
common man.
Inner
honor. Self-valuation. External honor as a means for each to assert himself. Thus, a man of honor. honestas.[93] External honor as a means is true, as an end
a delusion. This takes precedence over
self-preservation, equality, or preservation of the species. The [R98] desire for honor (direct) is either
based on the opinion of important perfections (patriotism) and called ambition, or is based on trifles and called
vanity. The consciousness of his honor,
as that the possession of which one believes in by himself and never by
measuring himself against others, is called pride. Dignity.[94] Gallantry
is either of pride or of vanity; the former of a petitmaitres[95],
the latter of a dandy. The proud person whom
others despise is arrogant. The vain person
If he wants to show it [20:131] through pomp [it is] haughty. The arrogant person who shows his disdain is pompous
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 79, at 2:242]
The
honor of man with respect to a woman is courage, and that of the woman is chastity. These points are peculiar. When the age[96]
becomes soft then the first honor is sweetness and the second is understanding
and boldness, the former makes things romantic, while the latter makes things
affected and courtly or fashionable
Because
philosophy is not a thing of pressing need but of agreeableness, it is strange
that one wants to restrict it by way of careful laws
Because
the lustful man chooses the wife as his ruler, he poeticizes her quite
admirably, since one does not want to be subjected to a wretched idol;
conversely, the woman wants to dominate.
Spectator, black monkey.[lv]
applied
to the hidden secret of all tender inclination toward the sex
The
strongest preferences gratifications will at first be boring
[20:132]
What it is that is called being domestic: making a need out of society. Boredom
The
housewife is worthy of honor. [The] beautiful
propriety of her domestic concern, intermixed with cleanliness and ornament,
must not appear to prefer being out of the house to [being] at home
The man
is the one who courts, the woman the one who chooses; that is the point of
making [R99] oneself hard to get. Should
they choose the romantic visionary, fools dressed in finery, or the selfish and phlegmatic unfeeling ones.
Saint-Evremond wanted to choose a wife and chose a coquette.[lvi] That happens because he is from a country
where every woman is a coquette, though
not toward her husband.[97]
The man
who does not make his amusements into his business but into recreation, who
knows how to live, that is, who makes his aim not acquisition but enjoyment,
who is enjoined to the peaceful gratification of company and friendship, he is the
man
All
gratifications become insipid if they are not recreations but occupations. The wife and husband who have something to do
will not become tired of one another
The
wife possesses the skill of always being womanly to a further extent than the
man, but she would rather not employ this skill except with her husband, who is
insipid to her
[Page 79 of Observations,
marginal note at lines 3-4, at 2:242]
The
standard of happiness is the household
[marginal notes at line 10 – lower margin, at 2:242]
I leave
a blooming field and the Arcadian valleys for barren fields[lvii]
[20:133]
The novel ends and the story begins. Henceforth
the magical haze gradually dissipates <through> him who saw the beloved
madness of his idols. The marriage-bed
welcomes a humane girl and the next morning, instead of being worshiped as a
goddess, she, as a wife,
suffocates the opposition of her slave Thereupon the
understanding husband [drinks] the salubrious water The lover, previously drunk with his
imaginations, wakes from beautiful dreaming and [breaks off]
The
sight of blossoms. A gallant
person always blossoms.
[Page 80 of Observations,
upper margin, at 2:242]
Love is
a unity Solomon
never loved [breaks
off] [lviii]
The
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 80, front side, at 2:242]
Beauty
is without utility because this is pressing a thing to other purposes, thus it indicates
no perfection complete in itself. Hence
the more useful things are, the more corners they show, so to speak, as means
to accommodate themselves to other connections; the roundness of a sphere is
perfect in itself
Gallantry:
a new kind of beauty of mores. Politesse.[98]
[20:134]
The former is a certain sweetness in pleasing behavior; the latter is a certain
gracious cautiousness
the
former is affected, the latter
peaceful and composed. Not every woman
is beautiful in the physical or spiritual sense, but gallantry meets them all with that subjection that is shown by him
who, through his inclination, will be ruled by a weaker person
The sentiment
for the beauty of young boys gave to the origin of Greek love the disgraceful most disgraceful passion that was at
that time and he in nature
that has ever depraved
stained <human> nature, and which well deserved that their criminals be given
over to the revenge and abuse of wives, etc.
[R101] The
permitted illusion is a kind of untruth that is not then a lie; it is a cause
for ideal gratification whose object is not in the things
Illusion
in a large gathering, as if they all would be cleverer than one
He who
thought himself the president in the marriage-bed wanted to contrive something
that could make the obscured magical power of illusion strong again
Illusion
is so compatible with the beautiful that even when one is aware of it, it will
please, but not so in the case of the noble.
Appearing as clever, pious, sincere, honest.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 81, at 2:243]
Benevolence
is a peaceful inclination to regard the happiness of others as an object of
one’s joy and also as a motive of one’s actions. Sympathy is an affect of benevolence [20:135] toward people in need in accordance
with which we imagine that we would do whatever is in our power to help them. It is therefore for the most part a chimera
because it is neither always in our power nor in our will. The commoner is sympathetic toward others who
become suppressed by the princes; the nobleman [is sympathetic] toward another
nobleman but callous toward peasants
With
luxury the fantasy of human love refines
itself and lessens capacity and pleasure.
The simple person takes in no others except those he can help
Understanding
creates no increase of moral feeling; he who ratiocinates has only cooled-off affects and is more cold-headed, [and] consequently
less evil and less good. The moral good
makes much more reasonable
One has
long tried to explain the feeling of pleasure in the ridiculous. In nature nothing is ridiculous
[R102] [20:136]
One demands illusion of priests and women; the former should appear to take no
part in frivolous gratification, the latter should appear to have no
inclination for lustful intimacy.
Thereby one makes them deceitful
[The] illusion
of religion as it is finally taken for the thing itself. Then is a delusion.
One
must pay respect to priests for the sacrifice of so many freedoms and
gratifications (they are almost in as tight boundaries as a woman)
One
must handle both with attentiveness because neither has either the capacity or the
propriety on their part to boldly resist insult
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 82, front side, at 2:243]
The
formality of all perfection consists in multiplicity (in addition to endurance and
strength) and unity; it [perfection] can also give gratification by itself
Sensitive. Insensitive.
The will
is perfect in so far as in accordance with the laws of freedom it is the greatest
ground of good in general. The moral feeling is the feeling of the perfection
of the will.
Whether
God is the originator of morality,
that is, whether we can only distinguish good and evil through the known will
of God
Sulzer[lix]
says that what facilitates and promotes the natural efficacy of the soul
touches me with gratification. This says
only that it promotes the natural striving for gratification
[Latin]
The corruption of one is the generation of
another. [German] Through the smell of putrefaction, nature wanted to warn
us of the greatest cause of dissolution and fermentation of the destruction of
animals
[R103] The
man is stronger in every capacity than the woman. But he is weaker with respect to inclination,
which he cannot so fully tame, and also with respect to the susceptibility of
his tenderness and confidence. The woman
is weaker with respect to power but also more cool-headed and therefore more
capable
In all
things the sexual inclination adopts the most ideal embellishment.
One
cause why women show off their great understanding early on: that one puts up
with them in the choice of matters so that at last they believe that there is
no other
Women
have a very quick but not thorough concept; they grasp something as much as is
necessary in order to discuss it and believe there is nothing better
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 83, at 2:244]
On the
means to measure the dryness and humidity of the air
[20:138]
With women, my courage makes me into a slave; with men, my cowardice does
Great
respect for people is based on chimerical excellences that we ascribe to others
That author[lx]
who said that when he observes a grave man in his serious or sublime attire, he
mitigates his blind reverence through the representation of his intimacy with
the wife or common pressing need. He did not need to have had this
representation. Still, this seems to be
why the Roman church has forbidden priests to have wives
The
free will (of one in need) is good for itself if it wills everything that
contributes to its perfection (gratification) and good for the whole if at the
same time it desires all perfection. As
incapable as the person who has this will may be, the will is still good. Other things may be useful; other people may
do much good in a certain action with a lesser degree of will but with more
power; yet the ground of willing the good is unique and is alone moral
[20:139]
The mathematician and the philosopher: they differ in that the former requires data from others while the latter
examines them himself. Hence the former
can prove [things] from any revealed religion.
The
fable of the swallow that wanted to catch the bird[lxi]
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 84, front side, at 2:244]
The
French love only laughing beauty, the Italians
only peaceful beauty.
A
selfish (lustful) human being requires a person who he can love; a generous
(affectionate) human being requires a person who loves him, that is, whom he
can make happy through his obliging behavior
No
woman will readily admit in the case of unhappiness in her marriage that the
long fast in her marital satisfaction does her harm, for the woman always wants
to appear to give and not to require; because she is already needy with respect
to all other parts of the man, if she appears to be in need for this then an
inequality will spring from this
Her
refusal is a kind of beautiful untruth
[20:140]
All things, if they are only known as they are, have little that is agreeable
in them; they elevate sentiment only through the fact that they appear as they
are not; all ideal gratifications are promoted through the art of illusion. If a woman could appear always as she liked,[R105]
the skill would be one to love very much; the ill therein [is] that the thing
comes [out] and the illusion disappears
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 85, at 2:245]
He who
does more than he owes is called kind insofar as he has no obligation at all to
the other, who nevertheless has nothing but obligation to him, so he is
merciful
A natural
human being can be merciful toward no one, for he has obligations to each. Nevertheless he can be merciful toward a
captured enemy.
In our
condition, when general injustice is well established, the natural rights of
the lowly cease; therefore, they alone are debtors; the nobles owe them
nothing. For this reason, these nobles
are called merciful lords. He who
requires nothing from them but [20:141] justice and can hold them to their
obligations does not need this subjection.
A
woman’s modest (civil) behavior, if
she is equal, is an obligation; female grace is kindness and must be requested,
not demanded. Therefore, noble women can
certainly be called merciful ladies, but their husbands cannot be called
merciful lords. If she is defiant and pompous,
then she passes off her obligation; if she is indifferent then she will be
treated as equal.
On
common and countrified faces
What maintains
the delusion of the inequality of status is, among other things, that the lowly
imagine this inequality themselves, on account of which a simple woman feels
lowliness with herself; she hates and her disquiet shows itself, which the
pride of the noble [breaks off]
<A
merciful lord who has no money is an absurdity, but a merciful lady without
money can certainly exist>[99]
[R106] On
the ‘he,’ ‘thou,’ and ‘you’[100]
On even
and uneven numbers
On the
youthful feeling
On the
reasons why he who pays is thanked although he does not do more give more than he gets. He merely makes money (Pope’s joke[101]
if there was no money[lxii]). For he who has money is richer than the one
who has goods because he has choice. He
who sells superfluous things (gallantry-monger,
coffee purveyor[102])
and lives on this must be more courteous than his customer, but not he who
sells necessary things, especially if he always finds a customer[103]
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 86, front side, at 2:245]
[20:142]
A married man acquires and earns more esteem than a single man and an old
confirmed bachelor.
A wife [is]
more than a maiden. A widow [is] also more
than a maiden. The reason is because the
vocation is then completed and also the other persons appear to be needy, that
is, a maiden wants to have a husband (without difficulties) but a wife never
wants to be a maiden. Moreover, the
encounter <with> a wife is looked upon as double and at the same time
just the opposite with the man
He must
know much who is supposed to teach others how to be wise with little
knowledge. It is a lot to wish for, that
this art become more refined
dumb
and wise ignorance.
The
custom of imagining the deity as like princes has brought about many false
concepts of religion, for example,
insults. The honor of God
If I
presuppose that everything in relations between the sexes [20:143] runs
inversely then there are two possibilities 1. that the maiden is abstinent but
becomes debauched as a wife, 2. that the maiden is debauched but is abstinent
as wife; the second is more in accordance with nature, the first more in
accordance with the age [R107] of propriety, for if the wife gets pregnant it
will seem every time as if her husband is the father.
Among
friends, each can talk about himself, because the other acts as though it
concerns him; among people and friends of fashion, one must not talk about
oneself (not even in books); if one wants to talk about oneself, then it must
be something that can be laughed about.
In a fashionable
society, I must regard each as exclusively egotistical, and therefore I must
praise neither those who are present nor those who are absent, and thus, so
that it be interesting, I must either joke or maliciously gossip <Malicious
gossip is based in part on the drive for equality. Ostracism. Aristides.[lxiii]>
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 87, at 2:245]
[20:144] The capacity to recognize something as
a perfection in others does not at all bring about the consequence that we ourselves
feel gratification in it. But if we have
a feeling that finds gratification in it, then we will also be moved to desire
it and apply our powers to it. Thus it
is to be asked whether we feel gratification immediately in the well-being of
another or whether the immediate pleasure actually lies in the possible
exercise of our power for promoting it.
Both are possible, but which is actual[?] Experience teaches that in a simple condition a
person regards the happiness of others with indifference, but if he assisted
it, it pleases him infinitely more. The ill-fortune
of others is commonly just as indifferent, but if I precipitated it, it hurts more
than if done by another. And concerning the
sympathetic instincts of compassion and good-naturedness, we have cause to
believe they are merely great attempts to mitigate the ill-fortune of others
stemming from the self-approbation of the soul that brings about these sentiments.
We have
gratification in certain of our perfections, but far more if we ourselves are
the cause. We have the most if we are
the freely acting cause. To subordinate everything to the free power
of choice is the greatest perfection.
And the perfection [20:145] of the free [R108] power of choice as a
cause of possibility is far greater than all other causes of the good even were
they to bring about the actuality [breaks off]
[Page 88 of Observations,
upper margin, at 2:246]
With
the French, the thought is ready sooner than those <does not mature by way of>
grounds, indeed it does not expect from them either discovery or
examination. The German seeks grounds
for all thoughts and is patient in improving [breaks off]
[under line 17, at 2:246]
The
French demand almost as much indulgence as women. Maupertius[lxiv]
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 88, front side, at 2:246]
[Latin]
<Habit>
[Latin]
action from the singular will is moral
solipsism
[Latin]
“ “
“ communal “ “ justice
The
feeling of pleasure and displeasure concerns either something with respect to
which we are passive or our self as an active principium of good and evil through freedom. The latter is moral feeling. Past physical evil aggrieves pleases us, but moral evil grieves us, and
it is a completely different kind of joy about the good that devolves upon us
and that which we do.
We have
little feeling for the condition of another, be it evil or good, except insofar
as we feel powerful to improve the former and promote the latter. Sympathy is an instinct that works only on
rare and important occasions, its other effects are contrived.
[R109] Because
the greatest inner perfection and the perfection that arises from that consists
in the subordination of all of our capacities and susceptibilities to the free power
of choice, the feeling for the goodness[104]
of the free power of choice must be immediately much different from and also
larger than all the good consequences that can be actualized through it.
This power
of choice contains either
<the mere> individual will as well as the universal will, or it considers
the person together in harmony[105]
with the universal will.
That
which is necessary through the universal will is an obligation
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 89, at 2:246]
Because
the human being of nature requires so little and the more he requires (needy[106])
the more miserable he is, the human being is perfect insofar as he can do
without; insofar as he still has many powers left to promote the needs and happiness
of others, he
is
he
has a feeling of a will that is beneficient beyond himself. Because the power of choice, insofar as it is
useful to the acting subject, is physically necessary with respect to pressing
need, it has no immediate goodness.
Hence, the moral goodness of action is unselfish
In the condition
of nature, one cannot be selfish, but neither can one be altruistic, but
friendships are possible
Adolescence
is more open to friendship because it is more unselfish, more participatory,
more <benevolent>, and more sincere than the later [ages]
[20:147]
On happiness in all ages of people. Youthful
inconstancy prevents
and disquiet prevent
many gratifications. The old person has
fewer lively inclinations, but the peaceful ones satisfy him. Yet we must not exchange the positions of
life
[R110] One
already has a biased attitude towards a nation that has a single language. Prussian Livonians.[lxv] Likewise the utter diversity of language
makes national hate. But, if the language of the populace comes
close to a language of the ruling tongue, it creates contempt. But all of this [is] still a long way off.
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 90, front side, at 2:247]
[Latin]
The inner sense of pleasure and
displeasure precede appetite and aversion, because the receptivity to enjoyment
or aversion lies in the subject, yet the subject may still be unaware of this
sense, as there is no desire for something unknown. Desire is either original or derived, the former is also different in
regard to quality. The inner sense, if
it is admitted as a logical principal for approval of the moral law, is an
occult quality; if it is admitted as a faculty of the soul, whose ground is
unknown, it is a phenomenon
[20:148]
A pactum[107]
is not possible between a domino[108]
and mancipio.[109] God enters into a bond with humans because they
have no sufficient, practical concept
of his dominio and so that they be
led through analogy with the pacto among humans and not abhor commanding severity
A
virtuous action is always an ethically good action that occurs reluctantly or
at least has occurred
[Latin]
Every conditional goodness of an action
is either under a possible condition (as in the problematic) or an actual condition
( as in accordance with the rules of prudence, every person wants to be healthy). But in mediated or conditional goodness willing
absolutely is not good apart from the powers
and the circumstances of time and place.
And in such a case, while the will is effective, it is a good, but if this
goodness is to be considered even with respect to the will alone then even if
the powers might be lacking, the will is nevertheless praiseworthy. In great things, to have willed is
enough. And this absolute perfection, where
it is indeterminate whether or not something is realized by it, is called
moral.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 91, at 2:247]
<The
wife can do without much more in regard to the gratification of needs than in regard
to vanity>
[R111] [20:149]
Equilibrium of sensation is the soul at peace.
This smooth surface will only be roused to indignation through
passions. It is a primary ground of happiness
not only to feel agreeable, but also to be conscious of one’s entire condition,
which is hindered <by> strong sensation
The
natural person is spared this disquiet through lack of feeling
Sufficiency* with respect to needs is called
simplicity. Insofar as the agreeablenesses
themselves are counted among needs it is partly beautiful and partly noble
simplicity.
Where superfluity
with respect to needs combined with the effort to produce agreeablenesses becomes
manifest, that is contrived; with respect to the beautiful [it is] adorned [and]
decorated; with respect to the sublime [it is] magnificent [and] grandiose.
Taste does not concern needs, but it must not
hinder them, as in the case of pomp.
Regularity
is consistent with simplicity, for if the rule does not determine the kind of
connection, it would be so contingent and indeterminate that it would also
contradict needs. For example, symmetry. Pairwise succession. Thus, in those things that are united
together, it determines their end.
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 92, front side, at 2:248]
[Latin]
The objective goodness of a free action [R112]
<simultaneously is subjective in God>[110]
or, what is the same, the objective necessity, is either conditional or
categorical. The former is goodness of
an action as a means,[111]
the latter [20:150] as an end; hence the former is mediated, the latter is unmediated;
the former contains a practical, problematic necessity, the latter, etc.
[Latin]
A conditioned, free, good action is not
for that reason a categorical necessity, e.g., my liberality to another person
who is destitute is useful, and thus one ought to be liberal. By no means.
But if someone wants to be useful to another, he will have to be
liberal. If, however, an action of genuine
liberality is not only good for another but good in itself, then it is an
obligation.
[Latin]
About moral sense and the possibility of
the opposite.
[Latin]
Indeed providence has so connected moral sense
to public and universal utility but also to private advantage that the goodness
of the will is not esteemed as highly as it is worthy of being.
When I
say that this action will bring me more honor than the other, I mean that I
appeal to the universal judgment so that the judgment that I pass on my own
action is grounded in that.
Disputes
in world-wisdom[112]
have the utility of [20:151] promoting the freedom of understanding and arousing
mistrust towards the system that was supposed to have been built upon the ruins
of another. In refutation, one is still so
lucky [breaks off]
In most
languages simplicity and stupidity mean pretty much the same thing. That is because a person of simplicity is
easily deceived by a person of artifice whom he considers to be as honorable as
himself
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 93, at 2:248]
One
always talks so much about virtue. However
one must first abolish injustice before one can become virtuous. One must remove conveniences, luxury and
everything else that oppresses others while it elevates me, so that I am not
one of all those who oppress their own race.[113] All virtue is impossible without this resolve.
All
virtue is based on ideal feeling. Hence
in a state of luxury no virtue will be encountered in a person who has purely
physical feeling; in the state of nature, however, simplicity in plain sentiment
and simplicity in ethics coexist completely
[R113] [20:152]
Where the lengths of days <throughout the year> are more equal, there one
is it
serves more orderly,
thus in
It is
funny that luxury makes the estates poor, especially the princes
The
misery of people is not to be pitied, but to be laughed at: Democritus[lxvi]
Swift’s
linen weaver, etc.[lxvii]
Among
all vanities the most common is that one wants to appear to be happy; hence one
would rather admit pretend that one does not want to do
something good (for example, marriage serves the commonweal) than that one
cannot do it, because the person who does without something or refrains from
doing it purely with his will is happy insofar as he has sufficient capacity to
satisfy his desires
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 94, front side, at 2:249]
[20:153]
We can see other worlds in the distance, but gravity forces us to remain on
earth; we can see still more perfections of spirit above us, but our nature
forces us to remain human beings.
Because
in society all Mine and Yours depends on contracts,[114]
but these depend on keeping one’s word; a love of truth is the foundation[115]
of all social virtue and lies are the main vices against others along with
robbery, murder, and rape[116]
If
people subordinate morality to
religion (which is also only possible and necessary for the oppressed rabble)
they will thereby become hostile, hypocritical, [and] slanderous; but if they
subordinate religion to morality,
then they are kind, benevolent and just
[R114] <All
choice must have to do with future taste>
True
marriage in its perfection, poeticized marriage in its perfection. Perfect happiness, peace
The
human being in his perfection is not in the state of simplicity [and]
is also not in the sufficiency,
likewise not in the state of luxury; instead he is returning from the latter
state to the former. Remarkable constitution
of human nature. This most perfect state
rests on the tip of a hair; the state of nature can of simple and original nature does not
last long; the state of re-established nature is more lasting but never as
innocent.
very
social women do not blush anymore, and if they are untrue they blush still less
than men; the scatter-brain[117]
who doesn’t blush
A great
proof of luxury is that entire states are now becoming poorer and poorer. National guilt. Standing armies
[20:154]
All amusements intoxicate, that is, prevent one from feeling the entire sum of happiness
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 95, at 2:249]
It is
to be asked whether all of morality could be derived from the soul at peace;
with natural human beings [this is] readily understood. Delights and debauches are opposed to
peace. The sexual inclination finds its
peace only in marriage. To offend others
disquiets oneself. Affects in general disquiet one.
It is horrible that according to this morality no other person has any utility*
Religion
determines the Jewish way of life. For
since they at always fear being forced by another, they abhor every way of life
in which they would not have enough freedom to avoid this. For this reason they do not till the ground
[R115] [20:155]
In flourishing countries the landlords and workers are polite and seek to
serve, whereas the customers and guests are domineering, and there is, so to
speak, more diligence than money, that is, even money has an inner principium of increase. In poor countries there is still more money
than diligence.
In rich
lands the merchants (en detail[119])
are cool-headed and it is the the customer is fair without haggling because there is just
as much merchandise as money; in poor [lands] there is more merchandise than
money and the merchants are servile
[Page 95 of Observations
p. , lower margin]
In all
nations, the custom of drinking among men ceased as soon as social gatherings were
adorned with women. The Greeks drank;
the old Germans [and] Prussians. The English still drink because the women are
separated. That would still be good with
certain women. Our lifestyle is nowadays
as it were Arcadian;[lxviii]
one always has society and love and game to entertain. But black sorrow, discord and tedium dominate
at home
[Sheet inserted at Observations
p. 96, front side, at 2:250]
Why an
old woman is an object of disgust for both sexes except when she is very pure
and not coquettish
[Latin]
The necessity of actions <objective (goodness)>
is either conditional (under the condition of some desired good) or
categorical. The former is problematic
and, if the desires that are seen as necessary conditions of action are seen as
not only possible but actual, this is a necessity of prudence. In order to know this, it will be necessary
to diagnose all of the drives and instincts of the human soul so that a
computation may be made about what is better for the inclination of the subject. And this indeed not only for the present, but
also for the future state. The
categorical necessity of an action does not depend on so much effort, but only on
the application of the deed to moral feeling.
In certain situations in life a lie can
be exceedingly useful, and thus [20:156] lying will be in accordance with the
rule of prudence, but for this, extensive astuteness and a shrewdness for the
consequences is required. If one
considers it morally, on the basis of moral simplicity, it will be immediately
known what one should do.
As much as false testimony might sometimes
be useful to others, it is still a lie if no strict obligation necessitates
it. From this, one can see that
truthfulness does not depend on philanthropy, but on the sense of justice,
through which we learn to carefully distinguish what is just. This sense, however, has its origin in the
nature of the human mind, through which one judges what is categorically good
(not useful), not by private benefit or benefit to others, but through supposing
the same action in others; if a contradiction and contrast then arises, it
displeases; if harmony and unison arise, they please. Hence the ability to put oneself in the place
of others as a heuristic means. Indeed we
are by nature social and could not sincerely approve in ourselves of what we
criticize in others. The common sense of
true and false is indeed nothing other than human reason taken generally as the
criterion of true and false, and the common sense of good and evil is the
criterion of that. Opposing minds would have
cancelled out logical certainty, opposing hearts, moral certainty.
[20:157] The goodness of the will is
removed from the effects of private or public use and the immediate inclination
for them, and the former has its basis in need, the latter in the power for the
good; the former relates to one’s own
benefit, the latter to the general benefi;, both feelings are concordant with
natural simplicity. But the goodness of
the will as that of a free principle can be recognized not insofar as these
utilities arise out of it, but insofar as it is good in itself. And the happiness of others in accordance
with reason . . . [breaks
off]
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 97, at 2:250]
Obligation
<naturally toward people> has a determinate measure, the duty of love has
none. The former consists in nothing
more being done than what I would have another do to me and in my giving him
only what is his; [R117] consequently, in accordance with such an action, everything
is equal (sympathy is excepted from this.)
If I
promise something to him, then I am robbing him of something, for I have created
a hope that I cannot fulfill. If he is
hungry and I do not help him, then I have not violated any obligation. But if I should, in the case in which I
myself were hungry, desire to get things from others only on the condition of giving it in return, then
it is [20:158] an obligation to also satisfy him with food. I A
robber certainly wishes that he might be pardoned,
but knows well that he would not pardon himself if he were a judge. The judge punishes even if he knows that if
he were [a] delinquent[120]
he would not want to be punished, but detained with punishment it is different, the
deprivation of life does not occur through the judge, but through the criminal,
on account of his misdeed. No one in a
time of need can imagine that, were he a rich man, he would help every needy
person
[Latin]
In the first condition of the human being,
his obedience was that of a slave, after that a subject, then a son; the
law-giving power was that of a master, prince, father.
Whoever binds slaves to himself as master
<despot>, sets only punishment as incentives, the prince who has subjects
bound to him (legitimately) sets rewards and punishments as incentives, the
father sets only love and rewards [as incentives] for his son. The basis of obligation is natural slavery
and guilt in the first case, the second contains a moral basis of a contract, the
third includes everything previous and at the same time an internal morality.
Christ
tried to bring people to a simple sufficiency through religion, in which he presented to them the glory of heaven; his
speeches could only produce perverted concepts among the Jews because they all
along only founded their religion on empty concepts and also built these
concepts on no other condition than
the recovery of their kingdom
All
truthfulness presumes an idea of equality; hence the Jews who in their opinion
have no duty at all to others are lying and deceiving without having any pangs
of conscience. [Latin] Heretics are not faithful
[R 118] [Page 98 of Observations,
upper margin, at 2:250]
Honor
cannot be a basic impulse because it would depend on the opinion of others;
when drinking and fighting (dueling)
is the fashion, one who does them is justified[121]
[Sheet inserted after Observations
98, front side, at 2:250]
Women
are much more domestic by nature than men because they [20:159] have children
to suckle. Our gallant wives who don’t have any [children] and our maidens who
know that they will never nurse are not domestic because it is not
necessary. Their beautiful natural
aptitude for clean housekeeping and for caring for a sick person, even if for
more thrifty use of what has been acquired [breaks off]
Manly
dignity and womanly grace are lost in society.
Mademoiselle Montagu[lxix]
Authors
seem to be profound when they dispel all wit, just as crude people seem to be
honorable
Just as
one deceives oneself through the illusion of wealth, so a woman at last believes
herself to actually have those virtues to the illusion of which she has devoted
herself from the beginning.
Duels orig[122]
It
takes more to be good as a common person than to be a good prince. If he is merely not exceptionally evil, then he
is already good for that.
[20:160] The young person full of sentiment, no
matter how much sense he has, will easily be persuaded by womanly illusion and
wants to be beguiled; he is seriously submissive and meek. The experienced and sharp-sighted wanton has
longest had insight into the mirage of illusion; for this reason he is bold, unabashed,
and, because he has excused the other sex from being coerced into being
scrupulous about decency, it is agreeable to him.
[R119] Duels have their true origin in the time
of gallantry from the inclinations of
women, for with common courtship the beauty picks out the most courageous one
and triumphs over her rivals in love so that thereby her lover is frightful to
her [rivals] . With insults that befall
her, he cannot maintain her appearance other than through courageousness.
Who wants
the women to grasp propriety
It
seems to me that Epicurus is
different from Zeno in that the
former imagined the virtuous soul at peace after having overcome moral hindrances,
but the latter imagined it in the struggle and effort to prevail [over such
hindrances] . Antisthenes never had such an elevated idea; he desired that one
should reflect only on vain ostentation and false happiness and choose to be a
simpler man rather than a great one[123][lxx]
[Back side, opposite Observations p. 99, at 2:251]
[Latin]
As long as a controllable object obeys my
will, it is mine, but I can transfer my will to another.
Obligation
is communal selfishness in aequilibrio [124]
[Latin]
Duty is either of benevolence discretionary or of duty. The former actions are morally [20:161] spontaneous,
the latter are morally compelled. (This differs
from political compulsion.) The will is
either the individual will of the person or the universal will of humankind.
the obligation
from the community of people
[Latin]
(Anything necessary is from the individual
good will of a person or from the universal [will] .)
<Right [and] wrong. >
Should
an action considered according to the universal human will contradict itself, it
is externally morally impossible (impermissible). Suppose that I am going to take the fruits
possessed[125]
by another. Then if I see that no person
will want to acquire [anything] under the condition that what he has acquired
will be snatched away from him, I will just privately want that which belongs
to another, while publicly refusing it.
As far as something depends entirely on
the will of a subject, so far is it impossible that it contradict itself
(objectively). The divine will, however,
would contradict itself if it willed that there to be human beings whose will was
opposed to its own will. The human will
would contradict itself if it willed what is in contradiction to the universal
will. In the case of a collision, however,
the universal will is weightier than the individual will.
[20:162]
The <hypothetical>
<conditional> necessity of an action as means to a possible end is problematic, [as a means] to an actual
end it is a <categorical> necessity of prudence, the categorical necessity is moral.
Making
a station belongs to morality; first, in the judgment of
others about the deed (from which, if it is an instinct, ambition originates
and goes farther than the means for determining legitimacy); secondly, in judgment the sentiment of others, so that one
senses their hardship or happiness (hence moral sympathy arises as an instinct)
The
origin of the love of honor regarding the beauty of actions therefore lies in a
wicked-minded means of managing one’s own morality, which falsely becomes an end
The
origin of the love of honor regarding the judgment of physical characteristics
lies in the means to freedom, self-preservation, and style.
[Page 99 of Observations,
lower margin, at 2:251]
To
compare oneself to others is a means of making comparative greatness or worth
one’s aim, [but this] is perverted and is the origin of envy
[R121] Bravery
is only a means; the savage values it as an end.
In the
end, honor can be placed in drinking and vice
[Page 100 of Observations,
upper margin, at 2:251]
The man
and the woman do not have the same sentiment
and also should not have it, but even from this arises unity, not the identity but the subordination of inclinations, since each feels that the other is
necessary to him for the greatest perfection.
Friendship presumes concordant sentiments[126]
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 100, front side, at 2:251]
In the
case of great corruption in ethics, maidens remain chaste and the wives become debauched
because the latter act solely against obligation, while the former act against propriety
<It
is already honor to not be despised.>
[20:163]
The
drive to I require
things or also people. Honor is either
indirect or direct. In the first case,
it is a drive for enjoyment; in the second, for illusion. In the first case, the imaginary needs to which the honor is a means are
either true or imaginary, and the former either in natural or unnat degenerate
conditions. Needs in natural conditions
for things <to be procured> do not require honor (because every person
can procure them himself), but in order to preserve them and oneself, they
demand that others have an opinion of our equality so that our freedom is not
injured, since we are able to seek our needs as we please. People’s natural need of acquisition is a woman. For
this, he has need of the opinion not of preference over but of equality with
other men, and also easily acquires this.
In both cases, however, the person will raise the drive for real honor
above equality, partly so that freedom be more assured, partly because he
begins to prefer one woman to the others, so that she also prefers him. Finally, in the state of excess <inequality>, the [R122] drive for
honor is either that of true need or of [20:164] artificial one. In
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 101, at 2:252]
Voluntary Slavery is either that of force of that of blindness. The
latter is based on either dependency on things (luxury), or on the delusions of
other people (vanity). The latter is more
absurd and also harder than the former because things are much more in my own power
than are the opinions of others, and it is also more despicable
The
loss of freedom is grounded on either dependency or subservience. In the first case one is ruled by means of
his inclination (either for things or for people, as [20:165] in love,
friendship, and parental love) or contrary to his inclination. The former is a consequence of weak luxury,
while the latter is a consequence of dreadful cowardice and is a consequence of
the former
The drive
for honor with respect to one’s sex also becomes pure delusion in the end. And marriage, which should promote
self-preservation, promotes this pure delusion, and vanity is a cause of remaining
unmarried
With a woman,
the drive for honor is erected solely
solely upon the sexual union and mediates that by means of needs, because she must
be sought; since this is not necessary with men, they will only be attracted
through commerce and, therefore, can sooner be resolved to the lack of honor
That
which proves the fantastical nature
of love quite well is that one loves the beloved object more in its absence
than in its presence; it is different with friendship.
[Page 102 of Observations,
upper margin]
The drive
for honor is grounded on the drive for equality and the drive for unity. As it were, two powers that move the animal
world. The instinct for unity is either
in judgments and thoughts or also in inclinations. The former brings about logical perfection,
the latter moral perfection.
[left margin, at 2:252]
The
single, naturally necessary good of a person in relation to the wills of others
is equality (freedom) and, with respect
to the whole, unity. Analogy: Repulsion,
through which the body fills its own space just as every other fills its
own. Attraction, through which all parts
combine into one.
[20:166] The truth of a perfection consists in
the magnitude of the pleasure that is not exclusive with regard to itself and
other greater ones. If falsity could be
lasting and more gratifying than truth, then the pleasure from this deception
would be a true pleasure, though a false cognition
[lower margin, at 2:252]
The natural
instincts of active benevolence toward others consist in love towards the
opposite sex and toward children. That
toward other people depends purely on equality and unity
There is
unity in the sovereign[129]
state but not equality; if the latter is combined with unity of all, then it constitutes the perfect republic.
[Sheet inserted at Observations
p. 102, front side, at 2:252]
[R124] The
drive to evaluate oneself merely comparatively, with respect to one’s worth as well
as one’s welfare, is far more extensive than the drive for honor, and contains
the latter within itself. It does not lie
in nature and is an indirect result of the practice of knowing the means of
one’s own condition better through comparison with others. Ambition, which is a spur of science, arises
from the comparison of our judgment with the judgment of others as a means, and
thus presupposes esteem for the judgment of others
The
Indians are remarkably calm and not violent
The
South Americans are remarkably indifferent and phlegmatic
The
Negroes are very careless and vain
The
Europeans are remarkably lively and hot-tempered
The affects of the Indians are nevertheless
still stronger than the Europeans’.
A
reason why Montesquieu was able to say so many admirable things is that he
presupposed that those who would introduce customs [20:167] or give laws always
had a reasonable ground[lxxi]
The
main intention of Rousseau is that education be free and also make a free human
being.
A woman
does not like to give away, in contrast, she takes. No one knows contentment; everyone asserts delightfulness
in its place. <Golden rain in the lap
of Danae. Jupiter a bull. Alcmene was faithful in Amphitryon>[lxxii]
How
education helps public policy is to be seen from the fact that the former makes
many goods, e.g., silk [and] gold, entirely unnecessary, whereas the latter
prohibits them in vain because it only offends thereby
[R125] A
woman loves less affectionately than a man or else she would not assume rule
over him and obviously would demand
prefer him to herself. She is also aware
that she bears more affection if the man does not have this refined sensation,
so then he is called coarse and hard by her
Marriage
gives no ideal gratification other than sympathy
Illusion
is sometimes better than truth, for the [20:168] gratification from the former
is a true gratification. Make-up: if one
knows it, then it is no longer a deception.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 103, at 2:253]
Living
long and little or short and much living
Much living
in enjoying or in acting
Both in
the greatest proportion [are] the best.
That the
capacity for living decreases from the 16th year
It is
to be noted that we do not value the goodness[130]
of an action because it is useful to another, otherwise we would not value it more
highly than the usefulness than it creates.
The moral
feeling applied to one’s own actions
is conscience
[20:169]
de stationibus: Physicis the moon is occupied
Logicis the
absence of: egoism
Moralibus the absence of: solipsism
[Latin]
To morally put oneself in the place of
another happens either through instinct, sympathy or pity. Or through intellect.
[R126] Magnetic
force is probably based on the dissimilarity (diverse specific gravity) of ethereal material of which iron is
full (the earth is full of iron), whereby the heavier things sink to the bottom
Hence
the magnetic quality appears more in length, e.g., more if a clump of iron is
long and vertical than if it is thick and short, precisely because the quantity of ether there must make a
greater difference to the thickness. One
can assume that the little clumps that have negative
and positive poles are small.
[Sheet inserted after Observations p. 104, front side, at 2:253]
Electricity
consists of parts that have been rubbed off; magnetism does not. Hence the latter is penetrating and works in
accordance with the mass; the former does not.
[20:170]
The two equivalent poles repel each other because two elastic spheres of ether
of similar thickness push them, but the two non-equivalent poles, because one
is of a lighter kind (according to the elements themselves, not purely by rarefaction), will be engulfed by
each other and the magnet will be attracted
The
needle sinks with its heavy end in the universal magnetic atmosphere and the
other end rises
The
sensitive soul at peace, in faces, in societies, in eloquence
Poetry
in marriages and sexual desire[131]
The
difference of the sexes
Blessedness
and cheerfulness
Perhaps
the moon, by affecting the electrical (refringing)[lxxiii]
material that extends so much higher, causes the winds and the ebb and flow
Perhaps
it is the compressed atmosphere itself from the Centro of gravity[132]
of the heavens to the Centro of the
earth
[R127] [20:171]
Thoughtlessness[134] (insipid boldness) rises above the
effort of appearing[135]
and expresses only a certain high-spirited dependability with respect to that
which can please. The petit maitre is a scatter-brain[136]
who is gallant, but he must appear to
be known by many in the great world. He has
good luck with women. The Germans travel
to
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 105, at 2:254]
Were the I suppose magnetic matter to be a sphere of nonhomogeneous
ether that yet in its expanse contains all species, one beneath the other [20:172]
, although the thicker parts are nearer to the Centrum of the earth, the
lighter parts above. If this atmosphere were to have a joint Centrum with the earth, then no direction toward the poles would take
place; were its Centrum in the axis, then no declination would take place.
For, since because the intersection of the horizons
of two spheres is a circle, to which the needle must stand perpendicularly, if
they should sink as far as possible into the magnetic circle[138],
while all these compasses run parallel with the equator, then the needles will hold the meridian.
If this
Centrum is not in the axis, then only
the same linea expers variationis[139]
is there where the meridian of the earth coincides with the magnetic meridian.[140] It Now,
because the axis magnetic axis lies on such a plane with
the earth’s axis that the meridian that goes through the earth’s poles also goes
through the magnetic poles, the linea
expers variationis would be at all times a meridian. Now, should it not be a meridian, then the
magnetic horizon must be spherical or else irregular, in that case, however,
the magnetic attractions must not [R127] aim at the Centro of the magnetic spheroid, but instead diverge from it. Suppose that this oblateness comes from the
centrifugal force of the earth, then the size of the divergence from the
magnetic Centro will suppress the
divergence from the Centro of the
earth in proportion to the strength of the conducted magnetic force. Therefore, the magnetic horizon can be bent
very differently and not only the inclination,
but also the declination can be quite
manifold
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 106, front side, at 2:254]
Moral
delusion happens when one takes the opinion of a possible moral perfection for
an actual one.
We have
selfish and altruistic sentiments. The
former are older than the latter and the latter are generated first in the
sexual inclination. A human being is
needy but also powerful over needs. [20:173] He who is in the state of nature is more
capable of altruistic and active sentiments, one in a state of luxury has
imaginary needs and is selfish. One
takes more interest in the ill that others suffer, especially the injustice
that they suffer, than in welfare. The
sympathetic sentiment is true if it is equal to the altruistic powers,
otherwise it is chimerical.[141]
It is universal in an indeterminate way
as long as it is extended to one out of all those I can help, or in a
determinate way if it is extended to help every sufferer; the latter is
chimerical. Kind-heartedness originates
through the culture of moral but
inactive sentiment and is a moral delusion.
On the negat
private kind-heartedness to do no evil and the justice of doing one’s
obligation
The
morality that wants nothing but genuine unselfishness is chimerical, also the
one that is sympathetic to imagined needs.
The morality that affirms self-interest alone is crude
The duties of benevolence[142] could never bring about that one would
rob himself of his own needs, but surely the duties of obligation[143]
could, for these are moral needs
[R129] [20:174]
Virtue carries along with it a natural wage, although not for goods of luxury,
but for goods of sufficiency
One can
think of a perfect person of nature, but not one of art
The
former takes care to impose some obligations on himself. And also the latter
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 107, at 2:255]
The
sweetness of present need is chimerical
Friendship
of agreeableness or of need. They must be similar, otherwise it is not called
friendship, but enjoyment
Friendship
is always mutual, hence not between father and child and, since the wife never
desires the man as much as the latter does her, marriage is only closely
related to the most perfect friendship.
In the
state of luxury, marriages must cease to become friendships.
The
friendship of delusion that consists of mutual, good wishes [20:175] without
effect is foolish but beautiful, that of convivial friendliness and harmonious
sentiments is the most common, but such a person is a socializer, [144]
perhaps open-hearted and reticent but no friend.
The
education of Rousseau is the only means to aid the flourishing of civil society
again. For since luxury always increases
more where need, oppression, contempt for position, and war arise, the laws can
accomplish nothing against it, as in
[R130] The
doubt that I assume is not dogmatic, but a doubt of postponement. Zetetics[145]
(ζητεîν) searcher.
I will advance the grounds of both sides. It is amazing that one be concerned about
danger from that. Speculation is not a matter
of pressing need. Knowledge with respect
to the latter is certain. The method of
doubt is useful in that it preserves
the mind, not to act upon speculation, but upon healthy understanding and sentiment. I seek the honor of Fabius Cunctator.[lxxv]
Truth
has no value in itself, it is all the same whether an opinion about the habitation
of many worlds is true or false. One
must not confuse it with truthfulness.
Only the manner in which one arrives at truth has a determinate worth,
because that which leads to error can also do so in practical matters
If
gratification from the sciences should be the motive, then it is all the same
whether it is true or false. In this, the
ignorant and precocious have an advantage over the reasonable and
cautious. The final end is to find the
vocation of humanity
[Page 107 of Observations,
lower margin, at 2:255]
[20:176] The opinion of inequality also makes
people unequal. Only the doctrine of Mr.
Rousseau can make it so that even the
most learned philosopher with his knowledge, honestly and without the help of
religion, does not regard himself as better than the common man
[Sheet inserted after Observations
p. 108, front side, at 2:255]
What a
miserable condition it is when oppression is so universal and commonplace that
an industrious and honest person cannot demand merely justice, but instead must
invoke mercy. The more we fail to
recognize our obligations, if we are not yet entirely corrupted, the more favors
remain for us; we mostly neglect the obligations toward some and give gifts to
others.
[R131] In
order to make up for the weakness of women in the active characteristics,
nature has made men weak insofar as they surrender themselves to illusion and
let themselves be easily deceived. The
man is inclined to form great conceptions of a beloved object and as it were to
feel unworthy of them. Yet the woman
commonly imagines herself worthy of courtship and makes no fantastical ideas of
the eminence of the man. They soon
believe that they are able to command the heart of the man. The man is inclined to value his wife or his beloved
higher than himself, the wife never. [20:177] If one merely considers the aims
of the sexes, then the wife evidently governs and is more clever. The generous person believes more easily than
the selfish and weak person.
The Gallantry (of men) is the art of appearing
to be in love.[146] For women, coquetterie is the art of making an illusion of their inclination
to conquer. Both are ridiculous in
marriages. If the wife and
husband Propriety is the
art of appearing virtuous and especially of appearing chaste; modesty, refined
and selective in taste, coyness, appearing affable, politesse[147],
refinement. If
this The people who
understand this art best make the worst marriages
If
illusion of
marriage is employed for
the purpose of marriage, then it is still good; if it lasts after marriage,
then it is quite ridiculous. Indeed, men
demand such women, who, as they say, do them credit, who are sought after, who one
would gladly like to withdraw from them.
[Back side, opposite Observations
p. 109, at 2:255]
[Latin] There is a
strict duty toward the Lord from obedience <reverence>, toward the
benefactor from love; in the new covenant one can love God, in the old covenant
one can revere him.
[20:178]
Bodies are either positive, transparent, or negative
(reflective), or zero (black). All
bodies on the surfaces are both at the same time, especially little membranes.
The
little membranes of iron magnets have this characteristic and pull in whole
clumps with their different poles.
Electrical bodies only have it on the surface
[R132] <With
women, book-reading occurs in order to seem learned>
<The
marriage that has no illusion has honesty likewise>
[Latin]
While right is the sum of the common
obligations of duty, the disposition of actions with right that are
decided on the basis of right is justice, which is either of what is obligating
(active) or of what is obligated (passive).
The former necessitates the actions of others, but not if they do not
correspond to right, [and] only so long as and to the extent that they promote
the basis of right. The latter is the disposition to action to one’s own action requires actions of another in
conformity with the strength of insofar as <insofar as they are>
necessitated for reasons of right. The
latter of determining oneself from the law is the disposition to determine
oneself to actions that are are necessitated by others for reasons of
right: … both can be from If the
disposition of actions is adequate to justice, then the former will be strict
justice, the latter -- -- -- [breaks
off]
[Latin]
The disposition of actions of
duties that oversteps the boundaries of active justice [is] Equity, such as of passive justice.[148]
Predisposition[149]
<The
illusion of friendship. Aristotle[lxxvi];
[20:179] if we wake, then we have mundum
communem[150]>
[Latin]
The sentence with regard to civil law:
the greatest right, the greatest wrong.
It is true as concerns the civilian, not the judge.[151]
<A
young groom is thus not good because he has not yet considered the falsity of
illusion>
Hume
means that priests very much practice the art of illusion.[lxxvii] Truth adapts itself only to the robe, to the
formal habit,[152]
to the illusion. All kinds of illusion in clothes. Make-up.
Alexander v. Antipater:
purple interior[lxxviii]
Envy
ceases when I can wipe away the illusory appearance of the other’s happiness
and perfection
[R133] On
the means of imagining a president or dignified man with his wife
[Page 110 of Observations,
upper margin, at 2:256]
The
most perfect wife. Reasonable and brave,
rational when she is willingly exempt from ratiocination. <Clever, wise – witty, refined> The
exemption from domestic business makes foolish women <gallant.> Foolish women.
He who
knows how to satisfy his desires is clever; he who knows how to rule them is
wise. World-wisdom[153]
[left margin, at lines 21-28]
Costs
and expenses.[154] They are expenses if one can have the
gratification [20:180] of money or of work and thus also forfeits them. The miser has the greatest expenses; he who knows
how to live, even with the expenditure of all money, has the greatest
profit. Also avaricious. to spend it every time for his contentment
(not delightfulness).[155]
[lower margin, between the text and the closing vignette]
Just as
the size of a person cannot grow above average without his becoming weaker and
also cannot remain below average without his being too weak, so it is with the ethical
and graceful characteristics
[lower margin, under the vignette]
Greek
Roman face. Characters of nations in company: the Spanish, French,
Germans, [and] English
That
our youths and men are[156]
still so childish is because they did not have enough permission to be children
earlier. Just so, the trees whose
blossoms were not properly allowed to break out in the spring bloom in [R134] the
fall
[Inside of the back cover]
Simplicity
is either that which is ignorant or that which is rational and wise
In all
moral definitions, the expression mean[157]
is quite wretched and indefinite, e.g., in
parsimony, for it indicates only that there is a degree that is not good by
reason of the size without saying how large the good must therefore be
This golden mean[158]
is an occult quality
Difference
between: he knows how to appear or he knows how to live.
[20:181]
One could say that metaphysics is a science of the limits of human reason
Metaphysical
doubt does not annul useful certainty, but only useless certainty
Metaphysics
is useful in that it puts an end to the illusion that can be harmful
In
metaphysics, not to think of the opposite side is partiality, and not saying it
is also a lie; in actions it is otherwise
One merely
falls in love with illusion, but one loves truth
If one
should reveal most people’s illusion, then they would seem like every bride of
whom it is said that she takes off her pretty, silken eyebrows, a pair of ivory
teeth, some cloth that supported her bosom, and excellent ringlets and has
wiped off her make-up for her confounded lover
Illusion
requires refinement and art, truth requires simplicity and peace. According to Swift, everything in the world
is clothes[lxxix]
What is
most ridiculous is this: that one creates illusion toward others for so long
that one himself imagines it to be true; children do the same with religion. Illusion, when the one for whom it is intended takes it as the thing itself,
is delusion.[159]
The
illusion that the woman intends as a
means to the attainment of marital love is no delusion, but [it] surely is in
any other case. On the art of making
easy things difficult
[20:183]
Loose Leaves
to
the
Observations
on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime
Women’s inclination to
novels perhaps comes from the fact that they wish that love were the sole
inclination by which men are ruled.
Just as the greatest superabundance
that arises from free government ultimately amounts to casting off everything
into slavery and eventually poverty, so does the unnatural freedom of the female sex and the agreeableness that they
enjoy and impart through it at last amount to making them downright despicable
and, in the end, making them into slaves.
Mr. Hume believes that
a woman who has no knowledge of the history of her fatherland or of
The woman, because she
always wants to rule, accepts a fool without reservation.
The valiant wife wants
to be honored through her husband, the vain wife would not ask for this honor
but wants to be striking herself. The coquette has the intention of influencing
inclinations, although she has none herself, it is merely a game of vanity.
All inclinations are
either exclusive or sympathetic. The
former are selfish, the latter are altruistic.
However, self-love and self-esteem are not exclusive according to their
nature; but egoism and self-conceit are.
In accordance with the law of nature, female love is exclusive with
respect to other men. The purely lustful
drive or the lover’s rage can even be exclusive [20:184] with respect to the
object of love, hence rape, Herod, etc.[lxxxi] The immediate drive for honor is exclusive
with respect to honor. The
characteristic of the mind that exclusively desires everything in objects,
where this drive is not justified by nature, is called envy. Envy is a kind of pain. But emulation, a sadness about inequality, can
only concern an imagined inequality; incidentally, it is then only a perverted
application of a good law of nature. The
drives that are sympathetic are the best: only in sexual impulses must sympathy
concern only the object of the amorous inclination.
Women’s refusals are
an irresistible drive for illusion, men who have not yet become extremely
wanton have the characteristic of being very easily deceived by this illusion, this
relation holds the strength of the opposing inclination within its bounds.
The ethical condition,
if the taste for a great number of feigned gratifications and attractions is
missing, is simplicity; that which is acquired by way of this taste is virtue,
heroic virtue however has to do with overcoming needs. Thus, one can be good without virtue. Correct judgment, which is acquired through
experience that depends on needs, is understanding; if the taste for many
things increases and magnifies the manifoldness of concerns, then reason,
indeed even refined reason, is necessary.
But the healthy reason is that fine reason, which returns to what is
necessary to judge and know. One can be
very reasonable without much fineness of reason.
Simple taste readily
degenerates, and ethical simplicity, from lack of knowledge of seductive charm,
is easily deceived; hence it is the greatest perfection
That wife who has
acquired no special taste for all sorts of distractions, gallantries, and vanities can be good without virtue and reasonable
without brooding. If she is pulled from the
midst [20:185] and out of the seat of this fine gratification, then thousands
of enticements affect her and she requires virtue to be a good wife.
In domestic life, one who
is spirited, good-hearted, and peaceful in company does not need books and
ratiocination, but if so much refined taste, concupiscence, and fashion is
acquired, then reason is required in order to prevent one from becoming a
foolish woman.
The most perfect wife
would be she who knows the various fine delights of life, manners [and] gallantry
in her lovely charms, and has taste, but willingly prepares herself for
domesticity and simplicity by way of reasoning insight into their uselessness
and knows how to force herself through virtue.
A wife needs even more
virtue in marriage than the husband, especially if the necessity of decent illusion
has gone completely out of style and gallant freedom, as innocent as it might be
called it, emerges. For she has a surer game,
as one can easily guess, and will be called upon more often.
In accordance with the
rule of prudence, one can assume that what is encountered seldom and if it is
encountered then is difficult to know will never be encountered ar all; for
this reason it is not in accordance with prudence to allow this deceitful
agreeableness of women to guide.
Elderly people love
jokes and whatever arouses laughter, youth is in love with moving tragedy that
arouses strong sensations. What is the
cause[?]
I find almost
universal the mistake that one does not ponder the brevity of human life
enough. It is to be sure perverse to
have it in mind only so that one despises it and merely looks to the
future. But one would thereby be in the
right position and not postpone life too long by way of [20:186] a foolish
imagining of the plan for our actions.
The epitaphs of various ages make use of the same as encouragement for
lustful and luxurious enjoyments and as an avaricious greediness for
gratification. But if well understood,
it serves only to free the mind, through sufficiency, from the rule of impulses
that entangle us in preparations against the brevity of life that are not in
accordance with the efforts of enjoyment.
Contemplation of the proximity of death is agreeable in itself and a corrective for bringing people toward
simplicity and assisting them toward the sensitive peace of the soul; this
begins as soon as blind ardor, through which one previously chased after the
imagined objects of his wishes, ceases.
The woman who is
constantly busy with the management of exquisite attire must be kept in this
practice in marriage. For, since she is
supported by no other inclination for purity and agreeableness than pleasing
others, she will become filthy and swinish if she is to live alone with her
husband.
In society, the man is
more often lost in the contemplation of what pleases him about women, while the
woman is more often lost in the contemplation of what in herself pleases men.
All the gratifications
of life have their great charm while one hunts after them; possession is cold
and the enchanting spirit has evaporated.
Thus, the greedy merchant has thousands of gratifications as long as he
is earning money. If he considers
enjoying his profits he will be tormented by thousands of worries. The young lover is extremely happy in hope,
and the day his happiness rises to its highest, it begins to decline again.
A certain quiet
self-confidence combined with the attributes of respect and decency acquires
trust and goodwill; on the other hand, a boldness that appears to give little
respect to others brings about hate and opposition
[20:187] In disputes, the quiet attitude of the mind
is combined with kindness and indulgence toward the people fighting, a sign of
one being in possession of power through which the understanding is certain of
his victory. Just as
Few people will endure
mockery and contempt with a peaceful mind when they are before a large crowd,
even if they know that the people in the crowd are all ignoramuses or
fools. The great crowd always instills
awe, indeed, even the spectator shivers with fright at the false step of
whoever compromises himself in its presence, although each individual would
find little disparaging in the speaker’s disapproval if he were alone with
him. But if the great crowd is absent,
then a steady man can very well regard their judgment with complete
indifference.
With regard to beautiful
objects, men are very well adorned with an intense passion, embarrassment, and
a languishing longing for women, but also] a peaceful affection. It cannot be good that the woman makes offers
to the man or anticipates his declarations of love. For he who alone has the power must
necessarily be dependent upon whomever has nothing but charm, and the latter
must be conscious of the value of her charm, else there would be slavery
instead of equality
That which is
mechanical in laughter is the shaking of the diaphragm and lungs together with
a contorted face, since the mouth is pulled by others, etc.; women and fat
people love to laugh. One laughs most
violently when one is supposed to remain serious. One laughs most strongly about those who look
serious. Strong laughter is tiring [and]
breaks out through tears as with sadness.
Laughter that is provoked by tickling is also quite fatiguing, while
that which is provoked by imagination is certainly amusing, but can end up in
convulsions. If I laugh about someone,
even if I could suffer injuries from him, I can no longer be evil. The recollection of something ridiculous
gives much pleasure and also does not wear off as easily [20:188] as other
agreeable anecdotes. The Abbot Terrasson with the cap on his head.[lxxxii]
The basis for laughter
seems to consist in the trembling of quickly pinched nerves that is transmitted
through the entire system; other
gratifications come from uniform movements of the nervous fluid. Therefore, if I hear something that has the
appearance of a prudent, purposeful connection, but is itself entirely
nullified in trifles, then there [will be] stretched nerves on one side and as
it were tensed and trembling ones [on the other] . I wouldn’t want to wager but I’ll swear to it
any time.
Pelisson should have
been painted in place of the devil.[lxxxiii]
Sexual inclination is
either amorous need or amorous concupiscence.
In the state of simplicity, the former rules and thus [there is] no
taste yet. In the state of art the
amorous concupiscence becomes either one of enjoyment of everything or of ideal
taste. The former constitutes lustful
immoderacy. In all of this two things
are to be noted. The female sex is
either mingled with the male sex in free company or excluded. If the latter is the case then no moral taste
takes place, but at most simplicity (lending the Spartan wives[lxxxiv]), or it is a lustful
delusion together with an amorous greed to possess much for enjoyment without
being able to even rightly enjoy one; Salomon.[lxxxv] In the state of simplicity, mutual need
rules. Here there is need on one side
and scarcity on the other. There,
fidelity without temptation existed; here, guards for chastity that is not
possible in itself. In the free intercourse
of both sexes, which is a new invention, concupiscence grows but so does moral
taste. One of the characteristics of
this drive is that it underlies the ideal charms but then must be promoted, always
as a kind of secret; from this arises a kind of [20:189] modest decency but with
strong desires, without which this would become common and, in the end,
subjected to weariness. Second, that the
female sex takes on illusion as if this were not a need for them; this is
necessary if the amorous inclination is supposed to remain united with ideal
gratification and moral taste in the state of art. In lustful passion this illusion is not
necessary at all. Therefore, female
surrenders appear to be merely either forced or marks of favor
A young man who
expresses no amorous inclination will be indifferent in the eyes of the woman.
If religion really can
provide a use that is directly focused on future happiness, then the most
natural first religion is that which focuses virtues in such a way that they
are good for the fulfilling of one’s station in the present world, so that one
thereby becomes worthy of things to come.
For what concerns fasting, ceremony, and chastening does nothing to
benefit the present world. But if this inherent
benefit is to be achieved, then morality must be refined[160]
before religion.
Montesquieu
says that it would be entirely unnatural for a wife to rule a household but that
it could very well happen that she should rule a country.[lxxxvi]
If ethics are entirely
simple and all luxury[161]
is banned, then the husband rules; if public matters are in a few hands and the
majority of men become idle, then the women leave their solitude and have great
influence over the men. If the women inspire virtue and thus romantic[162]
esteem in the men, then they rule hereafter in the household through kindness;
if they do not acquire him through coquetterie
before they mislead and make him foolish later, then they will rule him with
thumping and willfulness. In a good marriage both have only one will and that
is the will of the wife, in a bad marriage as well, but with the distinction
that the husband agrees with the will of the wife in the first case, in the
second he opposes it but is outweighed.
[20:190] This is the
age of rule by women, but with less honor because they diminish the worth of
the man. They first make him vain, yielding,
and foolish and, after they have deprived him of the dignity of masculine
honor, nothing stands in their way. In
all marriages the women dominate, but also over men of dignity.
There are two ways of
the Christian religion, insofar as it should improve morality, 1.: beginning with the revelation of mysteries, in that
one expects a consecration of the heart from the divine supernatural
influence 2. To begin from the
improvement of morality in accordance with the order of nature and to expect
supernatural assistance in accordance with the divine order of his decree that
has been expressed in revelation only after the greatest possible effort at
this. For it is not possible to expect
moral betterment from this instruction as a success in accordance with the
order of nature insofar as one begins with revelation.
The refined prospect
of things to come, if it is carried out to the end, namely, the goal of
impending death, brings its own remedy[163]
with it. For why should one torment
oneself with many grievous preparations when death will soon cut them short
anyway [?]
A man easily develops esteem
toward a woman who takes him in, while the woman for her part has more
inclination than respect. Therefore it
comes about that the man expresses a kind of courage in overcoming his own
lustful inclination, without which many women would be led astray. A tempted wanton is a dangerous person among
women.
It is good that
although the sensitive heart at peace is always beautiful, the affect of love
is nevertheless present in the man before marriage, while for the woman it is
quiet submissiveness: thus the man can appear to be in love without the least
bit of bad manners, but the woman merely appears to love.
[20:191] It is remarkable
that women have so much attentiveness and memory in things of decoration,
propriety, and politesse, while men
have so little.
One is not
compassionate with regard to the grief and distress of another but only insofar
as their causes are natural and not imagined.
Therefore a craftsman has no compassion for a bankrupt merchant who is
degraded to the position of broker or servant because he does not see that anything
is different other than his being rid of imagined needs. A merchant has no compassion for a courtier
who has fallen out of favor and must live off his own estates after the loss of
his benefits. But if both are regarded
as benefactors of the people, then one does not consider the ill according to
his own sentiment, but that of the other.
But the merchant has compassion for the downfall of another who is
otherwise honest when he obtains no advantage from it because he has just the
same imagined need as the other. In any
event, with an otherwise gentle woman one also has compassion for her grief
about imagined misfortune because one despises the husband for his weakness in
such a case, but not the wife. But
everyone has compassion for any ill that is in opposition to true needs. From this it follows that the good-heartedness
of a person of much luxury will contain a very extensive compassion, while that
of a person of simplicity a very restricted one. One has unlimited compassion for one’s
children
The more extensive the
compassion is, if the powers remain the same, the more idle it is; the more the
imagined needs keep growing, the greater the obstruction of yet other remaining
capacity to do good. Hence the kindness
of the luxurious condition becomes pure delusion
[20:192] There is no
sweeter idea than idleness and no other activity than that which is skilled at
gratification. This is also the object one has before his eyes if he
wants one day to sit in peace, but all of this is a fantasy. He who does not work dies of boredom and is,
in any event, numbed to delights and exhausted, but never refreshed and
satisfied
The drive for honor
with respect to those characteristics whose higher worth can make the judgments
of others more important and general is ambition, that drive for honor with
respect to the characteristics of less meaning, about which the judgments of
others are frivolous and fluctuating, is vanity.
Self-esteem,
humility. Ridiculous contemptuous
laughter is better hated than despised.
Self-esteem pertains
to equality, and if this is not well understood leads to respect..
Why incapacity is
regarded as more disgraceful than an evil will, namely, in those cases where
the incapacity cancels out the good consequences
That the desire for honor
is based in part on the status of equality one can see from the fact that aristocratic
people greatly despise the judgment of the lowly. That it is based on the sexual impulse one
can see because the contempt of a woman is very offensive